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“Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande besteht aus EU Sicht darin, im südlichen und  
östlichen Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort letztlich eine Zone politischer  
Stabilität und regionaler Integration zu erreichen. Es dürften mit anderen Worten – abgesehen  
von den wirtschaftlichen Interessen – eher sicherheitspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser  




The European Union currently constitutes the most sustainable peace project on the European conti-
nent. The countries of the Union (today twenty-seven) have coexisted in peace for more than sixty 
years. A glance at the history of Europe proves that this is all but a matter of course. Romano Prodi 
commented this joyful situation as follows: “The European Union can be seen in many ways. But to 
me it is one thing above all others: the fostering and flourishing of peace. We should never forget that 
the basic reason for the European integration process – and the European Union – is peace”2 
The European ambitions are innumerable and great. In the Mediterranean, Europe wants to demon-
strate political foresight and to establish a new form of relations across the entire region, thus to break 
new grounds in history. The preliminary motivation therefore is based on security concerns. It is the 
aim of the present work to examine this thematic field within the limits of a historic scope. As the 
thematic context suggests, the focus is not on renarrating the chronological or developmental steps of 
the European Mediterranean Policy, describing the innumerable programs and projects that have been 
persecuted within this policy frame, analysing the socio-economic determinates in-depth and empha-
sising the political positions regarding the Middle East Peace Process; it is rather aspired to scrutinize 
the European position in the context of the Mediterranean Affairs. What does the European discourse 
reveal according to its establishment, implementation and, in the cross-check, its perception? And 
what does that reveal about the European Union? 
 
What is the European Union? 
Each attempt to define the European Union, to stress its conceptual or cultural significance, inevitably 
leads to mazes of possible interpretations, because all arising questions finally result in one simple, 
essential question: what is the European Union? In regard to the foreign policy, the conception of the 
European Union is crucial concerning its conceivability. Two important aspects can be distinguished 
in this context: the definitional difficulty which threatens the credibility of each policy approach and 
the, despite of the inherent struggle, existing point of attraction for other countries.  
 
1  GEMPERLE, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
2  Romano PRODI, Europe and peace (University of Ulster 1st April 2004), 2. Available online: www.ulster.ac.uk/ 
news/prodi-magee-visit.pdf (26.09.2008).  
Introduction 2 
First, based on the terminological conception which is suggested by the denomination “union”, sev-
eral possibilities of interpretation appear, which indicate the internal and external difficulties to con-
ceive the European Union as a whole. The term “union” might suggest on the one hand a “confedera-
tion of states” or an “institutionalised negotiation system”, which implies the conceivability of an en-
tity; on the other hand, it can be attributed a process-related character when referring to “intergovern-
mentalism” or to a European “project”; another interpretation of the European Union perceives it as a 
community of values and peace, which is based upon definite social, religious or economic philoso-
phies. The self-determined denomination of the European Union is, despite all definitional struggles, a 
term that can easy be handled and inheres, from a psychological point of view, a possible emotive 
quality which can possibly lead to the evolvement of a European identity.3 All of the outlined percep-
tions might be applicable to the conceivability of the European Union, depending on the ambit it is 
stressed for. However, it is assured that the definitional struggle is perceived internally rather than 
externally. In respect of the foreign policy, the discrepancy between what the European Union aspires 
to represent and how it is actually perceived is crucial in terms of credibility and sustainability of its 
policy. 
The second issue concerns the attraction of the European Union as a contractual and cooperation 
partner. According to Mark Leonard, the continuous attraction of the European Union is based on the 
fact that it represents the most exclusive club ever4. He argues that its norms and guidelines dispose of 
a standard, which has not been reached so far; that its system of rules, which are both stringent and 
well-thought, has also a great appeal abroad and contributes to the definition of international stan-
dards. Concerning the foreign policy he further states that if a hegemonial power offers benefits for 
changing its attitude, this approach is normally regarded as imperial, but if a club calls on certain 
countries to act according to the same rules like the other members, this is considered to be part of the 
loyalty of principles. Leonard believes that the latter is what makes the European Union irresistible; 
Europe possesses the power to change systems, because it benefits reformers and rejects privileges to 
those, who are not willing to alter.5 This attraction and the convenient interpretation of the European 
approach might indeed be perceived as a chance to consolidate the European thought, also as far as the 
foreign policy is concerned because the countries dealing with the European Union might search for 
the European intention. However, is this approach less imperialistic indeed or did it just change its 
facade?  
 
The European Union and the Mediterranean: part and neighbour? 
Since the treaties of Rome in 1957, the European Union has steadily grown regarding activities, mem-
bers and institutions. Therefore, the structure, which the Union is based on, is immense, similar to the 
 
3  Comp. Wolfgang SCHMALE, Geschichte und Zukunft der Europäischen Identität (Stuttgart 2008), 132f. 
4  Mark LEONARD, Warum Europa die Zukunft gehört (München 2006), 74. 




internal and external challenges it has to face. The Mediterranean has continuously advanced to a chal-
lenge for the European Union. What actually is the Mediterranean?  
A simple answer, which contains the essence of the European necessity of a consistent policy in the 
Mediterranean, is stressed by Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning, stating that the Mediterranean is 
at the same time part and neighbour of Europe
6. This statement comprises a lot of what the European 
Union has to deal with when turning its interests towards the Mediterranean. On the one hand, it im-
plies that member countries of the European Union border the Mediterranean, which per definition is 
not yet significant. It only becomes an important issue at the moment when these countries have strong 
socio-economical or even cultural bonds in the Mediterranean ambit and therefore pursue individual 
interests. This implies that within the European Union certain interests of the member countries must 
find consideration in the EU policy. On the other hand, the Mediterranean belongs to the European 
neighbourhood, which suggests an ambit that is near but not inherent. According to this, there exists a 
predefined border which separates Europe from its neighbours. Hence, there is a frontier issue and at 
the same time a requirement of establishing rules of coexistence. Both aspects converge to the neces-
sity of defining a policy which covers the interests of the European Mediterranean member countries 
and of those that do not belong to the European Union. How does the European Union respond to this 
necessity? 
 
Beside all the developmental steps of the European Foreign Policy, the European approach in the 
Mediterranean started with the treaties of Rome in 1957. Due to the preferential treatment of the 
French protectorates, Morocco and Tunis, the European Union7 was obliged to include a “Mediterra-
nean perspective” from the very beginning of its existence, especially as the preferential treating fo-
mented feelings of discrimination among the other Mediterranean countries. This led to the conclusion 
of several association agreements. By 1972, the European Union had obtained a dense network of 
commercial relations across the Mediterranean but still lacked a coherent conception. Within the 
framework of the “Global Mediterranean Policy” (GMP) it was the aim to implement the creation of a 
Mediterranean free-trade area for industrial goods, an easing of custom restrictions for agrarian prod-
ucts within the preferential system and a closer cooperation in financial, technical and social matters8. 
The reception of this approach was remarkable, but the policy reached its economic limits with the oil 
crisis of 1973 and 1979 and its political limits due to the dual alignment and the interference on the 
 
6  Werner WEIDENFELD, Josef JANNING, Herausforderung Mittelmeer – die europäische Antwort. In: Werner 
WEIDENFELD (Hg.), Herausforderung Mittelmeer: Aufgaben, Ziele und Strategien europäischer Politik. Vorträge, 
Debatten und Dokumente der internationalen Konferenz in Barcelona 7.-8. Oktober 1991 (Eine Veröffentlichung der 
Bertelsmann Stiftung innerhalb der Reihe „Strategien und Optionen für die Zukunft Europas“, Gütersloh 1992), 34-
68, 35. 
7  The reference to the European Union at this point is synonymously used for all the denominations which the “Euro-
pean Project” has passed through in its earlier stages. 
8  Babak KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, Nordafrika und die EU im 21. Jahrhundert. Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft 




part of the European Commission and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which re-
sulted to be counterproductive.9 Until 1995, several further attempts of establishing a coherent Medi-
terranean Policy were undertaken. The increasing intents of evolving a consistent policy were due to 
the arising necessity because between 1981 and 1986 three decisive Mediterranean countries (GR,E, 
P) became members of the European Union, which caused a significant loss of export volume to the 
MNC; neither the Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the New Medi-
terranean Policy (NMP), nor the initiatives launched by the member countries, like the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) and 5+5, constituted promising policy frames. 
In November 1995, the Barcelona Process, synonymously denominated as Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership, was initiated. For the first time, the European member countries, at that time the EU-15, and 
eleven Mediterranean non-member countries signed a declaration which marked the starting point of a 
new dimension of cooperation. The novelty and diplomatic achievement of the Barcelona Process is 
the combination of a bilateral and a multilateral dimension. The cooperation areas are defined in three 
baskets: a) political and security dialogue to achieve a common area of peace and stability, based on 
respect for human rights and democracy; b) economic and financial partnership and the gradual estab-
lishment of a free-trade area to create a zone of shared prosperity and to support an economic transi-
tion in the partner states; c) social, cultural and human partnership to encourage the understanding 
between peoples and cultures and the exchanges between civil societies.10 This ambitious approach 
was launched in 1995; since then, the Barcelona Process has been seriously criticised and has even 
been considered as a failure. Nevertheless, the importance and urgency of a European Mediterranean 
Policy remains unbroken and was politically confirmed with the successful manifestation of the com-
mitment of forty-three European and Mediterranean countries at the Paris Summit in 2008. At the 
Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in November 2008 it was decided to rename the Barcelona Process 
as Union for the Mediterranean.11 
The European Mediterranean Policy constitutes the main bridge across the Mediterranean and disposes 
of a strong unifying claim. How can this approach be classified?  
 
The historical interlacing between Europe and the Mediterranean 
The apparent historical interlacing between Europe and the Mediterranean refers to colonial times. 
Three basic assumptions legitimate the application of this historical scope to the contemporary situa-
tion: the novelty character of the European approach, the notable European predominance within the 
 
9  Anette JÜNEMANN, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und politischen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte. 
In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 29-64, 40. 
10  Comp. the description of all three baskets www.euromedinfo.eu (23.09.2008) 
11  „Ministers propose that as from Marseille the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ should be called 
‘Union for the Mediterranean’” Comp. Council of the European Union, Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterra-
nean. Ministerial Conference. Final declaration. (Marseilles, 3-4 November 2008), 3. Available online: 




policy frame and the inherent region-building character. In the context of an evident unequal partner-
ship, despite mutual interests in the region and the one-sided imposition of reforms, the main research 
aim alludes to the question if the Barcelona Process is a result of postcolonial politics. This, at least to 
some extent, provocative question targets at assessing the European attempt to establish new diplo-
matic relations with countries which were formally dependent on European states. Is it possible to 
establish such a ‘partnership’, detached from old roles and attitudes?  
In his book “Geschichte Europas”, Wolfgang Schmale refers to five distinctive symbolic sceneries of 
appropriation of land and the claim for power in the non-European world: to Christopher Columbus, 
who set the banner of the Catholic Monarchs on the earth of the reached island, the Bahamas; to the 
Portuguese, who legitimated their appropriation of the land in Brasilia by means of astrologic calcula-
tions; to Sir Henry Gilbert, who delivered earth and a stick from St. John’s Harbor, Newfoundland; to 
the French, who held a procession on the island Maragnan, on the Brazilian coast, with the result that 
the Indians set the French flag and declared their land to be French property; and to the Dutch 
Cornelius Hendrickson, who elaborated a first descriptive geographical map of the discovered land in 
1616.12 Is it possible to transport this kind of approach to the 20th/21st century, the contextual setting of 
the Barcelona Process? What would be the symbolic reference in case of an appropriation in the 
broadest sense?  
 
The source corpus for the analysis and the structural outline 
Based on the assumption that language has become a primary medium of social control and power in 
the 20th/ 21st century13, the present work aims to stress possible colonial remains in the European 
Mediterranean Policy discourse. Three kinds of sources have been identified, which aspire to cover the 
establishment, implementation and reception of the European discourse:  
a) documents assigned to the European Commission and the European Council  
b) speeches of representative of the European Commission and the European Council  
c) articles of mayor opinion-forming newspapers of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, It-
aly, Spain and Switzerland  
In order to provide the greatest possible comparability of the results of the discourse analysis, all 
sources are stressed under the premise of the same analytical categories (chapter VIII). 
The present work is basically divided into four parts: introduction, theoretical part, empirical analysis 
and conclusion. The theoretical frame (chapter I-VIII) forms the thematic introduction on the topic and 
emphasises both, the development of the hypothesis and the methodological procedure. The heart of 
the work constitutes the empirical analysis (chapter IX-XXII). Based on the three distinctive types of 
sources, it is the aim to assess the establishment, implementation and perception of the European dis-
 
12  Comp. Wolfgang SCHMALE, Geschichte Europas (Wien 2001), 209. 




course in regard to the Mediterranean Affairs. In consideration of the introductory outlined research 
question, the results will be summarised and interpreted at the end of the work. A special concern will 




The introductive remarks on the theoretical frame form the contextual setting of the present work. 
Putting the Barcelona Process in a historical context means to give a temporal guideline, an overview 
on the conceptual categorization and an assumption concerning the actual role of the European policy 
in the Mediterranean. The linkage between content and research aim constitutes the claim of a substan-
tial thematic examination. By phrasing the hypothesis and definitional concretions regarding the op-
erational terminology in reference with indications of the research interest, general information on the 
scientific placement of the thesis is provided. Annotations on the methodological background and the 
characterization of the consulted sources explain the particular procedure of the analysis. 
THEMATIC INT RODUCTION: THE BARCELO NA PRO CESS 
Introductive remarks on the Mediterranean and its historical and contemporary dimension mark the 
beginning of this chapter. In its nature and its background root the reasons for the current European 
policy in the Mediterranean. The outline of the Mediterranean policy, from the treaties of Rome 1957 
to the Conference of Barcelona, explains the preliminary steps and decisions which resulted in the 
Declaration of Barcelona in 1995. This date marked the beginning of a new form of diplomatic rela-
tions over the Mediterranean. At the same time the paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership was 
established. Discussing this denomination, specifying the Barcelona Process within the European 
neighbourhood policy and giving an outlook on the strengths and weaknesses of the European policy 
form the conclusion of this thematic introduction. 
I THE ME DIT ERRANE AN 
The denomination, which most likely describes what can be imagined by discussing the Mediterra-
nean, is “richness in all respects”. The consequence of an approach on the singularity of this geo-
graphical region, which encompasses thousands of years of history, an unbelievable dimension of cul-
ture and uncountable developments either in a technical, economical, political or social sense, always 
lacks completeness. To give an idea on the complexity of the chosen study field, I shall recall the 
words of Fernand Braudel who concluded that the Mediterranean is a thousand things at the same 
time.14 
The focus of my introductive approach is on the interaction between commerce and politics in a his-
torical perspective. A connection between this historical references and the present hypothesis seems 
 
14  Comp. Fernand BRAUDEL (Hg.), Georges DUBY, Maurice AYMARD, Die Welt des Mittelmeers. Zur Geschichte 
und Geographie kultureller Lebensformen (Frankfurt am Main 1987),  7. 
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to be constructive at this point because socioeconomic aspects appear to be among the driving motors 
for European Mediterranean politics. The information provided in this chapter is based on my diploma 
thesis15. Therefore, the temporal setting of an exemplary extract of the abundance of historical events 
in the Mediterranean takes place with the advent of modern times, in the 15th and 16th century. 
 
1   Linkage  between po l i t i cs  and economy exempl i f ied  on the  cross  over  to 
the  modern t imes  
According to the premises of technical advancements, people living along the Mediterranean coast 
early set sail in order to improve or guarantee sources for subsistence. Although the main focus of the 
happenings in the Mediterranean relate to socio-economic phenomena, from the very beginning 
intercultural contacts enriched the Mediterranean life; it is thus no coincidence that we characterize the 
Mediterranean as an intercultural bridge and the cultural cradle of the three main philosophies (Chris-
tian, Islamic and Jewish). Throughout many centuries merchants were the bearer of maintaining subsi-
dence and affected the intercultural exchange. The development and the extension of commerce were 
followed by the establishment of regular transport routes. A series of predominant positions of mer-
chants can be highlighted in the Mediterranean; exemplary is the domination of the Roman Empire, 
followed by a period of Arab and Byzantine merchants dominating the Mediterranean. Then the Italian 
sea republics Pisa, Genoa, Venice and Amalfi formed a strong group of merchants and introduced 
centuries of commercial predominance of Italian merchants until the significance of other trading na-
tions was enhanced due to technological advances and the Atlantic expansion. The hard-fought com-
petitions among the Italian sea republics exemplarily demonstrate the strong linkage between politics 
and economy, especially considering the cases of Genoa and Venice.  
From the initially four competing sea powers only two should remain at the beginning of the 14th cen-
tury: the Normans took over the rule of Amalfi already in 1131, which implicated severe consequences 
for the Amalfian fleet, being decisively defeated by the Pisans in 1137. Pisa, on the other hand, always 
had a strong rival in Genoa due to the geographical nearness. Genoa took advantage of the political 
and economical weakness of Pisa and destroyed the Pisan fleet in 1284. Although the Pisan merchants 
remained important in the regional commerce, they never managed to recover their interregional sig-
nificance.16 The Genoese, for their concerns, were seriously weakened by their defeat at  Chiogga 
(1376-81) by the Venetians. Unlike the Amalfian and Pisan merchants, the Genoese merchants, who 
until then had held a strong position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Orient commerce, performed an 
exemplary shift of interests. They adjusted their commercial activity and assortment to their ship ca-
 
15  Stefanie STEINBICHLER, Die Genuesen in Spanien 1450-1550 (ungedr. Geisteswiss. Dipl. Wien 2005), 28-41. 
16  John MORRISSEY, Die italienischen Seerepubliken. In: Peter FELDBAUER, Gottfried LIEDL, John MORRISEY 
(Hrsg.), Mediterraner Kolonialismus. Expansion und Kulturaustausch im Mittelalter (Essen 2005), 111-131, here 
112-119. 
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pacity17 and turned their main interest towards Northern Europe. With an increasing focus on the trade 
with mass products and a significant higher shipping capacity than its rival Venice18, Genoa managed 
to position itself strategically better than any other Mediterranean sea power in the early modern 
world. Thanks to the outstanding refinement of the Genoese merchants and financiers, they took the 
lead in the European and, in consequence, in the world economy. Thus, the period between 1550 and 
1650 is often referred to as the “century of the Genoese”.19 
A plea on the outstanding flexibility, the keen sense for the developments of their times and the ability 
to react to changing conditions, which is characteristic for the Mediterranean merchants, can be ex-
tended in any order. The given example indicates that the Mediterranean region was not only involved 
in significant developments on the European continent, especially as the outreach of the Italian mer-
chants, who dominated the Mediterranean to the Northern shores of Europe, benefited the economical 
and cultural prosperity substantially. It was also the origin of many attributes, which were necessary to 
support these developments, like ships with an outstanding loading capacity, advanced financial know-
how and a highly developed network all over the known places.  
The impact of political developments on the conditions of commerce is illustrated by the example that 
after roughly thirty years beneath French rule, the town Genoa committed itself to an alliance with 
Spain. This decision, which is controversially debated in literature, is to an important degree linked to 
the personage of Andrea Doria (1468-1560). Militarily well-trained, he served not only the pope, but 
also during a long period the French King Francis I., always with the conviction to act in the interest 
of his home town.20 It is a fact that in 1528 Andrea Doria conquered Genoa with his troops and formed 
an alliance with Charles V. of Spain. While Enrique Otte explains this transition with economical con-
siderations and that this happening only constituted a political consequence21, Arturo Pacini states that 
it is important to consider the profound institutional crisis of the town Genoa, which was due to the 
multitude of social and political crises.22  
 
17  With masts over 45 meters and an extraordinary capacity Jacques Heers states that the Genoese possessed the most 
imposing ships of that time. Comp.: Jacques HEERS, Gênes au XVe siècle: civilisation méditerranéenne, grand capi-
talisme et capitalisme populaire (Paris 1971), 206; Richard Unger states more precisely: “In the middle of the fif-
teenth century, Genoese carracks of 500 tons, with an over-all length of almost 40 meters and a breadth of slightly 
over ten metres, were making direct voyages from the eastern Mediterranean to the north ports. There were larger 
carracks too, reaching 1000 to 1400 tons.” Richard UNGER, The ship in the Medieval Economy 600-1600 (London 
1980), 221. 
18  “Les grosses galées vénitiennes ne portent au maximum que 200 à 300 tonnes, contre 700 et parfois 1000 tonnes pour 
ces ‘navi’’. HEERES, Gênes, 209. 
19  Fernand BRAUDEL, Modell Italien 1450-1650, (Berlin 2003), 14. 
20  Enciclopedia universal ilustrada Europea-Americana, (Tomo XVIII, Madrid 1980), 2017-2025. 
21  “Il decisivo cambiamento di fronte di Genova nel 1528 fue solo la consequenza politica di una decisione economica 
presa già all’inizio degli anni venti.” Enrique OTTE, Il ruolo dei Genovesi nella Spagna del XV e XVI secolo. In: La 
repubblica internazionale del denaro tra XV e XVII secolo. A cura di Aldo De Maddalena e Hermann Kellenbenz, 
Annali dell’Instituto storico italo-germano, Quaderno 20 (Bologna 1986), 17-121, 33.  
22  Pacini refers to Aenas Silvius Piccolomini as contemporary witness in the past for the instability in Genoa and cites 
that the social and political conflicts are an “unsustainable threat to the very existence of the Genoese state with the 
beginning of the struggle between France and Spain for the hegemony in the peninsula.” Arturo PACINI, La Genova 
di Andrea Doria nell’Imperio di Carlo V.(Firenze 1999), 168. 
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In fact, both France and Spain had deep-rooted relations to Genoa and both constituted an attractive 
alliance partner. Due to its strategic favourable position, great financial resources, a highly developed 
information system and the capacity to build and charge ships, Genoa was of inestimable value for 
both powers, French and Spain, which struggled for the hegemony in Italy and Europe. The decision 
why Genoa formed an alliance with Spain is not mono causally explainable, but two mayor reasons 
can be extracted. Firstly, France already had a predominant position over Genoa via Milan, but inter-
nal struggles in Genoa concerning how to retain autonomy and stay political well positioned increas-
ingly led to conflicts about this dominant position. Hence, the atmosphere was tense. Secondly, the 
personage of Andrea Doria played a crucial role. Although his intentions are not totally clear nowa-
days, Vincente de Cadenas assumes that the disregarded personal concessions of France disappointed 
Doria. In addition, Cadenas is convinced that Doria acted with the personal conviction to do the best 
for his patria.23 Either way, Andrea Doria had already negotiated the alliance with Spain before he 
took Genoa and ejected the French. The new political constellation was based on the treaty which 
guarantees “loyality for protection, the loyality of Genoa towards the Imperial alliance in the greatest 
struggle with France, protection and safeguard of the city’s freedom on Charles V’s side. And the 
guarantee of loyalty of Genoa’s key sectors of its economy: ships and credit.”24 These decisive devel-
opments supported the strengthening of the Spanish hegemony, not only in the Mediterranean, but also 
in Europe. For the merchants outside Genoa the new alliance with Spain also happened to be advanta-
geous; the Genoese merchants consolidated their predominant position in Spain at the beginning of the 
16th century. Provided with a series of privileges, they not only extended their commercial activities in 
Seville, which advanced to the turning platform of goods all over the world, but they also managed to 
get decisively involved in the silver commerce in Europe and became the royal financiers for nearly a 
century. 
These examples explicitly demonstrate the linkage between economy and politics. Obviously, there 
are innumerable histories to tell, but what can be deduced is quite significant for the base of the pre-
sent hypothesis. Economic considerations played a central role throughout the Mediterranean history 
and the reciprocal influence between economy and politics can be traced throughout the centuries. The 
intensity and dependence varied. On the one hand, the political changeover of power generated a shift 
of economical interests, which contained an important developmental potential in many aspects. On 
the other hand, a change of political alliances implied an advantageous support to strengthen the pre-
dominant position of the merchants outside the hometown. In the case of the Genoese, Braudel found 
 
23  “En general la mayor parte de los historiadores se inclinan a estimar que el acto de Doria fue natural ante las circuns-
tancias, que si no le obligaban a cambiar su servicio tampoco tenía necesidad de quedar retenido con quien no le pro-
porcionaba satisfacciones debidas, ni siquiera le saldaba las deudas que había contraído para llevarlo a efecto.” And: 
“(...) la volubilidad de los italianos y la invocación que en nombre de su Patria siempre llevó delante Doria al efectuar 
el cambio. A ello indudablemente se unió la conveniencia personal y, porque no, la perspicacia política (...)” Vincente 
VICENTE DE CADENAS, El protectorado de Carlos V. en Génova ( Madrid 1977),43. 
24  PACINI, Genoa, 175. 
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the right words saying that over time they understood to rule over the richness of Europe and that way 
over the richness of the world.25 
Another important aspect can be deduced from these two examples: the actors who are involved in the 
Mediterranean history act in defence of their own interest. This can be retained for the terrestrial pow-
ers as well as for the sea powers and the merchants. Interestingly, the defence of interests comes along 
with the intension of extending, maintaining or defending power. 
 
2 Co lonial i sm in  the  Medi terranean 
Political and economic interlaces played a crucial role in the relations across the Mediterranean, not 
only in the cross over to the modern times. Hence, it is not the aim to provide a detailed historical set-
ting of the Euro-Mediterranean relations over the centuries, which would justify a separate examina-
tion. At this point, the thematical relevant focus is on the common historic denominator in the Euro-
pean relations with Mediterranean and also African countries; thus, colonialism is in the centre of in-
vestigation here. 
Colonialism is a crucial element in the Mediterranean history, if one heads out for examples which 
correspond to specifications on the definition of colonialism of Jürgen Osterhammel. He mentions 
three conditions which allow the contextualisation of happenings within the colonial definition: First, 
the relation between the dominator and the domineered targets on the completion of the colonizers’ 
necessities and interests, whereby the consideration of the development of the colonized society lacks 
a significant meaning and is often negated. Second, cultural foreignness is expressed in hierarchal 
structures and an acculturation of the colonized is demanded. The third definition refers to colonialism 
as a matter of consciousness; hence, the domination of other cultures bears the conviction of a cultural 
superiority.26 Colonial events can be traced back to the antique world (Greeks and the Romans), to 
mediaeval or modern times (crusades or sea powers) and to the contemporary history considering all 
the actors of the period of Imperialism and Second World War. The colonial history can not be classi-
fied as a uniform pattern of action, which is continuous over the centuries. The first transcontinental 
expeditions of the Spanish and Portuguese marked a crucial change and introduced a new dimension 
of relating with other cultures. Also the expansion of the Northwest-European countries contributed to 
a shift of power and strategic interests. At the beginning, this happened parallel to the predominant 
Spanish and Portuguese role overseas, but then finally displaced these predominating powers. Thus, 
national European conflicts were often transported abroad to the colonies all over the world. By taking 
a closer look at the European colonial actors in the Mediterranean countries, which contemporarily 
participate in the Barcelona Process, one identifies France, Italy, Spain and Great Britain as the most 
decisive colonial powers in these countries. From the 17th century onwards, the rivalry between France 
 
25   BRAUDEL, Modell Italien,14. 
26  Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL, Kolonialismus (München 2006), 19-21. 
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and Great Britain constituted the determining factor of the relations between the European powers, 
which was reflected in their colonial activities.27 While both nations were predominantly interested in 
economic advantages, which consequentially would better the positions in the struggle regarding the 
demand of hegemony, Great Britain’s interest in colonies on the African continent was predominantly 
due to strategic considerations, namely better access to routes to America and Asia. France, on the 
other hand, was never willing to accept the Iberian hegemony and aimed for more influence in the 
world power concert. In the 18th and 19th century Great Britain was the main rival in regard to the 
colonies abroad. Conflicts concerned, for example, zones of fishery, settlement areas and shares of 
trade companies. Whenever there was the possibility one nation aimed to harm the influence of the 
other party; in the end, Great Britain became the main European hegemonial power. France was not 
able to decide the conflicts in the Americas and India in its favour and lost its bases on Mauritius, la 
Reunion, and the Seychelles to Great Britain. Towards the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
century there was hardly any space which was not either directly or indirectly dependent on European 
influences. The European influence in African countries, which later participated in the Barcelona 
Process, was still apparent in the mid of the 20th century: parts of Morocco formed part of the Spanish 
protectorate, France maintained its colonial influence in French North Africa (parts of Morocco, Alge-
ria and Tunisia) and Egypt was still influenced by Great Britain. The Suez Crisis in 1956 marked the 
beginning of the end of the European predominant influence because it was one of the last times Great 
Britain and France tried to assure their strategic interests within the sovereignty of Mediterranean 
countries with military forces.28  
In the 70ies, the last colony which belonged to France became independent. Nevertheless, the relations 
between former colonizers and colonies are politically, socio-culturally and economically significant 
until nowadays. At this point one could raise the question if colonialism, once started, ever ended? 
What is sure is that form and intensity of colonialism varied throughout history. Regarding the linkage 
between the Mediterranean and colonialism, Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou 
pointed out accurately that all, “the Egyptian, Phoenician, Greek and Persian civilisation and later the 
Roman Empire, have found their way to the Mediterranean and sought to use it as a means of extend-
ing their power- base.”29 The abundance of historical experiences of colonialism and the interest-
oriented effort of political powers in the Mediterranean underline the legitimacy of the present under-




27  According to Reinhard Wendt the British and French power conflicts form the third dimension  beside the  Iberian 
expansion and its displacement by the the North-Western European powers. Comp. Reinhard WENDT, Vom Koloni-
alismus zur Globalisierung. Europa und die Welt seit 1500 (Paderborn 2007), 132. 
28  Comp. Ibid, 57-60, 107-113,123-140, 221- 231. 
29  Dimitris K. XENAKIS, Dimistris N. CHRYSSOCHOOU, The emerging Euro-Mediterranean System (Manchester 
2001), 28. 
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3 Contemporary  chal l enges  in  the  Medi terranean 
From the European point of view, the challenges in the Mediterranean can strikingly be summed up by 
the populist quote of Nicolas Sarkozy during the French presidential elections. He stated that the South 
sets the future course of the European Union and that in this concern a new strategy must be found.30 
One can or cannot believe the end time connotation that Sarkozy points out, but the Mediterranean 
region faces a lot of complex challenges which underline the significance of Mediterranean politics for 
the European Union. 
Firstly, the strong interlacement of Europe and the Mediterranean illustrates the fateful connection and 
shows the impossibility of an abnegation of the consequences of the developments in this region: 31  
• The Mediterranean region encompasses commercial routes, which are of central meaning for 
the European Union because there are essential energy sources in this area. Especially West-
ern Europe is still dependent on the oil production of some of the Mediterranean countries. 
• While the MNC of the European Union forms the third largest market for the European Union, 
the EU itself is most important purchaser of products of this region. 
• Additionally to the export revenue, the remittance of migrant workers in Europe forms the 
most important source of foreign currency for the Mediterranean countries. The main profiteer 
from the purchasing power of the foreign currency is the European Union. 
• The demographic growth in the South and the migration pressure heading North in the Medi-
terranean region has continuously more influence on the socio-cultural stability on the Euro-
pean continent.  
 
Secondly, numerous complex issues stress the difficulty which each kind of foreign policy has to face 
in the Mediterranean:32 
• The difference in the standard of living between the North and the South, Europe and the 
Mediterranean non-member states, is one of the most precarious consequences of the devel-
opments in this region. The economical efficiency of the countries of the southern shores is 
considerably beneath the Western European average. The agricultural harvest does not nourish 
the local population, the industrialisation is either partly focused on the internal structure or 
has failed and the dependency on financial and property aid is dominant in all Mediterranean 
non member states, except the countries with high revenues by means of oil export like Libya.  
• The demographic explosion in the southern Mediterranean, especially on the African conti-
nent, is opposed by a stagnating demographic development in Europe. This discrepancy is ac-
 
30  Editorial, (08.02.2007) FAZ. 
31  The punctual approach is mainly based on: WEIDENFELD (ed.), Herausforderung Mittelmeer, 35f; Pangagiotis 
PANOTOPOULOS, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union, (ungedr. Grund- und Integrationswiss. Dipl. 
Wien 2000),32; Roberto ALBIONI, Südmediterrane Herausforderungen. Antworten sind gefragt (Internationale Poli-
tik 1/1996), 9-14. 
32  WEIDENFELD, Herausforderung Mittelmeer,38-51; PANOTOPOULOS, Mittelmeerpolitik, 33-44.  
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companied by the fact that the lack of a future perspective in their home countries pushes the 
migration movements towards the North. The demographic prospect, the increasing migration 
pressure, the illegal immigration and the missing integration plans for those, who entered the 
European continent, are factors which constitute mayor difficulties. The European Union has 
to face these concerns nowadays. 
• Social tensions and instable governmental structures dominate the domestic political situation 
in nearly all European neighbouring countries in the Mediterranean. An intensification of 
these dynamics is provoked by the increasing demographic growth. The severe economical 
and political frictions burden the development of democratic structures; hence, the low level 
of constitutional culture contributes to the threat of political instability in the Mediterranean.  
• Vaclav Havel, Jacques Delors and Samuel Huntington are all convinced that the most danger-
ous conflicts are those which affect the break lines between cultures.33 Encompassing the three 
main civilising spaces and bearing the roots of the European and Arabic culture, the Mediter-
ranean holds a historic tradition of cultural conflicts. Due to the increasing terrorist threat, the 
relation between the Christian based culture in Europe and the Islamic based culture in the 
Arabian countries of the Mediterranean is nowadays more sensitive than ever. It culminated so 
far in the terrorist attacks of Madrid 2004 and London 2005 and the American invasion in Iraq 
in 2003. 
• Due to the high degree of pollution, the Mediterranean Sea ranks among the most threatened 
seas of the world. The area suffers from contamination caused by the leakage of oil, industrial 
and domestic waste and agricultural residua, soil pollution, a loss of soil through erosion and 
an increasing desertification. The impact of the advancing contamination of the region has se-
vere consequences for both, the already mainly agricultural oriented countries in the Mediter-
ranean and Europe.  
 
Thirdly, subsuming the following conflict potential, which accompanies any Mediterranean policy, the 
subsequent remarks can be stated:34  
• Conflicts of dominance: the Gulf War 1990/91, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the continu-
ing struggle with the destabilized country show an apparent conflict of dominance, which fur-
ther reached the Arabian region. 
• Territorial conflicts: due to the lack of a clear demarcation in the Mediterranean, ethnic, politi-
cal or economic tensions might easily transform into territorial conflicts.  
 
33  „‘Kulturelle Konflikte‘, hat Vaclav Havel erkannt ‚greifen um sich und sind heute gefährlicher denn je zuvor,‘ und 
Jacques Delors pflichtet ihm bei: ‚Künftige Konflikte werden sich nicht an den wirtschaftlichen oder ideologischen, 
sondern an den kulturellen Faktoren entzünden.‘ Die gefährlichsten Konflikte aber sind jene an den Bruchlinien zwi-
schen Kulturen.“ Samuel P. HUNTINGTON, Kampf der Kulturen. Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert 
(München 1998), 24. 
34  WEIDENFELD, Herausforderung Mittelmeer, 48-51.  
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• Ethnic conflicts: throughout the Mediterranean different ways of life, moral concepts and re-
ligious groups are continuously confronted with each other. 
• Conflicts concerning raw materials and recourses: the inhomogeneous apportionment of raw 
materials is among the specific causes for crisis and wars in the Mediterranean region. 
II  THE EUROP E AN MEDIT E RRANE AN POL ICY 
Facing these challenges, the importance of a stable and constructive policy seems evident. In the fol-
lowing chapters the current policy will be contextualized in order to provide the thematic background 
for the present work. 
 
1 Determining  factors  for  a  coherent  Medi terranean Pol i cy  
The Barcelona Process did not rise like a phoenix or, as Carlo Masala said, out of a “tabula rasa.”35 It 
is linked to a series of European attempts of dealing with Mediterranean affairs, which started with the 
treaties of Rome in 1957.  
The determining factors which facilitated the development of a coherent multilateral policy in the 
Mediterranean have been broadly discussed, mainly by political scientists.36 Hence, it is not surprising 
that the main arguments focus on the state and change of the international system, the European inte-
gration process, the national interests and the political, economical and cultural developments in the 
southern Mediterranean. From the point of a view of a historian, these aspects, which need to find 
consideration here, can be amplified by a further point which looks on the historical frame as a deter-
mining factor. The focus on the historical past refers to the linkage of economical, political and cul-
tural relations and aims to provide an additional comprehension of the boundaries between certain 
countries and an explanation of a certain positioning of some nations in the European Union.  
Consecutively follows an approach on the main determining factors, which facilitated the development 
of the current European Mediterranean policy. Thereby, the focus is on specifications of the European 
system because it builds the political frame of the Barcelona Process. Other aspects, like the issue of 
national interests or socio-economical developments as determining factors, will be briefly outlined at 
this point, but in conjunction with the broadly designed analysis will be extensively treated further on. 
1.1 European Foreign Policy within the international system 
Before the exterior developments which influence the positioning of the European politics will find 
consideration, it is necessary to comment on interior specifications of the European Union within the 
international system. An exemplary approximation to the evolutionary nature, to the dualism of the 
European system and to the restricted predominance of the European member states gives information 
 
35  Carlo MASALA, Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft. Geschichte- Struktur- Prozess (Center for European Integrati-
on Studies/Discussion Paper C68, Bonn 2000), 4. Available online: www.zei.de. 
36   Annette JÜNEMANN, Stephen C. Calleya, Babak KHALATBARI, Carlo MASALA,  Christoph BRUNERS, aa.   
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about the European system, which Jörg Monar constitutes as an exceptional form in the area of inter-
national relations.37 
Firstly, the development of an institutional frame of the European foreign policy explains the nature of 
the European system. The European foundation treaties of 1951 and 1957, which formed the base of 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), did 
not consider a common authority concerning foreign affairs. The first plan of a European defence 
community, which failed to be ratified, was made by the French Prime Minister René Pleven in 1952. 
The first initiative containing concrete steps for the political implementation of a common foreign 
policy was provided by the Belgian diplomat Etienne Davignon. The so-called “Davignon Report,” 
which was enacted in 1970 in Luxembourg, initiated the development of the European Political Coop-
eration (EPC), the forerunner cooperation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
main concern in Luxembourg was to initiate a consolidation mechanism in order to establish a com-
mon foreign policy. The intergovernmental co-operation should be achieved through meetings of the 
foreign ministers in periodic intervals and through the establishment of a political committee. Some of 
the regulations defined in Luxembourg still form an essential part of the current foreign policy as, for 
example, the principal of intergovernmental organisation.38 The advancements of the regulations of 
Luxembourg are based upon the Reports of Copenhagen 1973 and London 1981, both acting on the 
aim to strengthen the EPC. A formal consolidation of the EPC followed within the Single European 
Act (SEA) in 1987, where the so far three European treaties (ECSC, EAEC and EEC) were adopted 
and the co-operation in foreign policy matters was contractually assigned. By means of the SEA, the 
European foreign policy contained important improvements, from a concerted European foreign policy 
with the EPC towards a coordinated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was estab-
lished with the treaty of the European Union in Maastricht in 1992.39 The evolutionary nature of the 
system of the European Union roots in the interaction between “common” external economic relations 
and an intergovernmental co-operation in foreign policy.40 
Considering the achievement in the development to give the economical based European Union a con-
solidated common voice in foreign affairs indicated a system based on a certain dualism. Generally, 
there are two different levels of dualism: the relation with non member states and the decision-making 
process. In all kind of negotiations with European non member states the European Union is repre-
sented by the European Commission, but in all affairs concerning the CFSP the member state, which 
holds the current presidency, represents the European Union and is responsible for common deci-
sions.41 This entails a communication effort between the Commission and the presidency of the CFSP, 
 
37  Jörg MONAR, Die interne Dimension der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Institutionelle und 
verfahrensmäßige Probleme. In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 
65- 90, 66. 38  Frank R. PFETSCH, Die Europäische Union (München 2005), 232. 
39  Comp. Ibid. 230-247. 
40 MONAR, interne Dimension, 68. 
41  Ibid. 68f and PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 244. 
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which is not only costly in terms of labour and time, but also confusing, as European non member 
states often confer with different European representatives concerning the same negotiation. Regard-
ing the decision-making process, the mentioned dualism refers to the different competences between 
the European Commission and the CFSP. The European decision-making process is generally based 
on two methodological proceedings: the community and the intergovernmental method. The commu-
nity method, meaning the institutional operation mode, is set up in the first pillar of the European Un-
ion and encompasses the following features: Commission monopoly of the right of initiative, wide-
spread use of qualified majority voting in the Council, an active role of the European Parliament and a 
uniform interpretation of Community law by the Court of Justice.42 In contrast, the intergovernmental 
method of operation is set up in the second and third pillars, proceeds from an intergovernmental logic 
of cooperation and has the following salient features: the Commission’s right of initiative is shared 
with the member states or confined to specific areas of activity, the Council generally acts unani-
mously, the European Parliament has a purely consultative role and the Court of Justice plays only a 
minor role.43 The Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is regulated in the second pillar, 
mainly follows the intergovernmental method, while the European Commission, defending the Euro-
pean Union’s interests as a whole, sets its standards primarily within the community method. The out-
come of this is that the European Commission not only negotiates with non member states, but has to 
consider the positions and divergences of interests of all European member states simultaneously.44  
This leads to the third specification of the European system, the restricted predominance of the Euro-
pean member states. Formally, all foreign affairs concern the four mayor organs of the European Un-
ion: the European Council, the (Ministerial) Council, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. However, the primary decision-making competence is hold by the member states, which 
are represented in the European Council and in the Ministerial Council, respectively. While the mem-
ber states dispose in the CFSP of a considerable free space for separate national actions, of an unlim-
ited right of initiation and of a consensus bounded veto right, their action field in the Community is 
rather restricted because their decision power is based on the recommendation of the European Com-
mission. Another restrictive factor, which has to be considered, is the strength of the political and eco-
nomical relations among the member states. Weighing the costs of national unilateral approaches or 
blockade politics mostly favours the disposition of compromises.45  
 
Focussing on the exterior influences of the European Unions’ positioning makes it necessary to pro-
vide beforehand a theoretical approach on the constants of the international system, in which the 
Mediterranean is imbedded.  
 
42  www.europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/foreign_security_policy_en.htm (4.08.2008). 
43  Ibid. 
44 MONAR, interne Dimension, 73. 
45  Ibid. 69. 
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Babak Khalatbari locates the interfering constants in the Mediterranean within the theory of realism, 
neorealism, liberalism and institutionalism.46 The mechanisms of the international system, following 
the theory of realism and neorealism, emerge from an anarchical world perspective which supposes 
the dominance of the states. Hence, competitiveness forms the main characteristic of the international 
system. Beside the special awareness of potential national security threats, the legitimacy of mainte-
nance and the expansion of existence are the driving motors of the competing states.47 John Herz ex-
plains this mechanism with the reciprocal fear and distrust, which aliments an inherent sentiment of 
uncertainty. Therefore, it is the principal aim to constantly gain more power in order to prevent secu-
rity threats.48 This often criticized world view and interpretation of international politics as surviving 
assurance counters the voluntary association of cooperating states, which act on agreed principals, 
norms, rules and procedures; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union 
(EU) serve as examples here.49 The theory of liberalism emanates from a three-world model that de-
fines classifications and belongings and supposes strong relations between the domestic political order 
and the foreign policy where democracy is the ruling maxim. The central argument of the theory of 
institutionalism states that peace-keeping can be granted via institutionalized forms of cooperation and 
conflict settlements between nations. In contrast to the theory of neo-/realism, institutionalism consid-
ers the possibility of cooperation of egoistical actors.50 These three theories, selected by Babak Kha-
latbari in order to provide a theoretical frame for the Mediterranean policy, should be extended by the 
theory of interdependence. The world view of reciprocal interdependence, meaning that a decision or 
happening in one state can consecutively affect another state, emanates from the assumptions that 
states are neither cohesive entities nor single actors in worlds politics, that military power obtains a 
subordinated significance as a political instrument and that there is no purported hierarchy in the rank-
ing of goals in international politics.51   
On the basis of this brief description of relevant mechanisms affecting the Mediterranean policy, theo-
retically superordinated aspects derive, which find consideration in the present work: 
• Although the mechanism of surviving assurance is strongly debated within the political theory 
of realism and neorealism and debilitated by the fact of voluntary associations of nations, it 
ought to be considered that a supranational formation as the European Union might overtake 
characteristics and maintenance mechanisms over the years, which are appropriate to a single 
 
46  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten,  24-28. 
47  Comp. Ibid. 25. 
48  „...ein aus gegenseitiger Furcht und gegenseitigem Misstrauen geborenes Unsicherheitsgefühl die Einheiten in einem 
Wettstreit um die Macht dazu [treibt], ihrer Sicherheit halber immer mehr Macht anzuhäufen, ein Streben das uner-
füllbar bleibt, weil sich vollkommene Sicherheit nie erreichen lässt.“ John HERZ, Weltpolitik im Atomzeitalter 
(Stuttgart 1961), 130f.  
49  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 26.  
50  Ibid. 26-27. 
51 Manuela SPINDLER, Interdependenz. In: Siegfried SCHIEDER, Manuela SPINDLER (Hrsg.), Theorien der 
Internationalen Beziehungen (Opladen 2003), 89-117, 89-98. 
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nation. The positioning and driving motors of the European Union in the Mediterranean will 
be analysed further on. 
• The three world perception will play a mayor role in the discourse analysis as the view of the 
“other”, the so-called partner within the Mediterranean partnership, is a central concern of this 
work.  
• Democracy as a guiding principal of liberal approaches also plays an official argumentative 
role for the engagement of the European Union in Mediterranean affairs. The extent and rea-
sons behind this position will also be discussed in ensuing chapters. 
• The mentioned role of the theory of interdependence shall be generally assessed because it is 
to expect that significant results can be gained in reference with the socio-economic analysis.  
 
The Cold War was the dominating external factor in the international system until 1989. Although the 
Mediterranean also happened to be the setting of a bipolar blockade confrontation, there was no abso-
lute dominance of super powers or a related subordination of the Middle East client states. The re-
gional actors rather attempted to benefit from the rivalry of the super powers in order to form possible 
alliances according to their economical and military interests.52 The global zero-sum game guaranteed 
the regional actors political motivated development aids from the competing powers and implied the 
possibility of playing them off against each other.53 The regional influence of the European Commu-
nity during the Cold War was rather moderate. All the more, Europe asserted its power after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989; nevertheless, it was not achieved to displace the USA from its predominant 
position in the Mediterranean.54 For the developments in the Mediterranean the year 1989 is a decisive 
one in a double sense: Firstly, the end of the East-West conflict involved a mayor transformation of 
the international system concerning the polarity and distribution of power. And secondly, the loss of 
the external principal order with the end of the Cold War emphasised the local, ethnic and religious 
conflicts. This generated new conflict structures, which, from a European perspective, were attributed 
to an increasingly politicised Islam.55 The question whether the thesis of the substitutive character of 
the Islam after communism as concept of enemy is classified in its reduction banal56 or not, is not rele-
vant. Fact is that over the last decades the Islam took over a significant role in the discussion about 
concepts of enemies. Resentments against the Islam increased notably, especially since the Gulf War 
in 1991 and the wave of terrorism since 2001. 
 
52  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 27f. 
53 „Das globale Nullsummenspiel garantierte den MDL politisch motivierte Entwicklungshilfe seitens der konkurrieren-
den Supermächte und erlaubte es ihnen überdies, beide gegebenenfalls auch gegeneinander auszuspielen.“ JÜNE-
MANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 35. 
54  Comp. Ibid.6; and Majorie LISTER, The European Union and the South. Relations with developing countries (Lon-
don 1997), 70. 
55  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 32. 
56  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpoltik, 35f. 
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1.2 European integration process 
From the point of view of a political scientist, Annette Jünemann states that each integration process 
inevitably enforces the sentiment of exclusion and defines this as a basic mechanism which also influ-
ences the developments in the Mediterranean policy. Although it is possible to qualify this effect by 
means of adapting and shaping the foreign policy, it can not be totally distinguished.57 Hence, the de-
velopments of the European integration process affect the relation to the MNC. In this sense, two fur-
ther mechanisms exemplify this effect. Firstly, any intensification of the European integration process 
involves that more decision-making authorities are transferred from the national to the supranational 
level, which in turn implicates that bilateral relations between single EU countries and single MNC 
become less important. Secondly, the enlargement of the European Union constitutes a significant 
determining factor for the Euro-Mediterranean partnership: the southern enlargement of the EU in 
1986 (Spain and Portugal) had negative consequences for the MNC, especially concerning their trad-
ing interests; the northern and eastern enlargements fomented the fear of a marginalisation of the con-
cerns of the MNC.58 
The development of a common foreign policy, as described beforehand, shows a gradually advancing 
integration process that directly affects the MNC. Its progress and improvement are vital concerns on 
both sides of the Mediterranean. The European integration in general is still referred to as a process 
and its final form has not yet been reached. The integration debate is in theory and practice a very 
sensitive and prevailing concern of European politics and there are thus many possible interpretations. 
A common tenor in the debate constitutes the argument that the goal of the European integration proc-
ess is only vaguely designed.59 Concerning the European Mediterranean policy, this opinion can also 
be deduced from literature and the discussion of participants at the Conference “The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP): Perspectives from the Mediterranean EU Countries,” which took 
place between the 25th and 27th of October 2007, in Rethimnon, Crete. 
1.3 National interests 
Despite all endeavours to push the European integration process, the European politics show an in-
creasing conflict with a re-nationalisation tendency, as the recent debate on the ratification of the 
treaty of Lisbon demonstrates.60 Additionally, the intergovernmental character of the CFSP supports 
national ambitions in foreign affairs. Concerning the Barcelona Process, the interests of the southern 
European countries were predominant from the very beginning. Europe’s motivation for the launch of 
the Barcelona Process was the fear that the decline of North Africa would be a recipe for the rise of 
Islamist regimes and a major exodus of economic migrants and political refugees to Europe would 
 
57  Ibid. 31. 
58  Ibid. 31. 
59  PANOTOPOULOS, Mittelmeerpolitik, 29. 
60  See further information and the debate which can be deduced from the ratification and endorsement efforts of the 
European member countries: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (18.8.2008). 
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take place; on the other hand, the southern Mediterranean member countries were strongly concerned 
with a more even-handed distribution of European economic support, they feared to be marginalized 
compared to their eastern or southern neighbours and they aimed to sustain their interests in the Medi-
terranean region.61 Especially the concerns of the southern European countries (France, Spain and 
Italy) root not only in the strong historical and cultural bonds, which go beyond colonial times, but 
also in the conflict of interests regarding the competition of typical Mediterranean products or in the 
privileges of fishery in the Mediterranean Sea. 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is therefore shaped by interests of the southern European coun-
tries, which are expressed either in a bilateral or multilateral way. Altogether, the image of the Euro-
pean Mediterranean policy appears to be little coherent.62 This is also explained with the competing 
interests among the European member states. Thus, France, Spain and Italy struggle among each other 
and with the European Commission for a leading role in Mediterranean affairs. Additionally, it must 
be considered that the former practice of political task sharing - Germany being occupied with eastern 
and central European affairs and France being concerned with the Mediterranean as a national zone of 
influence - has changed. Both countries claim a voice in the affairs which historically belonged to the 
political environment of the other. The most recent example of such a claim was raised by Germany, 
namely when Nicolas Sarkozy tried to debar non-Mediterranean European countries from Mediterra-
nean affairs and attempted to launch the Mediterranean Union just with the countries bordering the 
Mediterranean. Germany claimed the Mediterranean region to be a European affair and therewith 
trimmed the aspired consolidation of the French national power in the Mediterranean. 
1.4 Economical, political and social developments in the southern Mediterranean 
The impossibility to comprise the whole Mediterranean region regarding its economical, political and 
cultural development roots first of all in the heterogeneity of the countries which are referred to in this 
thematic approach.63  
The socio-economic developments of the referred region will be discussed and analysed in detail fur-
ther on. For the present concern it is important to state that the socio-economic disparities are among 
the main concerns of the Mediterranean affairs and involve both sides of the Mediterranean decisively. 
Politically, the Barcelona Process remains a unique initiative to face the challenges in the Mediterra-
nean. Hence, difficult regional conflicts like the Middle East conflict are among the determining fac-
tors which designate success and failure of the Euro-Mediterranean relations.64 Culturally, religious 
and ethnic conflicts are complex and often grave, as there are signs of a radicalisation of the ruling 
regime in some countries. The democratization level is one of the most sensitive cultural and therefore 
 
61  GILLESPIE, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 1. 
62  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 32. 
63  “Ein Versuch, die Mittelmeerregion analog zur EG/EU zu analysieren, muss schon an der Heterogenität dieser Regi-
on scheitern.“ JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 33.  
64  Ibid. 33. 
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political aspects and hardly one MNC fulfils the democratic standard which is presupposed by the EU. 
One of the official aims of the Barcelona Process is to encourage the MNC to an advancing democra-
tization process. It is a fact that the same political base of operation is advantageous for the implemen-
tation of commonly agreed goals, but it is doubtable whether the democratization claim of the Euro-
pean Union in the Mediterranean region is among the primary preferences for the initiation of the Bar-
celona Process.  
From an analytical point of view, economic, political and cultural developments appear in different 
levels and paces. Socio-economic and cultural developments are long term developments, while politi-
cal developments tend to be short term developments. Long term developments are historically more 
significant, but, nevertheless, it remains highly interesting to embed short term developments in long 
term perspectives in order to analyse the decision-making scope of a certain moment in history. 
1.5 Historical relations over the Mediterranean 
In ancient times, the maritime trading culture facilitated relations across the Mediterranean; over the 
centuries the different continents were connected, especially by merchants, who cultivated the cultural 
transfer. The Mediterranean accommodated civilisations, which aspired to extend their power base, 
already very early. The Greeks, Romans and Arabs built empires of distinctive characters, sizes, sig-
nificance and persistency, which strode country, regional and even continental boundaries. The appro-
priation of the Mediterranean Sea dates back to these times. In the later medieval and in modern times, 
maritime powers utilized the Mediterranean as crossroads for economic relations or for the implemen-
tation of ideological convictions in order to expand their influences. However, the sea itself was to a 
lesser extent dominated by any single power. This persisted until the times of Imperialism; the sea was 
not occupied by a single power because too many competed for it in order to take advantages of new 
conquered towns or regions.  
The period from the 19th century until now is thematically the most relevant period to conceive the 
present relations across the Mediterranean. During these centuries the Mediterranean experienced the 
imperial and industrial competition of the European great powers, the First and the Second World War 
and the consolidation phase of the present world order, which was achieved by overcoming the Cold 
War and the foundation of the European Union. As a regional conception, the Mediterranean unifies a 
bundle of complex historical experiences, which influenced the cultural developments of the three 
mayor cultures that are located by the sea. This historical diversity constitutes the background of any 
contemporary policy and must form the base of any long-term promising policy, as Françoise Duchêne 
accurately states.65 
 
65  Françoise DUCHÊNE, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und der Mittelmeerraum (Europäische Dokumentation 3-4, 
Luxemburg 1985), 11. 
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2 Chrono logical  development  o f  pol i t i ca l  init i at ives  in  the  Medi terranean 
With the treaty of Rome in 1957 started a new period of international relations between Europe and its 
neighbour countries. Therefore, the year 1957 marks the beginning of a way which culminated in the 
Barcelona Process in 1995. The nearly forty years of the development of a coherent Mediterranean 
policy are marked by several phases and initiatives. These developments serve as an important back-
ground for the intended analysis and will thus be described in detail. Main elements of the Barcelona 
Process were politically considered much earlier than in 1995. 
2.1  Bilateral association agreements 1957-1972 
The former French protectorates, Morocco and Tunis, automatically received preferential commercial 
conventions with the new founded European Economic Community in 1957. Their exceptional rela-
tions to the EEC were designated in the additional protocols within the treaty of Rome66; Algeria was 
not mentioned separately as it still belonged to the foreign department of France.67 The consequence of 
this historically based reason for the preferential treatment of the former French colonies was an aris-
ing discrimination claim of the other Mediterranean countries, especially of the Southern European 
Mediterranean Countries (SEMC). In order to prevent an economic and political marginalisation of the 
other Mediterranean countries, the EEC granted numerous association agreements. These conventions 
are, from the point of view of a political scientist, critically classified because they assume that many 
of them were based on political short-term considerations. Consequently, this led to new claims due to 
unequally distributed vantages.68  
Although the EEC obtained a dense network of commercial relations across the Mediterranean, the 
political approach appeared in its characteristics to be rather a “Stückwerk- Politik”69 or a “politisches 
Flickwerk”70 than a coherent policy. 
2.2 Global Mediterranean Policy 1972 
Encouraged from a continuous economic growth and the global relaxation process, the European 
Community had the possibility to design ‘unconventional concepts’71 regarding their foreign policy. 
 
66  See additional protocols: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/11957E.html (27.02.2009). 
67  “In dem Bewusstsein, dass die Bestimmungen dieses Vertrags über Algerien und die überseeischen Departments der 
Französischen Republik das Problem aufwerfen, welche Regelung hinsichtlich Algerien und dieser Departments für 
die Waren zu treffen ist, die Gegenstand des Vertrags der Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und 
Stahl sind, in dem Wunsch, eine geeignete Lösung im Einklang mit den Grundsätzen der beiden Verträge zu finden, 
werden diese Frage im Geiste gegenseitiger Zusammenarbeit so bald wie möglich, spätestens jedoch bei der ersten 
Veränderung des Vertrags der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, regeln.“  Comp. Treaty of Rome:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/de/treaties/dat/11957E/tif/TRAITES_1957_CEE_1_XM_0946_x1919x.pdf (27.02.2009).   
68  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 37; KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 7; MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 
6. 
69  Detlef PUHL, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EG. Strukturschwächen des EG-Systems bei der Verwirklichung des 
Globalkonzepts (Kehl am Rhein 1982), XI. 
70  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 38. 
71 KHALATBARI, Naher Osten,8. 
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The growing political weight increased the necessity of an individual profile in foreign affairs, which 
was not only based on economic motivated conventions, but additionally guided by shared political 
interests.72  
 
According to Carlo Masala, the main impulse of a coherent concept regarding the policy towards the 
MNC came from outside; the North African states demanded a coherent policy for compensation to 
the domestic policy.73 Internally, the EC, who needed to extent the existing cooperation agreements to 
the new member states (Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark), replied on the external demands with the 
development of a new policy approach regarding the Mediterranean affairs. Federica Bicchi ascribes 
the internal driving motor of this new policy direction to France, which apparently received a hint by 
the Netherlands and suggested a “full-fledged approach envisaging a free trade area between the EEC 
and all the Mediterranean countries.”74 The proposal of “une approche globale avec un orientation 
commune” as an idea of a developmental approach was supported by parts of the Commission and the 
European Parliament.75 On this base, the EEC presented a proposal in order to reform the current con-
ventions with the MNC within the scope of a ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’ (GMP). 
The developed proposal, confirmed in Paris in 1972, encompassed three mayor areas: the creation of a 
Mediterranean free-trade area for industrial goods, an easing of custom restrictions for some agrarian 
products within the preferential system and a closer cooperation in financial, technical and social af-
fairs.76 Based on this concept, a series of new cooperation agreements marked the Mediterranean pol-
icy of the European Community (EC) in the 1970ies. In this sense the EC maintained contractual rela-
tions to Spain, Portugal, Malta, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Jordanian, Is-
rael, Egypt, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco. Spain and Portugal were excluded from the Mediterranean 
policy just at the moment when a member perspective was conceded by the Council; eleven out of 
twelve of the remaining Mediterranean countries concluded agreements based on the ‘global ap-
proach’ with the EC.77 Despite a similar structure of the agreements and a common denominator in 
order to deepen the relations across the Mediterranean, the conventions show a certain discrepancy 
regarding their significance:78 
 
72  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 38.  
73  MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 6. 
74  Federica Bicchi assumption of a hint of the Netherlands which France followed is a singular position in literature. 
Although there is no further reference of this circumstances and France obtains a strong position in Mediterranean 
Affairs since the very beginning due to its historical relation, I shall leave this hint at this point as it might be encour-
aging for further investigations. See: Federica BICCHI, The European Origins of Euro-Mediterranean Practices (In-
stitute of European Studies/ paper 040612/ 2004), 4. Available online: http://repositories.cdib.org/ies/040612/ 
(2.9.2008).  
75  Ibid. 4. 
76  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 9. 
77  PUHL, Mittelmeerpolitik, 31. 
78  Ibid. 31-36. Additionally must be added that with the exception of the conventions with Malta, Israel, Cyprus and 
Turkey all agreements were non-reciprocal preferential agreements Comp. MASALA, Euro-Mediterrane Partner-
schaft, 7. 
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• The Maghreb and Mashreq conventions encompass seven countries that ensure their will for a 
new model of relations. In this sense, the conventions contain a broad catalogue of areas of 
economic, technical and financial cooperation; furthermore, they take the individual develop-
ment degree of each country into account in order provide a balanced goods traffic, to encour-
age the economic growth and to improve the access of the goods to the common market.  
• The Israel convention was the first convention signed as “global Mediterranean convention” in 
1975. The fact that its duration was only foreseen until 1977 demonstrates the sensitive rela-
tion between the EC to Israel and the Arab states. The EC was keen to maintain even relations 
among these countries, which has been, facing the Middle East, a conflictive political under-
taking until nowadays.   
• The Yugoslavia convention, signed in 1980, was the last “global Mediterranean” convention. 
Although its structure is similar to the Maghreb and Masrique conventions, it explicitly relates 
to the world political position of Yugoslavia, which, as a developing country, continues to par-
ticipate in the general preferential system of the European Community. The higher developing 
degree of the Yugoslavian economy is cited as the reason for a less distinctive economical and 
financial support from the European side. 
• The Malta and Cyprus conventions, which were already established before Great Britain, Ire-
land and Denmark became members of the European Community, are in its nature association 
agreements. They do not only foresee a free-trade area like the Israel convention and in a long-
term perspective also other conventions, but also foresee a tariff union. Due to the strategic 
positions of Malta and Cyprus, their association agreements are characterised by the perspec-
tive of a future membership, a feature, which is lacking in the conventions of Greece (in the 
beginning) and Turkey.79 
Turkey and the European Community hold association agreements since 1963, in which both sides 
declare to establish a tariff union at the moment the preparation phase ends. In the additional protocol 
from 1970 they founded the base for this tariff union, which would have foreseen an accession to the 
EC as a third step. Due to the increasing violence and the political instability, the EC provoked the 
freezing of the association agreements in 1979. Since then, the membership issue of Turkey has re-
mained ambiguous, despite the economic and political developments over the last years.  
 
The “globalisation of the Mare Nostrum”80 as Khalatbari titled the corresponding chapter in his book, 
early reached its limits, especially as far as the economy was concerned due to the oil crisis of 1973 
and 1979. The total financial expenses for the Global Mediterranean Policy approach mounted up to 
1.8 billion ERE for the diverse countries in the Mediterranean until 1981. This was a considerable 
 
79  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 7. 
80  Ibid.8. 
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amount even though 510 millions were dedicated to Greece and Portugal, whose membership was 
already initiated, and 310 millions were designated for Turkey, who attempted to intensify the eco-
nomic relations to the EC in prospective of a membership.81  
Nevertheless, the limits of the global approach in the Mediterranean were also of political nature. The 
dual alignment and the interference of competences of the European Commission and the CFSP 
proved to be counterproductive due to the divergent national interest.82  
Evaluating the Global Mediterranean Policy approach shows two new elements regarding a Mediter-
ranean policy, which are crucial in two different ways. Firstly, despite its strong economical orienta-
tion, the concept of a coherent foreign policy in the Mediterranean continuously gained a majority 
among European politicians. Although the implementation did not succeed until 1995, the first strep 
towards a multilateral approach happened to take place with the Global Mediterranean Policy. Sec-
ondly, more important is the region building aspect, which is adherent to the approach of a GMP. 
Identifying the Global Mediterranean Policy approach as a crucial period in which the idea of a Medi-
terranean took hold, Federica Bicchi states that from then onwards, in Eurospeak the Mediterranean 
was no longer a generic geographical expression and, more than that, from the perspective of the 
EC/EU a new region was born.83 The political construct of a Mediterranean region was initiated with 
the GMP, but was formally implemented with the launch of the Barcelona Process and the foundation 
of a Euro-Mediterranean partnership, respectively.84 
Although the EC started a first attempt towards a coherent Mediterranean policy, the success of a new 
policy approach did neither cross the conceptual boarder nor enabled a more standardised structure of 
conventions. Nevertheless, the Global Mediterranean Policy marks the beginning of a consolidation 
process of a coherent Mediterranean policy which led to the declaration of Barcelona in 1995. 
2.3 New approaches since the 1980ies until 1995 
Although the Global Mediterranean Policy was a first attempt of replacing an inhomogeneous patch-
work of agreements with the MNC through a global framework, its limits were soon reached and the 
policy failed due to contradictory interests regarding the political positioning of the EC. Concerning 
the Mediterranean affairs, the 1980ies were characterised by the European southern enlargement. In 
consequence of the accession of Greece (1981), Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986) to the European 
Community, the MNC experienced a severe loss of their export volume; until then, their products were 
protected from southern European Mediterranean products by the preferential system and association 
agreements. The increasing competition of Mediterranean agrarian products on European markets led 
 
81  PUHL, Mittelmeerpolitik, 41. 
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to a commotion of the commercial policy85 due to the fact that the principal aim of the European 
Community was to equate national economies of the new member states to the EC average. Thus, the 
concerns of the MNC were of second rank. Given the increasing fear of the consequences of the Euro-
pean southern enlargement of the MNC, the European Community realized the necessity of action and 
closed additional (financial) protocols in 1987/88. According to Carlo Masala, the EC had become 
conscious of the need of an independent and offensive policy because the problems in the southern 
Mediterranean countries and, to the same extent, the possible threats for the member states of the 
European Community had apparently grown towards the late 80ies.86 Beside the socio-economic con-
siderations, the security concerns range among the principal motivations of the EC to intensify the 
relation with the MNC. Among the initiatives, which took place until 1995, one must separate two 
action levels: firstly, the political initiatives of the European Community and secondly, the national 
initiatives of European member states, which demonstrated that the interests of some countries were 
reaching further than the European course.  
 
a) Initiatives of the European Community
87
 
• As the GMP, the Euro-Arab Dialog (EAD) constituted an attempt to regulate the North-South 
conflict via cooperative and integrative elements. It formed a second political initiative beside 
the, until then, strong economically based Mediterranean policy. The impulse for the EAD 
came from the Arabian side because they regarded an alliance with the EC as beneficial for 
the Arabian-Israelian conflict. From the European side, some states, especially Italy and 
France, favoured the institutionalisation of the European-Arabian relations to strengthen the 
European position in the Middle East. Moreover, the significance of cooperative relations to 
the Arabian oil producing states was undoubted after the oil crisis of 1973. At the beginning of 
the negotiations both sides accorded that the Arabian-Israelian conflict should not be part of 
the EAD. Demonstrating the European ambition to maintain an equal distance policy to both 
conflict parties in the Middle East, parallel negotiations with Israel were started, which re-
sulted in closing the commercial conventions one year later due to the lack of future success of 
the EAD initiative. The failed expectancy to exploit Europe as a counterbalance to the Ameri-
can dominance in the Middle East led to the exposure of the EAD in 1979, only three years af-
ter its formation, when Egypt resigned its membership in the EAD with the peace of Camp 
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2005), 19-21; Martin BIEDERMANN, Die MIttelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union (Gemeinschaft) von 1987 biis 
1997. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von EU Dokumenten (ungedr. Wirtschaftswiss. Dipl. Wien 1997); Klaus 
PIRKER, Mittelmeerpolitik der EU. Der Barcelona Process (ungedr. Rechtswiss. Dipl. Graz 2003) 
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David. It was retaken in 1983, but lacked of attractiveness as the foundation of the Gulf Coop-
eration Council formed a pleasing alternative to the EAD. 
• The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was initiated in the early 1980ies and was more promis-
ing regarding an effective interregional cooperation because it consisted of a smaller commit-
tee and all oil producing countries took part in it. 
• The New Mediterranean Policy (NMP), which formerly constituted the official Mediterranean 
policy of the EC, substituted the GMP in 1990. The central aim was the replacement of the 
policy of developmental cooperation and the implementation of a newly designed ‘neighbour-
hood policy’, denominated as ‘New Mediterranean Policy’. In 1992, the EC extended the new 
policy approach to a ‘partnership policy’, reasoning the need of a new base of the euro-
maghrebinian relations. For the first time security policy concerns found consideration within 
the cooperation agreements. In 1993, the European Commission started an initiative for the 
regional integration in the Middle East and emphasised the need of a regional negotiation 
frame. In the communication paper of the European Commission of 1994, the Commission, 
aware that the region is of crucial interest regarding security and social stability and aware of 
the reciprocal dependency in many aspects, proposed the extension of the partnership model to 
the Mediterranean region with the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and stabil-
ity.88  
 
b) Initiatives of southern European member countries 
At the end of the 80ies and the beginning of the 90ies the ‘southern threat’89 became a central concern 
of the southern member states of the EC/EU. The notably increasing number of North African mi-
grants in France, Italy and Spain was the main indicator for the associated threat. The aim of the fol-
lowing initiatives was on the one hand to sensitise the EC/EU of the significance of the Mediterranean 
affairs and, on the other hand, to achieve a balance to the Eastern policy of the EG/EU.90 Two ap-
proaches with multilateral characteristics marked the years before the launch of the Barcelona Process. 
• The Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), which was initi-
ated by Spain and Italy in 1989, aimed to overcome the economic and social discrepancies of 
the northern and southern Mediterranean countries; at the beginning only the Maghreb coun-
tries were addressed. Under the mantle of several catchwords like globality, progressiveness 
and integrity, the CSCM was structured on the basis of three baskets, namely ‘regional stabil-
ity, ‘economical cooperation’ and ‘dialogue among civilisations and human rights’. Despite 
all endeavours the CSCM failed. With the Gulf Crisis in 1990 the objective of the CSCM 
 
88  COM(94) 427 endg., 2. 
89  The term ‘Southern threat’ (Südbedrohung) was firstly mentioned in the Italian white paper of defence in 1981 
Comp. Annette JÜNEMANN, Italiens Nahostpolitik von 1980-1990. Handlungsspielräume einer national eigenstän-
digen Interessenspolitik (Baden-Baden 1993), 86f. 
90  Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 14. 
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changed; from then on the principal ambition was to gain a regulatory voice in the region. In 
consequence of the European political positioning several problems occurred. First of all, the 
ambition to transfer the CSCM concept to the Mediterranean region was not possible due to 
the inequality and the distinctive problem structure among the partners and due to the lack of 
a block structure and leadership, which would have guaranteed successful negotiations, espe-
cially in the sub-regions of the Mediterranean. Thus stated Babak Khaltbari: “quantity de-
stroyed quality”.91 Second, with the European ambition for a regulatory power arose a com-
petitive position to the USA, which perceived a threat to its unilateral policy in the Middle 
East.92 
• The French initiative 5+5 constituted the French moment to launch an own Mediterranean 
Policy in 1990, after the failure of the CSCM. The reduced number of participating countries93 
should guarantee the success of this initiative. The main focus was directed on economic is-
sues, although the structural organisation was based on the three baskets of the CSCM and a 
fourth basket of environmental concerns was added. The initiative failed due to the unclear 
position regarding the political relation with Libya, the discrepancy concerning the security is-
sue and the related role of the NATO and WEU and, as Anette Jünemann states, due to a lack 
of political will regarding the interregional cooperation, because the southern European coun-
tries could not agree on a common procedure; the CSCM and the 5+5 initiative demonstrated 
the competitive positions among France, Italy and Spain concerning a Mediterranean policy.94 
2.4 Success and failure of the European Mediterranean Policy since 1957 
The way of standardising the bilateral agreements with the Mediterranean non member countries 
marks the first step towards a coherent Mediterranean policy. The European member states, being 
themselves in a decisive integration process, have distinctive positions regarding the direction of the 
European foreign policy. Although the discrepancy of national interests ranges among the principal 
causes for the failure of all initiatives before 1995, they also constitute a crucial driving motor.  
The economic relations across the Mediterranean are of vital importance, mainly for the southern 
European states, but also for Europe. Not surprisingly, the beginning phase of the political relations 
after 1957 was economically based. The enlargement of the European Union changed the conditions 
of economical relations to the foreign trading partner and encouraged a new political assertiveness of a 
 
91  Ibid. 15. 
92  Comp. Ibid. 14-17; JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 39f; KERSCHBAUMER, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 15-
17; for further information regarding the conclusions of the CSCM meetings and conderences see: http://ipu.org/iss-
e/cscm.htm (18.9.2008). 
93  The ten countries which formed the 5+5 were the members of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Mauretania, 
Morocco and Tunisia) as well as France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Malta as a associate participant until Malta be-
came a full member in 1991. 
94  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 40f; KERSCHBAUMER, Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft, 17f; KHALATBARI, 
Naher Osten, 16f.  
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growing power. These two levels of concerns dominate the success and the failure of European foreign 
policy issues in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, the EEC/EC/EU was created in order to balance 
the changes and economic consequences due to the European enlargement policy. On the other hand, 
there was a growing regulatory policy demand, especially regarding the Middle East. Starting on a 
bilateral base and an ambitious attempt to harmonize the agreed conventions with the MNC within the 
limits of a Global Mediterranean Policy, the EC/EU continuously noticed the reciprocal dependency, 
the consequences of a socio-economic discrepancy and the need of action. Although the GMP was 
ostensibly dominated by economic considerations, it was an initial point of a coherent policy in the 
Mediterranean. Furthermore, its conceptual approach is crucial in terms of region building aspects and, 
in the same way, internally as externally significant to establish a reference area in order to create a 
common reference. The GMP failed due to the divergence of interests and, as far as foreign policy is 
concerned, the lack of an advantageous developed dual European system. The following initiatives on 
the national superordinated level, the EC/EU, were direct forerunners of the Barcelona Process and 
demonstrate the process within the EC/EU to develop a coherent Mediterranean policy. The multilat-
eral initiatives of the member countries France, Italy and Spain show, especially in its structural or-
ganisation, elements which have been overtaken later on. The extension to a fourth basket of the 
French initiative 5+5, containing environmental concerns, was a crucial element of the recently 
launched Mediterranean Union (MU). The attempt to limit the MU to only Mediterranean countries, as 
it was originally suggested by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy, failed due to the intervention of 
Germany, which claimed that Mediterranean affairs were of European concern. This demonstrates 
nothing less than the still persisting national competitions to dominate the direction of the European 
policy, which were also the reasons for the failure of the CSCM and the 5+5. 
 
3 The  Barce lona  Proces s  
The Barcelona Process represents a novelty among the diplomatic relations over the Mediterranean, 
because it brings thirty-nine countries95 of different historical, political and economical backgrounds 
under the mantle of a common mission together: to improve the political stability, to establish an eco-
nomic partnership and to enhance the reciprocal cultural understanding. The following chapter deals 
with the most relevant aspects in order to provide a thematic setting for the consecutive discourse 
analysis. In contrast to the period before 1995, many happenings, features and particularities will not 
be specified in-depth as they will be revived and discussed further on. 
 
95  The EU-27 (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries (Albania, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Maurentania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey).  
Comp: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (19.9.2008). 
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3.1  The declaration of Barcelona 
With the intention to initiate a new dimension of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Barcelona Declara-
tion was signed by the former EU-15 and eleven southern Mediterranean states on November 27/28, 
1995.96 It was a symbolic date which received a new historical meaning because it was exactly nine 
hundred years after Pope Urban II called on the first Crusade.97 The choice of Barcelona as the venue 
for the launch of the conference and the naming of the follow-up committee called “Euro-
Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process” was subsequent to the recognition of Spain’s 
new predominance as a leading player in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership initiative.98 Richard 
Gillespie also correctly states that Spain has not been the only influential player in the development 
process before 1995; France, Morocco, Portugal and Algeria contributed essential inputs to the policy 
development, but the nomenclature of the process was allowed to Spain.99 Beside national engage-
ments, the European Commission gave the decisive impetus for developing a coherent Mediterranean 
policy and acted as an intermediator among the differing interests of the European member states in 
order to facilitate a successful conference meeting.  
In its communication to the Council in 1990, the Commission stressed the importance of a close coop-
eration of all involved countries and repeated the already voiced conviction that “there is little choice 
but to continue and intensify the process of economic reform and to bring about a considerable im-
provement in the volume and methods available to finance reform and growth.”100 In 1994, the Com-
mission emphasised that the Mediterranean is of great interest to the European Union regarding secu-
rity concerns and social stability and stressed the reciprocal dependency in many ambits; furthermore, 
the Commission phrased the need to develop a Europe-Mediterranean partnership and approved a 
Europe-Mediterranean conference in order to covenant common political and economical guide-
lines.101 At the meeting of the EU-15 in Cannes at the end of June 1995 the basic questions of internal 
and external confrontations have been the thematic concern. The European Council stressed the offi-
cial side of the European Union regarding the Mediterranean and “proposes that the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership should be put into practice with the adoption of a declaration of principals 
by all the partners at the conference in Barcelona this autumn, setting a number of objectives common 
 
96  The former EU-15 and eleven Southern Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Malta, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority) signed the Barcelona Declaration. See: Barcelona decla-
ration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean conference 27-28/11/95 http://ec.europa.eu/comm.external_relations/ eu-
romed/bd/htm (25.6.2006). The literature mostly alludes to the EU-15 and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries 
because Libya, which obtains an observer status since 1999, is also taken into account. According to the official 
document of the Barcelona declaration of 1995 only eleven countries signed.  
97  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 43. 
98  Richard GILLESPIE, Spanish Protagonismo and the Euro-Med Partnership Initiative. In: Richard GILLESPIE (ed.), 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political ad economic perspectives (London 1997), 33-49, 33. 
99  Ibid. 33f. 
100  SEC(90) 812 final (Brussels 1.06.1990), 3 [Comp. 1.1 and 1.2 of chapter 1. A general framework for Community 
operations in the Mediterranean]. 
101  COM(94)427endg. (Brüssel 19.10.1994) [Compare point 1,4,5 and 10 of the abstract]. 
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to the parties with regard to internal and external security.”102 Therewith, from the European point of 
view, the way to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona was paved. It was the intention “to 
establish a comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean partnership in order to turn the Mediterranean into a 
common area of peace, stability and prosperity through the reinforcement of political dialogue and 
security, an economic and financial partnership and a social, cultural and human partnership.” 103 
Due to the European enlargement policy, thirty-nine countries104 participate in the Barcelona Process 
today. Their sustained interest to cooperate was recently demonstrated with the sign of the declaration 
to revitalize the Barcelona Process under a new political mantle: the Mediterranean Union. 
3.3 Structural elements of the Barcelona Process 
Two principal structural elements have to be considered when discussing the Barcelona Process: First, 
the inherent structure which is based on three baskets in order to organize the ambits treated within the 
Mediterranean policy. Deriving from this structure, the working base corresponding to a bilateral and 
regional (multilateral) cooperation level of the Barcelona Process can be deduced. Second, the deci-
sion-making process which is essential to apprehend the implementation competence of this political 
constellation.  
 
a) Inherent structure of the Barcelona Process 
Although the Spanish-Italian initiative, CSCM, was not successful, some structural elements can be 
retrieved in the new Mediterranean policy launched in 1995. The Barcelona Declaration can be classi-
fied as ambitious attempt to create a catalogue of principals based on three baskets: 
The first basket concerns the partnership area of a “political and security dialogue to achieve a com-
mon area of peace and stability based on respect for human rights and democracy.”105 The responsible 
senior officials meet four times a year in matters concerning the first basket. Regarding the goals of 
the first basket, the declaration of Barcelona corresponds rather to a charter than to a legally binding 
document; up to now, the agreements on the first basket are based upon commitments, wherefore the 
results have to be considered as marginal. Nevertheless, four ‘confidence-building measures’ and 
 
102  Cannes European Council, Presidency conclusions (26-27 June 1995) [Compare quote from PART A, chapter “Euro-
Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona position of the European Union”, Sub-chapter II. Political and Security Part-
nership: Establishing a Common Area of Peace and Stability”] Available online: http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data 
/docs/pressData/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm (18.9.2008).  
103  Official formulation of the aim of the Barcelona declaration. See Barcelona declaration according to the summaries of 
legislation: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r15001.htm (19.9.2008). 
104  The EU-27 (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and twelve Southern Mediterranean countries (Albania, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauretania, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey) comp: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (19.9.2008). 
105  www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008). 
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‘partnership-building measures, respectively’106 were established in the first basket: the Mediterranean 
Academy of Diplomatic Studies (MEDAC)107, the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EU-
ROMESCO)108, the Cooperation among institutions of civil protection109 and the MEDA democracy 
programme.110  
With the new Mediterranean policy it was “not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives in 
the interest of peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their suc-
cess.”111 Therein originates the reason for the coexistence of several initiatives such as the Mediterra-
nean Forum (FOROMED)112, the EAD or the multilateral Arabian-Israelian working group Middle 
East Peace Process (MEEP), which is supported by the European Union.  
In the declaration of Barcelona the participants agreed on an intensified contact among parliamentari-
ans and regional and local authorities. The right of initiative concerning the implementation was 
granted to the European Union, as the formal statement within the declaration suggests: “The Euro-
pean Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future Eu-
roMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the part-
ners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues.”113 
 
106  Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 47. 
107 Twice a year the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies organizes an information and discussion forum with 
the ambition to encourage an informal contact network among diplomats and support the setting up of a Euro-
Mediterranean network. http://home.um.edu.mt/medac/ (22.9.2008); among the activities the Euro-Mediterranean 
seminars must find a special consideration because they encourage the debate by inviting independent experts and 
scientist. In November 2008 the 25th Seminar was held. For participants, programmes and papers see: 
http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/ (22.9.2008).    
108 In 1996 the EuroMeSCo network was launched under the coordination of the Lisbon Institute of International Studies 
(IEEI). Two working groups, one focusing on studies of political and security co-operations and the other working on 
confidential-building measures, disarmament and preventive diplomacy, were established http://www.euromesco.net/ 
(22.9.2008). 
109  This cooperation concerns the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean system for catastrophe prevention as well as 
the reduction and management natural disasters. The project was launched in 1998 due to the initiative of Egypt and 
Italy. On the basis of a five year working program, the field of action encompasses experience and technique transfer, 
cooperation as well as training sessions among Euro-Mediterranean civil protection boards. The project, which is co-
ordinated by a steering committee, consists of ten training sessions and the exchange of hundred and fifty experts of 
ten scientific and technical missions; the financial budget mounts up to 1.9 million EUR. Comp: KHALATBARI, 
Naher Osten, 49. 
110  The MEDA democracy programme forms a part of the European initiative for democracy and human rights launched 
of the European Parliament in 1994. Since first established, the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 
(EMHRN) follows the developments of the MEDA democracy programme which since 1996 holds a proper budget 
line (B-7050) to support non-profit-making associations (NGOs), universities, research canters and public bodies.  
Comp:http://www.euromedrights.net/usr/00000026/00000027/00000028/00000239.pdf (22.9.2008). 
111  Barcelona declaration http://ec.europa.eu/ comm.external_relations/euromed/bd/htm (25.6.2006) [fifth point of the 
abstract of the declaration]. 
112  On an initiative of France and Egypt the Mediterranean Forum was launched in 1994 and predated the Barcelona 
Process. The participating countries Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia 
and Turkey meet annually. Since 1997 it was commonly agreed that the informal nature ought to be protected and 
that the forum ought to concentrate their activities on developing ways of preventive diplomacy, for a continuous dia-
logue and understanding of each other. See http://www2.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/31052007_ 
McC1615.htm (23.9.2008) and for presidency conclusions until 2003 http://www.maec.gov.ma/en/forum/ meditera-
neEN.htm (23.9.2008).  
113  Barcelona declaration http://ec.europa.eu/ comm.external_relations/euromed/bd/htm (25.6.2006) [See Annex: Work 
Programme, chapter V. “Institutional Contacts” consecutive paragraph, EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue]. 
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The aim of the second basket is an “economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment 
of a free-trade area to create a zone of shared prosperity and to support economic transition in the 
partner states.”114 Babak Khalatbari tried to identify the mayor regional cooperation programmes in the 
non-transparent information supply of the European Union, which are established within the margin of 
the second basket:115 
• The systematic support of the private enterprise sector is crucial for a successful establishment 
of a free-trade area. The European strategy of implementing business centres relates to the 
concerns of the installation of the free-trade area, the transformation of the economic focus of 
the single MNC and the facilitation of interior and exterior private investment. 
• Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) and business co-operations form an essential part 
at the moment of implementation of political matters. In 1998, the programme of a “Euro-
Mediterranean Co-operation between SMEs” was launched. Its aim is to provide a multi-
sectoral platform for companies and to encourage the exchange of expertise in general or for 
regional and country specific concerns. The success of this programme especially depends on 
the cooperation disposition of European enterprises due to the fact that the legal security in 
most MNC is still uncertain. 
• From the aim to improve the reciprocal understanding and to encourage the exchange of in-
formation emanates the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean economic network, which 
comprises a scientific and a practical component. On the scientific level, the Euro-
Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes (FEMISE) was founded. It currently involves 
more than sixty independent economic research institutes which represent the thirty-seven 
partners of the Barcelona Process. The principal issues of the socio-economic research on top-
ics defined as priority for the future of the EMP concern: agricultural questions; development 
and the poverty treatment; policies regarding health and work; education, training and the role 
of women in the company; integration and cooperation between the countries of the south of 
the Mediterranean; the role of the state.116 The practical level of the Euro-Mediterranean Eco-
nomic Network concerns those industry associations which enhance the practical exchange. 
Since 2000 the project is known as “UNIMED Business Network”117, its working programme 
is based on the ‘Brussels Declaration on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation’ which 
foresees periodical conference meetings and summits.  
• Infrastructural programmes, which support the development of an economic and financial 
partnership, constitute the statistical co-operation with Mediterranean countries (MED-
 
114  www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008). 
115  KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 57-73. 
116  http://www.femise.org/Presentation/presentation_gb.html (23.9.2008). 
117  http://www.unimedbn.org/ (23.9.2008). 
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STAT)118, the Development Society Information in the Mediterranean Region (EUMEDIS)119 
and a project called ‘New Approaches Regarding Telecommunication Policy among Mediter-
ranean Partners’ (NATP). The last mentioned project aims to vitalize the opened and changing 
telecommunication sector of the MNC and therewith the adjunctive participation of private 
sectors in the infrastructural renovations. Regarding the transportation system, a Euro-
Mediterranean Transport Forum was convoked in 1998. Since then, the NATP works on a 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), a transport network for citizens of the partner 
countries, transport security, sea transport, and topic relevant science and development and 
statistics. 
• Environmental programs in the second basket are for example ‘The Short and Medium-Term 
Priority Environmental Action Programme’ (SMAP), encompassing five priority fields of ac-
tion: additional water management, additional wastage management, hot spots (urgent prob-
lems in urban areas, industrial sites etc.), management of the coastal zone, combating the de-
sertification; the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (EMWIS) emphasises the 
cooperation need in a sector which is threatened by scarcity; and the Euro-Mediterranean En-
ergy Forum aims to bring forward the cooperative attitude on the political, administrative and 
industrial level.  
• The Euro-Arab Management School was founded as a partner project with the Arab League120 
and the European Commission in 1995 in order to support teaching and training processes as 
well as future services in the margin of business developments between Arabian and European 
enterprises. 
• The third basket concerns a “social, cultural and human partnership to encourage understand-
ing between peoples and cultures and exchanges between civil societies.”121 In the declaration 
of Barcelona in 1995 the ambition of a cultural cooperation was consolidated for the first time. 
The cultural dimension aspires to improve the respect of the cultures and religions involved in 
the Mediterranean policy, to strengthen intercultural exchange, to combat racism and xeno-
phobia and to ameliorate the possibilities of education. The programs which are embedded 
within the third basket are the following: 
 
118  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=2313,59852546,2313_65332058&_dad=portal&_ sche-
ma=PORTAL (23.9.2008).  
119  The support and development of investigation and technology societies in the MNC and the encouragement of the 
advancement and modernisation of the local telecommunication infrastructure is stressed among the crucial elements 
for the success of the Barcelona Process. Comp. KHALATBARI, Naher Osten, 69. For further information on EUM-
EDIS see: http://www.eumedis.net/ (23.9.2008). 
120  The Arab League, founded in 1945, is the “informal name of the League of Arab States, a voluntary association of 
independent countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking. Its stated purposes are to strengthen ties among the 
member states, coordinate their policies, and promote their common interests.” http://www.arab.de/arabinfo/ 
league.htm (23.9.2008) Today 22 countries form the Arab League (Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Somalia, United 
Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, Comoros, Jordan, Mauretania, Qatar, Syria, Djibouti, 
Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia).  
121  www.euromedinfo.eu (23.9.2008). 
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• The Euromed Heritage-Program, launched in 1998, pursues the conservation and evolvement 
of the Euro-Mediterranean heritage. 
• The Euromed Audivisual Programm targets new forms of cooperation between European and 
Mediterranean operators in the audiovisual sector (broadcast, television and cinema) regarding 
technology and knowledge transfer. 
• The cooperation with civil societies attaches importance because it is apprehended as a tar-
geted support of democratisation forces in less democratic Mediterranean non-member coun-
tries.122 Med-programs like Med Campus, Med Media, Med Migration and Med Urbs are 
based on two principals: the Commission selects its partners without consulting the national 
governments and each Med-program ought to create a network that brings together at least 
three countries of both regions (EU and Mediterranean).123 
• The Euromed Youth programme is based on exchange programs which aim to facilitate the in-
tegration process in society and profession of young people, to encourage a closer cooperation 
among the generations and to enhance democratisation tendencies in civil societies.  
• The Barcelona Process comprises a bilateral and a multilateral dimension of actions within the 
thematic arrangement of the three basket-structure. The bilateral cooperation concerns bilat-
eral activities between the EU and each country on the base of association agreements which 
are negotiated individually. Although the agreements vary from one country to another, they 
have certain aspects in common such as a “political dialogue, respect for human rights and 
democracy, establishing a free trade zone, provisions relating to intellectual property, services, 
public procurement, competition rules, state aids and monopolies, and economic, social and 
cultural cooperation including migration.”124 The bilateral agreements with the MNC must be 
ratified by the national parliaments of the EU member states. The multilateral dimension rep-
resents an innovative element of the established Mediterranean policy because it tackles “po-
litical, economic and cultural issues such as industry, energy, the environment, finance and ag-
riculture important to many of the Mediterranean Partners.”125 In its function, the multilateral 
and the regional cooperation target at the support and complementation of bilateral activities. 
• The principal economic and financial instrument for warranting the agreed goals of the Barce-
lona Process is the MEDA programme, launched in 1997 (MEDA I), amended in 2000 
(MEDA II) and incorporated in the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) in 2007. Since 1995, the European Commission supported initiatives within the coop-
eration frame with about ! 16 billions from the Community budget. Furthermore, ! 2 million 
 
122  The democratisation issue of the Barcelona Process, which is often discussed in relation with the third basket, will be 
omitted at this point as it constitutes an essential element in the foreseen discourse analysis and will be treated exten-
sively further on. 
123  JÜNEMANN, Mittelmeerpolitik, 49. 
124  www.euromedinfo.eu (18.9.2008). 
125  Ibid.  
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annual loans of the European Investment Bank (EIB) have been granted within the MEDA 
margin.126 Project-supported concerns are the economic transition of Mediterranean non-
member countries (MNCs), the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area, sus-
tainable socio-economic developments and regional, sub-regional and cross-boarder co-
operations. Funds are allocated in form of grants managed by the European Commission and 
used for financing or co-financing projects, which contribute to the realisation of the agreed 
objectives; risk capital provided and managed by the EIB to strengthen the private sector; and 
interest rate subsidies for EIB loans within the framework of environmental cooperation, not 
exceeding a subsidiary rate of 3%.127 MEDA expenditures are subjected to strict control 
mechanisms, an overall assessment report and mid-term evaluations. The European Commis-
sion submits in collaboration with the EIB an annual report to the European Parliament and 
the Council.128 In 2007, the financial instruments of the European regional cooperation initia-
tive MEDA and TACIS129 have been incorporated in the ENPI, which, from an official side, is 
argued to represent a “widened strategic continuation”130 of the previous financial and techni-
cal instruments. The funds allocated to the Mediterranean policy agreements persist as before 
with the amendment that “the ENPI will be policy driven, supporting the implementation of 
agreed ENP.”131  
 
b) Decision making process and the distribution of competences 
The Barcelona Process is formally characterized as an intergovernmental process and works on the 
principal of coordination and consensus. This presupposes that all states are considered as sovereign 
contractual parties and, in addition, each country obtains the right of veto independently of the politi-
cal weight.132 The main decision-making body constitutes the annual meeting of the foreign minis-





126  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (24.8.2008).  
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The preparation of these meetings is organised by the Euro-Mediterranean committee, which meets in 
regular intervals. At a ministerial, administrative or expert level occur further technical and civil coor-
dination processes as well as ad-hoc meetings like workshops and seminars.135 The implementation of 
the decisions agreed at the Foreign Minister Meetings is delegated to the European Commission, 
which is responsible for the preparation and post-processing of the Conferences. On the one hand, the 
national ministerial offices and the General Secretariat of the European Council experienced a relief; 
on the other hand, the European Commission had difficulties to cope with the additional responsibili-
ties in the beginning.136 Despite restructuring measures, this demonstrates significant organisational 
coordination problems of the European system.137 The coordination problems result from the conflic-
tive internal allocation of rights and duties, the European Commission is formally responsible for the 
Foreign Minister Meetings, but the presidency of the Meetings can either be held by the corresponding 
nation, which holds the presidency of the European Council, or by the Commission, which increases 
the internal coordination effort and problems regarding a coherent internal communication.138 The 
dominant position of the European Union and the presidency of the Council in the Foreign Minister 
Meetings indicate a stronger agenda-setting position than the MNC’s. The Mediterranean policy is not 
only conditioned by the European Union, which follows its beforehand agreed agenda, but also by 
possible block buildings among the Arabian countries because some of them participate in the Arab 
League (AL) or in the Arab Maghrebian Union (AMU) 139 Despite the possibility of regional group-
ings to influence the proceedings, the block formation among the MNCs has never been comple-
mented. According to Anette Jünemann, the regularly meetings created a kind of “socialising” effect 
 
134  The conclusions of these Ministerial conferences and meetings constitute the sources for the discourse analysis of the 
European documentation. 
135  Andreas MAURER, Max HAEDER, Alternatives to Full Membership oft he EU. In: Johannes VARWICK, Kai Olaf 
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138  MONAR, interne Dimension, 83f. 
139  Impeding factors of a stronger lobby within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are the facts that not all countries of 
the AL and AMU are participants of the Barcelona Process and that bilateral conflicts on the regional level averts 
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and a “spirit of partnership,” respectively. Although this effect is less intensive among the MNCs than 
between the North-South140, it gives indication of an advancing cooperating sense. 
3.3 The establishment of a new paradigm – the issue of a common space 
With the establishment of the paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership political representatives 
of all member states, who signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995, appointed to transmit a sign of 
unity and good will to achieve the defined goals.141 Officially, the European Union stresses that the 
initiation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership represents the new dimension of the future relations 
in the Mediterranean and emphasizes the need of a superordinated coordination of the challenges both 
sides of the Mediterranean Sea have to deal with.142 Beside the official definition of the ambitious 
Mediterranean policy, there is a legitimate space for questioning these developments. What about the 
paradigm of the so-called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Irrespective whether the partnership is 
counterbalanced, equal or the right fundament for a successful policy or not, there is one crucial aspect 
that the denomination ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ contains, namely the suggestion of a common 
space. What is the nature of such a common space, what are its frontiers and what about its functional-
ity? Is there an identification criteria implied? The paradigm of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
undoubtedly contains a certain eurocentrism; hence, the prefix of the denotation of the political part-
nership refers to Europe. In the 21st century, the frontiers of the European Union are, despite the en-
largement policy, quite clear. But what about the so-called Mediterranean? 
 
In reference to the scientific debates over the last years, defining the Mediterranean space is anything 
but easy. The historical importance of the Mediterranean as a cross-road and bridge between Europe, 
Asia and Africa is undoubted. What keeps scientists of distinctive disciplines in check is rather the 
immeasurable complexity of the Mediterranean world.  
Following the consideration of the ethnologist Christian Giordano, there is an atmosphere of disap-
pointment and helplessness in the scientific approach on the Mediterranean. The lack of finding a 
“reasonable synthesis” for the necessity of a conceptualization of the Mediterranean as an object of 
investigation for the matters of sociology and anthropology leads to a fragmentation and encapsulation 
of research topics.143 It is true that subsequent to the debate of the “entity” or “unity” of the Mediterra-
nean, which constitutes an open-ended debate in the scientific discourse, there have not been any new 
approaches on the matter. Recently, with the shift of the political interest after launching the Barcelona 
Process in 1995, there is a new concern about the Mediterranean. 
 
140  Anette JÜNEMANN, Zehn Jahre (2005), 8.  
141  For the content of the Barcelona Declaration see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm 
(25.06.2006). 
142  Ibid. 2. 
143  Christian GIORDANO, Die Betrogenen der Geschichte. Überlagerungsmentalität und Überlagerungs-rationalität in 
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The implicated suggestion of a common space in the term “Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” recom-
mends tracing back in history in reference to the apprehension of the Mediterranean. It is beyond all 
questions that early considerations of the Mediterranean space refer to its geographical nature, which 
can be reconstructed by early cartography and nominations in historical sources. The first linguistic 
reference of the term “Great Sea,” whose roots can probably be found in the Semitic language, is made 
by the Hecataeus of Miletus in Greek around 500 B.C. The Mediterranean Sea certainly influenced the 
imagination of poets and literates and it formed the world and life vision of human beings, but the 
main function of the sea was the communication. Sea transport and navigation influenced the Mediter-
ranean life in its earliest days. Therefore, the development in the cartography not only reflects the 
grade of evolution in navigation, but also answers questions concerning the perception of the shape of 
the Mediterranean Sea. When the coastline voyages dominated the sailing method, people believed 
that the Mediterranean was a great river, as gathered from an early Roman map, the Peutinger Table. 
With the advancement in navigation, like the sophisticated direction-finding art based on segmenting 
the discernible horizon according to the names of prevailing winds (wind rose), the conception of the 
Mediterranean Sea as a space improved as well. Hence, scholars like Herodotus already had a clear 
idea of the geographical space, body and positioning of the Sea and of the knowledge how to sail 
across.144  
The early geographical knowledge, which was accompanied by the achievements in navigation, con-
tributed to the implicitness of acquaintance and perception of the sea in times of the Roman Empire. 
Romans considered the Mediterranean Sea as “Our Sea”, Mare Nostrum. With the thought of appro-
priation by denominating the sea as “their sea,” the Romans demonstrated the tangibility of the Medi-
terranean Sea. Hence, it illustrated that the Mediterranean Sea was not only important for transporta-
tion, communications and commerce and supply purposes, but also for the representation of political 
power. Following the concerns of Dimitris K. Xenakis and Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, all civilizations 
which had access to the Mediterranean Sea, attempted to use it to extent their power-base.145  
As a crosspoint between Europe, Africa and Asia, the history of the Mediterranean is an abundance of 
study worthy phenomena. Unequal cultural and economic developments throughout history not only 
allude to the complexity of the study case “Mediterranean,” but also advert to the fragmentation into 
regional entities, which is often used in matters of an orientation guide. Due to the interpretation of 
Herzfeld’s theory on the Mediterranean in the work of Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, the 
term “Mediterranean” is far from being a convenient geographical designation and retrieves a none too 
subtle political weapon, namely to distinguish between “us” – northern European, advanced, diverse – 
and “them” – southern, backward, uniform.146 Although the long given major cultural dissonance be-
tween the northern and the southern shores of the Mediterranean influenced the discussion, focuses on 
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longitudinal divisions regarding the perception of the region, the understanding of north – south divi-
sions in relation to the grade of cultural and economic development varied depending on the point of 
view: “Unlike most northern Europeans, who generally regard North Africa as an incongruent and 
‘backward region’ of no great strategic interest, Italy, Spain, France, Portugal and Greece hold a dif-
ferent view. Likewise, for many North Africans, the dividing line between Europe and Africa lies in 
the Sahara and not in the Mediterranean, as is usually the case with Western perceptions.”147  
The question is to which common space did the European Union refer to while establishing the para-
digm of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Are there historical references of a shared cultural 
space? Is not a common cultural denominator the essential base for the definition of a common space? 
The ethnologist Christian Giordano, who concedes the point to Fernand Braudel in matter of the pos-
sibility to perceive the Mediterranean as a unity, adheres to the aspect that despite unmistakable con-
trasts, there are many evident communalities and assigns to the dictum of Goldstein that problems stay 
constant, but not the socio-cultural institutions dealing with them.148 Thus, there might be a common 
Euro-Mediterranean space, but what are the common cultural denominators of the political paradigm 
that have been established in 1995? 
 
The initiation of the Barcelona Process certainly provoked a change in the attitude of the European 
policy. Although evaluations of the Euro-Mediterranean policy, which were discussed at the 10th anni-
versary in 2005, turned out to be very critical, the scientific approach was topped by political voices. 
Essential for the present research aim is the fact that with the establishment of the paradigm of a Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, the European policy in the Mediterranean occupies a strong region build-
ing aspect. It is to expect that the results of the discourse analysis provide a useful frame to assess the 
region building intention within the European Mediterranean policy. 
3.4  The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
From the beginning, the European Communities followed a considered neighbourhood policy, culti-
vating close relations to countries that have no joining perspective and an open-minded policy towards 
possible members. The launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 was a result of 
the European Union’s enlargement of the same year. The requirement for a reformed neighbourhood 
policy, which equally addresses the neighbours of the eastern and southern shores after the enlarge-
ment of 2004, derived from counterbalancing the eastern-southern competition, from the experience 
that “old concepts of cooperation have not generated substantial transformation effects” and from the 
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fact that the integration capacity of the European Union was exhausted.149 Thus, the ENP constitutes at 
the same time a “strategy compensating for enlargement” and a “substitute for or alternative to en-
largement”, as the policy is directed to countries which have an accession perspective.150 
The new policy approach results from the concern to stabilise the boarder periphery and the awareness 
of the need of an effective and coherent common policy to deal with its neighbours strategically.151 
The official reasoning of the European Commission comprises duty concerns “towards its citizens and 
those of new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing 
social cohesion and economic dynamism” as well as the “determination to avoid drawing new dividing 
lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Un-
ion.”152 Regarding the political promotion of the ENP, Romano Prodi stated that it is the aim “to create 
a ring of friends around the Union – stretching from Russia right around the Mediterranean to Mo-
rocco – and to share peace, stability prosperity.”153  
On the base that the ENP builds on existing contractual relations and does not foresee an accession 
perspective, the policy is directed to the following countries on eastern and southern borders of the 
European Union: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Countries, 
with which contractual relations can be established, like Belarus, Turkey and the Western Balkans 
(except Moldova) are recognised as candidates. Countries with which contractual relations already 
exist, like Libya, which would have to participate in the Barcelona Process first, or Syria, where Asso-
ciation Agreements would be the contractual base for the ENP, are excluded. A special case consti-
tutes Russia, which is the largest neighbour of the EU and requires different policy approaches. Never-
theless, with the end of TACIS the strategic partnership will also be funded from the ENPI as cross-
boarder cooperation. 154 The main instrument of the ENP proceeding, which is basically bilateral, con-
stitutes action plans that are negotiated individually on the preconditions of each country with a dura-
tion of three to four years. Multilateral contexts result from already existing regional and sub-regional 
co-operations or from projects that will to be realised in this context. On a shared basis, the bilateral 
association agreements and common goals to enhance formal and civil dialogues on various levels, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy constitutes the bilateral frame, while the Barcelona Process, for ex-
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ample, forms the multilateral context for the cooperation with the Mediterranean non-member coun-
tries. With the incorporation of the Barcelona Process in the ENP the European- Mediterranean rela-
tions should be strengthened because bilateral cooperations are considered to be “more suitable for 
internal advancement initiations in the neighbour countries.”155 Since 2007, the regional financial in-
struments MEDA and TACIS have been replaced by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI). The ENPI as “a much more flexible and policy driven instrument” with a budget 
of !12 billion (32% increase in real terms) is designed to target sustainable developments and ap-
proximations to the EU policy and standards as well as agreed priorities in the ENP Actions plans.156 
Evaluating the ENP Policy so far leaves the impression of a meagre advancement regarding the gen-
eral intention and agreements based on the Action Plans. Common criticism concern the deficiently 
defined goals and measures, the missing newness component of objectives, the lack of compatibility of 
measures regarding the economic and social conditions, especially in the MNCs, and the security con-
cerns, which are more ostensibly formulated, as, for example, within the margin of the Barcelona 
Process.157 Criticisms concerning the established action plans refer to the high grade of complexity and 
the low juridical commitment. Regarding the Mediterranean policy, it is an impeding factor that not all 
countries participate in the ENP. Libya and Syria still lack the contractual requirements, Albania and 
Turkey are considered accession candidates and Algeria, which disposes of the necessary require-
ments, did not yet decide on a participation in the ENP.158 Beside the participation issue, the fact that 
“old” barriers like the Middle East conflict could not be solved, the lack of integration among the 
MNCs could not be averted, improving solutions regarding the liberalisation of the agrarian and serv-
ice sector and the market accession for Mediterranean products could not be achieved, led to the ap-
prehension that the focus on bilateral cooperation not only enhances asymmetric relations across the 
Mediterranean and the fragmentation of the region, but abates the regional (multilateral) approach.159 
In 2007, the Commission satisfactory listed results in general, but proposed additional developmental 
steps, as the understanding of the ENP as a motor of cooperation with its neighbour countries com-
prised a type of partnership which followed the maxim “the more – the better,” i.e. the more partners 
approach to the European Union, more opportunities regarding political, economical, financial and 
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technical support an cooperation can be provided by the European Union.”160 In the same communica-
tion, the Commission granted its support to further regional initiatives to strengthen the already exist-
ing process and alluded in the same context to the French invitation in June 2008 to negotiate new 
impulses for the Mediterranean region.161 
3.5 The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean 
“Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government meeting in Paris on 13 July 2008, inspired by 
the shares political will to revitalise efforts to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, de-
mocracy and prosperity, agree to adopt the following joint declaration: 
The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean building in the Barcelona Declaration and its 
objectives of achieving peace, stability and security as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a 
multilateral partnership with a view to increase the potential for the regional integration and cohesion. 
Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the po-
litical agenda of all countries. They stress the need for a better co-ownership by all participants and for 
more relevance and visibility for the citizens. 
They share the conviction that the initiative can play an important role in addressing common chal-
lenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food 
security crisis, degradation of environment, including climate change and desertification, with the 
view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as 
promoting dialogue between cultures. 
It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other States 
(members and observers) of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League shall be invited to the meetings 
of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, in pursuance of its participation in the Barce-
lona Process. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean welcomes Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro which have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process.”162 
 
The conclusion of this declaration is based on the proposal of the former French presidential candidate 
Nicolas Sarkozy, who advanced the idea of a “Union of the Mediterranean” during his election night 
press conference on May 6, 2007.163 His discourse related from declarations of the failure of the Bar-
celona Process to the conviction that the time had come for “the Mediterranean and Europe to realise 
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that their destinies are tied together”164 and that it must be the aim to build a political, economic and 
cultural union “of which our children will be proud of.”165 He also compared a possible initiation of 
the Mediterranean Union with the moment of the foundation of the European Union.166 The original 
idea, limiting the Mediterranean Union just to countries bordering the Mediterranean, provoked criti-
cism at the highest governmental level and in the scientific debate. 
When France indented to assign Turkey a strong position within the Mediterranean Union as an alter-
native to a European membership, Turkey immediately rejected the idea. A far-reaching criticism was 
to be expected from Germany, which was not willing to except the French attempt to “sideline existing 
EU policies and hijack European funds to support French Foreign Policy initiatives.”167 The modifica-
tion of the French proposal to the whole European Union happened due to the vehement intervention 
of Germany, which determined to prevent a division of competences regarding the political responsi-
bility within the European foreign policy. The position of Great Britain was all but supportive and 
Spain and Italy expressed their concerns as they feared constraints of the existing Barcelona Process 
and a decline of their influence within the European Mediterranean policy. The reaction of the Medi-
terranean partners reflected a certain attitude of expectation regarding a concretion of the French pro-
posal and the apprehension of a limitation of the positive aspects of the Barcelona Process.168  
Encouraged by the political reaction, the experts and scientists working on the Mediterranean policy 
appraised the debate about Mediterranean issues and discussed the French motive of initiation and 
possible outcomes. The discussion on the reaction about the French single-handed initiative focuses on 
two crucial elements of the Mediterranean policy: on the competition among European national inter-
ests, which manifest the European disunity regarding the foreign policy direction; and on the Euro-
Mediterranean policy so far. The widespread criticism of the Barcelona Process regarding its bureau-
cratic ponderosity, its lack of transparency and its “confusing combination” with the European neigh-
bourhood policy found ample consideration. In respect of the actual proposal of a Mediterranean Un-
ion, the debates resembled the process of the development of the French proposal; the spectrum 
reached from the initial idea of limiting a possible Mediterranean Union to the Mediterranean coun-
tries and its historical reference, the French initiative of 5+5, to the decision of involving the whole 
European Union and countries willing to participate in the Barcelona Process and to questions regard-
ing the working process and the institutional structure. What came and what was left from the switch 
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of Sarkozy’s “rhetoric from a turning point to an increasing pragmatism”?169 Where does the proposal 
of the Mediterranean Union stand today? 
With the recognition of the need of “further and faster reforms” and a “qualitative and quantitative 
change” for the relations across the Mediterranean, the European Commission suggested to “reinforce 
the successful elements of the existing Barcelona Process” referring to its goals and cooperation ar-
eas.170 “The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” remains a multilateral partnership which 
focuses on regional and trans-regional projects. In three concrete aspects the new initiatives give a new 
impulse to the Barcelona Process:171 
• Upgrading the political level of the EU’s relationship with its Mediterranean partners; 
• Providing more co-ownership to the multilateral relations; 
• Making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional 
projects, relevant for the citizens of the region. 
 
Especially the intended upgrading of the political level leads to some renewals of the institutional co-
operation. It has been agreed to hold biennial summits by the heads of state and government, the con-
clusions constitute a two-year working programme. The annual foreign minister meetings are respon-
sible to review the implementation progress of the summit conclusions, the preparation of upcoming 
summit meetings and possible approvals of new projects. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary As-
sembly constitutes the legitimate parliamentary expression and the Anna Lindt Euro-Mediterranean 
Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures covers the cultural dimension on the institutionalized level. 
New elements of cooperation concern the alternate host of the summits either in a European or in a 
Mediterranean partner country, the establishment of a co-presidency applied to all meetings, the crea-
tion of a joint secretariat which shall play a key role in the institutional character and the foundation of 
a joint permanent committee. This committee, based in Brussels, will assist, prepare and ensure the 
follow-ups of the meeting of the senior officials, which keep their responsibility to prepare the Minis-
terial Meetings.172 
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III CONCL UDING RE M ARKS 
Without anticipating an overall evaluation of the European Mediterranean policy, some mayor aspects 
can conclusively be singled out to approach on the success and failure of the Barcelona Process in 
order to build a bridge to the attempted empirical research. 
The Barcelona Process truly constitutes a new form of diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean 
and provides a coherent concept of a Mediterranean policy approach for the first time since the foun-
dation of the European Union. It represents a partnership, which currently brings together thirty-nine 
governments and seven hundred million people173 of different political, economical, social and cultural 
backgrounds. Not to forget the common agreed declarations of Barcelona 1995 and the summit in 
Paris 2008, which especially the southern governments involved in regional conflicts to overcome 
local policy boundaries in order to participate in a cross-border European initiative under the mantle of 
a common mission. This alone can be credited to be an achievement. The multilateral approach cer-
tainly comprises a new issue within Euro-Mediterranean relations and openes a new spectrum of re-
gional cooperation. Another aspect of the success list regarding the Barcelona Process concerns the 
cultural dimension, the human aspect. Although it is broadly discussed in literature that the agreements 
regarding democratic values and protection of human rights within the Barcelona Process are not le-
gally binding and that the European Union could do more to support these initiative, it has to be stated 
that within such a sensitive area, where cultural differences dominate the world conception and easily 
lead to wars (Afghanistan, Iraq), it has to be considered as an achievement to bring all countries to a 
table of dialogue. 
However, there are impeding factors that limit the success of the European Mediterranean cooperation. 
As a matter of fact the Mediterranean basin experiences a multitude of challenges, which the countries 
are not able to face alone. Nevertheless, after reading the literature and documents one receives the 
impression that the cooperation across the Mediterranean is more than only agreements, forced by 
external factors. Mediterranean non-member countries hope that Europe constitutes a confidant in geo-
strategic world policy concerns and their precariousness regarding too much intervention in domestic 
affairs can be equally perceived. Europe’s principal impression is struggle, struggle for a political 
identity within the immense and fast integration process which it is experiencing.  
The mayor criticism of the Barcelona Process concerns its bureaucratic ponderosity and lack of trans-
parency. These kinds of problems constitute structural problems, which are reflected by the European 
endeavour to establish a right framework for its enlargement policy. The developmental process of the 
European Mediterranean policy demonstrates the struggle with structural components accurately. 
From the beginning of bilateral association agreements and first attempts of a global Mediterranean 
policy to the Barcelona Process and its incorporation in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the 
European Union always responded to changes on the European map. Beside the French interests of 
 
173  Ibid.9. 
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playing a key role in Mediterranean affairs, the Mediterranean Union constitutes a reform of a reform. 
The Barcelona Process literally dozed off with its incorporation in the ENP. Primary to the socio-
economic developments, the need of an efficient Mediterranean policy is required, as can be deduced 
from the communications of the Commission.174 The structural struggle does not only concern the 
setting of the policy framework, but also the internal processes of the European Union. The stressed 
dualism of the European system regarding the common foreign policy complicates the internal com-
munication and consecutively paralyses the advancement of possibly successful initiatives. This dual 
structure bears another impeding factor, the divergence of the European national interests. On the one 
hand, there is a great effort to accord the distinctive interests; on the other hand, the European Union 
needs to counterbalance the national competitions and possible block constructions as well as to avoid 
division lines, like inherent North-South or East-South divergences. Regarding the Mediterranean 
policy, the European Union demonstrates an internal struggle to build a common structure. In foreign 
affairs it demonstrates the lack of a role identity.  
Questioning the postcolonial remains within the European Mediterranean policy provides information 
about the continuity/discontinuity of imperial claims. This indicates nothing less than the grade of 
national dominances within a common policy, the motivation and concerns beside the official dis-
course and, in the best case, provides an additional perspective in order to read the European history 
and apprehend the current Mediterranean policy. 
 
RESEARCH QUES TION 
In the following chapter both, the backgrounds which lead to the formulation of the present research 
question and the concretions on the definition of the concept of postcolonialism will be highlighted. 
The approach to the central hypothesis focuses on the preliminary assumptions and on a schematic 
display of the research aim of this work. Consecutively follows a discussion of the concept of post-
colonialism and a definition regarding the applicability of the term. 
IV  HYP OT HES IS 
The approach to the hypothesis of the present work is exposed with an introductive depiction concern-
ing preliminary assumptions on the topic and concludes with a schematic display of the development 
of the central question of the present analysis. 
 
174  Comp. COM (2008)319 final and KOM (2007) 774 endg. 
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1 Pre l iminary  assumptions  
The hypothesis of the present work is developed from two elementary thoughts regarding current 
European politics in the Mediterranean region.  
The first aspect, which raises further questions, relates to the intention of the initiation of the Barce-
lona Process. Where does the necessity for this multilateral convention accrue? Which interests follow 
the countries which participate in the first multilateral approach of a Mediterranean policy? And what 
does this mean for the European foreign policy - can it be understood as a continuity of the historical 
interests in the Mediterranean or is it a new way for countries with an obvious economical, political 
and social discrepancy to deal with each other? The second fascinating issue concerns the fact that the 
Barcelona Process is synonymously used with the term Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.175 The estab-
lishment of the ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ as political paradigm took place at the very begin-
ning of the Barcelona Process. Challenging this paradigm leads to the following questions: What are 
the references of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership? Which historical concepts stand behind “Euro-
Mediterranean”? To what kind of partnership does it refer to? Who or what are the motors for this new 
political approach? What does it mean for the initiated process? How do the political powers face the 
apparent inequality among the participants in regard to the distinctive economical, political, social and 
cultural backgrounds? And what does it mean for the European political understanding of the Mediter-
ranean?  
Both, questioning the initiation and challenging the established paradigm of a “Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership” converge to the same aim: to scrutinise the European position in Mediterranean affairs.  
The conflictive discrepancy among the so-called “partners” in the Euro-Mediterranean policy is com-
monly known and often stressed in the media, as the press articles, which will later be analysed, will 
demonstrate. The literature explains that the European initiative was mainly based on socio-economic 
considerations and on the increasing security concern regarding the developments in the Mediterra-
nean non-member countries (MNC). On the other hand, the non-European participants of the Barce-
lona Process need a reliable linkage with Europe because their economies are more dependent and 
they face severe challenges, like handling the strong demographic growth with a significant weaker 
economic, political and social situation compared to Europe. Considering that these are the apparent 
arguments which may describe the political reason for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it is histori-
cally interesting to question the level beneath the official discourse and the explanation of political 
scientists.   
 
175  The synonymously use of ‘Barcelona Process’ and ‘Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’ is especially common in the 
political scientist literature and also a common undertaking from the European official side. In the present work the 
synonymous application of the two terms is not questioned and, if thematically not misleading, occasionally also ex-
ercised. Nevertheless, from a historical point of view and the basal placement of the central research aim of this work, 
the Barcelona Process is understood as a developing process in time, while the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership dif-
fers in its conceptuality, as it refers to a political paradigm. 
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Before the main aspects which legitimate a historical investigation will be discussed, it is necessary to 
illuminate the high degree of complexity, which the contemporary politics face in the Mediterranean. 
A punctual approach on the vast topic which encompasses the Mediterranean Policy gives an idea 
about the actual controversy of the subject matter and clarifies the necessity of limiting the investiga-
tion area to the focus of a concrete research aim. The interlacing issues, which mark the topical com-
plexity, are the following176:   
(1) The initiation of the Barcelona Process took place in 1995, which was no coincidence. (2) There-
fore, there is a historical background. (3) The Barcelona Declaration was firmed freely by all partici-
pants. (4) Thus, there must be political, economical and cultural interests on both sides of the Mediter-
ranean. (5) But the Mediterranean issue does not engage all European countries the same way. (6) This 
leads to the assumption of distinctive interests among the European Countries, especially of those 
which are not tightly linked to the Mediterranean Affairs. (7) Europe has a migration concern regard-
ing the illegal immigration and even a security concern, thus one reason for the initiation of the Barce-
lona Process could be to legitimate a monitoring position. (8) This would mean the Barcelona Process 
is an adequate diplomatic instrument to guarantee political allies on both sides of the Mediterranean to 
secure individual interests. (9) The synonymous use of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Barcelona 
Process indicates a region-building aspect from the European side as it stresses a reference to a com-
mon space. (10) Additional dynamic components of the European Mediterranean Policy lie, for in-
stance, in the increasing cultural challenges which concern this geographical region (terrorist attacks, 
sensitive religious atmosphere between Christians and Islamists) as well as (11) the political instability 
(Middle East conflict, radicalisation of political regimes). (12) Other conflictive aspects concern the 
fact that the mayor financial support of the Barcelona Process is provided by the European Union177 or 
(13) that in European tradition the Barcelona Process is highly bureaucratic, which involves (14) a 
certain ponderosity and opacity in its structure and operation. (15) Consecutively, it makes the whole 
process all but transparent. (16) Although the official documentation is publicly accessible, it has to be 
stated that it is the European Union who hosts the archives and reports. (17) The ten-year resume of 
the Barcelona Process lead from critical voices to the opinion of its failure. (18) The failure was firstly 
proclaimed by a high political representative in the French presidential elections of 2007. (19) Since 
then, France took over the political initiative in the Mediterranean Policy which (20) gives the topic a 
very newsworthy character, especially (21) as the French president succeeded to launch the Mediterra- 
 
 
176  As it is the aim of the work to scrutinize the attitude and position of the European Union, the punctual approach 
concerning the complexity of the topic also focuses on European concerns. 
177 Since 1957 and the development of a coherent Mediterranean Policy in 1995, the European Union experienced sev-
eral developmental steps which are also reflected in its denomination. If thematically not misleading, “European Un-
ion” is applied as superordinated denomination. 
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nean Union.178 (22) The fact that Germany thwarted the French initiative to limit the Mediterranean 
Union to the countries which boarder the Mediterranean demonstrates the struggle of differing inter-
ests among mayor European nations, which not only indicate diverging ambitions regarding their po-
litical self-understanding within the EU but, historically explained, root in times of colonialism.  
Deriving from this punctual approach on the topical complexity it is necessary to identify aspects 
which substantiate the legitimacy of a historical investigation. Within the historical scope three com-
mon denominators can be deduced from this vast topic: firstly, the novelty-character of the political 
initiative in the Mediterranean; secondly, the apparent predominant position of the European Union 
within the Barcelona Process; and thirdly, the European initiated, region-building aspect of the Euro-
pean Mediterranean Policy. 
1.1  Novelty character 
In the long time of Mediterranean history, it was the first time that the countries involved in the Barce-
lona Process signed a common declaration. Its historical value goes further than the mutual agreed 
political, economical and cultural partnership – it actual attempts to guarantee political stability, which 
inheres nothing less than the character of a treaty of peace. In a historical perspective, this political 
attitude is a new way to deal with potential conflicts and to face current challenges. In times of global-
ization, common challenges cannot be solved alone due to the geographical nearness and economical 
enmeshment of the southern European countries in the Mediterranean area.  
In literature, the consensus about the novelty character of the Barcelona Process is dominating. While 
Richard Gillespie is convinced that it “marked the start of a new chapter in the relations”179 over the 
Mediterranean, Stephen C. Calleya calls it even a “unique opportunity to strengthen political, eco-
nomic and cultural ties across the Euro-Mediterranean area.”180 Annette Jünemann states that never 
before existed a multilateral forum of dialogue, including the parties involved in the Middle East con-
flict, which discussed political and security themes regarding the region.181  
The development of the diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean constitutes de facto a novelty. 
From a historical point of view, the existence of a commonly agreed Mediterranean Policy, which 
brings together European countries and Mediterranean non-member countries, may not be underesti-
mated. Questioning the novelty character seems to be a useful undertaking when considering if there is 
a possible discrepancy between the official European position, which attempts to herald a new politi-
 
178  Originally, Nicolas Sarkozy planned to launch a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. 
Due to the conviction that the Mediterranean concerns the whole European Union, Germany intervened the way that 
the Mediterranean Union just constitutes a reaffirmation on the Barcelona Process and can be defined as a revitaliza-
tion of the aims formulated in 1995.  
179  Richard GILLESPIE, Introduction: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative. In: Richard GILLESPIE (ed.), 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: political and economic perspectives (London 1997), 1-9, here 1. 
180  Stephen C. CALLEYA, Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Mediterranean. In: (Center for European 
Integration Studies/Discussion Paper C75, Bonn 2000), 39. Available online: www.zei.de.  
181  Anette JÜNEMANN, Zehn Jahre Barcelona Prozess: Eine gemeinsame Geschichte. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschich-
te, APuZ 45/2005 (7.November 2005), 7-13,7. 
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cal era of Mediterranean Policies, and the actual content of the Mediterranean Policy. The discrepancy 
between statement and practice indicates in which way the European attitude relates to its past. Has 
the Union of European states overcome its imperial pretensions, its colonial past? Ruptures, continui-
ties within or a real new era of relations across the Mediterranean are central concerns when question-
ing the novelty character of the Barcelona Process.   
In times of increasing fast-paced developments, the reflection on the Barcelona Process and the Euro-
pean positioning with the knowledge of the Mediterranean and the European history may not only be 
an interesting undertaking but – in the best case – may inclusively be useful for broadening the discus-
sion field. 
1.2 Predominant European positioning 
Several aspects of the Barcelona Process show an apparent dominant position of the European Union. 
At this point three examples shall underline this argument.  
First, the initiation: Although the Southern Mediterranean countries were afraid of a cutback of their 
economic relation to the European market due to the European enlargement policy and demanded 
compensation, the decisive request for the initiation of the Barcelona Process was made by the south-
ern European Countries. Barcelona hosted the conference where the common declaration was signed 
and forms part of the nomenclature of the new Mediterranean Policy; this manifests the impression 
that Europe has been the leading voice for the initiation of the process.  
Second, the predominant information position: The procedure and kind of the establishment and im-
plementation of the policy indicate a mainly one-sided knowledge transfer. The negotiation of the 
framing of the Barcelona Process was a purely European matter. Stephen C. Calleya states that the 
“Euro-Med process has been essentially EU driven” and argues for a stronger involvement of the 
MNCs.182 The discrepancy between a rather dominant position of the European Union and the contri-
bution of the MNCs appears crucial in order to evaluate Europe’s position. Another aspect of a pre-
dominant information position concerns the documentation of the policy development. The documen-
tal access to former meetings, the status of the working process, the agenda, etc. can be obtained from 
the Web domain of the European Union, which is all but clearly laid out.183  
The third apparent aspect of a predominant European role in the Mediterranean policy pertains to the 
financial level: Among the principal concerns for the initiation of the Barcelona Process and the par-
ticipation in it range socio-economic considerations; the European Union’s interest to guarantee the 
stability on its boarder shores is opposed by the high dependency of the MNC economies on the Euro-
pean market. This motivational dialectic, which facilitated the launch of the Barcelona Process, de-
 
182  Stephen C. CALLEYA, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process. An Evaluation (Discussion Paper for the Elev-
enth Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminar, November 16th -17th 2001) Available online: 
http://www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/ (24.9.2008).   
183  http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/index_en.htm (24.9.2008). 
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pends on the European financial support. Without European funds there would be no Mediterranean 
policy of this kind. This raises a strong concern on deepening the question of the European interests in 
the Mediterranean. How does Europe deal with its responsibility towards the Mediterranean countries? 
In which way does the European domination influence the ambitious Mediterranean project? What 
about the consciousness of this domination? All these questions justify a profound historical analysis, 
not only because the historical perspective obtains a large knowledge about power and its forms, but 
also because of its contextual setting. The historical analysis may provide conclusions on how and to 
what extent power and domination is important for the positioning in the Mediterranean affairs. 
1.3 Region-building aspect 
The definition of the Mediterranean within the Barcelona Process does not refer to a geographical 
definition, but constitutes a political construction encompassing the following states and sub-regions: 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, which build the core states of the Maghreb; the Mashreq states Egypt, 
Israel, Lebanon and Syria, Jordan (which is no Mediterranean country, but was included due to its 
significance in the Middle East conflict); the Palestinian Authority and Turkey.184  
One way to detect region-building intentions is to focus on the nomenclature of the Mediterranean 
Policy. The synonymous use of Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) dem-
onstrates the region-building intention even more accurately than the denomination of “Euro-
Mediterranean” indicates a reference to a common space. Even more evident appears the recent revi-
talisation of the Barcelona Process under the mantle of the “Mediterranean Union”. 
Another way of approaching the region-building issue of the Barcelona Process is questioning the 
measures that have been taken for it. Richard Gillespie, who apprehends democratisation as one of the 
instruments of Euro-Mediterranean region-building, states that “there is a certain plausibility to the 
argument that an effective international promotion of shared values may contribute to region-building, 
and may even be a viable form of region building itself, to the extent that the normative effects of the 
activity become translated into common practices and purposeful interaction between states.”185 By 
contrast, Stephen C. Calleya refers to the international trend of regionalism when he comprises region-
building as a possibility to encourage regional relations. He is convinced that the reactivation of sub-
regional initiatives has helped to improve regional relations across the Mediterranean186 and states that 
“the main challenge facing the EMP is to try to nurture closer political and economic ties between the 
 
184  Anette JÜNEMANN, Europas Mittelmeerpolitik im regionalen und politischen Wandel: Interessen und Zielkonflikte. 
In: Wulfdiether ZIPPEL (Hrsg.), Die Mittelmeerpolitik der EU (Baden-Baden 1999), 29-64.32. 
185  Richard GILLESPIE, A Political Agenda for Region-building? The EMP and Democracy Promotion in North Africa. 
(Institute of European Studies/ Paper 040530, 2004), 2. Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040530  
(24.9.2008). 
186  Stephen C. CALLEYA, The Euro-Med Partnership and Sub Regionalism: A Case of Region Building? (Institute of 
European Studies/ Paper 040424, 2004) Available online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040424 (24.9.2008). 
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different sub-regions of the Mediterranean that largely continue to follow different evolutionary pat-
terns (…)”187  
Enhancing region-building measures is no accidental act, but pursues certain intentions. Hence, ques-
tioning the European motivation in the Mediterranean and challenging the effort “to promote the con-
struction of a Mediterranean ‘region’ of stability and peace via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or 
Barcelona Process” seem to be essential.188 For the present analysis of the historical dimension the 
following questions are crucial: What are the intentions of a political construct of a “Mediterranean 
region”? Does the region-building effort in the Mediterranean influence the building of a proper iden-
tity as regulatory/hegemonial power within the international power concert? Or from another perspec-
tive, how does the regionalism in the Mediterranean enhance or harm the European Mediterranean 
Policy? And what is the significance of the region-building issue for the relations across the Mediter-
ranean? 
 
2 Schemat i c  d isplay  on the  deve lopment  o f  the  centra l  hypothesi s  
Considering the novelty, the sensitive point of an apparent European domination and the region-
building aspect of the Barcelona process, what are the historical denominators which can be referred to 
analytically? The proposal of the schematic alignment is to refer to the times of colonialism as an ob-
vious link across the Mediterranean as a common historical denominator.  
 
 
Graph 2: „Development of the hypothesis“; own illustration 
 
187  Stephen C. CALLEYA, Region-building in the Mediterranean: Recent developments in the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, (EuroMeSCo E-news Nr.21/February 2008), 4. Available online: http://www.euromesco.net/ im-
ages/enews21_en.pdf The sub-regions Calleya refers to are: Southern Europe, the Balkans, the Maghreb and the 
Mashreq. 
188  Emanuel ADLER, Beverly CRAWFORD, Normative Power: The European Practice of Region Building and the 
Case oft he Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Institute of European Studies/ Paper 040400, 2004), 2. Available 
online: http://repositories.cdlib.org/ies/040400 (24.9.2008). 
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In the last one hundred and fifty years the European powers experienced mayor changes, which influ-
enced both their domestic sphere and their scope of foreign relations. However, the predominant cul-
tural position of the European powers over the last five hundred years seems to be even more relevant. 
The colonization as a form of expression of the worldwide dominating role of Europe finally found its 
end in the third quarter of the 20th century189, at a time when the collaborative thought disembogued in 
the gradually proceeding formation of the European Union. In the light of the ambitious European 
project to create a European Union and, therewith, the attempt to herald a new historical period for the 
European continent, the title of the present work and the question whether the Barcelona Process is a 
result of postcolonial politics implies a certain provocative aspect. The aim to create something new is 
challenged by exterior influences to path a new way of political relations and to try to achieve a regu-
latory power, as for example, in the Middle East Peace Process. Moreover, to remain credible at the 
same time is a hard undertaking as it can be deduced from the contemporary Mediterranean Policy. 
The decisive questions, which underline the objective of the present work when questioning the Barce-
lona Process, are: What is new and what is old? How are new elements and old elements related with 
each other? Where are ruptures and continuities among policy directions? And where does the official 
intention differ from the practice? By scrutinising the Barcelona Process as a result of postcolonial 
politics, it is the preliminary intention to focus on the questions to what extent the European project 
(EU) has emancipated itself from its past and what are the so-called postcolonial remains, if there are 
any.  
The one hundred and fifty years when the major European nations experienced their climax of impe-
rial power and the fifty years since the official end of colonialism constitute a relative short period in 
human history. Thus, the question of the nature of the European motivation regarding its Mediterra-
nean Policy seems a relevant undertaking, especially as Europe deduces its experience of over five 
hundred years of hegemony. Significant results of an evaluation of the nature of the European policy 
in the Mediterranean can not be gained by analysing circumstantial events of political successes and 
failures, but by an empirically exercised discourse analysis. By applying discourse analytical methods 
on sources, which carry distinctive purposes of discourses, the colonial remains within the contempo-
rary European policy in the Mediterranean can be evaluated and classified. It is the central concern of 
the present thesis to provide a distinctive reading of the European history by means of a particular 
definition of the postcolonial concept, applying the postcolonial terminology according to a self-
reflection of the contemporary European position in the Mediterranean. 
 
3 Research interes t  
The debate on the contemporary European Mediterranean Policy is obviously dominated by political 
scientists. The quantity of published works was subjected to the developmental process of the Mediter-
 
189   Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL, Kolonialismus. Geschichte. Formen. Folgen (München 2003), 124. 
V          Defining „postcolonial“ 
 
56 
ranean Policy. Before 1995, with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) approach or the Spanish and 
Italian initiative of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), numer-
ous articles were published and the scientific debate was lit up timely on the occasion of the 10th anni-
versary of the Barcelona Process and also since 2007, the year when the former French presidential 
candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, declared the failure of the Barcelona Process and announced the founda-
tion of a Mediterranean Union. Not surprisingly, the inflationary publication of works indicates the 
mayor development steps of such a, from a historical point of view, young process.  
Among the authors, who can be considered as specialists on the topic range, outstanding approaches 
can be found. For example, the articles of Annette Jünemann, who focuses on the democratisation 
aspect as a normative goal of the European Mediterranean Policy and serves as an idea contributor for 
many other works. Another author which should be highlighted is Stephen Calleya, who accurately 
analyses the assets and hindrances of the Barcelona Process by consistently remaining inventive. 
Among several authors, who worked on the Barcelona Process, there are hardly any profound histori-
cal reflections considered in the main arguments.  
Crucial for the present undertaking is the question of the possible contribution of the historical per-
spective to the thematic discussion of the Barcelona Process. Approaches of a contemporary setting 
often face harsh criticism for not exercising real historical research. The European history as an estab-
lished discipline requires historical approaches in order to support and encourage the reflection on the 
European project (EU). Questioning the European attitude towards its historical past regarding its con-
temporary relations across the Mediterranean through discourse analytical methods aspires to provide 
a different reading of history by widening the focus of the debate; this constitutes a great contribution 
to a self-reflective European history.  
V DE F INING “P OS T COL ONIAL” 
The term “postcolonial” encompasses a broad range of scientific debates; hence, it is not the aim to 
give a complete outline of the implementation of “post-colonialism” in humanities by defining the 
operational use for the present work, but to highlight arguments on specific aspects of the concept in 
order to justify their appropriation for this selection of topics. In a first step, the thematic diversity and 
interdisciplinary approach, which postcolonial studies deal with, are discussed. The second step fol-
lows with an etymological definition of the term “postcolonial” by important restrictions regarding the 
use of the term “postcolonial”. 
 
1 Themat i c  d iversi ty  and interdi scip l inar ity 
The term “postcolonial”, which came up in the 1970s, enjoys great popularity in a broad range of sci-
entific fields which thematically treat political, social, cultural and literary issues in sub-Saharan Af-
rica, South Asia, the Caribbean, the Arab world, and to lesser or different extents Latin America, Aus-
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tralia, Canada, Ireland, and even the United States.190 Explaining the abundance of possible perspec-
tives of postcolonial studies, David Chioni Moore states that in literature there is “a rough consensus 
that the cultures of postcolonial lands are characterized by tensions between the desire autonomy and a 
history of dependence, between the desire for autochthony and the fact of hybrid, part-colonial origin, 
between resistance and complicity, and between imitation (or mimicry) and originality.”191 However, 
not only former colonies entered the room of postcolonial reflection – the cultural impact on the colo-
nizers has also been discussed, although this undertaking has been frequently criticised. According to 
Bart Moore-Gilbert, there has been a “violent disagreement” among commentators of post-colonialism 
whether the postcolonial analysis should only treat postcolonial cultures or whether there is an exis-
tence of legitimacy – and if yes to what extent – to focus on the culture of the colonizing nations as 
well.192 As the colonialist action is based upon a colonizing and a colonized side, there are two posi-
tions to refer to. The legitimacy to focus on the colonizer roots not only in the fact that he is decisively 
involved in the colonialist act, but also that former colonialist relations did not end with the decoloni-
zation in many cases.  
Nevertheless, the appraisal of the magnitude of issues treated in reference with the postcolonial con-
cept is rather divided. While one side claims its accomplishment regarding the indefinite applicability, 
the other side criticizes its loss of efficacy as an analytical concept through its overstretched use.193 
Moore Gilbert attributes the elasticity of the concept „postcolonial“ to the fact that the term itself has 
been applied to many different kinds of historical moments, geographical regions, cultural identities, 
political predicaments and affiliations, and reading practices.194 Going through postcolonial literature 
leaves the impression that despite all attempts of defining the term “postcolonial” it remains ambigu-
ous and diffuse, which leads to permanent debates whenever it is applied. According to Chioni Moore, 
the auto-critical debate is not only a “remarkabe” achievement within postcolonial studies, but also 
strengthened the field’s hold.195 At this point the successful conjunction of the thematic diversity and 
its interdisciplinary approach can be understood; hence, the different guises in which postcolonial 
studies treat a variety of topics derive from its interdisciplinary accession, which the concept managed 
to develop over the time.  
One of the outstanding accomplishments, which have been achieved in the context of postcolonial 
discussions, is that the concept of postcolonialism, which has its origin in the field of English litera-
 
190  David CHIONI MOORE, Is the Post-in Postcolonial the Post- in Post-Soviet? Toward a Global Postcolonial Critique. 
In: Gaurav DESAI, Supriya NAIR (eds.), Postcolonialisms. An Anthology of Cultural Theory and Criticism (Oxford 
2005),514-538, 541. 
191  Ibid. 515. 
192  Bart MOORE-GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory. Contexts, Practices, Politics (London/ New York 1997), 11. 
193  Maria DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, Nikita DHAWAN (eds.), Postkoloniale Theorie. Eine kritische Einführung 
(Bielefeld 2005), 112. 
194 MOORE-GILBERT, Postcolonial Theory, 11.  
195  CHIONI MOORE, Post- in Postcolonial, 515.  
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ture, has managed to cross traditional boundaries of scientific disciplines in a short time.196 The prove-
nance of postcolonial studies is rooted in the “Commonwealth Literary Studies”, which originally 
examined the literature of colonies belonging to the British Empire. In a relative short time, a deeper 
examination of the culture and structure of the predominance proved to be needful. After the publica-
tion of Edward Saids’ book “Orientalism,” the methodological approach of a decided postcolonial 
discourse analysis enriched the scope of postcolonial studies. While the term “Postcolonial Studies” 
was synonymously used with “Commonwealth Literature Studies” before 1978, it found its own place 
within humanities after the publication of Saids’ pioneering work.197 The interdisciplinary claim arises 
with configurations such as “colonial discourse analysis,” which insists upon the entanglement be-
tween literature, history, politics, sociology and other disciplines.198 Ato Quayson, who analyses the 
dimension of interdisciplinarity in postcolonial studies, differentiates between instrumental interdisci-
plinarity, which is designed to intervene in specific problems in the world outside academia, and syn-
optic interdisciplinarity, which collates ideas either for the constitution of different disciplines or for 
the application of synthetic theory across disciplines.199 According to Quayson, postcolonial studies 
are highly interdisciplinary in the synoptic sense; in order to comprehend the complex relations, which 
underlie the process of colonialism, and the consequences, there is a necessity to cross disciplinary 
adhered boundaries.200  
Although postcolonial studies mainly focus on the former colonies as object of investigation and the 
analysis towards the opposite direction, the colonizers, is critically viewed, it is the purpose of the 
present work to provide a thematic amplification. The central hypothesis does not deal with the influ-
ences and consequences of colonialism on the culture of the colonizers, but tries to give answers to the 
colonial remains in the current Mediterranean politics. The postcolonial theory enables to widen the 
analytic scope to contemporary European politics due to its inherent ambition to examine complex 
structures not in a linear way and its search to cross traditional boundaries either in a thematically or 
disciplinary sense in order to find new approaches. Consequentially, every use of postcolonial theory 
and methodology takes place under the critical eyes of scientific authorities of the distinctive disci-
plines. For me, the elasticity of the concept of postcolonialism can not be valued as weakness, but as 
strength instead as long as methodological guidelines are respectively considered. The examination of 
the colonial act remains in the current European politics in the Mediterranean attempts to point out 
patterns of actions, intersections of interests, diverse political positioning and hidden conceptual per-
ceptions of political allies in order to provide a self-reflective analysis of the history of the European 
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Union. The methodological concern of applying a colonial discourse analysis and aiming for a well-
founded interdisciplinary approach is therefore based within the tradition of postcolonial theory.  
 
2 Etymological  approach 
The etymological provenience of the composite term “postcolonial” derives from Latin. The prefix 
“post” refers to two different meanings: first, the utilisation as adverb and preposition concerning spa-
cious specifications expresses “back” or “behind,” while its second significance derives from its use as 
temporal preposition meaning “after” and “since” respectively.201 Colonialism traces back in its sub-
stantive meaning to 1. col!nia, -ae ( f.): settlement, colony as well as settler, cultivator and its verbal 
denotation 2. col! 3. colo" cultus: cultivate, settle but also to feed, adorn, educate, conduct, exercise, 
admire and appraise.202  
In its conceptual meaning the sentiments vary and focus on different positions and perceptions of his-
tory. Stuart Hall, an often quoted author in regard to the definition and appointment of the meaning of 
the term postcolonial, questions the references of postcolonial times. He argues that if the postcolonial 
time refers to the time after colonialism and if colonialism is defined trough the binary differentiation 
between colonizers and colonized, one has to interrogate the matter and character of differences.203 
Hence, important guidelines of intellectual reflectiveness derive which question changes and break 
lines throughout history, especially in the period of decolonization. It is to say that instead of interpret-
ing history as a linear process, postcolonial theory allocates itself in the examination of inconsistencies 
in historical processes.204 Although the postcolonial concept is often criticised due to its theoretical 
and political ambivalent positioning regarding a clear division between colonizer and colonized and 
also due to its temporal ambiguity, as there is no apparent separation between an epistemological or 
chronological periodisation, Hall nevertheless states that the term might be useful to explain the 
change in global relations which marks the transition from the times of Empires to post-dependency 
and post- decolonization.205 He ascribes the capability of analysing the new relations and distributions 
of power, which emerge in new constellations, to the fact that the postcolonial concept contains a great 
level of abstraction. At the same time, he emphasises that the intersection from one conception of dif-
ference to another marks the focus of the “postcolonial” and this change encourages reading the colo- 
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nial encounter, which so far focused on binary oppositions in a new way.206 
David Chioni Moore starts his reflection on the terminology of “postcolonial” with the conclusive 
statement that “it is no doubt true that there is, on this planet, not a single square meter of inhabited 
land that has not been, at one time or another, colonized and then postcolonial.”207 Chioni Moore, be-
ing not such a representative spokesman of postcolonial theory as Stuart Hall, convinces with his re-
flection of postcolonialism in reference with the former Soviet Union not only because of the themati-
cally new approach, but also with the analysis of a supranational, multi-ethnical state as object of re-
search. He points out that the term “postcolonial” was invented in order to replace termini which for-
feit precision regarding the political correctness such as “non- Western”, “Third World”, “minority” 
and “emergent”.208 Chioni Moore emphasizes that the concept of “postcolonial” apparently worked 
better than all the other terms: “it lacked the derogations of former labels, it specified what unified its 
compass (a former subjugated relation to Western powers), it embodied a historical dimension, and it 
opened analytic windows onto common features of peoples who had only recently, and to the extent 
possible, thrown off their European chains.”209  
Not the replacement of conceptual terminology, but the appraisal of the multitude of things which are 
treated beneath the wording “postcolonial” come in valuation with the approach of Gaurav Desai and 
Supriya Nair. It is their suggestion to precise the terminology of postcolonial theory by using the 
term’s plural “postcolonialisms.” Hence, they aim to grant respect to the multitude of historical expe-




206  “(…) Doch eine vorbehaltlose Rückkehr zu einem reinen und unverfälschten Ursprung erwies sich als unmöglich, da 
die langfristigen historischen Auswirkungen der ‘Transkulturation‘, die für die koloniale Erfahrung charakteristisch 
waren, meiner Ansicht nach irreversibel waren. Die Unterschiede zwischen kolonisierten und kolonisierenden Kultu-
ren bleiben natürlich fundamental. Doch beruhten sie nie auf einer reinen binären Opposition und tun das auch heute 
nicht. Ja, ich würde sogar den Wandel seit den Konstellationen, in denen die antikoloniale Auseinandersetzungen 
scheinbar in einer binären Form dargestellt werden konnten, bis heute, wo das nicht mehr möglich ist, als Übergang 
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Oppositionen als Formen der Transkulturation, der kulturellen Übersetzung neu zu lesen, die unweigerlich dazu füh-
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These ways of reflections on the terminology of postcolonialism, which have been singled out from 
the multitude of approaches, demonstrate despite their different focuses that the definition of the post-
colonial concept has to do a lot with constructed and implemented perceptions in history. Postcolonial-
ism in its primary meaning refers to the time “after” colonialism, the time of decolonization. From its 
basal concept, there is no indication of an explicit geographical or temporal reference; therefore, there 
are no specific restrictions on its applicability. Consequentially, there are no arguments against its 
focus on European politics in the Mediterranean and its contemporary frame. Concerning the term 
postcolonialism in this work, the prefix ‘post’ does not implicate that colonial relations vanished with 
the official end of the colonial period in the 1970s. In this sense I follow Padmini Mongia, arguing that 
the ‘post’ in postcolonial can be read as a reference to both changes in power and structure after the 
end of colonialism and the continuing effects, particularly as they are discursively manifested.211 
Hence, postcolonialism functions as an umbrella term, which covers different critical approaches in 
order to deconstruct the European thought.212 
Concerning the concepts of binary oppositions (now – then, they – us…), it is important to underline 
that they can be useful analytical parameters in a restricted sense, but they never give comprehensive 
information about any moment in history. The achievement within the postcolonial theory lies in the 
approach to try to overcome these polarities with a different look on history, not in the way to accen-
tuate linearity, but to accentuate the changes and break lines. Regarding the history of the European 
Union, ruptures and repetitions in common historical patterns seem to be a very important issue, espe-
cially as all member countries refer to a different colonial past. To examine the new positioning in the 
world power concert, politics in a supposed new mantle and hidden paradigms are central concerns. 
Within the postcolonial theory a transnational historiography can take place as well as an attempt to 
reread the colonial history by applying a colonial discourse analysis. 
 
3 Res tr i c tion  
Among the criticism concerning the postcolonial theory there are two reproaches I conclusively want 
to comment on.  
One is the intense criticism on Eurocentric positions, which also takes an ample place in postcolonial 
debates. Following Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, who both define Eurocentrism as a model 
on which the histories and social formations of all societies can be measured and evaluated,213 the 
disaggregation of this approach also has to find room in the scientific tradition. Although the claim to 
overcome Eurocentric visions in the defined sense is comprehensive and needful, it is important to be 
aware of the provenience of this conception and its supposed legitimacy until now. Europe, a continent 
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whose history was determined by hegemony over the last centuries, looks retrospectively back on an 
assertiveness which is profoundly rooted in its culture. Hence, a hypothesis, which questions the colo-
nial and imperial leftovers within a newly designed Mediterranean politics, needs a Eurocentric refer-
ence in order to reach significant results on a self- reflective European history. The focus on European 
history regarding a colonial discourse analysis does not, at any point, want to raise the impression of 
negating room in the debate to the ones, who were domineered by European powers, especially as 
there is still the need for a lot of historical work. A self-reflective analysis of the European history may 
inclusively provide an additional perspective to the debate.    
Another point, which demands clarification, results from critical statements. For example, Ania 
Loombia appoints that using “postcolonial” as a term implicates the abnegation of the richness of the 
indigenous culture before the colonization.214 Such convictions make it necessary to straighten out a 
sensitive point, which inevitably comes along with working on historical relations of predominance 
and suppression in contemporary nearness. The attention, which focuses on the utilization of the term 
“postcolonial” in the present work, does not pretend a valuation of the history of colonialism to any 
extent.215 A political instrumentalisation of this sensitive topic in scientific debates, based in declar-
edly hard times, has to be strictly rejected. This investigation may aim to contribute to a wider per-
spective on political relevant fields, but should take place in a well considered way. 
 
METHOD 
The following remarks aim to illustrate the methodological outline of this doctoral thesis. In this sense, 
explanations on the structural composition are important as introductive annotations on both, the 
methodology of historical discourse analysis and the nature of sources, which build the fundament of 
the analysis. 
VI  ST RUCT URE  OF  T HE W ORK 
The structural setting of the present work, which is schematically outlined in the graph below, is basi-
cally arranged in two parts, an introductive oriented part and an empirically based part. The first part, 
the theoretical frame, provides a scientific and thematic introduction. For both concerns secondary 
literature is the main base for arguing development-orientated remarks on the hypothesis, terminologi-
cal concretions, methodological specifications and topical contextualization. The second part, the em-
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pirical investigation, represents the analytical heart of this doctoral thesis. The discourse analysis, ap-
plied on three different kinds of sources (European documents, speeches of political personages and 
articles published in the European press media), shall provide the analytical results to respond to the 
hypothesis. The introduction and especially the conclusion, which aims to provide a confirmatory trial 
by means of considering institutional structures and socio-economic developments, round the work 
off. 
 
Graph 3: Structural alignment of the present work, own Illustration 
While the introduction fulfils its assignment through introductive remarks on the topic, the theoretical 
frame provides the thematic and methodological background to put the aim and conduction of the em-
pirical analysis across. The descriptions of the thematic introduction and the development of the hy-
pothesis, the applied methodology form the setting of the analysis of the present work. Outlining the 
research question, method and thematic introduction will roughly form a bit less than a third of the 
entire work.  
As already mentioned before, the empirical part forms the heart of the present work. It is the aim to 
give an overview of the establishment, implementation and the perception of the official discourse of 
the European Union regarding the Mediterranean policy by an accurately applied methodology. There-
fore, the emphasis is on an examination of three different types of primary sources: documents of the 
European Union, speeches of personages of political or public weight and articles published by the 
European Media216. While the analysis of documents of the European Union interrogates the political 
discourse in its establishment function, the analysis of speeches shows the intended discourse regard-
ing its persuasive implementation and the analysis of the articles demonstrates the public perception in 
different European countries. Hence, the discourse analysis targets to achieve results on the kind of 
discourse Europe is basing its Mediterranean policy on. Concerning the extensiveness of this examina-
tion, the discourse analysis constitutes about two-thirds of the entire work. 
 
216  Note: Newspapers and magazines which are published in English, German, Spanish, French and Italian find consid-
eration. The selection is based on the languages skills of the author. 
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The conclusion completes the work. In accordance to the focus of the present research aim, the crucial 
aspects will be subsumed and assessed in regard to the gained results. 
The covered aspects shall give a detailed valuation of the European Mediterranean policy. They shall 
provide a comprehensive classification of the historical relations over the Mediterranean. At this point 
it is important to emphasis that the discourse analysis constitutes the most promising method to evalu-
ate postcolonial remains in current Mediterranean politics. 
VII  SOURCES 
The discourse analysis will be exercised on the basis of three different types of sources: documents of 
the European Union, speeches of political personages and articles published by the press media in 
Austria, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The following schematic 
alignment demonstrates the corpus of sources and the analytical considerations regarding the selection:  
 
 
Graph 4: OI, schematic alignment and analytical consideration of the selection of sources, own illustration 
The divergence and amplitude of sources aims to provide a broad coverage of different discourses 
regarding the Mediterranean policy. Hence, the European documentation reflects the official institu-
tional discourse of establishing a certain policy direction, while the speeches of politicians show the 
intention of implementing the discourse publicly; the press gives indications on the general perception, 
offers reactions on the discourse and expresses its own attitude. Consequentially, the analysis takes 
place on three distinctive levels of the discourse: on the institutional, political and public level. These 
three distinctive but interlaced levels constitute different discursive performances due to the fact that 
the official discourse is actively expressed on both the institutional level (EU documentation) and on 
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the political level (speeches). The European documents refer to the process of establishing a discourse 
concerning the Mediterranean policy. Considering both, the policy proposals of the European Com-
mission and the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings, it is possible to analyse an important 
spectrum of discourses of the European institutions.217 Analysing speeches of political representatives 
of the European Commission and Council also constitutes an active step as the discourse targets to 
persuade and convince, respectively the public of the motives and push the implementation of the in-
tended policy direction forward. It is to expect that the speeches give clearer expressions of the moti-
vation and functionality of the discourse than the official documents because they follow a more stan-
dardised expressed discourse. A comparison of both discourses will be interesting as both kinds of 
sources correspond to the same side of action. The reaction on the political discourse of the European 
Union can be evaluated by analysing the public level. The articles of the mayor quality newspapers of 
Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland shall provide an idea on the 
public perception of the Mediterranean policy per se and on the country specific importance of Medi-
terranean affairs. The country selection, which is based on language skills, provides a significant 
choice of member states of the European Union. Countries with a mayor political weight in European 
affairs (D, GB, F) and the Western European Mediterranean countries (E, I, F), who decisively influ-
ence the direction of the Mediterranean policy, are considered as well as a small European member 
country (A) and a non-European member state (CH). The selection of newspapers was oriented on 
agenda setting aspects and the balance between more conservative and liberal political orientations. 
The temporal setting of the sources concerns the period between the initiation of the Barcelona Proc-
ess in 1995 and the Conference in Paris in 2008 where an anew declaration was signed in order to 
revitalize the process. Concerning the quantity of sources that are considered in the analysis, Achim 
Landwehr already noted that it is quite hard to define the moment of reaching the adequate and reli-
able amount of results to begin with the discourse analysis.218 Of course, this personal decision, which 
disrupts a possible endless work, bears the criticism of imprecision or incompleteness. The question is 
how the significance of results can be guaranteed by the amount of sources and temporal preconditions 
of writing a doctoral thesis. The roughly five hundred sources – all of different length – can not raise 
the claim of completeness, but they have been selected with the largest possible amount of compara-
bility und accurateness. Similar to the importance of random samples in sociology it can be argued 
that drawing the main argumentative streams of the political discourse of the European Union will not 
denote a kind of deficiency for the present work. It will rather contribute a new approach to the scien-
 
217  The discourse spectrum of the selected sources is comprehensive considering the decision making process within 
institutional frame. The European Commission elaborates proposals and communications, respectively to the Euro-
pean Council and to the European Parliament regarding the content and direction of – in this case – the Mediterranean 
policy. The decision making authority is held by the European Council and the Foreign Ministerial Council, respec-
tively, who is represented in the Foreign Minister meetings. Therefore, the selected documents represent the spectrum 
of the internal process of policy development and a formal process of an agreed policy which is designated by the 
member of the Barcelona Process.   
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tific debate as both the methodological and thematic approach constitute a singularity beneath the 
works on the Barcelona Process and leave – in the best and the worst case – further challenges.  
VIII ME T HODOL OGICAL P ROCE D URE 
The methodological approach of the empirical analysis is based on the historical discourse analysis 
with a thematic focus on the current European Mediterranean policy. A short introduction on the 
method, the procedure and the development of the investigation criteria as well as the questionnaire, 
which will be applied, is provided in the following chapter. 
 
1 His tor ical  d iscourse  analys is  
The displacement of historicism in thought and methodology facilitated an approach on history with 
the guiding idea to understand the aim of the science, namely to bring the enlightenment forward. A 
reconstruction of the so far teleological based mission statement lead to a science of history, whose 
characteristics originate in an open attitude towards modernity, criticism, a theory based approach and 
an enlightened-emancipatory function. This reconfiguration of a disciplinary understanding disem-
bogued in the establishment of the historical social science. A newly reformation of the historical un-
dertaking began in the 1980ies with amplified theoretical, methodological and thematically approaches 
towards gender studies, historical studies of everyday life, micro history, historical anthropology and 
cultural studies. Therewith, not only a self-critical attitude within the science of history came along, 
but also an amplification of the historical horizon.219 
Improvements of this kind shall not happen without severe disputes and defences of the actual status. 
This of course implies critical debates whenever new methodological approaches occur. The historical 
discourse analysis, which in the meanwhile advanced to a method belonging to the “state of the art” in 
history, encompasses a wide range of methodological and empirical studies. Thus, the attempt to give 
an overall explanatory definition of this methodological approach has become a difficult undertaking. 
This is the reason why the focus at this point is not on the various concepts and outstanding ap-
proaches of scientists (like the representatives of the Annales School, the Historical Semantic Ap-
proach, the Intellectual History and the Cambridge School respectively, the Narrative Approach, Lin-
guistic turn, New Historicism), who encouraged the development of the discourse analysis, nor will 
the single approaches of Michael Foucault, Jürgen Habermas, Pierre Bordieux or Jacques Derrida 
come into the fore because they would disrupt the context. I will rather give attention to some work 
relevant aspects, such as the definition of the term “discourse” itself and the relation between lan-
guage, history and power. 
 
219  Comp. Michael MASET, Diskurs, Macht und Geschichte. Foucaults Analysetechniken und die historische Forschung 
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The matter of defining “discourse” as a term shows that there are not only controversies regarding its 
methodological use. It occurred that the term “discourse” advanced to an everyday-word and inclu-
sively experienced an inflationary use as nearly every scientific paper claims a discursive denomina-
tion. Therefore, one can understand “discourse” as an umbrella term, which covers distinctive theo-
retical concepts of different disciplinary approaches.220 In addition, this imprecision is amended with 
the matter of linguistic determinations depending in which language “discourse” is applied. There is, 
for instance, a significant discrepancy between the applicability of the German word “Diskurs” and the 
English word “discourse”, in the sense that in German “Diskurs” has no connotation of an everyday 
utility.221 Hence, the English term “discourse” remains vague to a certain extent. Its significance re-
garding the applicability in a historical use demands an individual specification.  
History and language are tightly linked to each other as history relays on sources produced and shared 
by human beings, whose explicit communication channel is language per se. Therefore, language is 
conceived as a social act with an interactive character. Regarding a historical discourse analysis, this 
implies that in the first place the examination is based on historical methods and sources which mainly 
constitute texts and images, in contemporary matters also recorded spoken language. In the second 
place, the historical discourse analysis understands language as interaction and converts this assump-
tion to the central focus of its work.222 Thus, the historical discourse analysis acts on the assumption 
that to a certain historical moment there is just a limited amount of statements related to a certain 
topic, although in a linguistic sense there is an infinite amount possible. Hence, it is the discourse 
which controls the possibilities of statements of a certain subject and organizes what is said and 
thought.223 Thus, the discourse analysis constitutes a method which examines the status, the appear-
ance, the conditions of exercising, the functioning, the institutionalizing and the transformation of 
discourses in history, but also the conditions, techniques and regularities which have to exist in a cer-
tain moment and context so that a statement can be taken as truth; the central aim of the discourse 
analytic method is not the legitimacy, but the lighting of the conditions for gaining acceptance of 
statements .224 
At the time a discourse analysis takes place in a historical perspective and both the term and the meth-
ods are defined, one inevitably crosses Michael Foucault. In this work the utilisation and comprehen-
sion of a discourse analysis happens in great nearness to Foucault. Firstly, his definition of discourse 
corresponds to a great extent to the aim of the present work. Foucault remarks that a discourse can be 
defined regarding its order of symbols, meaning that our understanding of the world occurs in a way 
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that our thoughts correspond to a certain order of symbols, which can be examined. He ascertains a 
discursive formation, when a certain amount of utterances in a similar system of diffusion with certain 
regularity can be detected. In this way, a discourse is a mode of speaking, which is or can be institu-
tionalized, and whose rules and mechanisms of functionality can be equally identified. Thereby, the 
importance is not in what was actually meant to express, but in the difference between what could 
have been said, following the rules of grammar and logic in a certain moment of time and what has 
been said. So, the essential questions are how certain statements repeatedly appear on a certain posi-
tion and why this happens in a certain moment in history. 225 Secondly, his awareness of the relation 
between power and language is especially important at the time of a discourse analysis in the historical 
context of colonialism. An attitude, which understands power as ‘always present,’226 accomplishes 
different requirements concerning the development of a methodological approach as, for example, the 
contemporary colleague of Foucault, Jürgen Habermas. Habermas, known for his opposing position to 
Foucault’s understanding of discourse, offers an interesting approach on the topic. However, his the-
ory is more concerned with the political ideal227 of democracy than with the offering of methodologi-
cal approaches on how to deconstruct a discourse in order to detect certain features like power rela-
tions. Consequentially, the methodological concern is of central meaning for the reflection of topic 
relevant literature; the nearness to Foucault rather results from his extensive argument on methodo-
logical proceeding than from his philosophical view of the world. This nearness can be also explained 
on the basis of the definition of three forms of discourse analysis by Phillip Sarasin. He states that the 
first form of discourse analysis is the etymological analysis based on conceptual history and lexicon; 
the second form defines the term “discourse” according to the theory of Derrida and Lacan and finds 
its application close to texts and words; the third form finally operates with Foucaults’ understanding 
of discourse detached from words and objects.228 Unlike others Foucault targets on the historical nar-
rowness, the factual shortness of single statements and speech acts, respectively; following Sarasin, 
discourses according to Foucault move in an intermediate space between words and objects, where 
they compose a compact materiality with inherent, describable rules to control social constructions of 
objects in the same way as to assign a location to the speaking subject, where the speaking and its 
language can develop.229  
 
 
225  LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 77-82. 
226  Bent FLYVBJERG, Habermas and Foucault: thinking for civil society? In: The British Journal of Sociology, 
Vol.49/2 (June 1998), 210-233, here 216. 
227  Ibid. 219. 
228  Phillip SARASIN, Diskurstheorie und Geschichtswissenschaft. In: Reiner KELLER, Andreas HIRSELAND, Werner 
SCHNEIDER, Willy VIEHÖVER (Hrsg.), Handbuch Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse, (Bd. 1 ,Opladen 
2001), 53-79, 60. 
229  „Diskurse bewegen sich nach Foucault in einem ‚Zwischenbereich‘ zwischen Worten und Dingen, wo diese eine 
kompakte Materialität mit eigenen, beschreibbaren Regeln darstellen, um auf diese Weise die gesellschaftliche Kon-
struktion der Dinge ebenso zu steuern wie dem sprechenden Subjekt einen Ort zuzuweisen, an dem sich sein Spre-
chen und seine Sprache erst entfalten können.“ Ibid. 61. 
VIII          Methodological procedure 
 
69 
The decision of an historical discourse analysis with the consideration of the methodological ap-
proaches of Michael Foucault is both a personal choice and a topical requirement; the political dis-
course of the European Union in the Mediterranean is a) temporally limited as it started in 1995 when, 
for the first time, bilateral treaties were extended by a multilateral dimension and b) strongly influ-
enced by power interests which ought to be dismantled in order to examine the current politics on con-
tinuities and discontinuities of colonialism.   
Due to the fact that discursive elements are never neutral230 and language has become a primary me-
dium of social control and power,231 the development of the criteria for of the present discourse analy-
sis will be explicated in detail. However, before the illustration of this outline, the question of the 
situation of the so-called colonial discourse analysis has to be resolved. 
 
Colonial discourse analysis  
What are the specifications in the treatment of a discourse analysis and colonialism? What does that 
mean for the present work? According to María do Mar Castro Varela and Nikita Dhawan, a colonial 
discourse analysis constitutes an important part of postcolonial theory and represents a new way of 
reading colonial history because cultural and economical processes are considered as reciprocally de-
termining formations of colonialism.232 Furthermore, Do Mar Castro Varela and Dhawan identify two 
aims of a colonial discourse analysis233; first, to target the overlapping of ideas and institutions be-
tween knowledge and power in the sense of Foucault in order to widen the perspective of colonial 
studies; beside the apparent manifested side of colonial dominance, the examination focuses on the 
mighty power of representation; second, in this undertaking the colonial discourse analysis acts on the 
assumption that literature can only be understood when it finds a combined consideration of the disci-
plines history, politics, philosophy, social studies and others.  
 
2 Methodo logical  procedure  
As it is the aim of the historical discourse analysis to demonstrate how our “reality” became historic, 
this method exposes the implicitness and obviousness, exhibits options for actions and willingly ques-
tions accepted evidences.234 How is it possible to suffice these claims and to detect historical realities 
within the political, economical, social and cultural contexts? The methodological procedure takes 
place according to the general proceeding of Archim Landwehr regarding the processing of discourse 
 
230  Ibid. 66. 
231  Norman FAIRCLOUGH, Language and power (London 1998), 3. 
232  “Die koloniale Diskursanalyse als wichtiger Teil postkolonialer Theorie repräsentiert einen neuen Weg Kolonialge-
schichte zu lesen, werden hier doch sowohl kulturelle als auch ökonomische Prozesse als sich bedingende Formatio-
nen des Kolonialismus betrachtet.“ DO MAR CASTRO VARELA, DHAWAN, Postkoloniale Theorie (2005), 24. 
233  Ibid. 24f. 
234  „Indem die historische Diskursanalyse zeigen kann, inwiefern unsere Wirklichkeit historisch ‚gemacht‘ ist, deckt sie 
Selbstverständlichkeiten auf, weist auf Handlungsmöglichkeiten hin und stellt allzu bereitwillig hingenommene Evi-
denzen in Frage.“ LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren (2001), 172. 
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analysis; this approach refers to the structural proceeding rather than to the conceptual meaning of the 
discourse analysis provided by Foucault235:  
• The first step is the identification of these sources which form the material corpus of the ex-
amination. The nature and specific characteristics as well as quantitative aspects find consid-
eration here. 
• The next undertaking corresponds to the analysis of the context. Therefore, four different as-
pects come into consideration: the situational context, which questions who does what where 
in a certain moment; the medial context, which appoints the form of media where texts occur; 
the institutional context, which focuses on the manner and structure of the institution as well 
as on the role of certain personages dealing with it; and the historical context, which deals 
with the political, social, economical and cultural overall situation. 
• The third step is the text analysis where the macro and micro structure find separate considera-
tion. Both are important sources of information for a wider historical context of the dis-
course.236 The macro structure concentrates on aspects which constitute the level of meaning 
like texture, graphic design, paragraphs, introduction, conclusion and passages of transition or 
the relation between speech and writing as well as the presentation principals. The micro 
structure focuses on aspects like argumentation, stylistics and rhetoric, which can analysed by 
considering the textual level and the specific application of sentences and words.  
• The last step is the discourse analysis itself. After dealing with step one to three follows the 
combination of the results because the handling of the discourse makes it necessary to refer to 
concrete statements, as discourse and statements determine each other. By means of outstand-
ing singular traits within the texts, it is possible to (re)design argumentative lines which cross 
the corpus of sources. For a continuative evaluation of the discourse it is necessary to define 
adequate categories of perception, constructions of significance and contributions to the con-
struction of identity in order to examine its historical mutability. 
 
These four steps form the methodological frame of the discourse analysis. The criteria for the compo-
sition of the sources have shortly been outlined in the preceding chapter; as the discourse analysis 
plans to consider basically three different types of sources (documents of the European Union, 
speeches and articles), the examination of the context and the macro structure have to be individually 
identified for each category of sources. Specifications regarding the assessment of the context, the 
macro and micro structure and the discourse analysis will be argued for each category in the corre-
sponding chapter.  
 
 
235  The punctual steps are defined on the basis of LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren (2001), 106-134.  
236  Ibid. 113f. 
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Thematic implementation  
After having outlined the theoretical setting and the adequate methodology, it is the aim to expound 
the aspired thematic implementation regarding the empirical realisation at this point. 
The four steps suggested by Achim Landwehr constitute the basic guideline of the analytical proceed-
ing. In accordance with the useful implementation regarding the research aim and the different nature 
of the sources they might be differently weighted. 
As there will be three different sources considered in the present analysis, the assessment of the “iden-
tification of the sources”, step 1 according to Landwehr, will accurately be stressed for each source. 
The context analysis, step 2, of the regarded sources will be examined according to the necessity of 
completion after the detailed contextual setting of chapter one by each source. Regarding the European 
documents and the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission and the European 
Council, further contextual information on the institutional frame of the European Union and the pro-
cedure of evolving the official documents will be provided. Concerning the analysis of the public dis-
course, additional information on the considered country might be useful. 
 Step 3, the macro and micro structural analysis, will be carried out for the documents assigned to the 
European Commission and the European Council, because they provide a high level of standardisation 
which facilitates such an undertaking. However, the macro and micro structural analysis of the 36 
speeches and more than 400 articles would exceed the scope of the present work. Style, wording and 
structure of both speeches and articles are dependent on the individual, who elaborates them. The pre-
sent work concentrates on the evaluation of the overall discourse; this constitutes the main argument 
for the consideration of such a large number of sources. Nevertheless, a profound analysis, especially 
of the micro-structural elements of the discourses of certain politicians, like Manuel Marín, Javier 
Solana, Benita Ferrero-Waldner or Nicolas Sarkozy, or of single newspapers with a stronger focus on 
the political inclination, would be an interesting undertaking for further investigation. 
The discourse analysis, step four by Landwehr, is carried out with the greatest possible accurateness.  
For scrutinizing the discursive elements of colonial characteristics or colonial remains, two superordi-
nated categories can be identified in order to establish argumentative streams. The first category ques-
tions the possible “colonial” power regarding expression and purpose. The second category questions 
the determining factor of any kind of policy, namely identity. These constitute the three super-




Graph 5: Overlook of the analytical categories applied in the discourse analysis, own illustration. 
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The category “expression” aims to highlight statements which implicitly or explicitly refer to putative 
colonial remains within the European position and attitude. The references, which at the same time 
constitute the sub-ordinated categories, concern the question of the “other”, associative and/or disso-
ciative elements between the so-called partners, the references to a Mediterranean region, European 
dominance and the perception of the Mediterranean Policy. The questions guiding the procedure at the 
time of analysis of the sources are the following: What kind of terminology, situations are referred to 
when talking about “the other”, the Mediterranean non-member countries? Which kind of associative 
and/or dissociative elements are mentioned in the context of the cooperation within the Barcelona 
Process? At the moment of defining the Mediterranean as a space, and establishing a political para-
digm like the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, what are the applied references in the discourses of the 
distinctive sources? Are there reasons for a suggested common Mediterranean space which could lead 
to a so-called common, a Euro-Mediterranean identity? Where is the European predominance obvious 
and at what point does it seem apparent? What kind of rhetoric does the European Union refer to in 
relation to claims of power? Does this occur in an obvious, hidden or suggestive way? Are there ex-
plicit or implicit references to colonialism? Which denominations, conceptions, changeability regard-
ing the terminology can be detected with respect to the European policy apprehension? How is the 
Mediterranean Policy perceived? 
These questions relate to a maximum of five sub-categories: a) “the other”, b) “associative/dissociative 
elements”, c) Mediterranean region, d) Mediterranean Policy and e) European dominance. According 
to each type of source these may be treated separately, sub-summed or in a reduced way. 
The second category which enables to question supposed colonial remains within the European dis-
course is the “purpose”. The main research aim within this category intends to assess possible reasons 
for the maintenance of certain hierarchies and the motivation for the Mediterranean Policy.  
It is to expect that within the discourses there is a difference between the intention of the policy and 
the officially stated “aim”. While the “purpose” indicated the motivation, the actual purpose of the 
Mediterranean Policy, the officially stated aim pretends to convince the audience of the policy and 
searches for legitimation. The two sub-categories, which pretend to provide results on the stated con-
cerns, are titled with “purpose” on the one hand, and with “aim” on the other hand. 
The third category, which analytically does not question assumed remains of colonial power, but 
which constitutes a crucial determining factor, deals with statements referring to the European Union 
as a whole. Beneath the super-ordinated denomination “identity”, this category aspires to detect a ref-
erence to the political ambition, the internal struggle, the role perception or self-reflection of the Euro-
pean Union in its political and economic conception. With regard to the two sub-categories “EU” and 
“role”, it is the aim to provide answers to the following relevant questions of the present undertaking: 
What kind of statements refer to the European Union as a whole? Which kind of denominations and 
conceptions are stressed? What constitutes the political ambition of the European Union in the Medi-
terranean? Are there references which concern a certain role perception? And what about the internal 
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struggle? Which statements refer to the internal forces within the European Union? One of the expec-
tations due to the determination of the three different types of sources is the aim to provide, at the end 
of the work, results on the discrepancy between the consciousness of the proper attitude and role and 
the external perception of the same. How does the European Union perceive itself and its policy and 
how is it regarded from an external, a public point of view.  
All in all, these categories represent a single approach among multiple other possibilities. There was a 
strong emphasis on developing a consistent analytical concept in order to stress the topic in accor-
dance with the research aim. The empirical analysis will prove whether this approach produces right 





The official discourse level concerns two kinds of sources which have been identified as relevant for 
the present thematic approach: the EU documents and speeches of various personages of official inter-
est. The documents refer to two different communication levels. The communications of the European 
Commission are directed to the European Council and the European Parliament. They propose a cer-
tain political direction and therefore constitute the base for decisions of the Council as decision-
making organ in foreign policy affairs. Furthermore, the communications of the Commission give the 
most precise indications of the internal discourse within the European institutions, as they are directed 
towards both, the European Council and the European Parliament. The conclusions of the meetings of 
the Foreign Ministers form the second source among the European documents. Although the meetings 
include the representatives of the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNCs), the documents will 
be discussed in the context of the European documents because the European Foreign Ministers em-
body the position of the European Council as the decision-making power. Therefore, the documents of 
the Foreign Minister Meetings form the base of the agreed discourse among the members of the Barce-
lona Process and demonstrate the extent of the transferred directives of the European Commission. 
This does not only provide the opportunity to analyse the establishment of the official European dis-
course in Mediterranean affairs, but also indicates the degree of European dominance.  
If the EU documents correspond to the establishment of the official discourse, the speeches of person-
ages of official interest indicate the implementation of the official discourse. In order to provide the 
greatest possible convergence with the analysis of the EU documents, a selected amount of speeches 
can be assigned to representatives of the European Commission and the European Council. The pre-
sent considerations evaluate the speeches as complementary sources to the European documents. The 
speakers per se are thus not of ostensible significance, their functions, which can be assigned either to 
the Commission or the Council, are more meaningful for the current research aim. Based on the nature 
of the sources it is to expect that the discourses of representatives of the Commission and the Council 
demonstrate a greater explicitness regarding the European position.  
Both kinds of sources are expected to provide a solid base for a profound assessment of the analytical 
“active” level, the establishment and implementation of the European discourse in the Mediterranean. 
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EU DOCUMENT S 
The EU documents concern two kinds of sources in a time span between 1995 and 2008: the Commu-
nications of the European Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament, and the 
conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings in the context of the Barcelona Process. Context, struc-
ture and discourse of both source types are discussed in the following chapter. While the context 
analysis is considered to be valid for both kinds of documents, the structural and discourse analyses 
are carried out for each kind of documents separately; here, the main emphasis is placed on the dis-
course analysis.  
IX IDE NT IFICAT ION OF T HE S OURCE S 
The central criteria of the selection of references among the sources are based on the characteristics of 
repetition and equability of both, said and written statements. According to Achim Landwehr, it is this 
certain character of diachronic sequences and synchronic accumulation which empirically legitimates 
the discourse analysis.237  
According to the thematic approach of the present work, two different kinds of sources have been 
identified among the European documents. In order to assess convergences or possible discrepancies 
among discourses, it was the aim to combine sources, which offer an internal perspective of the com-
munication among European institutions, and documents, which give an idea of the official statements 
from the European side. Hence, the selection of sources focused on the communications of the Euro-
pean Commission and the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings, representing the authority of 
the European Council, in the context of the Barcelona Process. The time span of the documents is situ-
ated from the foundation of the Barcelona Process until its revitalisation in 2008. The temporal limita-
tion and the identical character of the documents within its temporal appearance constitute an impor-
tant frame for undertaking a discourse analysis. When referring to the identification of sources, the 
issue of completeness is essential to be discussed. In the present undertaking, both the concept of the 
work and the applied method do not necessarily request a complete consideration of all possible 
sources. The greatest possible sample of statements of an accurately limited portfolio of sources, 
which, in its relevancy, can be equalized with what Foucault stresses as archive, defines the system of 
what can be expressed in equal measure.238 Therefore, the crucial point is not to discuss the possible or 
impossible completeness, but how representative the selection of sources in the context of a certain 
discourse is.  
Analytically, the selected sources represent two different levels of discourses within the EU docu-
ments: the predominantly internal discourse, which refers to documents assigned to the European 
 
237  Comp. LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 106. 
238  Comp. FOUCAULT, Archäologie des Wissens, 188. 
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Commission; and the predominantly official discourse of the European Union, which refers to docu-
ments assigned to the institutional level of the European Council. 
In order to further explain the identification of sources in the following chapter, the types of docu-
ments, their thematic aim and the temporal dispersion are quantitatively discussed. 
 
1 Li s t  o f  the  documents  a ssigned to  the  European Commission 
The following table shows the identified documents which find consideration in the discourse analy-
sis: 
Documents assigned to the European Commission 
19.10.1994 COM(94)427 endg. Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parla-
ment. Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Ent-
wicklung einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer 
08.03.1995 COM(95)72 final Communication from the Commission, Strengthening the Mediterra-
nean Policy of the European Union: Proposals for implementing a 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
19.02.1997 COM(97)68 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Progress report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship and preparations for the second conference of Foreign Affairs 
Ministers 
06.09.2000 KOM(2000)497 endg. Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parla-
ment zur Vorbereitung der vierten Europa-Mittelmeer-Tagung der 
Außenminister: "Intensivierung des Barcelona-Prozesses" 
13.02.2002 SEC(2002)159 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, to prepare the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean 
Foreign Ministers Valencia, 22-23 April, 2002 
         2003 Working paper Commission services working document to prepare the Euro-
Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Crete 26-27 May 2003 
21.05.2003 COM(2003)294 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and 
democratisation with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic guideline 
11.03.2003 COM(2003)104 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Frame-
work for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours 
24.06.2003 COM(2003) 376 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, on the development of a Euro-Mediterranean trans-
port network 
15.10.2003 COM(2003)610 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, to prepare the VI Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Naples, 2-3 December 2003 (Barcelona 
VI) 
12.04.2005 COM(2005)139 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next 
five years 
05.09.2006 COM(2006)475 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Establishing an Environment Strategy for the Me-
diterranean 
17.10.2006 COM(2006)592 final Communication from the Commission to the Council. Assessment of 
the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
(FEMIP) and Future Options 
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25.10.2006 COM(2006)620 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, on the preparation of the Tampere Euro-
Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference (27-28 No-
vember 2006). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Time to deliver 
17.10.2007 COM(2007)598 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, on the preparation of the Lisbon Euro-
Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Conference (5-6 November 2007). 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Advancing Regional Coopera-
tion to support peace, progress and inter-cultural dialogue 
20.05.2008 COM(2008)319 (Fi-
nal) 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean 
 
These just mentioned sixteen documents assigned to the European Commission are identified by code, 
year and version. Fourteen of them correspond to documents which are designated with the code 
“COM”. According to the General Secretariat of the European Commission, COM documents “pro-
posed legislation and other Commission communications to the Council and/or the other institutions, 
and their preparatory papers.”239 One document corresponds to SEC, which identifies documents as 
“internal documents associated with the decision-making process and the general operation of Com-
mission departments”240 and the other document is considered as a working document in order to pre-
pare a Foreign Minister Meeting, it does not correspond to a certain code. 
 
The aims of the documents can be grouped in three different categories: documents aiming to define 
the Mediterranean Policy, documents setting the path for the Foreign Minister Meetings and docu-
ments treating special topics regarding the Mediterranean Policy: 
 
Aim of the documents how many Which 
Defining the Mediterranean Policy 6 COM(94)437 endg, COM(95)72 final, COM(97) 
68 final, COM(2003)104 final, COM(2005)139 
final, COM(2008)319 final 
Preparing Foreign Minister Meetings 6 COM(2000) 497 endg, SEC(2002)159 final, 
working doc(Crete 03),COM(2003)610 final, 
COM(2006)620 final, COM(2007)598 final 
Specialized topics 4 COM (2003)294 final, COM(2003)376 final, 
COM(2006)475 final, COM(592) final 
Total 16    
 
Regarding the thematic approach on the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union and the prepara-
tion of the Foreign Minister Meetings, there is almost an even distribution. The distinctive aims of the 
documents can be considered as thematically important because they allow an explorative approach on 
the continuity and discrepancy of discourses.  Those three documents, which treat specialised topics 
within the Mediterranean Union, have been selected in order to provide a possible cross-check to the 
other document types.  
 
239  http://europa.eu/documents/comm/index_en.htm (21.11.2008) 
240  Ibid. (21.11.2008)
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The temporal distribution of the selected documents shows that the majority of them are dated within 
the last six years:  
 
Aim of the paper 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 
define policy x x  x      x  x   x 
prepare meetings       x  x xx   x x  
treat special topics          xx   xx   
 
The step marks of the documents which aim to assess the Mediterranean Policy itself are clearly linked 
to external events. In 1994/1995 it was important to assess the significance of a Mediterranean Policy 
in order to prepare and found the Barcelona Process. In 2003, the consequences of the EU enlargement 
of 2004 for the Mediterranean Policy had to be discussed. 2005, the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona 
Process, was the moment to recapitalize the past ten years and to set the path for the future. In 2008, 
the Commission discussed the plan to revitalize the Barcelona Process due to the external impetus of 
the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. Similar relatable are the documents which focus to prepare the 
Foreign Minister Meetings. Interestingly, the accessibility to the documents before 2000 is not trans-
parently archived to the same extent.241 In particular, the lack of transparency concerns the institutional 
development of the European Union rather than it is significance for the discourse analysis, because 
the European Foreign Policy, especially in the 90ies, still had to find its course, in general and in the 
Mediterranean. The temporal distribution of the documents, which treat special topics within the 
Mediterranean Policy, has no significance due to the fact that they were selected under the premise of 
providing samples in order to gain possible cross-checking arguments. 
 
2 Li s t  o f  documents  a ssigned to  the  European Counci l  
The following table shows the documents which have been identified for the discourse analysis: 
 
Documents assigned to the European Council 
27./28.11.1995 Barcelona Barcelona declaration 
15./16.04.1997 Malta Conclusions of the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference 
03./04.06.1998 Palermo Euromed ad hoc ministerial meeting 
15./16.04.1999 Stuttgart Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
15./16.11.2000 Marseilles Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
05./06.10.2001 Brussels Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
22./23.04.2002 Valencia Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
26/27.05.2003 Crete The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers 
   
 
241  The document service of the European Commission is perfectly organized and all existing documents can be ordered. 
The lack of completeness at this point refers to the argument beforehand – in the present work it is the aim to treat the 
greatest amount of possible sources. Due to work economy, this would not be possible; nevertheless, an analysis of 
certain sources taken out, are worth to be studied with the aim of completeness. 
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02./03.12.2003 Naples Sixth Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: reinforcing and bringing the 
Partnership forward 
05./06.05.2004 Dublin Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
29./30.11.2004 The Hague Presidency conclusions for the Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs 
30./31.5.2005 Luxembourg Conclusions for the VIIth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs 
27./28.11.2006 Tampere 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
05./06.11.2007 Lisbon Agreed Conclusion of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs 
13.07.2008 Paris Joint declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 
03./04.11.2008 Marseille Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference. 
Final declaration 
 
These sixteen documents can be distinguished by the following types:  
kind of documents how many which documents (date) 
Declarations 2 1995,2008 
Concl. Foreign Minister Meetings 10 1997,1999,2000,2002,2003,2005,2006,2007 
Interim Meetings 4 2001,2003,2004,2004 
Total 16    
 
The classification regarding the document types might be confusing to some extent because both dec-
larations are considered to be conclusions of the Ministerial Meetings. Thus, the Ministerial Meetings 
are: 1. Barcelona (1995), 2. Malta (1997), 3. Stuttgart (1999), 4. Marseille (2000), 5. Valencia (2002), 
6. Naples (2003), 7. Luxembourg (2005), 8. Tampere (2006), 9. Lisbon (2007), 10. Paris (2008), 11. 
Marseille (2008). The Interim Meetings were held in Palermo (1998), Lisbon (2000)242, Crete (2003), 
Dublin (2004), The Hague (2004).   
X CONT E XT ANAL YS IS 
The first chapter consists of an introduction, which aims to contextualize the intended research aim 
thematically. The following context analysis focuses on the specific context regarding the EU docu-
ments and discusses only those aspects which are relevant for the consecutive analysis. 
 
1 Si tua tional  contex t   
The situational contexts of the two types of European documents, which are considered in this analy-
sis, differ with regard to personages, institutional context and location where they are produced. 
1.1 Communications from the European Commission 
Since 1995 there have been four European Commission cabinets: Jacques Delors III (1993-1995), 
Jacques Santer/ Manuel Marín (1995-1999), Romano Prodi (1999-2004) and José Barroso (2004-). 
 
242  There was no document available for the interim meeting in Lisbon 2000. 
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While the cabinet of Jacques Delors III comprised seventeen Commissioners, there are currently 
twenty-seven Commissioners in Barroso’s cabinet. The following table indicates the distribution of 
charges per countries and political orientation: 
 
Distribution of charges per countries and political orientation since 1995
243
 
EU ENLARGEMENT     
1950 F,D,B,L,NL    
1952 I    
1973 UK,DK,IRL    
1981 GR    
1986 E,P    
1995 A,FIN,S    
2004 CZ,EST,H,LT,LV,PL,SK,SL,M,CY  
2007 RO,BG    
COMMISSION 1993-1995 1995-1999 1999-2004 2004- 
Charges 17 20 20 27 
EU -members at beginning 12 15 15 25244 
Countries double charges F,D,UK,E,I F,D,UK,E,I D,UK,E  
Countries tripple charges   FIN  
Distribution per political orientation    
Left-leaning 6 9 12/9 6 
Center 2 2 2/3 8 
Right-leaning 7 7 6/6 9 
Independent 1 2 0/1 3 
Green   1/1  
 
Until 2004, five countries of each Commission obtained two charges. In both, the cabinet Delors III 
and Santer and Marin, respectively, France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy were repre-
sented by two Commissioners. In the cabinet of Romano Prodi Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Spain had two Commissioners, while Finland was represented by three. Since Barroso took over the 
leading position in the European Commission, the Commissioners are evenly distributed – each mem-
ber state has one Commissioner. Consecutively, two new Commissioners were appointed when Ro-
mania and Bulgaria entered the European Union in 2007.245  
According to the distribution of the political orientation of the Commissions since 1995, it can be 
stated that, until 2004, the main part of the Commissioners either belonged to the more left-leaning or 
the more right-leaning parties in Europe. Since Barroso, there is a statistically more even distribution 
 
243  Sources: own illustration, http://ec.europa.eu , www.wikipedia.org.  . 
244  When the Commission of Barroso started its work, the EU mounted up to 25 member states due to the EU enlarge-
ment in 2004. On January 1st 2007 also Bulgaria and Romania became part of the European Union, thus the Com-
mission up to date counts 27 members. 
245  Bulgaria: Commissioner for Consumer Affairs, Meglena Kuneva; Romania: Commissioner for Multilingualism, 
Leonard Orban. http://ec.europa.eu (19.12.2008).  
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regarding the political orientation: six Commissioners can be appointed to the Party of European So-
cialists (left-leaning), eight are close to the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (center) and 
nine can be appointed to the European People’s Party and the Alliance for Europe of the Nations, re-
spectively (right-leaning). 
Since 1995, the European Commission experienced several developments, which reflect the aim to 
build a well functioning institutional frame that represents the ambition of the European project: to be 
a union of common values and policies in order to guarantee peace. After the last mayor enlargement 
in 2004, when the European Union grew by ten countries, the European Commission is not predomi-
nantly represented by five countries anymore, but by all member countries; furthermore, the political 
orientations of the Commissioners are basically evenly distributed. These developments indicate the 
chosen way of the European Union and its institutions. With the treaty of Lisbon, which still has to be 
ratified in all member countries, further changes in the institutional organisation of the EU, also within 
the European Commission, have to be expected. 
Another relevant aspect in order to assess the situational context of the European documents assigned 
to the Commission is the process concerning the development of the documents. Considering that the 
current Commission of president Barroso employs a regular staff of over 20,000 people in some forty 
Directorate-Generals (DGs), there is a vital need for an effective coordination between all depart-
ments. Regarding the evolvement of the documents which are dealt with in the present analysis, the 
highly complex administration process of the Commission can be highlighted as follows:246 
• According to the five-year working program, which is established at the moment the Commis-
sion is appointed, the Commission formulates an “annual policy strategy” (APS) and the 
“Commission legislative and work programme” (CLWP). For each field the Commission 
works on, there is a designated Directorate-General (DG), which draws an “annual manage-
ment plan” that is in line with the Commission’s prior objectives. Although there is a close 
cooperation between the directorates in order to evolve the communications of the Commis-
sion, it is to suppose that the main Directorate, which coordinates the Mediterranean Policy 
Affairs, is the so-called RELEX (Directorate for External Relations). 
• When a document has to be developed, the responsible DG drafts the documents and consults 
other DGS and services before the approval for the initiative can be secured in the College of 
the Commissioners (body of the Commissioners). 
• The four decision procedures of the Commission are: oral procedure (documents with major 
political or financial implication, no agreement among DGs during the interservice consulta-
tion stage, need for discussion during a Commission meeting); written procedure (prior 
agreement of all departments consulted – except in the case of finalisation, written procedures 
 
246  The information is based on a telephone call with the Information Service of the European Commission in Austria on 
December 17, 2008 and the confidentially transmitted “Commission Close up Nov.2008” in pdf format, 1-48. 
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where the agreement of the chefs de cabinets is given during their weekly meeting, no need 
for discussion at a Commission meeting); empowerment procedure (management or adminis-
trative measures, exercising a mandate under an earlier – general or ad hoc – empowerment 
decision, prior agreements of all departments consulted); and delegation procedure (manage-
ment or administrative measures, exercising a mandate under an earlier delegation decision, 
prior agreement of all the departments consulted). To get an impression, the Commission took 
more than 10,000 decisions in 2006.247 
• In the case of the communications of the Commission, the documents, which have been pre-
pared by the responsible DGs, are passed on to the cabinet of the responsible Commissioner. 
The cabinet assists the Commissioner in analysing and responding to the prepared proposals. 
The positions taken by the College (body of the Commissioners) are based on the preparatory 
work done by the heads of each Commissioner’s cabinet in their weekly meeting (usually 
every Monday). 
• The Commission usually meets every Wednesday in Brussels or Tuesdays in Strasbourg. In 
urgent matters there can be special reunions called by the President. The proposals, which 
have been revised by the heads of cabinets, can be marked with an “A”, meaning that they can 
be adopted without discussion or with a “B” in case there has been no agreement and therefore 
further discussion is required. 
• Among the Commissioners, the President can set up working groups, which are not empow-
ered to take decisions on behalf of the College. However, if a consensus is reached, the Presi-
dent may decide that an agreed initiative can be presented directly to the College which then 
adjudicates on it. The responsible working group for Mediterranean Affairs is the “External 
Relations Group” (CG3), presided over by the Commissioner for External Relations and 
Neighbourhood Policy. 
 
This is the procedure which leads to the development of the documents that are signalised with the 
code COM or SEC. These documents are considered in the consecutive analysis. 
1.2 Conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings 
Regarding the meetings of the Foreign Minister, the most important situational component refers to 
the procedure of the evolvement of the conclusion of the Foreign Minister Meetings which is docu-
mented in Article 13 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure248. According to this, minutes, which are 
drawn up for each meeting, have to be approved by the signature of the Secretary General/ High Rep-
resentative for the Common Foreign Security Policy or the Deputy Secretary General, who may dele-
 
247  Commission close up Nov. 2008, 30. 
248  Council’s Rules of Procedure are available online: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:L:2006:285:0047:0071:EN:PDF (6.1.2008) 
X       Context analysis 
 
83 
gate his power of signature to Directors-General or the General Secretariat. The minutes shall include, 
as a general rule indicates, each of the following items on the agenda: 
• The documents submitted to the Council 
• The decisions taken or the conclusions reached by the Council 
• The Statements made by the Council and those, whose entry has been requested by a Member 
of the Council or the Commission 
The draft minutes shall be drawn up by the General Secretariat within fifteen days and submitted for 
approval to the Councils or the Coreper (Comité des représentants permanents). Before the approval 
takes place, any member of the Council may request to insert more details in the minutes regarding 
any item of the agenda.249  
The conclusions of the Foreign Ministers Meetings have to pass this procedure before they become 
accessible for the public. 
 
2 Media l  contex t  
Considering that the media do not only fulfil formal and informative objectives, but also influence and 
create a certain space, time and subject perception250, it is essential to assess this context regarding the 
EU documents. 
The communications of the European Commission constitute an essential base of their functionality 
and therefore of the policy making. There is no periodical publication of such communications, but a 
publication due to requirements. Thus, communications of the European Commission refer to all fields 
treated by the Commission - there have been around 860 communications in 2007251. 
For an individual researcher there are various possibilities to access the documents: via the Informa-
tion Service of the European Commission, via the homepage of the European Union or other institu-
tions linked to the policy of the European Commission and, if there is a need for hard copies and not 
for web formats, there are library inventories. The same procedures are valid for the accessibility of 
the conclusions of the Foreign Minister Meetings.  
It is notable that the crucial aspect of accessing documents is not whether it is possible to get them or 
not, but how to get them in a certain continuity, as it was necessary for the present work. The EU, 
which is considered to provide the greatest possible transparency, has developed a system that reflects 
the high degree of bureaucracy, which is fundamental for the policy method it succeeds with. It creates 
distance and provokes renouncement via incomprehensible paths, in this case in order to gain informa-
tion. Searching per catchword, reference lists of thematically related homepages do not offer the pos-
sibility to access all relevant documents. Thus, cross-checking in numerous archives, home-pages etc. 
 
249  Comp. Councils Rules of Procedure, Article 13. 
250  Comp. LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 110.  
251  http://ec.europa.eu (18.12.2008) 
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becomes necessary in order to find essential homepages that have been restructured without previous 
document links.252 
In absolutist times, emperors impressed people with insuperable appearing stairs to keep them distant 
and obedient. One can argue that nowadays the same tactic is applied: an enormous appliance of bu-
reaucracy with intransparent ways of accessing a continuity of information resembles the historic ex-
ample to keep the people distant and obedient. 
 
3 Ins ti tutiona l  contex t  
The institutional context is of special relevance when considering documents of the European Com-
mission and documents that are assigned to the European Council because both institutions are driving 
forces for the European Foreign Policy and reflect in respect to the differing competences the institu-
tional dualism, which has been discussed earlier in this work.  
The temporal setting of the present work corresponds to the period of 1957-2008. Within this time 
span the European Union, as an actor in the Mediterranean Affairs, has experienced several develop-
mental steps. The territorial enlargement and the extension of competences of the European Union 
required a solid institutional framework in order to represent a reliable administrator of the delegated 
national competences of the member states and a trustworthy contract party in Foreign Affairs. Re-
garding the institutional frame, which integrates the Mediterranean Policy, it is needful to comment on 
some concretions and specifications of the European system in order to contextualize and comprehend 
the nature of the selected documents. 
The present institutional organisation of the European Union consists of three pillars; hereby, the de-
nomination of the European Union constitutes the superordinated frame.253 The first pillar (EC, EAEC 
and until its expiration the ECSC) represents the supranational part of the European Union254. Since its 
 
252 This happened to the homepage of the Barcelona Process http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ eu-
romed/index_en.htm (17.12.2008), which has been restructured in the course of the successful meeting in Paris in 
July 2008 and some documents, as the Declaration of the Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, are now ac-
cessible in different formats and are differing in content. In contrast to the current version, the document I printed 
from the same page a year before still contained the names of all participants. 
253 The applicability of the term „European Union“ often appears to be little precise, as there is, especially in juridical 
matters, a necessity of clarification regarding the denomination due to the fact that the European Union, as a political 
construct, lacks of legal personality.  „In der Praxis wird der Begriff der EU aber auch dann verwendet, wenn nur ein 
Teil der Europäischen Union, zum Beispiel die Erste Säule gemeint ist. Die häufige Verwendung des Überbegriffes 
der Europäischen Union ist auf Grund der mühsam rechtlichen Abgrenzung zwischen den Gebilden zu erklären. Da 
der Überbegriff der Europäischen Union aber zweifelsohne auch den Unterbegriff abdeckt, wird die Verwendung to-
leriert. Rechtlich problematisch wird es erst, wenn man mit dem Begriff der EU eigentlich die drei Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften umschreibt, da diese über eine eigene Rechtspersönlichkeit verfügen, die der EU weder als gemein-
sames Dach der drei Säulen der EU, noch als Gesamtgebilde zukommt.“ Christoph THUN-HOHENSTEIN, Franz 
CEDE, Europarecht. Das Recht der Europäischen Union unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der EU-Mitgliedschaft 
Österreichs (Wien# 1999), 31. 
254  „Im Unterschied zu Art.281 EGV fehlt eine Bestimmung über die Rechtspersönlichkeit der Europäischen Union als 
solcher. Ihre Völkerrechtspersönlichkeit ist streitig. Gleichwohl hat die Europäische Union mittlerweile bereits mehr-
fach Völkerrechtliche Verträge mit Drittstaaten zumindest formal im eigenen Namen geschlossen. Der Verfassungs-
vertrag sieht im Art. 1-7 EVV vor, der durch den EVV neugegründeten und damit einheitlichen ‚Europäischen Uni-
on‘ Rechtspersönlichkeit zuzusprechen“ Rudolf STREINZ, Europarecht (München7 2005), 252. 
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foundation, the European Community disposes of all attributes of a supranational organisation (law-
making power with the right of execution, majority decision in law-making issues in the Council and 
in the Commission, autonomous law-making authorized organs like the Commission, an own jurisdic-
tion, which is represented by the European Court of Justice). The singularity of the EC lies in the 
combination of all these elements and the amplitude of its field of activity.255 Thus, the EC represents 
its members as a legal personality and unifies the laws of the member states in the delegated fields 
(directives and regulations). The core competence of the first pillar is the ability to sign contracts with 
NMC and other supranational organisations. Neither the second pillar, which represents the collabora-
tion in Foreign Affairs (Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSC), nor the third pillar, which 
regulates the cooperation in judiciary matters (Police and Juridical Cooperation in Criminal Matters – 
PJCCM) dispose of a legal personality or supranationality. Therewith, the institutional organisation of 
the European Union is based on two mayor principals: supranationalism and intergovernmentalism.256 
The coexistence of supranational and intergovernmental elements determines the common negotiation 
processes in distinctive ways. The function and fields of action of the European organs are crucial for 
this inherent dualism in the European system. 
From a juridical perspective, the institution system of the European Union consists of five organs: (1) 
The Ministerial Council and Council of the European Union, which are centralised in one institution, 
(2) the European Commission, (3) the European Parliament, (4) the European Court of Justice and (5) 
the European Court of Auditors. Before the interaction between these organs will be described in order 
to justify the selection of the sources, the main functions will be listed in special consideration of their 
authority regarding Foreign Affairs: 
• The Council of the European Union: The Council is the main decision making organ of the 
European Union. Depending on the subject, ministers of each member state are delegated to 
meet within the Council (Ministerial Council). The heads of the states and governments meet 
twice a year to mark the guideline of the Common Policy. The European Council is presided 
by turns of six months by a European member state in accordance with a pre-established rota. 
Resolutions of the European Council often form orders for the Ministerial Council. Regarding 
the Foreign Policy, the Council is in charge of effecting treaties with MNC or association 
agreements.257 
• The European Commission: Representing the community as a whole, the Commission has the 
right of initiation (propositions for a new European legislation to the Council and the Parlia-
ment). In its function it manages and implements EU policies and budgets and enforces them 
as well together with the Court of Justice, the European law. In Foreign Affairs, it is the 
 
255  Klaus PIRKER, Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union. Der Barcelona Prozess (ungedr. Rechtswiss. Diplom. 
Graz 2003), 7. 
256  Frank R. PFRETSCH, Die Europäische Union (München#  2005), 133f. 
257  Comp. http://consilium.europa.eu; STREINZ, Europarecht, 102; PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 144; 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=242&lang=en&mode=g (28.8.2008). 
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Commission’s competence to negotiate commercial and other conventions and to represent the 
Community in international meetings. Regarding the areas that are treated by the CSFC, the 
Commission is involved to the same extent.258 
• The European Parliament: Elected by the European citizens, the European Parliament is not 
bound by instructions of institutions or politicians. It represents the democratic European will. 
In its function the European Parliament exercises a democratic supervision of the other Euro-
pean institutions, passes the European laws and shares the authority over the EU budget with 
the Council.259 
• The European Court of Justice: Its field of functions encompasses the duty to guarantee that 
the EU legislation is interpreted and applied in a similar manner in all European member 
states, the ensuring of the law concerning the interpretation and application of treaties and the 
right for hearing of the European citizens, member states or other institutions.260 
• The European Court of Auditors: In its functions the Court ensures that the European funds, 
which come from the taxpayers, are properly collected and spend legally, economically and 
for the intended purpose.261  
 
4 His tor ical  contex t  
The historical context, which has been outlined in detail in the first chapters of the present work, con-
stitutes the frame of all considered documents. The most relevant argument for the consecutive analy-
sis can be demonstrated by means of the following graph, which shows the temporal dispersion of the 
documents in relation to external influences: 
 
 
Graph 6: The temporal dispersion of the documents in relation with external influences 
The graph illustrates the temporal distribution of the selected documents (green stars= Council level, 
yellow stars= Commission level) in relation with the mayor external influences (red stars). Apart from 
 
258  Comp. STREINZ, Europarecht, 120; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index_en.htm (28.8.2008)  
259  Comp. PFRETSCH, Europäische Union, 144f; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/index_en.htm 
(28.8.2008). 
260  Comp. Ibid. 145; and http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index_en.htm (28.8.2008)  
261  Comp. http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/auditors/index_en.htm (28.8.2008) 
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the continuously influencing factor, the Middle East Conflict, the most outranging events affecting the 
European Policy in the Mediterranean happened in three years: in 2001, 2003 and 2004.  
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 called for a vote of confidence among the established partnership 
between Europe and the MNCs. The reinforced commitment to the Barcelona Process after 9/11 gave 
a new impetus to the development of a common strategy. The high number of documents, which have 
been evolved in 2003, indicates the European ambition to retain the positive political climate among 
the partners of the Barcelona Process and to resolve all doubts about the enlargement of the European 
Union by ten new member countries in 2004. The US invasion in Irak is hardly commented in the 
documents of these years.  
XI  EU DOCUM E NT S AS SIGNE D T O T HE  EUROP E AN COM M IS SION 
As it is not the aim of a historical discourse analysis to enhance text and language of sources to an end 
in itself, but to combine both information carriers in order to identify and assess a broader context, the 
following chapter deals with aspects of the macro and micro structure of the analysed texts.262 Al-
though the analysis is basically oriented on the guidelines proposed by Achim Landwehr, it has to be 
stated that, due to the number of documents considered in the work, the macro and micro structure of 
the texts is of secondary significance, as the corpus of sources targets different types of documents. 
Aspects of the macro and micro structural analysis, which are relevant for the present research aim, are 
definitely considered, but the main focus of the assessment is directed towards the discourse analysis. 
 
1 Macro  and micro  s tructure  
A schematic display of macro structural elements is highlighted in the following table: 
 
 Document Theme Structure Pages Annex 
(pages) 
1 COM(94)427 endg. development partnership  numbered headlines 38 19 
2 COM(95)72 final implementing a EMP numbered headlines 10  
3 COM(97)68 final preparing FMM numbered headlines 10  
4 KOM(2000)497 endg. intensivation BP headlines, numb. Pa-
ragraphs 
31 13 
5 SEC(2002) preparing FMM (Valencia) numbered headlines 26 8 
6 WP(2003) preparing FMM (Crete) headlines, numb. Pa-
ragraphs 
27 17 
7 COM(2003)294 final strateg. guidelines democracy, 
HR 
numbered headlines 19  
8 COM(2003)104 final Neighbourhood Policy numbered headlines 25 6 
9 COM(2003)376 final transport network numbered headlines 27 8 




262  See: LANDWEHR, Geschichte des Sagbaren, 113f. 
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11 COM(2005)139 final 10th anniversary, working 
program 
numbered headlines 27 9 
12 COM(2006)475 final environment strategy numbered headlines 10  
13 COM(2006)592 final FEMIP numbered headlines 12  
14 COM(2006)620 final preparing FMM numbered headlines 13  











The thematic approach accentuates what has been stated before: six documents refer to attempts of the 
Commission to define the Mediterranean Policy, six documents set the preparatory guidelines for the 
Foreign Minister Meetings and four documents represent special reports on issues treated by the 
Commission in the context of the Mediterranean Policy.  
Concerning the texture of the documents assigned to the European Commission, it has to be stated that 
the formal structure is basically standardised. There are two different organisational forms: the docu-
ments are either structured by numbered headlines, which usually do not exceed four points with addi-
tional subheadings, or the headings, indicating the thematic classifications and the paragraphs, are 
numbered263. Eight of the sixteen documents (fifty percent) have an annex, which gives more detailed 
background information, also in statistical and graphic formats. This is not an outstanding aspect but, 
nevertheless, necessary to be mentioned, because the annexes are independent of the temporal moment 
or the thematic aim of the documents. They just inform other decision-making institutions like the 
European Parliament and the European Council.  
Considering the whole text, the introductions and conclusions have a similar aim, unimportant of the 
formal structure regarding, for example, the headings and the numerological proceeding: the first and 
the last chapter transmit the essence of the document. The introduction gives more contextual informa-
tion, while the conclusion shortly delivers the message of the document. The chapters in between are 
standardised and show frequent repetitions when treating, for instance, the Middle East Peace Process, 
the multilateral dimension or the confirmation concerning the commitment to the Mediterranean Pol-
icy. Textual transitions do not show special significance, which is due to the highly standardised for-
mat of the documents. 
Regarding the presentation principles, the tonality of the texts is surprisingly casual. From the strict 
formal criteria and the institutional marathon that the documents have passed through, it was to expect 
that, by the moment they are officially accessible, they comprise a more standardised phraseology. 
Two reasons can be identified for the relative low degree of standardisation. First, the texts represent 
the interinstitutional communication among European institutions; they thus have a strong informative 
character on an internal level. Second, they aim to convince decision-making organs to decide on be-
 
263  For example the Working paper on the preparation of the Ministerial Meeting in Crete 2003 contains unnumbered 
headings but thirty-three paragraphs. 
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half of their thematic outline, their background information. Therefore, apprehensible and direct for-
mulations of the purpose of the recommended policy direction are essential within the documents as-
signed to the European Commission.  
Crucially seems the fact that the speech of the Commission varies from time to time in the use of the 
1st and the 3rd plural in respect of references in context with the partnership. This was first noticed in 
the preparation document of the meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers in Valencia 
(April 22-23, 2002). For instance, the Commission states that the countries of the Mediterranean re-
gion are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours too
264, or we face innumerable 
common challenges 265and we need to work closely266. Elsewhere in the same document the Commis-
sion denominates the “other” as our partners267 and establishes associative links by referring to our 
populations
268. These changes of the tonality can be explained with the high sensitive political parquet 
concerning the relations with Islamic countries after the terror attacks of 9/11. However, it has to be 
stated that these intermixture of the 3rd and 1st person does not occur frequently and is only used to 
convince the Member States of the importance of the Barcelona Process. 
The micro structural analysis aims to assess the level of the text, sentences and words and analyses the 
rhetoric and the lexical aspects of the documents. Due to the numerous documents that are considered 
in the present work, the micro structural analysis will rather focus on the most relevant aspects regard-
ing the discourse than on an overall assessment in-depth. The consecutive analysis focuses on aspects 
which aim to explain the link between text and discourse by referring to the textual level, to some ex-
amples of wording and to the structural frame of the alignment of the sentences. 
Concerning the textual level, the argumentation may follow two different aims: the factual and logic 
argumentation, which nurtures the rational level, and the argumentation, which targets the emotional 
level. Predominantly, the communications of the Commission aim to use rational argumentation, but at 
some points there are indications of arguments that correspond to the affected argumentation, like 
when the Commission expresses its concern about the developments in the Mediterranean and under-
lines the importance of the Barcelona Process. The Commission then uses terms like “urgency, threats, 
strategic importance etc”. The use of words containing emotional transmitters is placed with the aim to 
sensitize the European decision-making organs of the importance which the Commission adhered to 
the Mediterranean Policy. 
The structural alignment of the sentences can be summed up by the conclusion that they are of me-
dium length, meaning that they are extended by subordinated clauses over three to four lines. Al-
though there are some references to emotive arguments, the documents assigned to the Commission 
 
264  Comp. “the countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours too” 
SEC (2002) 159 final, 2. 
265  Comp. “we face innumerable common challenges (…)” SEC (2002) 159 final, 2. 
266  Comp. “we need to work closely (…)”SEC (2002) 159 final, 2. 
267  Comp. “our partners” SEC (2002) 159 final, 3. 
268  Comp. “our populations” SEC (2002) 159 final, 6. 
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contain over the years formulaic repetitions, which are only expressed in the context of declarative 
sentences.  
 
2 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Expression 
Within the analytical category “Expression” statements have been considered which concern: 
• “the other” regarding the denomination of the MNCs, the description of their situation and the 
cooperative character of the apparent policy in partnership; 
• “MMPOL” , the Mediterranean Policy, pertaining to the designation of the Policy itself as 
well as the factual cooperation on a political level; 
• “associational/dissasociative” elements among the members of the Mediterranean Policy 
• “MMR”, the Mediterranean Region, concerning its denotation from European side; 
• and implicit or explicit indications of European “predominance” 
Here, it has to be stated that this is a gross categorisation aiming to group the statements. The delimita-
tions between the statements (135 in total) are obviously fluent. 
 
COMM-DOCS: Number of statements assigned to the analytical category “Expression”
269
 
 "The other" "MMPOL" "ass./diss." "MMR" "predominance" Total 
EXPRESSION 40 59 10 8 18 135 
 
More than three quarters of the statements concern the categories of the other and the Mediterranean 
Policy, very few refer to associational and dissasociative elements and the Mediterranean region. 
 
COMM-DOCS: Distribution of statements (“Expression”) per year 
 94 95 97 00 02 03 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 23 5 9 19 18 24 16 11 4 6 135 
 
The selected statements show a quite balanced distribution over the years, although the early docu-
ment of 1994 and the one before the EU enlargement in 2004 can be highlighted with over twenty 
statements. 
2.1 The view of the “other” 
The supposed “other” concerns all member countries of the Barcelona Process which do not belong to 
the European Union. The denomination of the “other” varies over the years. In the early documents, 
the characterisation of the “other” still contains a component of strangeness, as there are expressions 
like these countries, the concerned countries270or these individuals 271 which can not be found in later 
 
269  MMPOL= Mediterranean Policy, ass./diss.= associational/dissociative, MMR= Mediterranean Region 
270  Comp. „diese Länder“, „betreffenden Länder“ COM 94 (427) final, 3,8; 
271  Comp. „these Individuals“ COM 95 (68) final, 1. 
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documents, in which the MNCs are predominantly called the Mediterranean Partners272, our part-
ners
273 or just partners274. Remarkable seems the fact that the tone of the Commission is particularly 
associational in the years after 9/11 when the discussion is centred upon our partners in the Mediter-
ranean
275 or even a ring of friends276  
In few occasions the “others” are commented in reference to their number. In some documents there 
are introductive listings regarding the participating countries, but in the document of 1997 there is a 
numeric reference for the first time, namely twelve Mediterranean Partners277. In later documents, 
unifying characteristics regarding the number of the “others” are kept general: Euro-Med partners278, 
all Mediterranean Partners
279 or even with EU reference all of the EU’s Mediterranean partners280.  
A large number of denominations regarding the “other” concern the situation of the participating coun-
tries. In this respect general considerations vary from simple differentiations like the countries of the 
region are (…) very different
281 to explicit denominations of a lower development status like their 
general development level is a lot lower
282
, which has been expressed in reference to the high popula-
tion growth
283 they have to fight with or the lack of well formed craftsmen284. According to the course 
of the 20th century, which implies the possibility of progress, the Commission states that these forces 
have not led to greater convergence
285 among the Mediterranean countries and further mentions rea-
sons like a very poor rate of growth in the GDP per capita286. These simple appearing determinations 
implicitly contain the superior cultural comprehension which is inherent in the European position. 
In general, the Commission respects that the partner countries are at different stages of develop-
ments
287
, but stresses the different level of progress among the partners in nearly the same breath. In 
this respect it is outlined that the greatest proceedings can be noticed in the cases of Cyprus, Malta, 
Turkey and Israel
288. Although the Commission considered the different situation among the MNC as 
it constitutes that the situation, in respect of human rights and democracy, varies from one partner to 
 
272  Comp. „Mediterranean Partners“ in for example COM 97 (68) final, 6; 
273  Comp. „our partners“ COM 2002 (159), 3; 
274  Among the numerous denominations of „partner“ compare two examples in COM 2000 (497) final, 9; and COM 
2005 (139) final, 3. 
275  Comp. „our partners in the Mediterranean“ COM 2003 (294), 19. 
276   Comp. „a ring of friends“ COM 2003 (104), 4. 
277  Comp. „twelve Mediterranean Partners“ COM 97 (68) final, 1. 
278  Comp. „all Euro-Med partners“ 2006 (620) final, 10. 
279  Comp. „all Mediterranean Partners“ COM 2007 (598) final, 2. 
280  Comp. „all oft he EU’s Mediterranean partners“ COM 2008 (319) final, 4. 
281  Comp. „die Länder der Region sind (...) sehr unterschiedlich“ COM 2000 (497) final, 4. 
282  Comp. „Ihr allgemeines Entwicklungsniveau ist sehr viel niedriger“ COM 94 (427) final, 10. 
283  Comp. „Sie haben mit einem hohen Bevölkerungswachstum zu kämpfen“ COM 94 (427) final, 10. 
284  Comp. “Sie besitzen keine gut ausgebildeten Facharbeiter“ COM 94 (427) final, 11. 
285   Comp. „These forces have not necessarily led to greater convergence.“ COM 2003 (104), 4. 
286  Comp. „What is perhaps less known is that the Mediterranean has also had a very poor rate of growth in GDP per 
capita” COM 2003 (104) final, 7. 
287   Comp. „the partner countries are at different stages of development“ COM 97 (68) final, 6. 
288  Comp. „Zypern, Malta, Türkei, Israel (...) die größten Fortschritte“ COM 94 (427) final, 12. 





, there is a clear distinction among the so-called partner. For instance, it is stressed that with 
the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory 
record in this respect
290. Regarding the differentiations made by the Commission, it is remarkable that 
it mainly concerns countries which have a privileged relation to the European Union, either because of 
their historical linkage, like it is the case in Israel, or because they have a candidate status like Turkey 
or even a clear accession perspective like Cyprus and Malta, who both joined the European Union in 
2004. In this respect, the differentiation made by the Commission can not to be classified as a simple 
distinction. Instead, it must be taken as an example of a distinguishing discourse, which implies a non 
conquerable determination because none of the MNCs has the perspective to become a member coun-
try. By this means, a retained differentiation is possible despite a cooperative policy. 
In terms of the political cooperation, the Commission’s expectation is linked to the situational valua-
tion, as it considers that the partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to under-
take rapid reform and comprehensive transition
291 and that certain partners are more interested than 
others
292
. Differentiations expressed in reference to the political cooperation can be of a general nature 
as, for example, when referring to obvious differences regarding the political system in comparison 
with the EU: the EU has internal mechanism for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice 
while the differences between the Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having 
similar co-ordination mechanisms on their side
293
. This comparison with the EU indicates both an 
inequality among the partnership and a European superiority. This is particularly indicative of the pre-
dominant position of the European Union within the institutional framework of the Barcelona Process 
when it is stated that as long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship ar-
rangements could work effectively
294
. Regarding the cooperation, the Commission values the partici-
pation by the Mediterranean partners as extremely good, regular and at a high level295, although there 
exists the consciousness concerning the evolvement of the Barcelona Process that it can only reach its 
full potential if there is an awareness of a joint responsibility in the region
296
. 
The latter implies that the “other” is not completely aware of the dimension and the aim of the policy. 
Therewith, the differentiation is related to the view that only Europe is conscious of the importance of 
 
289  Comp. „the situation varies from one partner to the another“ COM 2002 (159) final, 5. 
290  Comp. „with the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory re-
cord in this respect” COM 2002 (159) final 5. 
291   Comp. „partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid reform and comprehen-
sive transition” COM 2003 (104) final, 16. 
292   Comp. „certain partner are more interested than others“ WP 2003, 5. 
293   Comp. „The EU has internal mechanism for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice while the differ-
ences between the Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from having similar co-ordination mecha-
nisms on their side” COM 2002 (159) final, 17. 
294  Comp. “As long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship arrangements could work effec-
tively” COM 2002 (159) final, 17. 
295   Comp. „participation by the Mediterranean partners has been extremely good, regular and at a high level” COM 97 
(68) final, 6. 
296  Comp. „Der Barcelona Prozess kann sein volles Potential nur dann entfalten, wenn man sich in der Region der 
‚Mitverantwortung‘ für den Prozess bewusst ist“ COM 2000 (497) final, 16. 
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the measures that have to be undertaken in order to reach the goal of transforming the Mediterranean 
into a region of prosperity and wealth. In 2005, the year of the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Proc-
ess, the apparent lack of commitment of the Mediterranean partners has been excused by the continu-
ing conflicts in the region and because the search for consensus has sometimes acted as a break on 
those wishing to move forward more rapidly
297
. This expression already belongs to the evaluative way 
of describing the situation of the “other”. Backed by the supposed consciousness of the desire of our 
partners for a closer and deeper relation with the EU
298
, the Commission assesses the situation as 
follows: Nearly all Mediterranean partners have corrected their imbalance but which is considered to 
be insufficient and instable
299 or the political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterra-
nean has not progressed as quickly as desired
300
. These evaluative discourses can be classified as jus-
tifications for knowing what the “other” needs, which is, for example, expressed in concrete terms 
when stressing the need of a dynamic growth301 or in an indirect way by means of callings, like the 
invitations to sign association agreements, which form the Commission’s only way of directly address-
ing the “other” in documents.302  
2.2 Associational and dissociative elements 
Until the terror attacks of 9/11, the European discourse did not imply apparent associative elements. 
After 9/11, it is remarkable that within the documents of the European Commission, which represent 
the inner European discourse, clear references of common ties are made. The most striking statement 
to signalise the conjunction between Europe and the Mediterranean can be classified as an attempt to 
encourage the view of association with the MNC within Europe: The countries of the Mediterranean 
region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours in many other ways, too
303
. Fur-
ther expressions underline this impression, as the Commission speaks of innumerable common chal-
lenges, we face
304 or we need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle  
 
 
297   Comp. „Partners have at times not appears wholy commited to implementing the principals to which they signed up, 
partly because of the difficulties caused by the continuing conflicts in the region and because the search for consensus 
has sometimes acted as a break on those wishing to move forward more rapidly” COM 2005 (139) final, 3. 
298  Comp. „Conscious(…) of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relation with the EU” COM 2002 (159) 
final, 5. 
299   Comp. „fast alle Mittelmeerpartner (haben) iher Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert, (...) diese Fortschritte sind jedoch 
unzureichend und instabil“ COM 2000 (497) final, 3. 
300  Comp. “Yet the political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not progressed as quickly as 
desired” COM 2003 (104) final, 7. 
301  Comp. “Die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen können, wenn sie eine dop-
pelte Strategie verfolgen (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 3. 
302   The Commission calls on Egypt and Jordanian to sign association agreements and further cooperation of Lebanon, 
Syria and Egypt with the EU COM 2000 (497) final, 6f. 
303  Comp. „The countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are near neighbours in 
many other ways, too” COM 2002 (159) final,2. 
304  Comp. „We face innummerable common challenges“ COM 2002 (159) final, 2. 




305 and only by working together we can hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage306. 
True, 9/11 constituted a major challenge to the diplomatic relations across the Mediterranean; hence, it 
is not surprising that there was a major effort within the European Union to keep the member countries 
on course. A recall on the close historical linkage between the countries was again necessary when 
Nicolas Sarkozy spread separate forces within Europe with the proposal to establish a Mediterranean 
Union just for European countries bordering the Mediterranean: all of the EU’ Mediterranean partners 
have close historical and cultural links with Europe
307
. 
2.3 References to a Mediterranean region 
There have been little references to the Mediterranean itself. When there was a reference to its geo-
graphical characteristics, the denomination by the Commission referred to the Mediterranean basin308 
or a European-Mediterranean zone309. The most striking statement, which forms a singular happening 
in my research, demonstrates a European appropriation of the Mediterranean when the Commission 
describes the Mediterranean as the largest European sea310. This is a clear indication that the Roman 
“Mare nostrum” is still perceived by some means or other in the European consciousness.  
2.4 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The definitions of the Mediterranean Policy provided by the Commission refer on the one hand to the 
policy itself and on the other hand to its significance for Europe. 
The expressions used by the Commission to describe the European Mediterranean Policy range from 
community, partnership, forum and instrument to framework and a new start. The discursive distinc-
tion lies in the denomination. When the Commission refers in early documents to a community with 
the Mediterranean countries or its southern neighbours311or partnership and forum, these terms indi-
cate an associative discourse that lacks a hierarchy. The description of a partnership between Europe 
and the Mediterranean
312
, which in its meaning refers to geographical entities, does not imply any sort 
of superiority. Furthermore, the comparison with a permanent forum of dialogue313, a unique forum314 
 
305  Comp. „we need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle East” COM 2002 (159) final, 2. 
306  Comp. „only by working together we can hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage” COM 2006 (475) 
final, 10. 
307  Comp. „all of the EU’ Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with Europe” COM 2008 (319) 
final, 2. 
308  Comp. „Mittelmeerbecken” COM 94 (427) final, 5. 
309  Comp. „Europäisch-mediterrane Zone” COM 94 (427) final, 12. 
310  Comp. „The Mediterranean is the largest European sea (...)“ COM 2006 (475) final, 2. 
311  Comp. „Gemeinschaft (...) mit den südlichen Mittelmeerländern“ COM 94 (427) final, 3; and „Gemeinschaft (...) 
südlichen Nachbarn“ COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
312  Comp. „Partnerschaft Europa- Mittelmeer“ COM 94 (427) final, 7. 
313  Comp. „a permanent forum for dialogue“ COM 95 (72) final, 9. 
314  Comp. „ das einzige Forum, in dem Israel, Syrien und der Libanon auf Ministerebene zusammentreffen“ COM 2000 
(159) final, 4. 
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or the only regional forum315 when referring to the Barcelona Process does not give a reason to inter-
pret hegemonial pretensions. The only remarkable issue is that the description as a singular and only 
forum implies a certain inner European legitimacy of its policy. Differently to interpret is the descrip-
tion of an indispensible instrument316 or a unique or strong policy framework317 when referring to the 
Barcelona Process. There is a clear reference to a political space or medium which is necessary to 
impose policy intentions. The indication of the Barcelona Process representing a recommencement318 
constitutes one of the rare moments in which the discourse of the Commission suggests that the Medi-
terranean Policy has opened a new chapter in history since 1995 and figures as a symbol of overcom-
ing history. Although this intention can be repetitiously manifested by single statements, the signifi-
cance, which the Commission adheres to the Barcelona Process for Europe, demonstrates that there is 
still a lot of the historical predominance rooted in European positions, at least on a subconscious level.  
The significance of the Barcelona Process as it is expressed by the European Commission refers on the 
one hand to a strategic significance and classification and on the other hand to operational indicators 
and the strategic implementation, respectively. When the Barcelona Process is linked to expressions 
like Europe’s priority319, the European Union’s strategic approach320, a major strategic political and 
economic asset
321 or a unique asset322, the strategic importance of the policy launched in the Mediter-
ranean is beyond question. When the Commission comments on its policies in the Mediterranean, one 
can deduce the intention of strategic classifications. In the context of the Barcelona Process the im-
plementation of the ENP required a significant strategic coordination within Europe, but also in front 
of the MNC partners. Arguments, which indicate these strategic considerations, are for example: the 
new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework
323 or the new Neighbourhood 
Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process
324 and the ENP and the Barcelona Process 
will work in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way
325
. Both, the operational level and the 
strategic implementation of the European Policy is highlighted by the Commission’s statement that the 
process in practice is already irreversible
326 or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a 




315   Comp. „(...) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains the only regional forum where political and security dia-
logue among all Euro-Mediterranean partner is possible” COM 2006 (620) final, 3. 
316  Comp. „ Barcelona process (...) an indispensible instrument“ COM 97 (68) final, 1. 
317  Comp. „partnership as a unique framework“ COM 2002 (159) final, 9; and „the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
offers a strong policy framework“ COM 2003 (104) final, 8. 
318  Comp. „stellt (...) einen Neuanfang dar“ COM 2000 (497), 2. 
319  Comp. „Europe’s priority“ COM 95 (72) final, 1. 
320  Comp. „The European Union’s strategic approach“ COM 97 (68) final, 1. 
321  Comp. „The Barcelona Process has become a major strategic political and economic asset“ COM 2002 (159) final, 2. 
322  Comp. „EMP presents a unique asset“ COM 2002 (159) final, 7. 
323  Comp. „the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework” COM 2003 (104) final, 15. 
324  Comp. „the new Neighbourhood Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process” WP 2003, 4. 
325  Comp. „In this way the ENP and the Barcelona Process will work in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way” 
COM 2005 (139) final, 3. 
326  Comp. „the process in practice is already irreversible” COM 2003 (610) final, 4. 
327  Comp. „the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a critically important new phase” COM 2006 (620) final, 3. 
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The importance of the Mediterranean Policy for Europe could not be better expressed than when the 
Commission stated that the relations between the European and the MNC countries reflect the political 
and strategic importance which Europe admits to the Mediterranean.328  
2.5 Perception of the cooperation among the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
In the Commission’s discourse the cooperation, which takes place between the northern and southern 
Mediterranean countries
329, the Union and the Mediterranean partners330 or between Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries
331
, which has also been described as cooperation between the partners in 
Europe and the Mediterranean
332
, focuses either on characteristics of the policy or on thematic ele-
ments. The spins of partnership333, the Mediterranean Policy, is identified to be comprehensive in its 
geographical coverage as well as in its sectoral scope and forward looking in its political, economic 
and social ambitions
334
. Working together according to the objectives of the Barcelona Process, espe-
cially in the areas of freedom, justice and governance is perceived as a sign of a new maturity and 
closeness in the EMP
335
, despite the existing awareness that a further development regarding the con-
ceptual and institutional approach is required. The aim of the policy is not characterised to be new336 
and the common position is reflected when stating that only by working together there is a hope to 
protect the common Mediterranean heritage.337 
The thematic references constitute the major amount of statements. They can not be extensively dis-
cussed at this point, as it is not the aim of the present work to provide an analysis of the working plans 
within the Barcelona Process, but to discuss the European discourse in the context of the Barcelona 
Process. Hence, it is noticeable what kind of topics it is referred to when talking about vital impor-
tance, cornerstones or essential elements. For example, the topic of migration and human exchanges is 
considered to be of vital importance to the Partnership338; human rights and democracy are perceived 
as essential elements339 of the Barcelona process; and the Association Process remains at the core of 
 
328  Comp. „(Die Beziehungen der EU spiegeln wider), von welcher politischen und strategischen Bedeutung dieser 
Region für die EU ist“ COM 2000 (497) final, 2. 
329  Comp. „Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Mittelmeerländern“ COM 94 (427) final, 7. 
330  Comp. „Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern“ COM 94 (427) final, 8. 
331  Comp. „Europa und die Mittelmeerländer“ COM 94 (427) final, 9. 
332  Comp. „Die Partner in Europa und im Mittelmeerraum“ COM 94 (427) final, 13. 
333  Comp. „in the spins of partnership” COM 97 (68) final, 2. 
334  Comp. „A partnership was launched which is comprehensive, both in its geographical coverage and its sectoral scope, 
and forward looking in its political, economic and social ambition” COM 2005 (139) final, 2. 
335  Comp. „working together in these areas [freedom, justice] is not only a sign of a new maturity and closeness in the 
EMP, (…)” COM 2002 (159) final, 6. 
336  Comp. „The political desire to develop a special relationship of cooperation with the countries of the Mediterranean 
basis is not new, (...)“ COM 2003 (376) final, 3. 
337  Comp. “Only by working together can we hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage” COM 2006 (620) 
final, 10. 
338  Comp. „[migration and human exchanges] are of vital importance to the Partnership“ COM 2002 (159) final, 6. 
339  Comp. „Since 1992 (…) Human Rights and democracy as ‘essential elements’” COM 2003 (294) final, 8. 





. The regional integration aspect can be found among other topical key features. 
Thus, it can be highlighted to be a major concern of the Commission as it states that a South-South 
regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key to achieving dynamic 
and diversified economies in Mediterranean countries
341
; hence, it is considered an indispensable 
component of the Barcelona Process to strengthen trade ties between Mediterranean countries them-
selves.
342 These thematic priorities can be illuminated from the multitude of issues that are aimed to be 
covered by the Barcelona Process. In its self-interest, the preliminary concern of Europe is to cope 
with the challenges of migration and social pressures and therefore to aspire a close cooperation on the 
executive level. Other subjects like democracy and human rights belong to a certain mission statement, 
which Europe, as hegemonial power, tries to assume and forces the way that the launched policy re-
quires, because there is a need for a common base of values in order to achieve the defined goals.  
2.6 References of European predominance  
In the discourse of the European Commission, the references of the European dominance can be mani-
fested via indications of material instruments or immaterial media like advantages in knowledge and 
via demonstrations of power. 
The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives (…), namely budget re-
sources and EIB loans
343
. Due to the economical weaker MNCs, these are potential material instru-
ments the European Union can revert to in order to influence the direction of their policies. However, 
the power of the knowledge advantage of the European Union must not be neglected. In the Commis-
sion’s discourse this becomes either explicitly or implicitly obvious.  
Statements like common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and 
reap the benefits of the enlarged EU internal market
344 explicitly indicate the knowledge advantage of 
Europe. In contrast, references suggesting that successful economic policies will require bolder re-
forms
345 or calls on the partners should now take the necessary measures are more implicit346. These 
statements imply a knowledge advantage, because Europe knows, due to its experience347, how bolder 
reforms and necessary measures can successfully be implemented. At the same time, Europe makes 
 
340  Comp. „the Association Process remains at the core of the Partnership” WP 2003, 4. 
341  Comp. „South-South regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key to achieving 
dynamic and diversified economies in Mediterranean countries” COM 2005 (139) final, 9. 
342  Comp. “an indispensable component of the Barcelona Process to strengthen trade ties between Mediterranean coun-
tries themselves” COM 2005 (139) final, 8. 
343  Comp. „The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives (…), namely budget resources 
and EIB loans” COM 95 (72) final, 8. 
344  Comp. „common rules and standards are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the benefits of the 
enlarged EU internal market (…)” COM 2003 (104) final, 14. 
345  Comp. „successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners” COM 2003 (610) final, 
7. 
346  Comp. „partners should consider now take the necessary measures to expand the scope (…)” COM 2005 (139) final, 
5. 
347  Comp. „die Erfahrung Europas (...)“ COM 94 (427) final, 12. 
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clear that it is difficult to overcome the knowledge gap between the northern and southern shores of 
the Mediterranean, when the Commission states that they will need to show a strong commitment to 
build up their administrative institutional and legal capacity
348
. 
Demonstrations of European dominance can be deduced from statements, which include certain 
evaluations of the “other” and conditions imposed on the “other”. For instance, evaluative statements 
can be highlighted in the context of financial aid provided by the EU. Here, the Commission suggests 
to evaluate the readiness of the partners of demonstrating their decisiveness regarding an intensifica-
tion of the regional trade and economic cooperation as well as economic reforms
349 or that future ap-
portionments of funds should be oriented on the preparedness of the partners to carry into effect the 
accorded goals
350 within the Barcelona Process. At the moment conditions are formulated, the Euro-
pean dominance appears to be even more explicit, like the benefits to be obtained from the establish-
ment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area will only be released if the Mediterranean partners 
continue their efforts to improve the framework conditions for attracting investment, including foreign 
investment, and helping create and develop business
351
; or when the Commission suggests to imple-
ment reforms so that just some of the partner countries benefit from them: those countries that show 
the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environment issues should be those with whom the 




3 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Purpose  
The analytical category “purpose” encompasses statements, which refer to the motivation, the purpose, 
of the Mediterranean policy and the policy’s aim. 
In total, there have been hundred and seven statements identified for this category. 
 
Documents assigned to the European Commission 
 "Aim" "Purpose" Total 
PURPOSE 52 55 107 
 
 
348  Comp. „they will need to show a strong commitment to build up their administrative institutional and legal capacity” 
COM 2003 (610) final, 16. 
349   Comp. „wird sich die künftige Programmierung schwerpunktmäßig auf eine geringere Anzahl unmittelbar mit den 
Abkommen verknüpfter Prioritäten konzentrieren und stärker berücksichtigen, inwieweit die Partner bereit sind ihre 
Entschlossenheit zur Intensivierung des regionalen Handels und der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit sowie zu den 
notwendigen Wirtschaftsreformen, vor allem den im Finanzsektor, durch Taten zu untermauern, um den wirtschaftli-
chen und politischen Übergang zu vollenden“ COM 2000 (497) final, 10. 
350  Comp. „(…) muss sich in künftigen Mittelszuweisungen die Bereitschaft der Partner zur Verwirklichung der Ziele 
der Abkommen – vor allem zur Beschleunigung der Wirtschaftsreformen – und zur Ausweitung ihrer Aufnahmeka-
pazitäten“ COM 2000 (497) 10. 
351  Comp. „the benefits to be obtained from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area will only be 
released if the Mediterranean partners continue their efforts to improve the framework conditions for attracting in-
vestment, including foreign investment, and helping create and develop business” COM 2002 (159) final, 14. 
352  C omp. „Those countries that show the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environment issues should be those 
with whom the Commission moves ahead first” COM 2006 (475) final, 10. 
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As illustrated in the table below, the distribution per category is almost even. Although there has been 
the greatest number of statements in the first years after the foundation of the Barcelona Process, the 
distribution per year does not indicate outstanding patterns. 
 
COMM - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year 
 94 95 97 00 02 03 05 06 07 08 Total 
PURPOSE 25 12 11 14 5 14 9 6 5 6 107 
 
3.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy 
The statements assigned to the category “purpose” refer to the strategy that is designed by the Com-
mission in its discourse concerning the European Union in the Mediterranean. The distinctions have 
been set in regard to statements reasoning the strategy of the Mediterranean Policy in general, mid-
term strategies having a more operative character and certain thematic references that predominantly 
appeared in the lecture of the sources.  
In general, the Commission states that the Mediterranean is strategically important to the European 
Union
353
, which is explained by the fact that the geographical territories are, concerning security and 
social stability, of great interest to the European Union
354 and that there exist reciprocal de-
pendences
355
 in many aspects. These few statements of the early documents indicate that the funda-
mental purpose of the European Union in the Mediterranean is based on security concerns. The argu-
ment is underlined by further statements, which express a certain fear of an instable neighbourhood in 
the Mediterranean. This is proved by the consideration that negative effects of conflicts on economic 
and political development, especially where sustained over a long period, cannot be over-estimated
356
. 
In the same context, the Commission states that the EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these 
common challenges are addressed
357 by the Mediterranean Policy. There is a certain urgency ex-
pressed by the Commission at many stages. Especially in the preparation document of the Barcelona 
Conference it is stated that time rushes358 and that it is on time to reveal possibilities for the advance-
ment of peace by cooperation and mutual understanding
359
. After having expressed the need for a 
long-term policy360 in 1994, the Commission argues in 2002 that the terrible events of 11 September 
 
353  Comp. „ Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union” COM 95 (72) final, 1. 
354  Comp. „(...) geographischen Gebiete, die für die Union hinsichtlich Sicherheit und sozialer Stabilität von großem 
Interesse sind” COM 94 (427)final, 2 and 4. 
355  Comp. „ (...) in vielen Bereichen eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit” COM 94 (427) final, 5. 
356  Comp. „the negative effects of conflicts on economic and political development, especially where sustained over a 
long period, cannot be over-estimated” COM 2003 (104) final, 9. 
357  Comp. „the EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed” COM 2003 (104) final, 
9. 
358  Comp. „Die Zeit drängt (...)“ COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
359  Comp. „(...) ist es an der Zeit, Möglichkeiten für die Förderung des Friedens über Zusammenarbeit und beidseitiges 
Verständnis aufzuzeigen” COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
360  Comp. „benötigt wird eine langfristige Strategie“ COM 94 (427) final, 7. 
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have imparted new urgency and even greater importance to the efforts
361 of establishing a successful 
policy in the Mediterranean.  
As it is the purpose to raise the awareness362 of the challenges which have to be faced in the Mediter-
ranean, the Commission is convinced that shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common 
understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and 
more open dialogue on the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
363
. From the state-
ment that the situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues 
to give cause for concern
364 derives the conclusion that the transmission of European values, which are 
considered to be of international standards, is one of the continuative purposes of the European policy 
in the Mediterranean. In the context of the establishment of the Mediterranean Union, the Commission 
identifies the Mediterranean as key region365 once more and declares that there is a need to reassert in 




According to these statements, the strategic purpose of the European Union is in the conservation of 
peace and stability, in the enhancement of security and in the missionary attempt of transporting Euro-
pean values and know-how to the neighbouring states. This conclusion seems valid despite attempts to 
trivialise the political purpose by statements like: the policy of the Union attempts to help them to cope 
with the challenges
367
; or all member states would benefit from an improvement in the region’s stabil-
ity and prosperity
368
; and the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic 
integration with the EU
369
. 
The Commission argues in its discourse that the mid-term strategy ranges from simple evidences, like 
strengthening the Mediterranean Policy in a short- and medium- term
370
, demands on intensifying the 
political dialogue
371 to stressing the need to continue and even accelerate the pace of economic mod-
 
361  Comp. „the terrible events of 11 September have imparted new urgency and even greater importance to the efforts” 
COM 2002 (159) final, 5. 
362  Comp. „raise the awareness” COM 2005 (139) final, 5. 
363  Comp. „that shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise 
respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP)” COM 2003 (104) final, 12. 
364  Comp. „the situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues to give cause for 
concern” COM 2002 (159) final, 5. 
365  Comp. „(...) the Commission identifies Mediterranean as key region (…)” COM 2007 (598) final, 7. 
366  Comp. „there is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean in the political 
agenda of all participants” COM 2008 (319) final, 4. 
367  Comp. „(...) die Gemeinschaft eine Politik verfolgt, um ihnen zu helfen (…) Herausforderungen zu bewältigen” COM 
94 (427) final, 6. 
368  Comp. „all the member states would benefit from an improvement in the region’s stability and prosperity, (…)” COM 
95 (72) final, 4. 
369  Comp. „(…) the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU” 
COM 2003 (104) final, 10. 
370  Comp. „(...) kurzfristige und mittelfristige Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik” COM 94 (427) final, 4. 
371  Comp. „Der politische Dialog mit den Mittelmeerpartnern der Union sollte daher intensiviert und auf Sicherheitsfra-
gen ausgedehnt werden“ COM 94 (427) final, 9. 





, to confirm and reinforce the commitment to the Barcelona Process373 and to emphasise 
the willingness to continue with the process
374
.  
The predominant thematic references regarding statements, which indicate the purpose of the Mediter-
ranean Policy, surprisingly correspond to the European interests, defined by the Commission: energy 
supply, migration, trade and investment
375
. Hence, the Commission states that making European in-
vestment in energy easier and involving the MNC in the European Energy Charter would have posi-
tive consequences for cooperation.
376 Or, the expressed concern regarding the migration pressure that 
if it will not be controlled it could easily lead to tensions
377
. With respect to trade the Commission 
states that the realisation of the free-trade area constitutes one of the major ambitions of the Barcelona 
process, which aims to minimize the prosperity gap. Other thematic references concern the preoccupa-
tion of the Commission regarding the dispersion of unconventional weapons, human rights, democ-
ratic values and also environmental matters. 
3.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy 
The aim expressed in the discourse of the Commission concerns both, general formulations and spe-
cific statements. The latter ones are directed towards the aim and towards the operative issues of the 
European Mediterranean Policy.  
The Commission’s formulaic stated aims pertain to general formulations such as establishing a closer 
cooperation
378or a Euro-Mediterranean area which is politically stable and safe379.  
A reference to stability and security can also be found in the general definition of the main aims. In the 
early documents the main aim of the Mediterranean Policy of the Union is highlighted to constitute the 
assurance of peace and stability in the region and that it should be reached with all available media380. 
More concretely, the three main aims of the Mediterranean policy of the EU are: creation of a space 
of peace and stability, creation of a space of common prosperity through the stepwise established free-
trade area, and the improvement of the reciprocal understanding of the peoples and the development 
 
372  Comp. „The pace of economic modernisation should continue and will even need to accelerate in order to produce the 
expected results in terms of economic growth and increased industrial competitiveness” COM 2002 (159) final, 10. 
373  Comp. „The meeting should confirm and reinforce this commitment (…)” WP 2003, 1. 
374  Comp. „All partners should emphasise their willingness to continue with this process” COM 2002 (159) final, 18. 
375  Comp. „Die Interessen Europas in der Region sind sehr vielfältig und betreffen Bereiche wie Energieversorgung, 
Migration, Handel, und Investitionen“ COM 94 (427) final, 5. 
376  Comp. „Making European investment in energy easier and involving MNC in the European Energy Charter would 
have positive consequences for cooperation” COM 95 (72) final, 4. 
377  Comp. „Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht (...) gesteuert, so könnte es nur zu leicht zu Spannungen kommen, (...)“ 
COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
378  Comp. „(...) eine engere Zusammenarbeit“ COM 94(427) final, 7. 
379  Comp. „(...) the Community expressed the view that the key objective oft he European Community’s Mediterranean 
policy, the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean area which is politically stable and safe (...)“ COM 95 (72) final, 2. 
380  Comp. „Das Hauptziel der Mittelmeerpolitik der Union ist die Sicherung von Frieden und Stabilität in der Region. 
Dieses Ziel sollte mit allen der Union zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln (...) verfolgt werden“ COM 94 (427) final, 8. 
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of an active civil society
381. In 2006, the reference to the main aims is more precise: to advance politi-
cal dialogue and reform, tackle the regional and global threats to security and stability, support sus-
tainable socio-economic development, accelerate moves towards free trade area, works towards the 
de-pollution of the Mediterranean, increase cooperation in the field of education and culture, and 
address migratory flows by the way of a comprehensive and integrated approach
382
.  
Other references determine the Barcelona Process as an indispensable instrument for the achievement 
of a common area of peace and stability
383 or that it is its aim to bring the historic and political bind-
ings between Europe and the Mediterranean countries to a full evolvement.
384 For these more general 
statements it can be said that it is indicative that peace and stability range among the most explicitly 
expressed aims. 
More specifically, the aims of the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union can be highlighted as 
follows: 




• To be aware of the reasons for destabilisation and potential conflicts at an early stage
386
.  
• To improve the effectiveness of all actions and to achieve a more visible impact on the wellbe-
ing of the people concerned
387
. 
• To increase the European awareness of the challenges facing the people of the South and to 
land impetus to North-South relations
388
.  
• To develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood
389
. 




381  Comp. „Die drei Hauptzeile der Mittelmeerpolitik der EU sind: Schaffung eines Raumes des Friedens und der Stabili-
tät (…); Schaffung eines Raumes des gemeinsamen Wohlstands durch die schrittweise Errichtung einer Freihandels-
zone (…); Verbesserung des gegenseitigen Verständnisses der Völker in der Region und Aufbau einer aktiven Zivil-
gesellschaft“ COM 2000 (497) final, 2. 
382  Comp. „to advance political dialogue and reform, tackle the regional and global threats to security and stability, 
support sustainable socio-economic development, accelerate moves towards free trade area, works towards the de-
pollution of the Mediterranean, increase cooperation in the field of education and culture, and address migratory 
flows by the way of a comprehensive and integrated approach” COM 2006 (620) final, 2. 
383  Comp. „The European Union’s strategic approach (…) was defined in the (…) Barcelona Process, which is seen as an 
indispensable instrument for the achievement of a common area of peace and stability” COM 97 (68) final, 1. 
384  Comp. „(...) die historischen und politischen Bindungen zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern zur vollen 
Entfaltung bringen“ COM 2000 (497) final, 2. 
385  Comp. „Vorrangig sollte daher der politische Dialog zwischen der Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern gefördert 
werden“ COM 94 (427) final, 8. 
386  Comp. „(...) um frühzeitig die Ursachen von Destabilisierung und potentiellen Konflikten zu erkennen” COM 94 
(427) final, 8. 
387  Comp. „It must strive to improve the effectiveness of all these actions and to achieve a more visible impact on the 
wellbeing of the people concerned“ COM 95 (72) final, 6. 
388  Comp. „These actions and others like them, will not only increase the awareness of the challenges facing the peoples 
in the South, but will also land impetus to North-South relations by encouraging the direct participation of key play-
ers among those peoples” COM 95(72) final, 7. 
389  Comp. „the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood (...)“  
390  Comp. „The aim is to advance political reforms towards human rights, democracy, peace and security (…)“ COM 
2005 (139) final, 4. 
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This representative selection of statements of the European Commission again indicates the strong 
concern to assure peace and stability by enhancing mainly economic reforms. 
Operative aims to accomplish the aims of the policy are diverse and concern, for example, the proposi-
tion of a quick closure391 of the proceedings of the Barcelona Process to conduct all activities with a 
view of guaranteeing the interaction and synergies between bilateral and regional schemes
392
 and that 
the process should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies based on market economy princi-
pals
393
. Therefore, the operative aim is to set up an area of shared prosperity and to give firm impetus 
to the establishment of free trade
394 in order to get rid of existing barriers in transport395; European 
private investment in the region should be promoted
396 and several recommendations to the partner 
countries are made; for instance, those countries which so far did not access the WTO should catch 
up
397 or each country which closed an association agreement with the European Union should aim to 
sign free trade agreements with other countries which hold association agreements with the EU within 
five years
398
. Concerning other areas of the Mediterranean Policy like the multilateral dimension, the 
Commission suggests at one point to make greater use of the cooperation programs by involving fewer 
partners399. This indicates that the policy struggles with the successful implementation of their objec-
tives in this dimension of the Barcelona Process and that the European vision of a region which should 
be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange is much harder to achieve, even if it is considered to 
be the harvest of cultural diversity through the ages400. 
Numerous references have been identified that illustrate the European ambition to change the Mediter-
ranean according to their policy convictions. The Commission urges the need to bring new initiatives 
forward, which aim to increase the Euro-Mediterranean wealth and prosperity401; in 2008, the proac-
 
391  Comp. „rascher Abschluss“ COM 94 (427) final, 3. 
392  Comp „ all activities must be conducted with a view to guaranteeing the interaction and synergies between bilateral 
and regional schemes” COM 97 (68) final, 6. 
393  Comp. „It will be a gradual process and should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies based on market econ-
omy principals” COM 97(68) final, 3. 
394  Comp. „(…) that the first objective of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers should be to emphasize the will 
and desire of the 27 Partners to set up an area of shared prosperity and to give firm impetus to the establishment of 
free trade (…)” COM 97 (68) final, 6. 
395  Comp. „The establishment of free trade area would moreover get rid of existing barriers in transport (…)” COM 95 
(72) final, 3. 
396  Comp. „A systematic effort should be made to promote European private investment in the region” COM 97 (68) 
final, 7.  
397   Comp. „Die Partner, die den Beitritt zur WTO noch nicht beantragt haben, sollte die (...) nachholen (...)“ COM 2000 
(497) final, 9. 
398  Comp. „Jedes Land, das ein Assoziationsabkommen mit der EU unterzeichnet, sollte spätestens innerhalb von fünf 
Jahren danach Freihandelsabkommen mit allen übrigen Unterzeichnern von Assoziationsabkommen schließen“ COM 
2000 (497) final, 9. 
399  Comp. „Die Kommission schlägt vor, die multilaterale Dimension der regionalen Kooperationsprogramme stärker zu 
nutzen, indem Projekte mit einer geringeren Anzahl von Mitgliedstaaten und Mittelmeerpartnern ausgearbeitet wer-
den können (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 12. 
400  Comp. „the region must be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange, which has been the harvest of cultural 
diversity through the ages” COM 2002 (159) final, 2. 
401  Comp. „It is now the moment to deepen and strengthen Marseilles’ decisions and also to put forwards new initiatives 
aimed at increasing Euro-Mediterranean wealth and prosperity” COM 2002 (159) final, 3. 
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tive attitude is even more explicit: more engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform 
the objectives of the Barcelona Process into tangible realities
402
, especially as it has become clear that 
all countries agree on the need to build a stranger partnership
403
. 
Furthermore, the operative aims make references where humanitarian aims regarding illegal migration 
are ostensible, for example, when the Commission states that preventing further loss of life needs to be 
a clear priority in the framework of the partnership
404; they also indicate Europe’s awareness that no 
single country can protect the Mediterranean environment by acting alone
405
; thus, the European pol-
icy is based on certain self-perceptions and role claims which influence the often positively perceived 
intentions. 
 
4 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Identi ty  
The discourse of the European Commission regarding references to the European identity deals with 
aspects like self-reflection, the role of the European Union and the legitimation of the political man-
date, which Europe has assumed in the Mediterranean. 
In total, seventy statements which correspond to this analytical category have been identified. 
 
Documents assigned to the European Commission 
 "EU" "Auftrag" Total 
IDENTITY 48 22 70 
 
The distribution per years indicates that more than half of the statements have been identified in the 
years before 2000. Remarkable is the low number of statements which refer to the European identity 
in the years between 2006 and 2008.  
 
COMM – DOCS: Distribution of statements per year 
 94 95 97 00 02 03 05 06 07 08 Total 
IDENTITY 19 12 9 7 7 10 4 1 1  70 
 
The lack of significant statements concerning the identity of the EU in the discourse of the Commis-
sion indicates that more attention is paid on defining the Mediterranean Policy, especially in 2007 and 
2008 with the proposal of Nicolas Sarkozy to found a Mediterranean Union. It further has to be inves-
 
402  Comp. „more engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the Barcelona Process 
into tangible realities” COM 2008 (319) final, 4. 
403  Comp. „(…) it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partnership (…)” COM 2008 
(319) final, 5. 
404  Comp. „preventing further loss of life needs to be a clear priority in the framework of the partnership” COM 2005 
(139) final, 13. 
405  Comp. „As no single country can be held responsible for the deterioration of the Mediterranean environment, no 
single country can protect it by acting alone” COM 2006 (475) final, 2. 
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tigated whether this suggests a changing self-assurance of Europe or whether it has to be evaluated 
differently.  
 
4 .1 The  se l f -percept ion  of  the  European Union 
Self-reflecting statements within the documents assigned to the European Commission facilitate the 
deduction of characteristics which the European Union is ascribing itself to. The attributes identified 
concern statements, which aim to recall open-mindness, to guard values of human rights and freedom, 
to assure the knowledge advantage, to preserve the image both internally and externally, and to dem-
onstrate power and generosity. Although no specific pattern regarding the temporal appearance of the 
statements can be found, they refer to an image, which the European Union aspires to represent. The 
factual image regarding the political identity will be discussed in the consecutive chapter. 
The discursive recall of open-mindness is confirmed with statements, in which the Commission re-
proves that the Union herself should be prepared for a regular dialogue406 and act with sufficient flexi-
bility and efficiency
407
. When the Commission reminds that the respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms is at the heart of the EU’s international policy
408
, it manifests what implicitly is of 
mayor political interest and can be classified as extended mission statement. This is underlined by 
certain references to the knowledge superiority, which Europe claims for itself when stating experi-
ence has shown
409 or the European experience should be used410. Nevertheless, the position of the 
Commission contains internal criticism and reprimands to some extent: for instance, the Commission 
states that the necessary and quick closure of Association Agreements will require a certain flexibility 
of the Council
411
, or that if a document is signed by Ministers there must be a commitment to gradually 
deepen its content
412
.This severe appearing internal discourse is also given when constituting that no 
moves have been made in a certain direction since the Barcelona Conference and that the Commission 
strongly urges the European Parliament to take initiative
413
. While the Commission is pressuring ad-
vancement in the Mediterranean Policy when it states that the Council has multiple times demanded an 
 
406  Comp. „Die Union sollte ihrerseits zu einem regelmäßigen politischen Dialog (...) bereit sein“ COM 94 (427) final, 
15. 
407  Comp. „Experience has shown that centrally managed programs have not always been able to respond with sufficient 
flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange” COM 2002 (159) final, 7. 
408   Comp. „respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is at the heart of the EU’s international policy” 
COM 97 (68) final, 5. 
409  Comp. „Experience has shown that centrally managed programs have not always been able to respond with sufficient 
flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange” COM 2002 (159) final, 7. 
410  Comp. „Die Europäische Erfahrung mit der Errichtung eines Binnenmarktest sollte genutzt werden (...)“ COM 2000 
(497) final, 8. 
411  Comp. „[rascher Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue Abkommen] Dies wird eine gewisse Flexibilität auf Seiten 
des Rates erfordern, (...)“ COM 94 (427) final, 15. 
412  Comp. „If a document is signed by Ministers there must also be a commitment to gradually deepen its content” COM 
97 (68) final, 5.  
413  Comp. “no moves have been made in this direction since the Barcelona Conference and the Commission strongly 
urges the European Parliament to take initiative” COM 97 (68) final, 10. 
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intensification of the European–Mediterranean– Partnership
414
,it also self-critically assesses that im-
portant internal reform have to be carried out within the Commission regarding external aid and that 
the Council and the Parliament should agree on a more effective handling regarding the financial 
instrument of the Barcelona Process
415 Further criticism towards other European institutions can be 
retained when the Commission constitutes that it has made a number of recommendations on a subject 
which have not been adequately followed up
416
. These internal pressures confirm the position that the 
Commission adheres to its discourse. The Barcelona Process is considered to be of strategic impor-
tance and the Commission’s communications focus on proposals to strengthen and deepen the part-
nership in the future,
417 which in its opinion requires that the European Union and the European insti-
tutions are fully involved in this collective effort
418
. 
Especially the priorities of the Mediterranean Policy have not been properly focused and the content of 
the dialogue has proved to be difficult to define in the opinion of the Commission. It recalls several 
times that the EU needs to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood and 
act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of neighbouring countries within the EU
419
. Al-
though it is postulated that the EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking 
with one voice
420 in regard to the analysis of the statements, it seems necessary for the Commission to 
improve the collective position of the EU. Consequently, this means that a stronger collective identity 
has to be built up.  
 
4 .2 The  ro l e  o f  the  European Union in  the  Medi terranean 
Regarding the political role, which the Commission ascribes to the EU, several aspects discussed be-
forehand might seem repetitive. While the characteristics refer to the internal view of the EU, the as-
pects assessed at this point correspond to the externally aspired image. 
Generally speaking, the conviction that Europe knows what “the other” needs is dominating, espe-
cially when it is stated that the relations to each region are based on the specific needs and capaci-
 
414  Comp. „Der Rat hat mehrfach eine Intensivierung der Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft gefordert“ COM 2000 (497) 
final, 5. 
415  Comp. “Die Kommission muss eine wichtige interne Reform in Bezug auf die Erbringung der Auslandshilfe 
durchführen und das Parlament und der Rat müssen der EU eine wirksamere MEDA- Verordnung an die Hand 
geben“ COM 2000 (497) final, 10. 
416  Comp. “The Commission made a number of recommendations on this subject (…) which have not been adequately 
followed up” COM 2002 (159) final, 5. 
417  Comp. „It should be stressed that the Communications focus on proposals to strengthen and deepen the partnership in 
the future” COM 2005 (139) final, 3. 
418  Comp. “For the Commission it is essential that the European Union and the European institutions are fully involved 
in this collective effort” COM 2006 (475) final, 10. 
419  Comp. „the EU needs also to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood and act to combat 
stereotypes which affect perceptions of neighbouring countries within the EU” COM 2003 (104) final, 12. 
420  Comp. „the EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice (…)” COM 2002 
(159) final, 17. 





. Beside this reference of almighty knowledge, the Commission perceives the European Union as 
pacifier, guardian of the prosperity and defender in times of major threat. Europe, as a politically 
young entity, aspires to be a hegemonial power and assumes all these roles. It is a fact that the dis-
course suggests at some points such behaviour to be legitimate. Peace, which is also central for the 
foundation of the European Union, is an additional motivating factor for the policy in the Mediterra-
nean. Therefore, the Commission is convinced that the dialogue of cultures and civilisation instituted 
by the Barcelona Process is one of the EU’s major contributions to the promotion of mutual under-
standing and the opposing interpretations of present events as a conflict between Western society and 
Islam.
422 Hence, Europe assumes the role of a pacifier, especially in times when prosperity must be 
guarded and brought to those that do not dispose of it. A Mediterranean space where stability and 
prosperity dominates is considered to be advantageous for all member states423. In order to reach this 
aim, the European Union is aware that it must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter 
into similar negotiations with each other and with European countries which are not members of the 
Community
424
. Moreover, the Union states that Association Agreements offer possibilities, but no 
guarantees and that all advantages can only unlimited be used by those countries, which are ready to 
modernise and open their economies
425
. The medium scaled perspective of the EU in the Mediterra-
nean is to change the region into a zone of relative prosperity
426
. Therefore, it can be stated that the 
Commission urges a policy, which is proactive and clear in its position to encourage changes in the 
Mediterranean region according to its measures.  
Hence, the maintenance of peace is one of the roles the EU has ascribed itself to, another one is the 
prevention of the continent of threats caused in the Mediterranean. The identified threats also form a 
part of the legitimation of the European Policy in the Mediterranean. Threats, such as cultural incom-
prehension, socio-economic instability and the Middle East Conflict, are considered to be major moti-
vations for this kind of policy that has been established in 1995. Beside the Middle East Peace Proc-
ess, which is extensively discussed in the documents concerning the discourse of the Commission, it is 
the basic opinion that nowadays, the political, economical and social conditions in most of the coun-
tries threaten the stability and lead to mass emigrations, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drug 
 
421  Comp. „Die Beziehungen zu jeder Region basieren auf den jeweiligen spezifischen Bedürfnissen und Kapazitäten“ 
COM 94 (427) final, 2. 
422  Comp. „that the dialogue of cultures and civilisation instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the EU’s major 
contributions to the promotion of mutual understanding and the opposing interpretations of present events as a con-
flict between Western society and Islam” WP 2003, 6.  
423  Comp. „Dagegen wäre ein Mittelmeerraum, in dem Stabilität und Wohlstand herrschen, für alle Mitgliedstaaten von 
Vorteil“ COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
424  Comp. „(…) the community must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter into similar negotiations 
with each other and with European countries which are not members of the Community” COM 95 (72) final, 4. 
425  Comp. „Die Assoziationsabkommen bieten Möglichkeiten, jedoch keine Garantien, und ihre Vorteile können nur von 
denjenigen Ländern uneingeschränkt ausgeschöpft werden, die bereit sind, ihre Wirtschaft zu modernisieren und zu 
öffnen“ COM 2000 (497) final, 5. 
426  Comp. „Mittelfristig wird die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraumes in eine Zone relativen Wohlstands (...)“ COM 94 
(72) final, 15. 
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abuse and organised crime427. Regarding the organised crime and drug traffic, the Commission is con-
cerned about the necessity of a cooperation improvement as these subjects bear the possibility of re-
ciprocal accusations
428
. The migration pressure provokes similar concerns: if it would not be coordi-
nated accurately and systematically with the concerned countries, this could easily lead to tensions 
which affect international relations and it could damage the immigrants themselves
429
. Concrete ac-
tions have been proposed in this context: in the view of the high rates of population growth in the 
Mediterranean it must be a priority for the relationship to inject a new dynamism into the market inte-
gration, with the view of generating more investment, higher growth rates and job creation
430. Here, 
the European Unions fears that a massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, 
political and environmental consequences for the countries of the region and for the Community.431 In 
the context of these subjects, which constitute major concerns in the discourse of the Commission, the 
attitude, which is proposed in order to deal with such matters, is broadly discussed and indicates 
Europe’s difficulties to dispose a homogenous image. By recalling the priorities of Europe in the re-
gion, the Commission also reproves that the Community must give its unreserved backing432, that the 
EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to embark on new chapters of integra-
tion
433 and that the community must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance434. These 
ways of encouraging a common position within the EU suggest the existing difficulties to speak with 
one voice. These difficulties can especially be found in an area with a known limitation to the aspired 
European superiority - the Community can not solve these problems alone435. This explains why the 
discourse of the Commission puts a special concern to remind that in order to be successful the Euro-




427  Comp. „Heute gefährden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen in vielen dieser Länder die 
Stabilität und führen zu Massenauswanderungen, fundamentalistischem Extremismus, Terrorismus, Drogensucht und 
organisiertem Verbrechen“ COM 94 (427) final, 8. 
428  Comp. „da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu gegenseitigen Beschuldigen geben“ COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
429  Comp. „Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht sorgfältig über eine gezielte Zusammenarbeit mit den betreffenden Ländern 
gesteuert, so könnte es nur leicht zu Spannungen kommen, die sowohl den internationalen Beziehungen als auch den 
Einwandern selbst schaden.“ COM 94 (427) final, 6. 
430  Comp. „in the view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean,  injecting a new dynamism into the 
market integration, with the view of generating more investment, higher growth rates and job creation must be a pri-
ority for the relationship” COM 2005 (139) final, 6. 
431  Comp. „a massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, political and environmental conse-
quences for the countries of the region and for the Community” COM 95 (72) final, 6.  
432  Comp. „the Community must give its unreserved backing (…)” COM 95 (72) final, 3. 
433  Comp. „Against this background, the EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to embark on new 
chapters of integration by engaging negotiations not on the traditional ‘hub and spoke’ model that has been followed 
since 1995, but in a way that would combine North – South and South – South integration” COM 2005 (139) final, 7. 
434  Comp. „the community must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance (…)” COM 95 (72) final, 4. 
435  Comp. „Die Gemeinschaft kann diese Probleme natürlich nicht alle alleine lösen“ COM 94 ( 427) final, 13. 
436  Comp. „Um erfolgreich zu sein, sollte die Union so weit wie möglich als Ganzes auftreten und Einzelinitiativen 
vermeiden“ COM 94 (427) final, 8. 
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4 .3 The  as sumed mandate  in  the  Medi terranean 
It is repetitively stated that Europe’s interests in the region are many and varied437; therefore, the dis-
course about the nature of the mandate, which Europe has assumed in the Mediterranean by launching 
its policy, is not monocausally explainable. Within the discourse of the European Commission it is 
possible to distinguish between statements, which relate to the way Europe wants to create its policy, 
the way this policy can be pushed and who is legitimated. By this means, the comprehension of the 
political mandate in the Mediterranean can be filtered. 
The design of the policy is preliminary declared to be conceptualized as an evolutionary framework438, 
which is supposed to form a dynamic process439. Hence, on the Union’s part, the Partnership is a sign 
of willingness to play an increasing active role in the region on the political, economic and social 
front
440
. In addition, a greater EU involvement in crisis management in responds to specific regional 
threats would be a tangible demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the 
burden of conflict resolution in the neighbouring countries
441
. Now, the conclusion can be drawn that 
the EU’s effort of a new policy with the MNC is based on the wish to be a political player in the re-
gion and on the conviction that this role is welcomed by the others. 
The ways how to fulfil this charge in the frame of the developed policy concern distinctive levels. In 
general, the policy should encourage the regional cooperation442.The necessary requirements on the 
European side are defined as the obligation to share its experience443 and the need to translate its 
wishes into a form of action which produces benefits for the people on both sides of the Mediterra-
nean
444
. In order to successfully implement the European policy, the Commission formulates the con-
viction that with an explicit commitment of the MNC to conduct the economic reforms, it is possible to 
raise the level of employment and to minimize the prosperity gap as well
445
. With the conviction that 
the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of a closer economic integration with the 
EU
446
, the Commission states that, due to the lack of acceptance of the European traditional approach 
 
437  Comp. „Europe’s interests in the region are many and varied” COM 95 (72) final, 2. 
438  Comp. „Die Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer, die als evolutives Rahmenwerk konzipiert werden muss (…)” COM 94 
(427) final, 7. 
439  Comp. „Die Gemeinschaft sollte jedoch schon jetzt eindeutig zu verstehen geben, dass sie einen dynamischen Prozess 
wünscht” COM 94 (427) final, 13. 
440  Comp. „on the Union’s part, the Partnership is a sign of willingness to play an increasing active role in the region on 
the political, economic and social front” COM 97 (68) final, 1. 
441  Comp. „greater EU involvement in crisis management in response to specific regional threats would be a tangible 
demonstration of the EU’s willingness to assume a greater share of the burden of conflict resolution in the neighbour-
ing countries” COM 2003 (104) final, 12. 
442  Comp. „(...) sollte die Union die regionale Zusammenarbeit (...)fördern“ COM 94 (427) final, 15. 
443  Comp. „ (...) Community will have to share its experience in this field with its partners“ COM 95 (72) final, 5. 
444  Comp. „the community must translate its wishes into a form of action which produces benefits for the people on both 
sides of the Mediterranean” COM 95 (72) final, 5. 
445  Comp. „Mit einer eindeutigen Verpflichtung zur Durchführung der wirtschaftlichen Reformen könnten die betreffen-
den Länder die Beschäftigung erhöhen und das Wohlstandsgefälle gegenüber der Union verringern“ COM 94 (427) 
final, 8. 
446  Comp. „the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of a closer economic integration with the EU” 
COM 2003 (104) final, 9. 
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by the local regimes, it has to be done more
447 to convince the partner countries of the positive inten-
tions of the EU in the Mediterranean.  
Concerning the legitimation of the policy, the Commission states that the EU can and should work to 
spread the benefits of enlargement for political and economic stability in the neighbouring coun-
tries
448
. The assumed mission derives from the conviction of being conscious of the desire of our part-
ners for a closer and deeper relationship with the EU
449 and that the mandate derives from the vision 
to establish a good relation with the neighbourhood, to minimize the prosperity gap between the North 
and the South and to bring the people of the region closer to each other
450
. 
XII EU DOCUM E NT S AS SIGNE D T O T HE  EUROP E AN COUNCIL 
The analysis of the documents assigned to the European Council follows a similar pattern as the EU 
documents assigned to the Commission. The macro and micro analyses form additional contributions 
to the discourse analysis, which constitutes the main focus of the assessment. 
 
1 Macro  and micro  s tructure  
A schematic display on macro structural elements is highlighted in the following table: 
 
 
Document Theme Structure Pages Annex 
(pages) 
1 D (95) Barcelona Initiation of the Barcelona Process unnumbered headlines, 
paragraphs 
19 9 
2 MC (97) Malta recalling the declaration, reaffirm 
commitment 
numbered headlines 10 4 
3 IM (98) Palermo Speech    
4 MC (99) Stuttgart balancing the last years, reaffirm 
commitment 
numbered paragraphs 6  
5 IM (00) Lisbon not available    
6 MC (00) Marseilles reinvigorate the EMP numbered paragraphs 8  
7 IM (01) Brussels confirmation of the importance of 
the policy 
numbered paragraphs 17  
8 MC (02) Valencia formulates the need for an increased 
dialogue 
numbered paragraphs 16 10 
9 IM (03) Crete take stock of the progress, discuss 
the future developments 
numbered paragraphs 17  
10 MC (03) Naples reaffirm willingness to strengthen 
the partnership 
numbered paragraphs 18 2 
 
447  Comp. „Der traditionelle Ansatz der EU, (...) wurde nicht immer von den lokalen Regierungen mitgetragen. Es muss 
noch mehr getan werden (...)“ COM 2000 (497) final, 4. 
448  Comp. „the EU can and should work to spread the benefits of enlargement for political and economic stability in the 
neighbouring countries (…)” COM 2003 (104) final, 9. 
449  Comp. „Conscious of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and of the desire of our partners for a closer and 
deeper relationship with the EU” COM 2002 (159) final, 3. 
450  Comp. „Allgemeiner sollte sich die Union darum bemühen, (...) gute nachbarschaftliche Beziehungen herzustellen 
und ein noch stärkeres Nord-Süd-Gefälle zwischen der Union und ihren Partnern im Mittelmeerraum zu verhindern 
und stattdessen die Länder und Völker dieser Region einander näher zu bringen. COM 94 (427) final,8. 
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11 IM (04) Dublin reaffirmation of the common com-
mitment 
numbered paragraphs 15  
12 IM (04) The Hague BP enhanced by the ENP numbered paragraphs 23  
13 MC (05) Luxem-
bourg 
assessment of achievements and set 
guidelines 
numbered headlines 20 6 
14 MC (05) Barcelona Anniversary - speech and comm doc   
15 MC (06) Tampere renew commitment to implement 5 
year working program 
numbered paragraphs 11 3 
16 MC (07) Lisbon assess progress and agree on upcom-
ing priorities 
numbered paragraphs 21 1 
17 D (08) Paris Union for the Mediterranean numbered paragraphs 20 3 
18 MC (08) Marseilles reinforce MMPOL, upgrade rela-
tions, define institutional changes 
numbered paragraphs 28 16 
 
From these eighteen documents one document is not available (IM (00) Lisbon), and two documents, 
the Interim Meeting in Palermo 1998 and the Foreign Minister Meeting on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary, are speeches. Thus, fifteen documents remain, which can be assigned to the political level 
of the European Council. Two of them, the document of the Barcelona Conference in 1995 and the 
Paris Summit in 2008, are considered as declarations. Except the documents that are not available, 
there are four documents dealing with the Interim Ministerial Meetings and nine documents contain 
the conclusions of the Ministerial Meetings. 
Apart from the declaration of 1995, all documents are structured by numbered paragraphs. Each para-
graph either deals with new aspects or with thematic different considerations, which are indicated by 
unnumbered headlines. Beside this, only the declaration possesses a list of the participating Foreign 
Ministers and Heads of State, respectively at the Paris Summit in 2008. More than fifty percent of the 
considered documents possess an annex, which either provides further information on the develop-
ments of the Barcelona Process (for example MC (2005) Luxembourg), a detailed Action Plan (MC 
(2002) Valencia) or summaries of the initiative for the upcoming period (MC (2006) Tampere). 
The first paragraphs largely refer to a summary of the Conference and highlight the most important 
issues that have been agreed on, discussed or assessed during the meeting. Not surprisingly, most 
statements which are relevant for the established categories of the analysis have been identified on the 
first page. Further paragraphs deal with issues corresponding to the interests of the meeting. These 
might concern concrete happenings (earthquakes, wars, conflicts, terrorist attacks), the situation in the 
Middle East Peace Process as all countries involved in the Barcelona Process are interested in the pro-
gress, but also concerns of single countries, financial issues and commitments to further cooperations. 
There are no concluding statements; the whole document represents the conclusions of the Meetings. 
Regarding the presentation principles, it has to be stated that the documents are predominantly formu-
laic. The results concerning the nature of the document evolve from the Meeting of the Foreign Minis-
ters participating in the Barcelona Process; thus, the Ministers of the Mediterranean countries are also 
represented at the Conference. Therefore, the tonality and formulations are subject to the diplomatic 
standards. 
XII          EU Documents assigned to the European Council 
 
112 
In respect of the micro structure, the textual level of the documents that are assigned to the European 
Commission is dominated by factually logic arguments. There are hardly any references regarding 
emotive statements. Only when the Ministers express their total condemnation of terrorism451 or the 
Ministers insist on the unique contribution of the Barcelona Process to peace, stability and develop-
ment in the region
452 emotive arguments can be deduced. In the context of the Middle East Conflict, 
the statement it urges both sides to bring an end to violence453 apparently indicates the same. These 
just mentioned statements mark emotions, but this shall not be the norm. 
The analysis of the formulaic repetitions that can be found at the beginning of the sentences “Minis-
ters/Participants/ Heads of States + verb” do not show a significant pattern over time; neither does the 
denomination of the subjects, namely the Ministers themselves; nor the verbal conjunctions, which 
give indication to their common interests, can be consulted to draw meaningful conclusions. The verbs 
used for common positions are: develop, respect, give, refrain, promote, affirm, encourage, stress, 
recognize, take note, reiterate, agree, consider, recall, express, welcome etc. The verbs welcome, rec-
ognize and agree are the most frequent formulations. 
In general, the structure of those sentences, which are between medium and long (three to five lines), 
are stretched by numerous subordinated clauses. Similar to the documents of the European Commis-
sion, the discourse of the Ministers is only expressed by declarative sentences. 
 
2 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Expression 
The statements which have been allocated to the category “expression” concern denominations of “the 
other”, associative and dissociative elements, references to the Mediterranean Policy and indications 
about the European predominance. 
Within the discourse of the Foreign Ministers eighty six corresponding statements have been detected: 
 
Documents assigned to the European Council 
 "The Other" "MMPOL" "ass./diss." "predominance" Total 
EXPRESSION 14 53 17 2 86 
 
The distribution of the same over the years: 
 
COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year 
 95 97 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
EXPRESSION 6 2 4 2 3 7 15 15 12 3 3 14 86 
 
451  Comp. „express their total condemnation of terrorism” IM (2001) Brussels, 1. 
452  Comp. „the Ministers insist on the unique contribution of the Barcelona Process to peace, stability and development 
in the region” MC (2002) Marseilles, 1. 
453  Comp. „it urges both sides to bring an end to violence” IM (2001) Brussels, 3. 
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2.1 The view of the “other” 
According to the discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings in the framework of the Barcelona Proc-
ess, which includes the ministers of the MNCs, there are hardly any explicit denominations of “the 
other”. Harmless references like partners or Euromed partners do not indicate a distinguishing view of 
the “other”. In contrast, references, which contain a direct request from the European side, indicate a 
predominating attitude and a certain inhomogeneity of the so-called partnership. At the Ministerial 
Conference in Stuttgart in 1999, for example, the “other” was directly addressed when stating that the 
progress achieved by the Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly encour-
aged to follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general
454
. At another time the 
Mediterranean partners are advised that successful economic policies will require bolder reforms455. 
This indicates the knowledge advancement of the European side. 
Other statements including references to countries, which are not members of the European Union, can 
be considered as common statements about the situation in one or the other country. For example, this 
took place in 1999, when the admission of Libya to the Barcelona Process was discussed: Ministers 
agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a full member of the 
Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have been lifted and Libya has ac-
cepted the whole Barcelona acquis
456
. The same problem was again emphasised in 2005, when the 
Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
457
. The 
participation of new members in the Barcelona Process was also stressed in 2008, when the revitalisa-
tion of the Mediterranean Policy disembogued in the foundation of the Mediterranean Union: the Min-
isters welcome the dedication and the interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montene-
gro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to successful integration of the Adriatic 
countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region
458
. 
Concerning the Middle East Peace Process, the document of the Interim Meeting in Dublin, where the 
Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East
459
, also includes an example of a refer-
ence that evaluates the positive cooperation between the Palestinian Authority and Israel: they wel-
comed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in the framework of 
 
454  Comp. „the progress achieved by the Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly encouraged to 
follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general” MC (1999) Stuttgart, 4. 
455  Comp. „successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners” MC (2003) Naples, 9. 
456  Comp. „Ministers agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a full member of the 
Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have been lifted and Libya has accepted the whole 
Barcelona acquis” MC (1999) Stuttgart, 6. 
457  Comp. „Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” MC (2005) 
Luxembourg, 6. 
458  Comp. „The Ministers welcome the dedication and the interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona 
Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with 
Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and fu-
ture initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region” MC (2008) Marseilles, 5. 
459  Comp. „Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East” IM (2003) Dublin, 1. 
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Technical Working Group open to Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting 




Although the discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings hardly allows any conclusions concerning a 
specific European view of the “other”, the diplomatically standardised formulations still indicate a 
certain European elevation in the context of knowledge advancement.  
2.2 Associative and dissociative elements 
Associative and dissociative elements are, as it lies in the nature of the sources, part of the common 
diplomatic discourse; nevertheless, the topics which the statements refer to indicate those areas, in 
which a special treatment among the partners is necessitated. 
There are general formulations which stress the ambition of how to respect each other in the moment 
of cooperation. In the declaration of Barcelona in 1995, the official statement says that the participants 
recognize that the traditions of culture and civilisation throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue 
between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential 
factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their 
perception of each other
461
. The ambition to create a policy of associative character is underlined in 
the same document, namely that there is a demand to respect the territorial integrity and unity of each 
of the other partners
462
. This kind of demand is unique within all the analysed documents. In 2003, the 
unifying formulations regarding the mutual respect are stated as follows: the Euromed Partners are 
encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, including developing policies to promote 
gender equality, pluralism, institution building and how to better associate and engage social partners 
and civil societies as well as encourage its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules 
of international law to the principal on non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in internal affairs of 
another partner and while recognising the specifity of each society
463. In the declaration of Paris 2008, 
the conviction is stated that Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography 
 
460  Comp. „they welcomed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to cooperate in the framework 
of Technical Working Group open to Mediterranean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting inter-
connexion projects of common interests to be integrated into the framework of the Euromediterranean partnership” 
IM (2003) Dublin, 7. 
461  Comp. „the participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilisation throughout the Mediterranean region, 
dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in 
bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other” 
D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
462  Comp. „respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners” D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
463  Comp. „The Euromed Partners are encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, including developing 
policies to promote gender equality, pluralism, institution building and how to better associate and engage social 
partners and civil societies as well as encourage its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules of in-
ternational law to the principal on non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in internal affairs of another partner and 
while recognising the specifity of each society” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6. 




464 and further that they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of 
peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding
465
. These general kept 
attempts to consolidate the laces of cooperation already reached their climax at the Ministerial Meet-
ing in 2000. There, it was declared that a Euro-Mediterranean label will be established466, which indi-
cates the required effort to establish a common identity. 
At the beginning of the Barcelona Process common positions are quite generally formulated, as the 
following statement of 1995 suggests: the participants express their conviction that peace, stability 
and security of the Mediterranean region are common assets
467
. However, declarations of common 
positions may also refer to thematically highly significant subjects, as the following statement, taken 
from the Interim Meeting in Dublin, demonstrates: the Ministers declared that such close and co-
operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and the 
strengthening of commitments to common values and common principals, such as promoting human 
rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
468
. A careful state-
ment regarding a common position can be detected in the declaration of 1995 concerning the Middle 
East Peace Process: the participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and 
principals mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including 
the principle land for peace with all that this implies
469
. In 2008, the tone regarding the Middle Eastern 
Conflict is already more direct: Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immedi-
ately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent 
two state solution to the Israel- Palestinian conflict
470
. Concerning the condemnation of terrorism, the 
common statements are even more decisive. In 2001, it was stated at the Interim Meeting in Brussels 
that Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks and that in this connection 




464  Comp. „Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture” D (2008) Paris, 9. 
465  Comp. „they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and hu-
man, social and cultural understanding” D (2008) Paris, 9. 
466  Comp. „a Euro-Mediterranean label will be established” MC (2000) Marseilles, 8. 
467  Comp. „the participants express their conviction that peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are 
common assets” D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
468  Comp. „such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of security concerns and 
the strengthening of commitments to common values and common principals, such as promoting human rights, com-
bating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” IM (2004) Dublin, 2. 
469  Comp. „the participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle 
East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principals mentioned in the letter of invi-
tation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace with all that this implies” 
D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
470  Comp. „Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immediately implement their respective obliga-
tions under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two state solution to the Israel- Palestinian conflict” MC 
(2008) Marseilles, 4. 
471  Comp. „Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks (…). In this connection they expressed 
their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity” IM (2001) Brussels, 1. 
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Also in 2002 they expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence472. In addition, in 2004 the 
Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and urged all states 
to act to combat terrorism
473
. The issue terrorism contains a strong separative component; neverthe-
less, there is an endeavour at the Ministerial Conferences to attain a common position when it is stated 
that differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying ar-
eas where they can cooperate
474
. 
The common position regarding migration is remarkable because it is positively formulated, despite 
the fact that the matter is one of the mayor European concerns: the Ministers reaffirmed the impor-
tance of migration and expressed the view that, if carefully managed, migration can be a positive fac-
tor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region
475
. 
Other statements refer to associative positions, especially expressing compassion with conflictive 
situations in one of the participating countries of the Barcelona Process. Hence, in 2003 the Ministers 
expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Algerian government and peo-
ple alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by the last earthquake’s catastro-
phe
476
. In the same document they also expressed their full solidarity with Morocco477. A statement of 
2004 offers another example; the Euro Mediterranean partners expressed their common position, 
which includes their determination to assist the Iraqi people on their way to a new era in the history of 
their country. The only reference which can be regarded as a comment to the situation of a European 
country can be found in the document of the Interim Meeting in Dublin in 2003; there it was stated 
that the Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency on the issue of 
sustainable development such as the convening of the International Conference on Sustainable Devel-
opment and Lasting Peace
478
. 
Within the general formulations regarding the values the cooperation should be based on, a strong call 
on reciprocal respect is contained. Hence, there implicitly derives a mutual concern on possible infrac-
tions, which indicate dissociative ambitions among the so-called partners. Also the attempt of finding 
common positions regarding the Middle Eastern Conflict, terrorism and migration demonstrates that 
 
472  Comp. „they expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence” MC (2002) Valencia, 3. 
473  Comp. „the Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and urged all states to 
act to combat terrorism” IM (2004) The Hague, 6. 
474  Comp. „differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from identifying areas where 
they can cooperate” IM (2003) Dublin, 4. 
475  Comp. „the Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and expressed the view that, if carefully managed, 
migration can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth of the whole region” IM (2004) Dublin, 14. 
476  Comp. „the Ministers expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Algerian government and 
people alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by the last earthquake’s catastrophe” IM (2003) 
Crete, 1. 
477  Comp. „the Ministers expressed their full solidarity with Morocco” IM (2003) Dublin, 1. 
478  Comp. „the Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency on the issue of sustain-
able development such as the convening of the International Conference on Sustainable Development and Lasting 
Peace” IM (2003) Crete, 8. 
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these subjects include a strong separative character, which is aimed to be countervailed on diplomatic 
ground. 
2.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
Within the discourse of the Ministerial Conferences the references, which concern the nature of the 
Mediterranean Policy, use a similar terminology as the Commission. As the aim of the documents is 
different, the used expressions do not refer to the internal perception of the policy, but explain how the 
policy wants to be perceived in an external ambit. Thus, the known expressions like “partnership” 
transport the connotation of an equalised policy, references such as “framework” and “forum” estab-
lish the allusion to a constitutional significance, while the terms “initiative” and “instrument” deliver 
the message of a proactive policy. It is important to analyse these descriptions together with the ap-
plied attributes because the assumption of the significance of the words sometimes have a different 
meaning. As the Ministers act in representation of their countries and allude to the public, certain adu-
lations concerning their agreed policy must be included.  
Although the applied terminology suggests references that correspond to the perception of an equal-
ised policy only few of them can be found. The term “partnership” is explicitly used to describe the 
Mediterranean Policy as EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension479. At 
another time, in 2005, the description states that it is a mutually beneficial partnership480. And in the 
declaration of Paris in 2008, the statements refer to a multilateral partnership with a view to increas-
ing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion
481
. According to the references that are linked 
to the denomination partnership, one deduces rather ambitious and strategic aims and not an equalised 
policy of all participating countries. 
The constitutional significance, which is linked to the terms “framework” and “forum”, mainly refer to 
the urgency that the Ministers ascribe to the policy. Thus, the policy is described as vital and preferred 
framework for dialogue and cooperation,
482 as essential framework483 and as the main framework for a 
coherent set of privileged relations with the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood
484
. The policy, which 
has provided a framework for continued engagement and development
485
, is also denominated in rela-
tion to the terminology “forum”. The attributes given in this context underline the singular political 
 
479  Comp. „EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension” IM (2004) Dublin, 3. 
480  Comp. „This is a mutually beneficial partnership” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 3. 
481  Comp. „The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objec-
tives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral part-
nership with a view to increasing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion” D (2008) Paris, 8. 
482  Comp. „Vital and preferred framework for dialogue and cooperation between the European Union and the countries 
of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean” IM (2001) Brussels, 1. 
483  Comp. „(...) as an essential framework for dialogue and cooperation, a true meeting point of cultures and civilisa-
tions” MC (2002) Valencia, 1. 
484  Comp. „The Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coherent set of privileged relations with the Euro-
Mediterranean neighbourhood within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood” IM (2004) Dublin, 1. 
485  Comp. „(…) it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development” D (2008) Paris, 9. 
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significance that the Barcelona Process legitimately obtains: It is the only forum within all Euro-
Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persist-
ing conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region
486
. 
The proactive character of the Mediterranean Policy is expressed when the terminology refers to an 
initiative or instrument. In the declaration of 1995, the Ministers referred to this Euro-Mediterranean 
initiative
487
. In 2004, the initiative was attributed as the main initiative for the Mediterranean in which 
the EU and the Mediterranean partners jointly participate
488
. The proactive significance is also ex-




The Ministers’ special appraisals of the policy vary from the geographical reference that the policy 
encompasses an area of relation from Mauritania to the Iran – the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East
490 to avowals of the outranging significance. Including the historic connotation, the Ministers 
stated in the year of the 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process that 1995 marked a turning-point in 
relations between the European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean
491
. In the context of the foundation of the Mediterranean Union, the Ministers stressed 
that this was an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and 
upgrade it to a new level
492
. Its character is repetitively referred to as being unique in its scope493 and 
that its finality is to make a distinct contribution to encouraging a process of political and economic 
progress for the peoples of the region
494
. Moreover, it provides an important contribution to 
promoting progress and to furthering mutual understanding
495
.  
This leads to another important aspect that the statements regarding the analytical category “Mediter-
ranean Policy” refer to: the strategic significance which the Ministers ascribe to the Barcelona Process. 
This is expressed through the way that the Ministers repeat the statement of their commitment to the 
Mediterranean Policy throughout the documents. Thus, they state for example in 1999 that all mem-
 
486  Comp. „The Barcelona Process is the only forum within all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage 
in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region” D 
(2008) Paris, 8 and 9. 
487  Comp. „this Euro-Mediterranean initiative” D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
488  Comp. „(...) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy is the main initiative for the 
Mediterranean in which the EU and the Mediterranean partners jointly participate” IM (2004) The Hague, 1. 
489  Comp. „(…) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy central instrument for partner-
ship and dialogue for the Mediterranean” IM (2004) The Hague, 1. 
490  Comp. „(...) relations with an area which extends from Mauritania to the Iran – the Mediterranean an the Middle 
East” IM (2004) Dublin, 1. 
491  Comp. „1995 marked a turning-point in relations between the European Union and its neighbours on the southern and 
eastern shores of the Mediterranean” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 1. 
492  Comp. „The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is an historic opportunity to 
revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level” D (2008) Paris, 17. 
493  Comp. „(...) a Partnership which is unique in its scope” MC (2007) Lisbon, 4. 
494  Comp. „(…) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership makes a distinct contribution to encouraging a process of political 
and economic progress for the peoples of the region” IM (2004) Dublin, 15. 
495  Comp. „The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress and to furthering mutual 
understanding” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6. 
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bers remain fully committed to all objectives and principles of the Barcelona Process and have reaf-
firmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into a new millennium
496
. Also in 2003 they reaf-
firmed their joint interest
497
. Moreover, at the Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process in 2008 they 
injected a renewed political momentum into the Euro-Mediterranean relation
498 and commented on 
the unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declara-
tion a reality
499
. Ministers are convinced that the Barcelona Process is solid and lasting500 and, at the 
Ministerial Conference in Marseilles, they insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and 
development in the Mediterranean region501. In 2002, the Ministers further expressed their belief that 
the Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the participants to be able 
to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern
502
. In 2005, the year of anniversary, the 
Ministers self-critically stated that the principals of the partnership are actually more relevant than 
ever
503 and that its vast potential is far from being exhausted504. The strategic ambition, expressed in 
2008, stresses that this initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as 
well as regional security
505
. 
These continuous affirmations of the importance of the Mediterranean Policy do, on the one hand, 
indicate the significance and the necessity the Ministers ascribe to the Barcelona Process; and, on the 
other hand, the statements appear in a light of adulation and innate persuasion, as there are only few 
critical references. 
2.4 References on European predominance 
Only one statement can be identified which explicitly indicates a dominant European attitude. It con-
cerns the Middle Eastern Conflict, when the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its 
military operations, to immediately withdraw its military forces from Palestinian cities
506 at the Con-
 
496  Comp. „all members remain fully committed to all objectives and principles of the Barcelona Process and have reaf-
firmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into a new millennium” MC (1999) Stuttgart, 1. 
497  Comp. „they reaffirmed their joint interest” MC (2003) Crete, 1. 
498  Comp. „they injected a renewed political momentum into the Euro-Mediterranean relation” MC (2008) Marseilles, 3. 
499  Comp. „(…)unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration a 
reality” MC (2008) Marseilles, 3. 
500  Comp. „The discussions have shown that the Partnership is solid and lasting“ MC (1999) Stuttgart, 1. 
501  Comp. „(...)the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the region” MC 
(2000) Marseilles, 1. 
502  Comp. „the Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the participants to be able to 
engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual concern” MC (2002) Valencia, 5. 
503  Comp. „The Barcelona Declaration is still the cornerstone oft he partnership and is actually more relevant than ever “ 
MC (2005) Luxembourg, 1. 
504  Comp. „its vast potential is far from being exhausted and sets objectives for many years to come” MC (2005) Lux-
embourg, 1. 
505  Comp. „this initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security 
(…)” D (2008) Paris, 9. 
506  Comp. „the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its military operations, to immediately withdraw its 
military forces from Palestinian cities” MC (2002) Valencia, 4. 
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ference in Valencia in 2002. This is the only reference of a European demand which denotes Europe as 
a big power, in other words, as a relevant political player in the region.  
Implicitly, European dominance can be perceived between the lines concerning knowledge advance-
ment and financial support. For instance, the statement saying that the EU will establish substantial 
financial facility to support willing Mediterranean Partners in carrying out their reforms taking into 
account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region
507
 indicates the 
principal of carrot and stick, inclusion and exclusion. On the one hand, there is a reserved generosity 
when it is stated that reform must be encouraged within the societies; on the other hand, however, the 
willing countries are promised substantial financial facilities, which they receive after the reforms 
have been characterised as “valid” according to European standards. Thus, this can be classified as an 
implicit example of European predominance.  
 
3 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Purpose  
Within the category “purpose” fifty-eight statements have been identified. Slightly more references 
can be ascribed to the rubric concerning the aim of the Mediterranean policy. 
 
Documents assigned to the European Council 
 "Aim" "Purpose" Total 
PURPOSE 34 23 57 
 
The distribution per year indicates that in the documents of the years 2003, 2004 and 2008 more than 
ten statements contain references which belong to the analytical category “purpose”. Indicators might 
be that 2003 was the preparation year of the EU enlargement and the establishment of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy; 2004 was the year before the anniversary and in 2008 the revitalisation of the 
Barcelona Process took place on French request.  
 
COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year 
 95 97 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
PURPOSE 2 1 4 4 4 1 11 13 3 1 1 12 58 
 
3.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy  
References, ascribed to the rubric “purpose”, deal with the strategic ambition which forms the basis of 
the Barcelona Process. Due to the highly standardised documents of the Ministerial conferences, there 
have only been few statements identified which explicitly mention the reasons for establishing such a 
Mediterranean Policy. In 1995, the Ministers stressed the strategic importance of the Mediterranean 
 
507  Comp. „the EU will establish substantial financial facility to support willing Mediterranean  Partners in carrying out 
their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop from within the societies of the region” MC 
(2006) Tampere, 2. 
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and stated that they are moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension
508
. Since then, 
the formulations which indicate strategic consideration, concern the recognition of the serious threat 
that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership
509 and that it remains of key importance to 
tackle illegal immigration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as associated criminal offences, includ-
ing cross-boarder human trafficking
510
. It can be deduced from these statements that socio-economic 
considerations form the main strategic concern of the participating countries. The fact that the purpose 
concerns also control mechanism is documented by the following statement: Ministers confirmed that 
the dialogue could deal inter alia with the following issues: monitoring the economic situation in the 
region, monitoring structural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Association 
Agreements and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using precise and meas-
urable indicators including poverty issues and poverty
511
. Thus, monitoring, which is probably 
strongly enhanced by the European countries, forms a considerable part of the strategic motivation to 
initiate the Barcelona Process.  
According to the purpose, the vision of the Ministers concerning the cooperation in the Mediterranean 
is based on the need to improve the outcome of the Barcelona Process. Therefore, the Ministers ex-
press in their discourse the need to strengthen the intercultural dialogue512 and the need to contribute 
to clear up misunderstanding, foster approximation of analysis and perceptions and make it possible 
subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency
513
. Hence, still greater 
efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to demonstrate genuine political will to imple-
ment the commitments
514
. Although the official purpose and aim is to bring people closer together, to 
promote understanding and to improve the mutual perception, the dominating impression of the pur-
pose of the Barcelona Process lies in socio-economic concerns, like preventing the transporting of 
illegal immigrants by sea
515 and to make sure that extremis and radicalisation, racism and discrimina-
 
508  Comp. „stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and stated that they are moved by the will to give 
their future relations a new dimension (…)” D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
509  Comp. „They recognized the serious threat that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership” MC (1999) Stutt-
gart, 3. 
510  Comp. „It remains of key importance to tackle illegal immigration via the Mediterranean Sea as well as associated 
criminal offences, including cross-boarder human trafficking” IM (2004) Dublin, 14. 
511  Comp. „Ministers confirmed that the dialogue could deal inter alia with the following issues: monitoring the eco-
nomic situation in the region, monitoring structural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Associa-
tion Agreements and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using precise and measurable indi-
cators including poverty issues and poverty” MC (2003) Naples, 7. 
512  Comp. „the need to further strengthen the intercultural dialogue” MC (2006) Tampere, 7. 
513  Comp. „(…) to contribute to clear up misunderstanding, foster approximation of analysis and perceptions and make it 
possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency” MC (2000) Marseilles, 3. 
514  Comp. „still greater efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to demonstrate genuine political will to 
implement the commitments jointly entered into the Valencia Action Plan” IM (2004) The Hague, 3. 
515  Comp. „Concerted efforts by all members of the Barcelona Process should lead to a prevention of the transporting 
illegal immigrants by sea” IM (2004) Dublin, 14. 
XII          EU Documents assigned to the European Council 
 
122 
tion and xenophobia do not gain the upper hand
516
. The stated aims indicate how these ambitions 
should be achieved. 
3.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy 
Concerning the stated aims, declarations can be found which refer to general formulations and which 
provide further details on the goals and how to achieve them.  
From the beginning onwards, it was the aim to establish a comprehensive partnership through 
strengthening political dialogue on a regular basis
517 with the finality to establish a common area of 
peace and stability to create an area of shared prosperity and to develop a partnership in social, cul-
tural and human affairs.
518 At the Paris Summit dominated the conviction that this initiative can play 
an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as 
economic and social development, world food security crisis, degradation of environment, including 
climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development, energy, mi-
gration, terrorism and extremis, as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.
519 
In order to achieve this general aims, the Ministers mention numerous measures, such as: 
• To make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential 
instrument for upgrading economies
520
. 
• To reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters521. 
• To reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-
ownership of the process
522
. 
• To speed up the process of implementation of commitments
523
. 
• To upgrade the activities of the Partnership
524
. 





516  Comp. „They stressed the need to make sure that extremis and radicalisation, racism and discrimination and xeno-
phobia do not gain the upper hand over the majority of the population that wants to live peacefully.” IM (2004) The 
Hague, 12. 
517  Comp. „to establish a comprehensive partnership through strengthening political dialogue on a regular basis” D 
(1995) Barcelona, 2. 
518  Comp. „to establish a common area of peace and stability to create an area of shared prosperity and to develop a 
partnership in social, cultural and human affairs” MC (2007) Lisbon, 1. 
519  Comp. „this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean 
region, such as economic and social development, world food security crisis, degradation of environment, including 
climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development, energy, migration, terrorism 
and extremis, as well as promoting dialogue between cultures” D (2008) Paris, 8. 
520  Comp. „To make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for 
upgrading economies” MC (2000) Marseilles, 5. 
521  Comp. „reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean  Partnership in all its chapters” MC (2003) Naples, 2 
522  Comp. „(…)to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense of co-ownership of the 
process” IM (2004) Dublin, 1. 
523  Comp. „(…)to speed up the process of implementation of commitments” IM (2004) Dublin, 15. 
524  Comp. „(…) to upgrade the activities of the Partnership” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 5. 
525  Comp. „(…)provide continued support for the cooperation among the parties” MC (2005) Luxembourg, 6. 
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With the conviction that by enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will contribute 
to the solution of tensions and crises in the area
526
, the ministers aim to reach a level of cooperation 
that lacks any taboos concerning questions of mutual interest and the dialogue may be extended to 
other conflictive topics527. In all these statements, which are, due to their standardised form, well-
known at this stage of this work, it has to be added that no remarkable statements, indicating further 
aims on the general level, or operative aims are explicitly mentioned. Between the lines, there is the 
persisting concern to implement measures to assure peace and security in the Mediterranean region, 
which indicates that the governments are moved by considerable worries. 
 
4 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Identi ty  
The statements which refer to the analytical category “identity” aim to accentuate a possible European 
self-perception and to illustrate Europe’s assumed role in the Mediterranean. In total, thirty-seven 
statements, which fulfil these requirements, have been identified. Due to the high standardised charac-
ter of the documents and the fact that the Ministerial Conferences are assisted by all ministers of the 
countries participating in the Barcelona Process, thus also the MNCs, there is obviously a certain res-
ervation regarding too many references to the image, role and mandate from the European side.  
 
Documents assigned to the European Council 
 "EU" "Auftrag" Total 
IDENTITY 26 11 37 
 
Apart from the anniversary year 2005, the statements are spread quite evenly over the years. A reason 
for the outstanding number of statements in the years 2005 can be found in the fact that it constituted 
the year of an overall assessment of the success and failure of the European initiative.  
 
COUNCIL - DOCS: Distribution of statements per year 
 95 97 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
IDENTITY 2 2 2 3  4 7 10 5 1  1 37 
 
4.1 The self-perception of the European Union 
Due to the nature of the documents there are hardly any explicit statements referring to a possible self-
perception of the European Union. The references of the European Union, its policy understanding and 
the support provided by the EU are omnipresent in all documents. The important role that the Euro-
 
526  Comp. „by enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will contribute to the solution of tensions and 
crises in the area” MC (1999) Stuttgart, 2. 
527  Comp. „They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mutual interest were con-
cerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other topics (...)” MC (2000) Marseilles, 3. 
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pean Union aspires to play in the region is noticeably expressed in the documents as well as in the 
mandate which the EU has assumed.  
4.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean 
The role of the European Union, which can be perceived in the documents of the Ministerial Confer-
ences, is obviously focused on supportive elements and does not indicate further pretensions because it 
has to be conformable with the MNCs. Thus, there are statements concerning the substantiation of the 
European willingness to provide support for the region, there are references indicating the resources 
allocated and there are evidences evaluating the European role in the Mediterranean. 
In the document of the Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart in 1999, the Ministers recorded that the 
European Union confirmed its assistance for the period 2000-2006, which reflects the high priority 
that the EU attaches to the relations with its Mediterranean Partners
528
. The EU continuously reaf-
firms its offer to provide technical assistance and support529. In 2000, the EU offered its support in the 
context of the Middle East Peace Process, when it reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the 
service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement 
them
530
. The apparent omnipresence of the European offer for assistance is explained by a fact which 
is included in the document of 2005: the EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries 
both in trade of goods and services
531
. From the European side, there is a cooperation disposition also 
with other partners, notably with the US, the G8 and the NATO
532
; the unique position of the EU as 
appreciated in the way that within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a mire intensive politi-
cal dialogue and greater access to EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in 
the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and 
home affairs
533. Therewith, the Ministers agreed that the EU regional policy could serve, among other 
policies, as a source of inspiration for regional development in the Mediterranean countries, in col-
laboration with the relevant regional structures
534
. In general, the role of the European Union is per-
 
528  Comp. „The European Union confirmed that its assistance for the period 2000-2006 will again reflect the high prior-
ity that it attaches to relations with its Mediterranean Partners in the context of its overall external commitments.” 
MC (1999) Stuttgart, 6. 
529  For example in 2002 Comp. „The EU renewed its offer to provide technical assistance to these initiatives“ MC (2002) 
Valencia, 2; and in 2003 Comp. „ (…)the Commission will provide technical support” IM (2003) Crete, 6.  
530  Comp. „The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facili-
tate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them” MC (2000) Marseilles, 2. 
531  Comp. „The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and services” MC (2005) 
Luxembourg, 3. 
532  Comp. „The EU has stated its readiness to cooperate with other actors (…), notably with the US (…), the G8 and the 
NATO” IM (2004) Dublin, 3. 
533  Comp. „within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a mire intensive political dialogue and greater access to 
EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in the four freedoms particularly the Single Market, 
as well as reinforced co-operation on justice and home affairs” IM (2004) Dublin, 1. 
534  Comp. „the Ministers agreed that the EU regional policy could serve, among other policies, as a source of inspiration 
for regional development in the Mediterranean countries, in collaboration with the relevant regional structures” MC 
(2005) Luxembourg, 9. 
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ceived as useful and accepted from all participating countries which are not member countries. The 
evaluation of the European dedication in the Mediterranean is especially positive in the most conflic-
tive subject of the Barcelona Process: the Middle East Peace Process. Thus, the Ministers stated that 
they welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East535 and the Middle East Peace 
Process
536.  
4.3 The assumed mandate in the Mediterranean 
In the Barcelona Declaration, the Ministers stated that they were convinced that the general objective 
of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing 
peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, 
sustainable and balanced economic and social developments, measures to combat poverty and promo-
tion of greater understanding between cultures
537
. This was basically the mandate that the European 
Union assumed at the moment of launching the Barcelona Process. The legitimation of the proceeding 
can be traced back several years. In 1999, for instance, the Ministers encouraged the European Union 
to continue increasing its role in support of the Middle East Peace Process
538
; or, in the proximate 
year, the Ministers called for a greater involvement of the European Union vis-à-vis all parties to fos-
ter dialogue and restore trust and confidence
539
. At another point in 2003, the Ministers encouraged 
the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in cooperation with Member States and Partner 
countries, the coordination of programs financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international 
organisations.
540 In the same document the Commission was further invited to explore how, within the 
existing MEDA framework, a more substantial involvement of the Mediterranean partner in the rele-
vant EU programs could be achieved
541
. Finally, in 2004, the Ministers welcomed the EU willingness 




535  Comp. „Ministers welcomed the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East (…)” MC (2006) Tampere, 1. 
536  Comp. „Ministers welcomed the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, notably in the 
framework of the Quartet” MC (2008) Marseilles, 4. 
537  Comp. „convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange 
and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for 
human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social developments, measures to combat poverty and promo-
tion of greater understanding between cultures” D (1995) Barcelona, 2. 
538  Comp. „the Ministers encouraged the European Union to continue increasing its role in support of the Middle East 
Peace Process” MC (1999) Stuttgart, 2. 
539  Comp. „the Ministers called for a greater involvement of the European Union vis-à-vis all parties to foster dialogue 
and restore trust and confidence” MC (2000) Marseilles, 2. 
540  Comp. „the Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in cooperation with Member 
States and Partner countries, the coordination of programs financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international 
organisations” IM (2003) Crete, 8. 
541  Comp. „invited to explore how, within the existing MEDA framework, a more substantial involvement of the Medi-
terranean partner in the relevant EU programs could be achieved” IM (2003) Crete, 10. 
542  Comp. „the Ministers welcomed the EU willingness to support indigenous programs for development and reform 
emanating from within the countries of the Mediterranean” IM (2004) The Hague, 2. 
XIII          Interinstitutional discourse analysis – concluding remarks „EU Documents“ 
 
126 
It seems evident that the mandate assumed by Europe in the Mediterranean is broadly accepted and 
backed by the MNC. In this context, the most remarkable issue is the support of the European role in 
the Middle East Peace Process, which reflects the wish of the MNC to become more autonomous from 
US interventions. For further research proposals it would be interesting to examine if the European 
mandate in the Mediterranean is of sincere concern to the MNC or just tolerated as a lesser evil. 
XIII INTE RINS T IT UT IONAL DIS COURS E ANAL YS IS – CONCL UDING RE M ARKS  
“EU DOCUM E NTS” 
Both, the documents assigned to the European Commission and those assigned to the European Coun-
cil assess the official discourse of the European Union in the Mediterranean. With regard to the Barce-
lona Process, initiated in 1995 and reinvigorated in 2008 with the renaming of the policy in Mediterra-
nean Union543, the discourse of the EU documents concern the active level, the establishment of the 
official discourse. By this means, the documents of the European Commission refer to the internal 
discourse within the European institutions. According to that, the communications of the Commission 
are addressed to the European Parliament and to the European Council. The communications aim to 
provide background information, set the path for the Foreign Policy and coordinate the internal senti-
ments. Thus, the significance of the documents assigned to the Commission predominately lies in its 
nature of representing the internal, interinstitutional discourse. The conclusions of the Foreign Minis-
ter Meetings are formally assigned to the European Council, which represents the European Member 
States and possesses decision-making power regarding the Common Foreign Security Policy. There-
fore, the documents which are evolved in presence of all representatives of the participating countries 
in the Barcelona Process, including the MNCs, give reference to the official agreed discourse. Hence, 
the declared discourse of the Foreign Minister Meetings is the agreed result of what has been inter-
nally stressed, for example, on behalf of the European Commission. Thus, the analytical sequence/ of 
the concerns of the present analysis can be simplified as follows: from the internal discourse results 
the agreed discourse, which represents the official discourse of the European Union.  
492 statements have been identified in both kinds of sources: 
 
Total number of statements 
 Commission Council  
EXPRESSION 135 86  
PURPOSE 107 37  
IDENTITY 70 57  
Total 312 177 492 
 
 
543  This was accorded on the Ministerial Conference in Marseilles, November 2008. 
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Nearly twice as many statements have been selected in regard to documents assigned to the European 
Commission. This is due to the fact that these documents are in its nature less formulaic. Their finality 
is in convincing the internal forces within the EU, providing background information, stressing the 
motivation for policy efforts, combining visionary and assumed realistic ambitions, and developing the 
base for the decision-making. The Foreign Ministers, who dispose of decision-making power, are on 
the other hand bound to diplomatic proceedings, which, in the context of defining the Mediterranean 
Policy, concern determining, negotiating and reaching a consensus. Thus, the conclusions of the For-
eign Minister Meetings are more formulaic and less informative concerning the established criteria of 
analysis. This explains the lower number of identified statements. 
Concerning the identification of the sources, their accessibility and the context analysis, there are no 
noteworthy discrepancies that would enrich the present research question. Similarly, regarding the 
macro and the micro structural analysis, the essential aspects relate again to the already stressed con-
clusion that the documents differ in their degree of standardisation although both are significantly 
involved in the Foreign Policy development.  
With respect to the discourse analysis itself and the analytical category “expression”, the discrepancy 
between the number of statements is 49 (Commission: 135 - Council: 86). In the subcategory the 
“other”, the discrepancy is even more explicit, as 40 statements have been identified in the documents 
assigned to the Commission and less than the half, namely 14, in the Conclusions of the Foreign Min-
ister Meetings. As a matter of fact, hardly any explicit references of the “other” can be found because 
the partner countries assist the conferences. Nevertheless, the statements concerning the “other” occur 
when there is a direct request on a certain subject as, for example, the encouragement to implement 
certain reforms suggested by the European Union. The references in the documents of the Commis-
sion, on the other hand, show an explicit temporal development (expression of strangeness in the be-
ginning of the Barcelona Process), strong influence of external events (associative tonality after 9/11) 
and an articulated estimation that their development is significantly inferior to the European one. From 
this derives the self-legitimated mandate which is assumed by the European Union in the Mediterra-
nean, a so called mission statement. For example, the inferior development, which derives from the 
socio-economic discrepancy and the lack of implementation of international values (e.g. Human 
Rights), served as legitimation for the European predominance in the institutional organisation of the 
Barcelona Process over the years and the assumption of the appropriate reforms for the MNC. The 
subcategory “associative/dissociative” represents the only rubric, where the Council documents pro-
vide more statements than those of the Commission (17:10). This is explained by the, generally speak-
ing, consensus oriented diplomatic procedure. The statements of the Ministerial Meetings mention 
common positions, stress reciprocal solidarity and demand for respect, while the discourse of the 
European Commission aims to bridge dissociative forces, such as terror attacks with increasing asso-
ciative formulations; for example, references to a common cultural heritage or the taking of a “we” 
and “our” in the context of the cooperation aims. Concerning the subcategory “Mediterranean Policy,” 
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the number of statements is nearly equally proportioned 59 (Commission): 53 (Council). While both 
institutions use similar expressions like “forum”, “framework” and “partnership”, the main part of the 
statements assigned to the Commission describe the policy with adjectives, which refer to its singular-
ity and strategic significance. The Ministerial discourse, on the other hand, is less focused on the in-
ternal persuasion, but on how the policy is externally perceived. At this point, the discourses meet 
each other because both aim to convince the parties (internally as well as externally) of the strategic 
importance and the essential need of the initiative (which in its terminology is equivalent to a proac-
tive policy). Again, a noticeable discrepancy in the amount of identified statements can be highlighted 
within the subcategory “European predominance”, namely 18 (Commission): 2 (Council). While the 
Ministerial discourse obviously preserves cautiousness, the references in the documents of the Euro-
pean Commission indicate a clear awareness of the own predominant position.   
In the context of the analytical category “purpose,” the total number of selected statements amounts to 
164, 107 to the Commission and 57 to the Council. The reason for the discrepancy can be found in the 
more standardised and formulaic discourse of the documents assigned to the Council. Although in the 
subcategory “aim”, where 52 statements belong to the document of the Commission and 34 to the 
Council, the wording concerning the aim of the three areas of cooperation is quite similar, the dis-
course of the Commission provided more variety, which, at this point is not really significant. Some 
terminological discrepancies can be identified regarding the verbal constructions. Within the discourse 
of the Commission verbs like “encourage”, “be aware”, “develop” and “increase” appear in the con-
text of a certain apprehensibility and atmosphere of departure, namely to mobilise forces to change the 
status quo. In contrast, the Ministerial discourse, including verbs like “make”, “reinvigorate”, “speed 
up” and “upgrade”, indicates the wish to become more active, more successful and more decisive in 
implementing the policy. At this point of the discourse, Europe’s interests appear as a strong driving 
motor. In the subcategory “purpose” 55 statements have been identified in the documents assigned to 
the Commission and 23 in those assigned to the Council. Although there are more statements on the 
Commission’s side, more significant references have been identified in the Ministerial discourses. At 
the Ministerial Conferences strategic considerations and the need for improved control mechanism are 
openly stressed so that they represent a common concern. Thus, the Ministerial discourse postulates a 
so called win-win situation; however, after examining them in-depth and comparing them with the 
statements of the Commission’s discourse, one finds out that what is really meant is the European’s 
fear and threat towards an instable Mediterranean boarder. 
The discrepancy of statements concerning the category “identity”, 70 (Commission) : 37 (Council), is 
likewise due to the fact that there are hardly any references of a European self-perception and role 
understanding in the documents of the Foreign Minister Meetings. In the discourse of the Commission 
the EU refers to its open-mindedness, its knowledge advancement and its assumed mandate to guard 
the international standards regarding democracy and human rights. The role the Commission ascribes 
to the EU is that its approach is legitimated by the superior knowledge; in other words, the EU knows 
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what the “other” needs. There are also self-critical references which stress the fact that a successful 
and coherent policy demands a European Unions that speaks with one voice. Nevertheless, the Com-
mission assumes that the EU has a clear mandate in the Mediterranean, as the policy is based on the 
premise that it is also their, the “other’s”, wish that the EU becomes more proactive and that its finality 
is a benefit for all participants. Within the Ministerial discourse the beneficial aspect is less argued 
than the aspiration of acceptance as an important political player. The support and the positive feed-
back regarding the involvement of the European Union can clearly be deduced from the statements 
within the document of the Ministerial Conferences. It is to suspect that the motivation of the support 
of the MNC happens because they prefer Europe to the USA and Russia as a player in the region and 
that Europe represents the lesser evil. A further analysis of this support would definitely be a promis-
ing research aim and a very interesting undertaking. 
OFFICIAL DISCOURSE - SPEE CHES 
The speeches complete the analysis of the European discourse in this thesis because they represent its 
implementation. Due to the nature of the sources, the speeches constitute an important contribution to 
the analysis, since the discourse expressed by the high representatives of the European institutions 
aspired to be more direct and less formulaic.  
It is to expect that the speeches assigned to the European Commission are less diverse because the 
speakers all represent a single political institution, namely the European Commission. The speeches 
assigned to the European Council, on the other hand, are held by politicians who also represent the 
opinion and interests of their home countries.  
XIV IDE NT IFICAT ION OF T HE S OURCE S 
In order to provide the greatest possible comparability with the analysis of the European documents 
which stress the establishment of the European discourse, the selected speeches have also been 
grouped into those that can be assigned to the European Commission and those assigned to the Euro-
pean Council. The speakers have been selected in regard to their political functionality within the 
European institutions. In total, there have been thirty-six speeches concerning Mediterranean Policy 
Affairs identified.  
 
1 Li s t  o f  speeches  a ssigned to  the  European Commission 
Twenty one documents can be assigned to the European Commission. The listing below gives an 
overview of date, location and the person who held the speech. Additionally, there is also a reference 
to the nationality and the political function of the speaker.  
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I Directorate General III, 
Head of Unit - A2 - 
Industrial Co-operation 
Status of Euro- Med 
sectorial policy discus-
sions (Industry and 
Energy) 
23.05.1997 Oslo Manuel 
Marin 
E Vice- president of the 
European Commission 






F Member of the Commis-
sion, DG 1B A.4, Médi-
terranée du Sud, Moyen 




lisée et société civile en 
Méditerranée 
31.01.2001 Brussels Rt Hon 
Chris Pat-
ten 
UK Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations 
Joint debate on com-




18.06.2001 Rabat Rt Hon 
Chris Pat-
ten 
UK Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations 
The EU and Morocco - 
close partners in re-
gional leadership 
19.06.2001 Puglia António 
Vitorino 
P European Commissioner 
for Justice and Home 
Affairs 
The European Dimen-
sion of Immigration, 





I President of the Euro-
pean Commission 
Europe and the Medi-
terranean: time for 
action 
23.02.2005 Strasbourg Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-





14.03.2005 Cairo Margot 
Wallström 
S Vice President of the 
European Union respon-












A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
Ten years after the 
Barcelona Process: 
Empowering Women 
as a Catalyst for Eco-
nomic Development 
24.11.2005 Madrid Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
El proceso de Barcelo-
na: Un puente sobre el 
Mediterráneo 
25.11.2005 Barcelona Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
Euromed and the Me-
dia 
03.02.2006 Warsaw Danuta 
Hübner 
PL Member of the European 
Commission responsible 
for Regional Policy 
The borders of Europe 
15.03.2006 Strasbourg Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-




Policy / Preparation of 
APEM 
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07.04.2006 Wien Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
Islam in Europa: Vom 
Dialog zum Handeln 
02.06.2006 Hamburg Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
The EU, the Mediter-
ranean and the Middle 
East: A Partnership for 
Reform 
06.06.2006 Brussels Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-















P President of the Euro-
pean Commission 
Shared Challenges, 
shared futures: Taking 
the neighbourhood 
policy forward 
05./06.11.2007 Lisbon Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
Address to Euromed 
Ministerial Plenary 
Session 
03.04.2008 Fez Joe Borg M Member of the European 
Commission responsible 
for Fisheries and Mari-
time Affairs 
EU initiatives on tour-
ism in the Mediterra-
nean region 
07.04.2008 Bruges Benita 
Ferrero- 
Waldner 
A Member of the Commis-
sion for Foreign Affairs 
and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
The European Union 
and its place in the 
world - the current 
agenda 
 
The relative high number of documents results of the fact that more speeches haven been available of 
the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The twenty-one documents 
correspond to eleven different speakers. By nationality, the distribution accounts as follows: 2x Italy, 
1x Spain, 1x France, 2x Great Britain, 2x Portugal, 1x Sweden, 1x Poland, 1x Malta and 10x Austria. 
Thus, a third (7) of the speeches where held by representatives of Mediterranean countries. These sta-
tistical concretions are relevant in a complementary sense, but they do not have any further influence 
on the discourse analysis, because the functionality of the speakers is considered as more important. 
Therefore, the discourse and the results of the discourse analysis can rather be attributed to the Euro-
pean institutions; thus, the results are expected to reflect the distinctive European positions rather than 
special national, political or gender related statements.  
The distribution of the statements per year shows a slight accumulation of statements in 1997, in 2001 
and in 2007/2008 and the greatest accumulation in 2005 and 2006. Considering the ten speeches of 
Ferrero-Waldner, which falsify the statistical distribution after 2004, it has to be stated that most 
speeches of distinctive representatives of the Commission took place before 2004, thus, at a time, 
when the testing of persistency at the beginning of the policy and the terror attacks of 2001 challenged 
the Barcelona Process in its existence. The gender distribution is also statistically adulterated: ten 
speeches correspond to the same female speaker and the relation between male and female speaker is 
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nine to three for the male speakers. The female quotient only comes to the fore after 2004, in the 
Commission of José Manuel Barroso.544  
 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 total 
Distribution   xx  x  xxx x   xxxxx xxxxx xx xx 21 
Male   xx  x  xxx x     x x 9 
Female           xxxxx xxxxx x x 12 
 
2 Li s t  o f  speeches  a ssigned to  the  European Counci l  
There are fifteen documents which can be assigned to the European Council. The context also refers to 
the date, location, nationality and function of the speaker. 
 
Date Location Who Nat. Function Title 
3./4.06.1998 Palermo Robin Cook UK Representative 
of the UK 
presidency 
Concluding statement 





Perspectives of the Euro-med 
Partnership of the Barcelona 
Process 
19./22.11.1999 Malta Lisa Val-
jento 
FIN Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs 
Finland 
Status of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and Priorities of the 
Finnish Presidency 
02.07.2003 Strasbourg Silvio Ber-
lusconi 
I  Speech to the European Parlia-
ment 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg Jean Assel-
born 
L General Affairs and External Relations, Luxem-
bourg Presidency 
June 2005 Spain José Luis 
Rodríguez 
Zapatero 
E Presidente del 
Gobierno espa-
nol 
Entrevista "Afka/ideas", El Medi-
terráneo propicia el acercamento 
entre los pueblos 






Head of States Articulo de Zapatero y Blair en El 
Pais, Una cumbre para el futuro 




Chairman's statement 10th 
anniversary Euro-Mediterranean 
summit 
22.05.2006 Vienna Hans Wink-
ler 
A State Secretary, 
Austrian presi-
dency 
Racism, Xenophobia and the 
Media: Towards respect and 




D Federal Foreign Minister, German Presidency 
27./30.04.2007 Malta Renate 
Schimkoreit 
D Euromed-Coordinator, German Presidency 
04.10.2007 Portugal José Ma-
galhães 
P Secretário de 
Estado Adjunto 
Migrantes, Expressão do Pilar 
Humano do Processo de Barcelo-
 
544  At this point it might be relevant to state that the results are not to be considered in absolute numbers. They indicate a 
pattern due to the research results gained in the present work. 






23.10.2007 Tangiers Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
F President of the 
Republic 
State visit to Morocco 
30.04.2008 Tunis Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
F President of the 
Republic 
Speech before the students of the 
National Institute of Applied 
Sciences and Technology 




Opening remarks at the Euro-
Mediterranean Seminar "Ensur-
ing Respect for Human Rights 
While Countering Terrorism in 
Accordance with International 
Law" 
 
Most of the speeches were held by Heads of State of European Member Countries that referred to the 
Mediterranean Policy at the time when they presided the European Council.545 Thus, there is a greater 
distribution per nationality than in the speeches assigned to the Commission. The distribution per na-
tionality shows that only representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Germany and France held two 
speeches regarding Mediterranean affairs. Zapatero and Blair, who wrote an article together, constitute 
an exception and are not considered in this nomination.546 
The temporal distribution shows that more speeches took place after 2004. This might be due to the 
fact that the Mediterranean Policy reached more urgency in the consciousness of the politicians since 
2004. In contrast to the documents of the Commission, the gender distributions can be valued as accu-
rate because there are no striking repetitions among the speakers. Not surprisingly, it indicates that 
there are predominantly male speakers. 
 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Distribution    xx x    x  xxxx x xxxx xx 15 
Male    xx     x  xxxx x xxx  12 
Female     x        x xx 3 
 
XV CONT E XT ANAL YS IS 
It has also been distinguished between speeches that can be assigned to the European Commission and 
those that can be assigned to the European Council. In the context of the present research undertaking, 
the role of the speaker is limited to its function within the predefined structures of the institution he 
represents. The analysis is carried out to demonstrate how the European discourse is transported to the 
 
545  Some high representatives as, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy did not preside the Council when the speeches were held; 
however, he presided it shortly afterwards and, in case of Nicolas Sarkozy, his contribution to the Mediterranean Pol-
icy was essentially the input which led to the foundation of the Mediterranean Union. 
546  Of the 15 documents, two documents were published in the media (one interview and one article by Zapatero/Blair). 
There were considered because only few speeches of the Spanish president Zapatero are available and the articles, al-
though they were published in the media, only express the opinion/message of these two politicians and are not fur-
ther commented.  
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public. Hence, the speeches of representatives of the Commission and of the Council aim to imple-
ment the previously established discourse. Thus, the contextual analysis of the previous chapter is also 
valid for the ensuing assessment of the speeches.  
XVI SPE E CHE S AS SIGNE D T O T HE  EUROP E AN COM MISS ION 
These speeches constitute the discourse that is allocated to the European Commission. The politicians 
who deliver the speeches act in their function within the European institution. It is to expect that their 
opinions correspond to the official position of the Commission, which sets the path for the European 
Policy in the Mediterranean. 
 
1 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Expression 
The statements, which have been grouped into the same categories as in the previous chapter, mount 
up to a total of 89 in the category “expression”. Far the most can be assigned to the rubric “Mediterra-
nean Policy”, while there are hardly any explicit references to the European “predominance”.  
 
Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 "The Other" "MMPOL" "Ass./Diss." "MMR" "Predominance" Total 
EXPRESSION 5 46 17 18 3 89 
 
1.1 The view of the “other” 
Within the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission the “other” is addressed with 
a lot of respect; thus, the “other” is conceded a special position in the relations with the European Un-
ion. This is shown by a statement of Chris Patten, who said in 2001 that our partners of the southern 
flank of the Mediterranean have a privileged place in our external relations
547. Romano Prodi ad-
dressed “the other” in a similar way when he stated that apart from the current candidate countries, 
the Mediterranean countries may be the only ones with such strong links to Europe
548. The importance 
and closeness was even more explicitly expressed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner in 2006 who referred to 
the significance of the Barcelona Process: Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our 
closest partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common 




547  Comp. „our partners of the southern flank of the Mediterranean have a privileged place in our external relations” 
Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
548  Comp. „apart from the current candidate countries, the Mediterranean countries may be the only ones with such 
strong links to Europe” Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report. 
549  Comp. „Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest partners and friends. We share practical 
interests, ideals and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. 
We want a relationship which better reflects that” Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Brussels. 
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Of course, this position can be explained due to the fact that the Union is the Mediterranean countries’ 
main trading partner
550
; however, the emphasis of the special position in the political discourse indi-
cates a strong persuasive connotation. This is notable because it offers several interpretations like ap-
peasing the partner regarding the European enlargement policy and the European engagement in the 
East; or suggesting that everything proposed by the Union happens in the best interest for the “other”, 
which is not only persuasive, but manipulative in implementing one’s own interests.  
1.2 Associative and dissociative elements 
 Associative and dissociative aspects of the discourse concern statements indicating positions, which 
are applied to transcend implied discrepancies and conflictive circumstances among the partners. 
These are also identified with the aim to show how possible differences are expressed. 
In the earliest document, a speech of Manuel Marín in 1997, the differences are attempted to be over-
come by calling for cooperation on both sides. First, concerning the Mediterranean countries: we ask 
the Mediterranean partner to run the risk of abolishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, 
while benefiting from the existence of Common Market
551. And second, concerning the European coun-
tries: we ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade concessions, but to make a 
major effort to help Mediterranean countries cope with the adjustments needed for modernizing their 
economies
552. These two requests exemplify the attempt to overcome barriers of cooperation by a di-
rect appeal. 
Another way to transcend differences is the creation of a common position, thus referring to shared 
interests. Chris Patten stated in 2001 that the EU and the Mediterranean Partners share many common 
interests: from trade and investment, through safeguarding the environment and energy supply, to 
maintaining regional peace and stability
553. The references to a common base are often done similar as 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner did it in February 2005 in Strasbourg: we share common bonds of geography, 
history, trade, migration and culture
554. Although this is a repeated argument regarding the ambition 




550  Comp. „the Union is the Mediterranean countries’ main trading partner” Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report. 
551  Comp. „we ask the Mediterranean partner to run the risk of abolishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, 
while benefiting from the existence of Common Market” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
552  Comp. „we ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade concessions, but to make a major effort to 
help Mediterranean countries cope with the adjustments needed for modernizing their economies” Marín, (May 1997) 
Oslo. 
553  Comp. „the EU and the Mediterranean Partners share many common interests: from trade and investment, through 
safeguarding the environment and energy supply, to maintaining regional peace and stability” Patten, (January 2001) 
Brussels. 
554  Comp. „we share common bonds of geography, history, trade, migration and culture” Ferreo-Waldner, (February 
2005) Madrid. 
555  Comp. „it is also a question of mutual interests” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona. 
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A conflictive statement regarding the reference to common bonds has been identified in the speech of 
Chris Patten in 2001 in Rabat. He stated that thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has 
always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with Morocco
556. Without underestimating the need of 
positive rhetoric, the reference suggests a questionable belittlement of the Moroccan history in the 19th 
and 20th century, especially as Morocco became politically independent from France only in 1956. 
Despite this more or less explicit belittlement of the colonial past, the appreciation of the addressed 
country was clearly ostensible: We study with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan government for 
a deeper association among us. They are full of good ideas and contain a lot of common sense
557. 
Thus, the question arises if the implicitly stated belittlement of the historical past indicates either sup-
pression or an overcoming of the colonial past. This can only be satisfyingly assessed in an overall 
conclusion. 
Concerning the dissociative elements of discourse, it has to be stated that there is quite a frank han-
dling regarding different perceptions and problems that could arise in such a political partnership. 
Hence, Manuel Marín stated in 1997 that both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to 
the problems of ‘image’ we have of each other
558. And Chris Patten mentioned that of course argu-
ments will always arise between close trading partners with a mature relationship. They arise in our 
relationships with the US just as they arise in our relation with Mediterranean partners
559. 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner even referred to such a sensitive topic as the clash of civilisations, which she 
denoted as misnomer and stated that we are not confronted with a clash of civilisations, but with a 
clash of ignorance
560. According to her conviction, expressed in 2005, there is a necessity of retrieving 
the values of the age of exchange which took place in the renaissance
561. This wish for less conflictive 
relations with the countries over the Mediterranean is real and finally implies that there are more dif-
ferences and conflicts among the participants than wanted.  
Another dissociative aspect, which also concerns a highly conflictive and sensitive topic, is the immi-
gration to Europe. Romano Prodi stated in 2002: let us not forget that certain European capitals such 
as Paris and London have become centres for major Mediterranean social, economic and cultural 
 
556  Comp. „thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has always enjoyed an extremely close relationship with 
Morocco” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
557  Comp. „We study with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan government for a deeper association among us. They 
are full of good ideas and contain a lot of common sense” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
558  Comp. „both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to the problems of ‘image’ we have of each other” 
Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
559  Comp. „of course arguments will always arise between close trading partners with a mature relationship. They arise 
in our relationships with the US just as they arise in our relation with Mediterranean partners” Patten, (June 2001) 
Rabat. 
560  Comp. „(...) weil der Begriff ‘Clash of Civilisation’ eine Fehlbezeichnung ist. Wir sind nicht mit einem Aufeinander-
prallen der Zivilisationen konfrontiert, sondern mit einem aufeinanderprallen von Ignoranz“ Ferrero-Waldner (April 
2007), Wien. 
561  Comp. „Necesitamos redescubrir la época de los intercambios que dieron lugar al Renacimiento” Ferrero-Waldner, 
(February 2005) Madrid. 




562, and further that it is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities 
that came from the south long ago or more recently are developing new ways of living together. These 
dynamics have nothing to do with security or the prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out prom-
ise of new vibrant forms of social behaviour
563. From this discourse it can be deduced that the migra-
tion issue from Mediterranean countries to Europe inheres a strong dissociative component and has to 
be treated in a sensitive way. Here, it has to be positively highlighted that these problems are explicitly 
expressed by politicians.  
1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The statements referring to the Mediterranean Policy can further be assigned to references concerning 
the definitional or the functional level.  
In respect of the definition of the Mediterranean Policy, the statements either refer to expressions 
which describe the policy per se, in other words which indicate the instrumental character, or they 
refer to the pretensions of the same. In this context, the European Commission perceives that the 
European Union, and the governments of the Mediterranean countries, has established a variety of 
shared actions in order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to consolidate an area of 
shared prosperity and to promote partnerships on the social and humanistic spheres
564. There exists 
the conviction that with the Barcelona Process an entirely new era565 in the relations over the Mediter-
ranean was launched. Comparisons referring to a counterbalanced partnership are attributed to the 
Barcelona Process, which is not seen as an isolated political and diplomatic event566. These compari-
sons include “forum” or “partnership” or indicate the instrumental character when using a terminology 
like “instrument” or “framework”.  
In the discourse, the references indicate the singularity and uniqueness which the Commission ascribes 
to the European Mediterranean Policy throughout all investigated documents. It is stated that the Bar-
celona Process is a unique regional forum567, an important multilateral forum568 or a solid and durable 
 
 
562  Comp. „let us not forget that certain European capitals such as Paris and London have become centres for major 
Mediterranean social, economic and cultural developments” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report 
563  Comp. „it is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities that came from the south long ago or 
more recently are developing new ways of living together. These dynamics have nothing to do with security or the 
prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out promise of new vibrant forms of social behaviour” Prodi, (November 
2002) Euro-Med Report. 
564  Comp. „the European Union, and the governments of the Mediterranean countries, has established a variety of shared 
actions in order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to consolidate an area of shared prosperity and to 
promote partnerships on the social and humanistic spheres” Merolla, (March 1997), Brussels. 
565  Comp „(...) launched an entirely new era in their relations” Marin, (May 1997), Oslo. 
566  Comp. „(...) we proved that Barcelona was not simply and isolated political and diplomatic event” Marin, (May 
1997), Oslo. 
567  Comp. „The Barcelona Process is a unique regional forum“ Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
568  Comp. „Barcelona is an important multilateral forum for the Euro-Mediterranean area (...)“ Ferrero-Waldner, (June 
2006), Brussels. 




569. With the understanding that the Mediterranean is a long term agenda570 and that the 
establishment of the Barcelona Process has marked a turning point571, as it constitutes a network of 
exchanges of views and initiatives
572, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Benita Ferrero- Waldner 
stated in 2005 that we are on the eve of a historic occasion573. From this comprehension derives the 
instrumental demand on the Barcelona Process that has explicitly been stated in Rabat in 2001: Our 
Euro-Mediterranean agreement ought to be a dynamic instrument
574. According to Romano Prodi in 
2002, the Barcelona Process remains the instrument on which Europe can base its actions575. The 
singularity that the Commission ascribes to the Mediterranean Policy is not only expressed in the defi-
nitional or instrumental characteristics, but also in the pretensions which are interpreted. Therefore, the 
Barcelona Process represents the only attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the 
Mediterranean multilaterally and from a long-term perspective
576. 
Concerning the attributed functionality of the Mediterranean Policy, the statements refer to both, mis-
sionary and visionary expressions and to operational issues and pretensions. The missionary character 
is perceived when references indicate that common values can be transmitted via the Mediterranean 
Policy. This is suggested by statements which, for example, constitute that the joint Declaration estab-
lishes the common principles of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, pluralism and toler-
ance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation and dialogue
577. The designed long term policy 
is considered as main priority of the European Commission578. In expressing the importance of the 
Barcelona Process, the Commission uses phrases like Barcelona was just the beginning of a process579 
or Barcelona is here to stay580 and the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important as ever as it is 
the cornerstone of the regional dialogue
581. There is also a valuation of the achievement that even 
against the background of difficulties in the region, there was the possibility to pursue a frank political 
 
569  Comp. “[achievements] they have made our partnership solid and durable” Patten, (April 2002), Brussels. 
570  Comp. „Ours is a long term agenda“ Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
571  Comp. „the Partnership established in 1995 marked a turning point in that relationship” Patten, (January 2001), Brus-
sels. 
572  Comp. „(...) a network of exchanges of views and initiatives has been established, and an unprecedented habit of 
dialogue has been created” Marin, (May 1997) Oslo.  
573  Comp. „Estamos en vísperas de una ocasión histórica” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid. 
574  Comp. „Our Euro-Mediterranean agreement ought to be a dynamic instrument” Patten, (June 2001), Rabat. 
575  Comp. „The Barcelona Process, which got going in 1995, remains the instrument on which Europe can base its ac-
tions” Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med Report. 
576  Comp. „the Barcelona Process is still fully valid because it is the only attempt ever made to address instability and 
diversity in the Mediterranean multilaterally and from a long-term perspective” Prodi, (November 2002), Euro-Med 
Report. 
577  Comp. „the joint Declaration establishes the common principles of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, 
pluralism and tolerance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation and dialogue” Marin, (May 1997), Oslo. 
578  Comp. „main priority of the European Commission” Marin, (May 1997), Oslo. 
579  Comp. „Barcelona was just the beginning of a process” Marin, (May 1997) Oslo. 
580  Comp. „Barcelona is here to stay” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005), Barcelona. 
581  Comp. „the Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important - is the cornerstone of the regional dialogue (…)” Bar-
roso, (September 2007), Brussels. 
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dialogue and to make substantial progress on crucial issues in the partnership
582. The visionary com-
ponents of the Commission’s discourse concern, for instance, the belief that the policy is most likely to 
have a direct effect on individuals both in the Union and in the Mediterranean partners
583
, which is a 
necessary circumstance considering the purpose of the initiation of the policy. Another statement 
stresses the aim to recover the antique concept of a Euro-Mediterranean region in which the recipro-
cal understanding of our common identity roots
 584 and constitutes the base for a successful policy.  
Beside these high exigencies which are expressed by the representatives of the Commission, the coor-
dination of the Barcelona Process on an operative level is also stressed. Since its implementation in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), there have been many references which repetitively state that 
the Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Barcelona Process; it reinforces it
585 or that the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barcelona more remote, rather it brings it into a sharper 
focus
586. In 2008, the ENP is naturally perceived as a complementary and reinforced frame for the 
Barcelona Process. The significance of the European Mediterranean Policy is explicitly expressed in 
the following statement: the ENP continues to prove its worth – showing that our policy of encourag-
ing and rewarding reform does have an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us
587. 
Despite the fact that the discourses of the politicians of the Commission are dominated by the convic-
tion that the Mediterranean Policy is capable to unify countries like the Arabians and Israel588, and 
that it creates a win-win situation589 for all participants, there are also voices which bring up certain 
critical self-reflections, like the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has not yet fulfilled its entire poten-
tial
590
 or the ENP is not, and never has been, a one-size-fits-all policy591. This implicates something 
which is not explicitly stated most of the time: although there is the aim to establish an equitable part-
nership, not all interests can be addressed in the same way.  
 
582  Comp. „even against the background of difficulties in the region we were able to pursue a frank political dialogue and 
to make substantial progress on crucial issues in the partnership” Patten, (January 2001), Brussels. 
583  Comp. „(…) most likely to have a direct effect on individuals both in the Union and in the Mediterranean partners” 
Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
584  Comp. „La respuesta reside en el redescubrimiento de un antiguo concepto de la región euromediterránea, cuya raíz 
sería el entendimiento mutuo de nuestra común identidad” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona. 
585  Comp. „the Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Barcelona Process; it reinforces it” Ferrero-Waldner, (Febru-
ary 2005) Strasbourg.  
586  Comp. „the European Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barcelona more remote, rather it brings it into a sharper 
focus” Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo. 
587  Comp. „ENP continues to prove its worth – showing that our policy of encouraging and rewarding reform does have 
an impact on our neighbours and is bringing them closer to us” Ferrero- Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges. 
588  Comp. „el unico foro capaz the reunir en un marco común a las naciones árabes y a Israel” Ferrero-Waldner, (No-
vember 2005) Barcelona. 
589  Comp. „The Neighbourhood Policy creates a ‚win-win situation’“ Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
590  Comp. „But let us be frank, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has not yet fulfilled its entire potential” Ferrero-
Waldner (November 2007) Lisbon. 
591  Comp. „the ENP is not, and never has been, a one-size-fits-all policy” Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels. 
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1.4 References on European predominance 
There have been few references dealing with a European predominance within the speeches of repre-
sentatives of the European Commission. The first opportunity to address the European predominance 
is to indirectly encourage the partner countries to undertake further reforms. For instance, Romano 
Prodi stated in 2002 that the incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the internal 
reforms that are vital if the Mediterranean countries are to benefit fully from bilateral relations with 
the Union and from the open-up of economies and trade
592. This leads to the second form of mention-
ing the dominance: via attractants in combination with conditions. This was done by Benita Ferro-
Waldner in 2005, when she said that those countries which adopt the brave and difficult decisions and 
express clearly their will to accomplish the reforms will receive a generous response from the Euro-
pean Union
593. And in 2007 she directly addressed the MNC by stating that the closer you want to be 
in the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both 
assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations
594. 
These examples show that Europe assumes a predominant position within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership and that this predominance is mentioned by some means or other from time to time. The 
predominance is based on the supposed knowledge advancement and the economic margin of the 
European Union. 
1.5 References to a Mediterranean region 
The perception of the Mediterranean in the discourse of the representatives of the European Commis-
sion concern on the one hand the description and symbolic perception of the Mediterranean Sea per se 
and on the other hand the situational characterisation. 
Surprisingly, the rhetoric of representatives of the Commission, especially of Romano Prodi, fre-
quently includes philosophical references in order to reflect on what the Mediterranean is. So it is, for 
example, the region’s diversity which makes the definition of the Mediterranean particularly difficult. 
We might even wonder whether the Mediterranean really exists, politically and economically
595. He 
further stresses the denomination in regard to the denomination of the Mediterranean, for which he 
quotes Mercator who wrote that the Mediterranean was given different names depending on the shores 
it washed up against; he then refers to the Bible which also gives the Mediterranean various names 
 
592  Comp. „the incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the internal reforms that are vital if the 
Mediterranean countries are to benefit fully from bilateral relations with the Union and from the open-up of 
economies and trade” Prodi (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
593  Comp. „Aquellos que adopten decisiones valientes y deficiles y expresan claramente su voluntad de llevar a cabo la 
reforma resibirán una respuesta generosa de la UE” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) 
594  Comp. „the closer you want to be in the EU, and the greater your commitment to reform, the more we will offer you 
in terms of both assistance to reach those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations” Ferrero-
Waldner, (September 2007) Brussels. 
595  Comp. „But the region’s diversity makes the task particularly difficult. We might even wonder weather the Mediter-
ranean really exists, politically and economically” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
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and the diversity was also great when we called it mare nostrum
596. Finally, he concludes with a fa-
mous reference to Fernand Braudel when stressing, perhaps there is no single Mediterranean. Perhaps 
there are lots of Mediterraneans
597. Here, Prodi reflects on what many philosophers and historians did 
before him - he questions what the Mediterranean really is. Later in the same document he brings the 
discussion to the political level and concludes that there is a human, social and historic reality called 
Mediterranean – a reality that ever more urgently demands courageous, long-term action
598. In the 
same context he stresses that between 1994 and 2000 the Euro-Mediterranean trade doubled. And yet, 
the Mediterranean region is still unable to develop its own personality
599. Therewith, he appoints a 
decisive problem which the European Policy faces in the Mediterranean: the establishment of a com-
mon identity when implementing a reference such as Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Hence, when 
the Mediterranean per se is not tangible, what is the Mediterranean that the MNC should appoint to? 
The less philosophic definitions in the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission 
refer to a Mediterranean which is our ‘near abroad’ on our Southern flank600, our neighbourhood601 
and not a barrier which separates the peoples of its shores, but a medium which facilitates the ex-
change on an economic, social and cultural level
602. The definition per se says that the Mediterranean 
in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and 
economic region stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf
603. And in consideration 
of Europe, to build a new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe’s cradle, would be a grave 
mistake
604. 
The perception of the Mediterranean often occurs in the context of the historic reference of a “mare 
nostrum”. Hence, the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, states that precisely 
what we perceive as mare nostrum refers to a shared space, physically and psychologically, where we 
all have the right to navigate
605. Although intended, this statement does not minimize the appropriat-
 
596  Comp. „the Mediterranean, wrote Mercator, was given different names depending on the shores it washed up against. 
The Bible also gives the Mediterranean various names and the diversity was also great when we called it mare nos-
trum” Prodi, (November 2001) Euro-Med Report. 
597  Comp. „perhaps there is no single Mediterranean. Perhaps there are lots of Mediterraneans” Prodi, (November 2002), 
Euro-Med Report. 
598  Comp. „that there is a human, social and historic reality called Mediterranean – a reality that ever more urgently 
demands courageous, long-term action” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
599  Comp. „between 1994 and 2000 the Euro-Mediterranean trade doubled. And yet, the Mediterranean region is still 
unable to develop its own personality” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
600  Comp. „the Mediterranean is our ‘near abroad’ on our Southern flank.” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
601  Comp. „(...) it is also our neighbourhood“ Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg. 
602  Comp. „Esta idea contempla el Mediterráneo no como una barrera que separa a los pueblos de sus orillas sino como 
un medio que facilita los intercambios comerciales, sociales y culturales” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Ma-
drid. 
603  Comp. „the Mediterranean in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast 
political and economic region stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf” Prodi, (November 2002) 
Euro-Med Report. 
604  Comp. „To build a new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe’s cradle, would be a grave mistake” Prodi, 
(November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
605  Comp. „Es preciso que concibamos el Mare Nostrum precisamente de ese modo, como un espacio compartido, tanto 
física como psicológicamente, en el que todos tenemos derecho a navegar” Ferrero-Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges. 
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ing character which is implied in the expression “mare nostrum”, especially as it contains an implicit 
legitimation that the Mediterranean Policy is carried on by the European Union. This is underlined by 
a statement of Ferrero-Waldner in 2008: after all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations 
across and around our “mare nostrum”, the Mediterranean we all share
606. 
 
2 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Purpose  
Within the category “purpose” the identified statements are almost uniformly distributed among both 
subcategories. The here found forty-seven statements are almost only half of the statements identified 
for the category expression and identity.  
 
Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 "Aim" "Purpose" Total 
PURPOSE 22 25 47 
 
2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy 
The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy is either defined very general, including special thematic 
approaches, or in a persuasive way which is also addressed to the European member states. The main 
difference regarding the stated aims is that the statements, which refer to the purpose of the European 
Mediterranean Policy, indicate the basal motivation for the establishment of the policy.  
The general formulations refer to the establishment of a relationship of close association, and at the 
creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by the year 2010
607. Another purpose is to create a 
region of shared peace and wealth and a close cooperation on a social and cultural level in order to 
improve the reciprocal understanding608. 
More specifically, the purposes are stressed as follows: 
• To combat the instability of economic and social policy in the Mediterranean
609
 
• To reinvigorate democracy within the Mediterranean societies and to improve a better under-




606  Comp. „after all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations across and around our “mare nostrum”, the 
Mediterranean we all share” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid. 
607  Comp. „the establishment of a relationship of close association, and at the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade 
area by the year 2010” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
608  Comp. „Su objetivo era crear a través del libre comercio una región de paz y prosperidad compartida y una asocia-
ción de amplio alcance social y cultural que propiciara un mejor conocimienti recíproco de los pueblos” Ferrero-
Waldner, (Noviember 2005) Madrid. 
609  Comp. „Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial cooperation is key to combat the instability of economic and 
social policy in the Mediterranean” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
610  Comp. „C’est là un moyen essentiel de renforcer la démocratie à l’intérieur des sociétés méditerranéennes et égale-
ment un moyen essentiel de favoriser une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre deux rives de la Méditerrannée 
(…)” Giraudon, (April 1999), Malta. 
XVI          Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 
143 
• To increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to the pursuit of reform, peace and sta-
bility in the region
611
 
• To bring the partnership closer to our citizens’ concerns
612
 
• To work together with our partners to reduce poverty, create a space of prosperity and shared 
values, based on free trade, increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural 








What derives from these statements is that Europe is concerned with guaranteeing peace and stability 
in the Mediterranean region, which, coherent to the European method, is only possible by additionally 
strengthening the cultural issues. Still, economic and financial matters are of course at the heart of the 
partnership
615. Romano Prodi clarified the methodological purpose of the Mediterranean Policy: Mul-
tilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather than coercion are the watchwords that 
will guide our actions in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean
616. 
The necessity which is expressed in the discourse of representatives of the European Commission is 
underlined by several statements, showing a certain self-motivation: 




• Forge new ways of working together, in a regional partnership
618
 
• There we see all the biggest challenges for peace, security and the fight against terrorism 
above all – for development, for respect of human rights, for the safeguarding of the environ-





611  Comp. „(…) to increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to the pursuit of reform, peace and stability in the 
region” Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg. 
612  Comp. „To bring the partnership closer to our citizens’ concerns” Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg. 
613  Comp. „To work together with our partners to reduce poverty, create a space of prosperity and shared values, based 
on free trade, increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural ties, greater cross-boarder cooperation 
and shared responsibilities in the prevention and resolution of conflicts” Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo. 
614  Comp. „(…) to expand the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EU’s members to our neighbours” Fer-
rero-Waldner, (June 2006) Brussels. 
615  Comp. „economic and financial matters are of course at the heart of the partnership” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
616  Comp. „Multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather than coercion are the watchwords that will 
guide our actions in the world and particularly in the Mediterranean” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
617  Comp. „We should continue working towards Barcelona regardless of difficulties on the Middle East” Patten, (Janu-
ary 2001) Brussles. 
618  Comp. „Forge new ways of working together, in a regional partnership” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
619  Comp. „There we see all the biggest challenges for peace, security and the fight against terrorism above all – for 
development, for respect of human rights, for the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable growth and education 
– particularly for women and for positive governance of immigration” Ferrero- Waldner, (November 2005) Barce-
lona. 
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From the European’s side, one is convinced that the time has come to be decisive, to implement and to 
strengthen the Mediterranean Policy. While the purpose is explicitly linked to the necessity which 
derived from the, for Europe perturbing, socio-economic developments, the expressed aims may indi-
cate the strategic vision of the Barcelona Process in a more detailed and precise manner.  
2.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy 
The general definition of the aims of the European Mediterranean Policy is similarly expressed as the 
purpose: working together for peace and stability, creating shared prosperity through establishing 
free trade and providing the economic and financial assistance to meet the challenges which that im-
plies, and helping to improve mutual understanding and tolerance among peoples of differing cultures 
and traditions
621. In a short version: working together for peace and stability, improving mutual un-
derstanding and tolerance and creating shared prosperity
622. 
The aims of certain aspects of the Barcelona Process are stated explicitly. For example, in the context 
of the cultural cooperation it is the formulated aim to improve mutual understanding in the region 
through intellectual, cultural and personal exchanges
623. Concerning security, the strategic aim is to 
create a zone of prosperity, special security and stability outside Europe’s frontiers
624.  
In regard to the strategic finality of the Mediterranean Policy, the representatives of the European 
Commission repetitively appoint to the urgency of the matters in the region and the significance of the 
policy. On the operative side the exigency is expressed in connection with signing the Association 
Agreements: We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agree-
ments
625. In respect of the financial instrument of the Barcelona Process, the MEDA, it is stated that it 
needs a better use of targeting
626. The success of the Mediterranean Policy is often linked to the re-
gional integration among the MNC; this can also be seen in the speeches of representatives of the 
Commission, who explicitly express the need to deepen the South-South relationship627. 
 
620  Comp. „We need to counter the risk of mutual incomprehension through an improved dialogue of civilisations” Fer-
rero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
621  Comp. „working together for peace and stability, creating shared prosperity through establishing free trade and pro-
viding the economic and financial assistance to meet the challenges which that implies, and helping to improve mu-
tual understanding and tolerance among peoples of differing cultures and traditions” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
622  Comp. „(…) working together for peace and stability, improving mutual understanding and tolerance and creating 
shared prosperity” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
623  Comp. „(…) to improve mutual understanding in the region through intellectual, cultural and personal exchanges” 
Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
624  Comp. „Nuestro objetivo estratégico es proyectar una zona de prosperidad, y especialmente la seguridad y estabilidad 
más allá de nuestras fronteras” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid.  
625  Comp. „We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the Association Agreements” Patten, (January 
2001) Brussels. 
626  Comp. „(...) a better use of targeting of MEDA” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
627  Comp. „(...) we need to deepen the South-South relationship” Patten, (April 2002) Brussels. 
XVI          Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 
145 
However, most of the concerns refer to the human, the cultural level. For example, Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner stated in Strasbourg in 2005 that it is high time that we ask ourselves what the part-
nership can do to meet the concerns of the people
628. Her concern is also expressed several months 
later in the same year when she emphasises the necessity to get to know each other better629, meaning 
that the differences among the partners of the Barcelona Process may not be underestimated. She fur-
ther believes that a clash of ignorance constitutes the mayor threat of a common future630 and that a 
common understanding of a common region and future is essential
631. 
In 2005, the anniversary of the Barcelona Process, Margot Wallström evaluated the European Mediter-
ranean Policy as follows: It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering 
it and realising, as certain analysts have said, its potential
632. In the speech of Ferrero-Waldner in 
April 2008 one perceives that the realisation of the potential was incorporated, but the search of the 
best way to achieve all officially stated aims has not yet been concluded: the aim is to build on the 





3 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Identi ty  
Within the speeches of the representatives of the European Commission, statements, which belong to 
the analytical category “identity”, refer to expressions stressing the self-perception of the European 
Union and its role in the Mediterranean. In total, ninety-one statements have been identified: 
 
Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 "EU" "Role" Total 
IDENTITY 54 37 91 
 
3.1 The self-perception of the European Union 
Due to the nature of the sources, the speeches constitute a medium to implement, among others, a cer-
tain perspective or image. Within the discourses of representatives of the European Commission in the 
context of the Mediterranean Affairs, the statements that indicate a European self-reference concern 
 
628  Comp. „it is high time that we ask ourselves what the partnership can do to meet the concerns of the people” Ferrero-
Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg. 
629  Comp. „(...) debemos conocernos mejor unos a otros“ Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Madrid. 
630  Comp. „(...) tenemos que encontrar caminos paa superar el ‚choque de ignorancias‘ quem mucho más que el ‘choque 
de civilizaciones’, es una de las mayores amenazas para nuestro futuro común” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) 
Madrid. 
631  Comp. „(...)cque necesitamos un entendimiento común de nuestra región y nuestro futuro” Ferrero-Waldner, (No-
vember 2005) Madrid. 
632  Comp. „It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, rediscovering it and realising, as certain ana-
lysts have said, its potential” Wallström, (March 2005) Cairo. 
633  Comp. „the aim is to build on the achievements of the Barcelona Process to intensify our cooperation with the region 
and strengthen key bilateral relationships.  
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statements which discuss the own political approach in regard to the significance of the Foreign Policy 
and various positions providing feedback. There are also statements which refer to Europe and its 
power position and others which indicate a vision of Europe.  
Concerning the Mediterranean Policy in 1997, Manuel Marín admitted that the EU only recently real-
ised the importance of its external relations
634, it defined for the first time a comprehensive framework 
for relations with its Mediterranean neighbours
635. This indicates something which he has already 
pointed out before, namely that the European Union itself is a profound cognitive process, which, over 
the years, rendered the possibility to define a Foreign Policy, in the current case also in regard to the 
Mediterranean Policy. A decisive aspect, especially at the beginning of the Barcelona Process, was the 
establishment of a balance between the policies in the East and the South; this was particularly due to 
the fact that the internal enlargement policy caused an increasing competition between these two bor-
ders. Thus, Marin stated in 1997 that the European Union defined the concepts of parallelism and 
equilibrium between the Union’s Eastern and Southern borders and called it a significant achievement 
in itself
636. One is able to perceive a certain pride among the speakers about the achievements of the 
European Union. 
In the context of stressing the achievements in regard to a Mediterranean Policy, there are also state-
ments which will value the approach later on. For instance, Chris Patten referred in 2001 to the Un-
ion’s effort of establishing a counterbalanced partnership: It recognized that common objectives and 
common interests need to be addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility leaving behind the more ‘pa-
tronising’ approach which often marked our policy in the past
637. Therewith, an attempt of overcom-
ing the past can be constituted.   
Europe is struggling to structure and define its approach in the Mediterranean. A permanent problem 
concerns the fact that it is very difficult to make out the Union’s new frontiers638, because for thou-
sands of years it has been hard to decide how far Europe stretches
639
 and that it is not possible to draw 
a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries – Malta and Cyprus – are preparing to 
become members of the Union, other – Turkey- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to 
Europe by ties of tradition, special situations and interests
640. The Barcelona Process facilitated an 
 
634  Comp. „(…) that the EU only recently realised the importance of its external relations” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
635  Comp.. „(...) for the first time a comprehensive framework for relations with its Mediterranean neighbours” Marín, 
(May 1997) Oslo. 
636  Comp. „(...) defined the concepts of parallelism and equilibrium between the Union’s Eastern and Southern borders 
and called it a significant achievement in itself” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
637  Comp. „It recognized that common objectives and common interests need to be addressed in a spirit of co-
responsibility leaving behind the more ‘patronising’ approach which often marked our policy in the past” Patten, 
(January 2001) Brussels. 
638  Comp. „it is very difficult to make out the Union’s new frontiers” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
639  Comp. „thousands of years it has been hard to decide how far Europe stretches (...)” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-
Med Report. 
640  Comp. „(…) draw a neat demarcation line, as some Mediterranean countries – Malta and Cyprus – are preparing to 
become members of the Union, other – Turkey- are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of 
tradition, special situations and interests” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
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approach which made cooperation within a new frame possible. Sometimes there are expressions of 
gratification for the acceptance of the European approach. One of those is included in a statement of 
Chris Patten, who conceded after a Meeting in Marseilles that our ideas fell on fertile ground641. Prodi 
stated in 2002 that Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dialogue, and that is a 
powerful instrument for integrating and including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just for an-
other aspect of foreign policy
642. Nevertheless, the Barcelona Process stagnated and did not progress as 
it could have; hence, proposals such as reinvigorating the Barcelona Process by founding a Mediterra-
nean Union were positively received within the European Commission: Ideas such as the Euro-
Mediterranean Union proposed by President Sarkozy, could add political momentum for regional 
cooperation and are welcome
643. 
There are a numerous statements which refer to the European Union as a power in the context of pos-
sible threats. One was explicitly stated by Romano Prodi, stressing that in the case of the EU enlarge-
ment it involves viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, The Medi-
terranean becomes the southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the 
flows of migrants, combat any form of international terrorism and encourage a development policy 
heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against unlawful activities
644. The security considera-
tions can also be identified in the discourse of Manuel Marín in 1997. He stated that Europe cannot 
ignore the fact that there are more than ten million Muslims resident in the Union
645 and thus indi-
rectly referred to an internal threat. The global view of the European situation was explicitly expressed 
by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner: Europe cannot assure its won stability, security and pros-
perity without helping our neighbours achieve similar and relative levels of security, stability and 
prosperity
646. Even more directly formulated in a speech in Madrid in 1995, she said that only if we 
increase the wealth, the security and the stability in those countries we are able to maintain the same 
in ours
647. Hence, she further reasoned, the interest of European and the Mediterranean are inevitably 
interweaved and that it is now the opportunity to find a common response and a euro-mediterranean 
 
641  Comp. „(…) in Marseilles last November our ideas fell on fertile ground” Patten, (June 2001) Rabat. 
642 Comp. „Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dialogue, and that is a powerful instrument for inte-
grating and including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just for another aspect of foreign policy” Prodi, (Novem-
ber 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
643  Comp. „Ideas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union proposed by President Sarkozy, could add political momentum 
for regional cooperation and are welcome (…) The Commission should be fully associated and we are ready to coop-
erate.” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2007) Lisbon. 
644  Comp. „viewing the Mediterranean primarily as a question of security. In this case, The Mediterranean becomes the 
southern border of the Union, where we must take up position to manage the flows of migrants, combat any form of 
international terrorism and encourage a development policy heavily geared towards cooperation in the fight against 
unlawful activities” Prodi (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
645  Comp. „Europe cannot ignore the fact that there are more than ten million Muslims resident in the Union” Marín, 
(May 1997) Oslo. 
646  Comp. „Europe cannot assure its won stability, security and prosperity without helping our neighbours achieve simi-
lar and relative levels of security, stability and prosperity” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Barcelona. 
647  Comp. „Porque solo si implusamos la prosperidad, la seguridad y la estabilidad en esos paises podremos mantenerlas 
en los nuestros“ Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Mardid. 
XVI          Speeches assigned to the European Commission 
 
148 
focus on these problems
648. Over the years this perspective notably comes to a head. Ferrero-Waldner 
stressed in 2006 that it is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not 
‘export’ stability, it would ‘import’ instability
649. And further, it is in our European interest that our 
neighbourhood is well-governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that conflicts in our vicinity are 
resolved and issues like migration, organised crime and terrorism are tackled more effectively
650. In 
2007, she stated that if we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle these challenges and 
make more of the Euro-Med Partnership I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the 
challenges that lie ahead
651. The reason for this was explicitly expressed in 2008: our goal of promot-
ing stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus for ourselves, is more relevant than 
ever
652. 
Beside these clear threat-scenarios, out of which Europe apparently explains its actions, there are sev-
eral statements which directly refer to self-definitions of Europe: 
• The great difference of course between ‘Europe’ and the ‘European Union’ is that one is de-
fined by culture, history and geography, the second is defined by treaties, policies and laws
653. 
• Europe can not be an ‘introspective bystander’. On contrary, we are and must remain key ac-
tor in the region; a political and economic partner who supports and managed change and 
who helps reap the opportunities that flow from it
654. 
• The European Union is neither an island nor a fortress
655. 
These three examples show the struggle of Europe to find its identity. Correctly, one needs to distin-
guish between continental and cultural Europe and its political entity; however, Europe is and wants to 
become a serious player on the stage of world politics. As a political entity one carries cultural values; 
the values that the European Union wants to carry in the Mediterranean are clearly expressed, the 
struggle remains in the efficiency of the way how to do it. Of course, Europe is confronted with the 
burden of history, but much-talk- about- nothing does not produce results. The most important aspect 
 
648  Comp. „Nuestros intereses están tan inextricablemente ligados entre sí que nuestra única oportunidad es una respues-
ta común y un enfoque euromediterráneo específico de nuestros problemas” Ferrero-Waldner, (November 2005) Bar-
celona. 
649  Comp. „is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-interest. If Europe did not ‘export’ stability, it would 
‘import’ instability” Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
650  Comp. „it is in our European interest that our neighbourhood is well-governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that 
conflicts in our vicinity are resolved and issues like migration, organised crime and terrorism are tackled more effec-
tively” Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
651  Comp. „if we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle these challenges and make more of the Euro-
Med Partnership I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the challenges that lie ahead” Ferrero-
Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
652  Comp. „our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for our neighbours, and thus for ourselves, is more 
relevant than ever” Ferrero-Waldner, (April 2008) Bruges. 
653  Comp. „The great difference of course between ‘Europe’ and the ‘European Union’ is that one is defined by culture, 
history and geography, the second is defined by treaties, policies and laws” Hübner, (February 2006) Warsaw. 
654  Comp. „Europe can not be an ‘introspective bystander’. On contrary, we are and must remain key actor in the region; 
a political and economic partner who supports and managed change and who helps reap the opportunities that flow 
from it” Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
655  Comp. „The European Union is neither an island nor a fortress” Ferrero-Waldner, (June 2006) Hamburg. 
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of developing an identity is one’s own vision; these visions can be found on the Commission’s side: At 
a time when we are building a new Europe, a united European continent, when we are seeking to work 
out new ways for people of different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating a new 
unity within diversity, when the EU’s borders are expanding, we must also develop our strategy to-
wards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, we must be decisive in our Mediterranean pol-
icy
656. 
3.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean 
The statements which refer to the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean mostly stress the 
EU as a political power, its disposition of action, its method and a certain self-criticism. There are also 
references that identify the EU as one great power, compared to other powers like the United States of 
America.  
From the Commission’s side it is stated that Europe is a great power, a political entity. Concerning its 
engagement in the Mediterranean, Manuel Marín said in 1997 that the European Union has already 
shown its readiness to encourage and help
657
. Beside the power status of Europe in the discourse of 
representatives of the European Commission, there are numerous statements indicating that the aspired 
method is shared responsibility. Thus, the limitation of the possibilities that Europe possesses is 
stressed: the Union’s aid and technical assistance can act only as a catalyst: they will have an effort 
only if made in conjunction with the political will and modernisation efforts of the Mediterranean 
Partners themselves
658. In 2001, Chris Patten also stressed the necessity to increase the sense of co-
ownership of the partnership among the Med partners
659
. Co-ownership is a particular sensitive aspect 
in the organisation of the Barcelona Process, but it is repetitively stated from the European side that it 
is an essential part for the success of the Barcelona Process. Shared responsibility seems to be one of 
Europe’s concerns and therefore there are repetitive references which assure the European awareness 
regarding the differences among the partners. The president of the European Commission, José 
Manuel Barroso, addressed the participants of the Barcelona Process by explicitly expressing the posi-
tion of the European Union: We (Europe) stand firm on the principal that this is not about forcing any 
country in particular direction. It is about responding to the decisions you make towards realising our 
 
656  Comp. „At a time when we are building a new Europe, a united European continent, when we are seeking to work out 
new ways for people of different cultures to live and work together, when we are creating a new unity within diver-
sity, when the EU’s borders are expanding, we must also develop our strategy towards the regions closest to Europe 
and, above all, we must be decisive in our Mediterranean policy” Prodi, (November 2002) Euro-Med Report. 
657  Comp. „the European Union has already shown its readiness to encourage and help.” Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 
658  Comp. „the Union’s aid and technical assistance can act only as a catalyst: they will have an effort only if made in 
conjunction with the political will and modernisation efforts of the Mediterranean Partners themselves” Marín, (May 
1997) Oslo. 
659  Comp. „(…) to increase the sense of co-ownership of the partnership among the Med partners” Patten, (January 
2001) Brussels. 
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common vision of a zone of stability and prosperity
660. He further stated that we (Europe) are commit-
ted to the idea that each country shapes its relationship with us individually
661. And, especially be-
cause differentiation is vital662, we (Europe) are not trying to force artificial links between countries 
with very different interests and needs
663. This discourse shows both, what the European Union aspires 
to represent and what its reality is. The discrepancy results from the fact that the will to share respon-
sibility is only realisable if all countries are equally perceived. The original idea and the wish of a co-
ownership could not be implemented; it became increasingly difficult over the years, especially as the 
EU offers the MNC the realisation of reforms with different velocities. The recent restructuring of the 
Barcelona Process, the currently denominated Mediterranean Union, tries to avoid this duality of ap-
proaches. Its success has to be proved in the future. 
As far as the strategic approach is concerned, the European Union presents itself as a proactive and 
comprehensive power, especially in concerns of the Middle East Peace Process. Chris Patten noted the 
calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process and states, let us not 
underestimate our contribution
664. He further stresses that of course we should not be naïve, we cannot 
expect wholesale changes to cultural traditions overnight. But we should aim for a structural ap-
proach leading to improvement over time
665. In financial matters of the Mediterranean Policy the EU 
figures as a donor with knowledge advance. Thus, Chris Patten states that he is convinced that the 
effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping a tight focus on the key priorities of the partnership even if 
this means that others call on our assistance
666.  
As the US also holds a strong position in the Mediterranean, especially in concerns of the Middle East 
Peace Process, it is important for Europe to position itself. The few statements which refer to this mat-
ter indicate a precautious approach of Europe. Thus, Manuel Marin stated in 1997: We do not see the 
Union’s role as an alternative to the role of the United States, but as complement to it
667. In 2005, 
Ferrero- Waldner stated that many of the EU’s objectives for the region are shared by the US, and we 
are more likely to achieve them together. Working in parallel, reinforcing our common objectives, the 
EU and US will have a greater degree of persuasion and political influence in the region than we 
 
660  Comp. „We stand firm on the principal that this is not about forcing any country in particular direction. It is about 
responding to the decisions you make towards realising our common vision of a zone of stability and prosperity” Bar-
roso, (September 2007) Brussels. 
661  Comp. „we are committed to the idea that each country shapes its relationship with us individually” Barroso, (Sep-
tember 2007) Brussels. 
662  Comp. „differentiation is vital” Barroso, (September 2007) Brussels. 
663  Comp. „we are not trying to force artificial links between countries with very different interests and needs” Barroso, 
(September 2007) Brussels. 
664  Comp. „noted the calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role in the Peace Process and states, let us not 
underestimate our contribution” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
665  Comp. „of course we should not be naïve, we cannot expect wholesale changes to cultural traditions overnight. But 
we should aim for a structural approach leading to improvement over time” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
666  Comp. „convinced that the effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping a tight focus on the key priorities of the 
partnership even if this means that others call on our assistance” Patten, (January 2001) Brussels. 
667  Comp. „We do not see the Union’s role as an alternative to the role of the United States, but as complement to it” 
Marín, (May 1997) Oslo. 




668. These examples demonstrate the will to become a decisive power in the region, 
but also indicate the predominant cooperative approach, the working together with other great powers 
like the United States. The European Union wants to sway politics in the Mediterranean, but it is eden-
tulous at the moment of action. 
XVII SPE E CHE S AS SIGNE D T O T HE  EUROP E AN COUNCIL 
The speeches which can be assigned to the European Council are held by European politicians, who 
are either representatives of their national presidency or are heads of state and thus members of the 
Council. Therewith, the discourse assigned to the European Council contains a strong intergovernmen-
tal element and appears to be the most diverse discourse of all analysed documents so far.  
 
1 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Expression 
From the fifty statements which have been identified for the known subcategories, far the most pertain 
to the category “Mediterranean Policy”, only few of them deal with “associative and dissociative ele-
ments”, “the other” or the “Mediterranean region”. 
 
Speeches assigned to the European Council 
 "The Other" "MMPOL" "ass./diss." "MMR" "predominace" Total 
EXPRESSION 3 38 3 5 1 50 
 
1.1 The view of “the other” 
Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council, the “other” receives no other de-
nomination as in the other documents. They are partners and partner countries. There are examples 
indicating how to proceed with conflictive countries like Libya. Thus, it is stated in 1998 that Libya 
for its part has not been forgotten. Libya is an integral part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural 
partner in the Euro-Med Partnership on the very day when UN sanctions will be lifted
669. The rela-
tions with Libya, who received an observer status in the Barcelona Process in 1999, remain conflictive 
to this day. Europe, who as a long-term objective wanted Libya to become a full member of the Barce-
lona Process, only managed to reach a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in July 2007. The con-
flictive aspect is that “if Libya fails to join, the E.U. would be accused of double standards for punish-
 
668  Comp. „many of the EU’s objectives for the region are shared by the US, and we are more likely to achieve them 
together. Working in parallel, reinforcing our common objectives, the EU and US will have a greater degree of per-
suasion and political influence in the region than we would separately” Ferrero-Waldner, (February 2005) Strasbourg. 
669  Comp. “Libya for its part has not been forgotten. Libya is an integral part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural 
partner in the Euro-Med Partnership on the very day when UN sanctions will be lifted” Kröll, (November 1998) 
Malta. 
XVII          Speeches assigned to the European Council 
 
152 
ing member Arab states for authoritarian behaviour while leaving Libya alone”.670 This would have 
serious consequences regarding Europe’s consistency in terms of credibility. Thus, the Commission 
proposed a negotiation mandate for a framework agreement in February 2008, which Commissioner 
Ferrero-Waldner commented as “this is a historic decision. Libya is an important player in the Medi-
terranean region and in Africa, and so far has no framework for relations with the EU. The launching 
of negotiations for a new agreement is the successful result of the reciprocal dialogue and engagement 
started in 2004. I am confident that the agreement will create solid and long lasting relations between 
Libya and the EU.”
671 Beside this consideration, the situation concerning Libya remains complicated, 
because the multilateral character of the Barcelona Process and the recently renamed Mediterranean 
Union require too many suggestions for reforms and it is doubtable if Libya is willing to concede 
them672. It was just recently that Moamer Ghaddafi rejected the French proposed Euro-Mediterranean 
Union673 and did not participate at a meeting on the 13th of July 2008, where the Heads of State and 
high representatives of all participating countries decided on the Barcelona Process: Union for the 
Mediterranean674. 
Other references of the “other” in the discourse of representatives of the European Council demon-
strate the conviction that all participating countries support the European way. In order to underline 
this position, one speaks of a wide consensus in the Arab world about the necessity of intensifying the 
pace of modernisation and gradually adapting the legal frames and administrative practices to the 
necessities of the citizens and to the national and foreign investors
675. Another way to signal the 
shared commitment is expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy, who addressed them directly: It is Mediterrane-
ans who will decide whether or not the civilisations and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. 
Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and the South are going to clash, Mediter-
raneans who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the 
world their violence and intolerance
676. Therewith, the French President calls on the shared responsi-
bility by involving the “other” as a decisive factor on issues that especially Europe is afraid of. 
 
670  Dana MOSS, Libya and the European Union: How Far Can Relations Go?, ( Arab Reform Bulletin/ 6.2.2008); Avail-
able Online: http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=412 (22.1.2009). 
671 IP/08/308 (27. February 2008) Brussels; Available online: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= 
IP/08/308&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (22.1.2008) 
672  Comp. Dana MOSS, Libya and the European Union: How Far Can Relations Go?, (6.2.2008/ Arab Reform Bulletin); 
Available Online: http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=412 (22.1.2009). 
673  http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/06/libya_rejects_p.php (22.1.2009) 
674  Comp. Meessen, NZZ (5.11.2008) 
675  Comp. “Hay un amplio consensus en el mundo árabe sobre la necesidad de intensificar el paso a la modernidad y 
adaptar gradualmente los marcos legales y las practicas administrativas a las necesidades de sus cuidadanos, así como 
a las incersores nacionales y extranjeros” Zapatero/Blair (28.11.2005) El País. 
676  Comp. „It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilisations and religions will wage the most terrible 
of wars. Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the North and the South are going to clash, Mediterraneans 
who will decide whether or not terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the world their violence 
and intolerance” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
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1.2 Associative and dissociative elements 
The few statements which can be allocated to the subcategory “associative and dissociative elements” 
show that the postulated differences facilitate a common position. Notably, the differences are not 
specifically assigned to the “other”, but they refer to the socio-economic challenges which all coun-
tries are concerned with. Associatively expressed and addressed to all participating countries, Jean 
Asselborn stated that in 1995 through a major political initiative and by common agreement, we de-
cided to combine our efforts to help the spirit of solidarity and cooperation take root in the Mediterra-
nean
677. Frank – Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister and representative of the German Presi-
dency, expressed the perceived associative character even more explicitly: We all face the same prob-
lems: multiple risks and the potential for international conflict, such as the crisis in the Middle East, 
the threat of terrorism, the challenges of climate change and concerns about the security of energy 
supplies. These problems require urgent responses which we will find only if we work together
678. He 
further accentuated that this is in the interest of us all679. The discursive strategy therewith is to ad-
vance association by bridging the socio-economic concern via a direct advice regarding a shared “des-
tiny”. 
1.3 Reference to a Mediterranean region 
The significance of the Mediterranean Region is mentioned in the context of opposed shores, the dia-
lectic between frontier and bridge and its future-critical connotation. 
The Spanish President José Luis Zapatero comments, for instance, that the connection with the Medi-
terranean is evident because it constitutes an ambit which enables the approach of the peoples of the 
shores. José Magalhães, on the other hand, states that the Mediterranean can be either perceived as a 
frontier between Europe and the African continent or as a bridge, across which one could reach a 
global cooperation and solidarity. The outcome of this is that the definition of the Mediterranean is 
continuously linked to conceptions and wishes. The discourse transports the vision of belonging to-
gether, which enables to “heal” the world. This is supported by statements of the French President, 
Nicolas Sarkozy: it is there (the Mediterranean) that everything will be won or everything lost680. 
From an analytical point of view, whether this is political exaggeration or not, what seems to be fact is 
that from the European side, and even more explicitly from the intergovernmental level of the Euro-
pean Council, the opinion is pushed that the Mediterranean better belongs close to Europe and that it 
has a future-critical significance. 
 
677  Comp. „in 1995 through a major political initiative and by common agreement, we decided to combine our efforts to 
help the spirit of solidarity and cooperation take root in the Mediterranean” Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg. 
678  Comp. „We all face the same problems: multiple risks and the potential for international conflict, such as the crisis in 
the Middle East, the threat of terrorism, the challenges of climate change and concerns about the security of energy 
supplies. These problems require urgent responses which we will find only if we work together” Steinmeier, (March 
2007) Berlin. 
679  Comp. „this is in the interest of us all” Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin. 
680  Comp. „it is there that everything will be won or everything lost” Sarkozy, (April 2007) Tangiers. 
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1.4 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The statements which refer to the Mediterranean Policy itself aim to define or to characterise it. In the 
speeches assigned to the European Council, especially towards the end of the considered temporal 
bracket, there are strong critical voices concerning the Barcelona Process. This criticism concerns the 
policy itself, but it also gives indication of the European struggle to speak with one voice.  
In 1998, Herbert Kröll, ambassador in function of the representation of the Austrian presidency, stated 
that the most ambitious and best progressing Mediterranean initiative is the (European Union’s) 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 – also knows as the ‘Bar-
celona Process’
681. He further explained that the EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU foreign 
policy approach towards the Mediterranean
682, and even more precisely it is a long-term and compre-
hensive approach, virtually non-existent in previous European efforts in that region
683. The pride of 
the singularity of the European Mediterranean Policy can explicitly be perceived in these statements. 
Within the perception of most of the speakers the Barcelona Process is the result of long European 
endeavours. In connection with the initiation of the Barcelona Process, this is even explicitly men-
tioned: The Barcelona Conference represents the pinnacle of a year-long effort by the EU to give the 
partnership with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, 
Turkey and the Palestinian Authority a solid foundation
684. 
Concerning further terms of defining the Mediterranean Policy, the discourse of representatives of the 
European Council does not differ from the discourse within the other analysed documents. Thus, the 
Barcelona Process is the only multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the region in a compre-
hensive way
685 and it provides a crucial framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation686. In 
contrast to other documents, there are more statements that evaluate the Mediterranean Policy. It is 
either stated that it represents a challenge for the European Union with its wide scope and ambitious 
objectives or it is expressed from the European’s side that we are privileged to have a forum like our 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership and we should make full use of it
687. Among the European side, one 
 
681  Comp. „the most ambitious and best progressing Mediterranean initiative is the (European Union’s) Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in November 1995 – also knows as the ‘Barcelona Process’” Kröll, 
(November 1998) Malta. 
682  Comp. „the EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU foreign policy approach towards the Mediterranean” Kröll 
(November 1998) Malta. 
683  Comp. „(...) is a long-term and comprehensive approach, virtually non-existent in previous European efforts in that 
region” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
684  Comp. „The Barcelona Conference represents the pinnacle of a year-long effort by the EU to give the partnership 
with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian 
Authority a solid foundation” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
685  Comp. „the Barcelona Process is the only multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the region in a comprehen-
sive way (…)” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
686  Comp. „it provides a crucial framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation” Winkler, (May 2006) Vienna. 
687  Comp. „we are privileged to have a forum like our Euro-Mediterranean partnership and we should make full use of 
it” Winkler, (May 2006) Vienna. 
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is aware of the enormous strategic importance of the Mediterranean Region688 and the relevance of the 
Barcelona Process which cannot be understated
689. The evaluation of the Barcelona Process on the 
occasion of its tenth anniversary demonstrated the historic significance, the need for action and the 
will to succeed with this policy. Thus, Jean Asselborn, who is responsible for General Affairs and 
External Relations and a representative of the Luxembourg Presidency, stated that the Barcelona 
Process was an innovative concept which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and successive 
enlargements, was to prove central in consolidating our links of solidarity and in supporting the major 
changes that have affected our region
690
. He further stressed that the Barcelona Declaration was born 
of this common vision and this sense of shared responsibility
691 and that today this fundamental and 
unique text has not lost any of its urgency. More than ever, it constitutes the frame of reference for 




An even clearer claim of historic significance was expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy in the context of 
restructuring the Barcelona Process and promoting his idea of a Mediterranean Union: This is what the 
Mediterranean Union is: a break with the past – a break with attitudes. Ways of thinking, playing safe, 
a state of mind opposed to audacity and courage
693
. And with its concrete definition he stated in 2008 
that the Union for the Mediterranean is a political project because it is one of that entails political 
will, without which nothing is possible, and it is a project that will allow the Mediterranean to shake 
off all that is keeping it from looking to the future
694
. In respect of launching the Mediterranean Union 
under the premise of reinvigorating the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean Policy has strongly been 
criticised so far, especially by the French President Nicolas Sarkory. He denounced Europe’s pre-
dominant position when stating that in Barcelona everything came from the North. By that I mean 
north of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, Europe decided first
695. He valued the European’s effort, 
but commented on their failures in the same breath: Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled 
 
688  Comp. „é enorme a importância estratégica da região mediterrânica para a União Europeia para Portugal (...)” Magal-
hães, (October 2007) Portugal. 
689  Comp. “the relevance of the Barcelona Process cannot be understated” Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta. 
690  Comp. „the Barcelona Process was an innovative concept which, in the context of the post-Cold War period and 
successive enlargements, was to prove central in consolidating our links of solidarity and in supporting the major 
changes that have affected our region” Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg. 
691  Comp. „the Barcelona Declaration was born of this common vision and this sense of shared responsibility” Assel-
born, (May 2005) Luxembourg. 
692  Comp. „this fundamental and unique text has not lost any of its urgency. More than ever, it constitutes the frame of 
reference for cooperative relations and links of solidarity between the European Union and Mediterranean partner 
countries” Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg. 
693  Comp. „This is what the Mediterranean Union is: a break with the past – a break with attitudes. Ways of thinking, 
playing safe, a state of mind opposed to audacity and courage” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
694  Comp. „the Union for the Mediterranean is a political project because it is one of that entails political will, without 
which nothing is possible, and it is a project that will allow the Mediterranean to shake off all that is keeping it from 
looking to the future” Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
695  Comp. „in Barcelona everything came from the North. By that I mean north of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, 
Europe decided first” Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
XVII          Speeches assigned to the European Council 
 
156 
Europe’s salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the hands of the South
696. Barcelona was 
an error, because it continued along a path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decolonisation – 
that is, dialogue based on an unequal relationship where one decides and the other receives
697. 
Moreover, Nicolas Sarkozy talked about the base of many assumptions in the discussion of the Barce-
lona Process: Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Barcelona, I am sorry to say, was not a 
partnership between peoples
698.  
Therewith, the president of France explicitly claims that Europe has a predominant position in the 
Barcelona Process, which is far from resembling an equal partnership. Although there is an acceptable 
component in the discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy, especially in concerns of the present research under-
taking as it refers to the same conclusion, one may not forget the background of this explicit French 
position. With the proposal of a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the Mediterranean, 
France reorganised the Mediterranean Policy in order to strengthen its position within Europe and to 
minimize the influence of other powerful member states like Germany or Great Britain. 
 
2 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Purpose  
Within the speeches of representatives of the European Council there are few references on the actual 
purpose or the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy. Interestingly, two-thirds of the state-
ments concern the actual purpose and only one-third the aim. This indicates that the discourse aims 
rather to explain than to persuade.  
 
Speeches assigned to the European Council 
 "Aim" "Purpose" Total 
PURPOSE 11 22 33 
 
2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy 
The purpose of the European policy in the Mediterranean concerns both, the need of action, which 
implies an interest on socio-economic developments, and the attempt to evolve something meaningful, 
something of lasting significance. 
The need of action is expressed when the speakers refer to: 




696  Comp. „Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled Europe’s salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the 
hands of the South” Sarkory, (April 2008) Tunis. 
697  Comp. „Barcelona was an error, because it continued along a path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decoloni-
sation – that is, dialogue based on an unequal relationship where one decides and the other receives” Sarkozy, (April 
2008) Tunis. 
698  Comp. „Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Barcelona, I am sorry to say, was not a partnership between 
peoples” Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
699  Comp. „There is a need for rapid progress in the negotiations of the Association Agreements” Kröll, (November 
1998) Malta. 
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• It is important to encourage Med Partners to reinforce their mutual relations
700
 
• It is vital that we have success
701
 
• We have to act more rapidly
702
 
These statements exemplify the urgency and the necessity which are expressed by the representatives 
of the European Council. The reasons are of distinctive nature. Jean Asselborn, representative of the 
Luxembourg Presidency, stated: Our ambition was to identify together the great political, economic 
and social challenges faced by the Mediterranean region
703. José Luis Zapatero, the Spanish president, 
reasoned that he believes that the Mediterranean inheres, more than any other zone of the world, the 
risk of a conflict between civilisations and also the enormous potential of an alliance
704. Therewith, he 
referred to the high sensitiveness of conflicts in the region, the repetitively stated risk of instability and 
the possibility to overcome these threats, which are considered to affect both sides of the Mediterra-
nean equally by means of a political alliance that goes beyond diplomatic relations. Further reasons are 
that we are confronted with shared challenges and new threats705 and that the prosperity gap between 
the European Union and its neighbours in the south, which is one of the hugest in the world, did not 
decrease but increase and that this augments the frustration and the emigration of the south
706. 
Regarding the Mediterranean Policy, the European politicians are convinced that they have to continue 
their work in a balanced way in all three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to attain the objec-
tives of peace, stability and prosperity and that they should concentrate their efforts to develop new 
partnership building measures to gradually increase mutual confidence
707. 
The French proposal facilitated the implementation of a European and French, respectively vision 
about how the Mediterranean Policy should evolve itself in the future. Nicolas Sarkozy addressed all 
Mediterranean countries when he stated: I want to say that the time has come to move from dialogue to 
politics, that the moment has come to stop discussion and start building
708. He corroborated his opin-
ion by stressing the significance of the Mediterranean for Europe saying that it is in the Mediterranean 
 
700  Comp. „It is important to encourage Med Partners to reinforce their mutual relations” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
701  Comp. „Es vital que tengamos éxtio” Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País.  
702  Comp. „Pero deemos hacer más rápidamente” Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País. 
703  Comp. „Our ambition was to identify together the great political, economic and social challenges faced by the Medi-
terranean region” Asselborn, (May 2005) Luxembourg. 
704  Comp. „Creo que el Mediterráneo encarna, mejor que ninguna zona en el mundo, los riesgos inherentes a un conflicto 
de civilisacioones y, al mismo tiempo, las enormes potencialidades de una Alianza.“ Zapatero, (June 2005) Af-
kar/ideas. 
705  Comp. “Afrontamos retos compartidos y nuevas amenazas” Zapatero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País. 
706  Comp. „the prosperity gap between the European Union and its neighbours in the south, which is one of the hugest in 
the world, did not decrease but increase and that this augments the frustration and the emigration of the south” Za-
patero/Blair, (28.11.2005) El País. 
707  Comp. „we have to continue our work in a balanced way in all three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to 
attain the objectives of peace, stability and prosperity. (…) we should concentrate our efforts to develop new partner-
ship building measures to gradually increase mutual confidence” Valjento, (November 1999) Malta. 
708  Comp. „To all Mediterranean (…) I want to say that the time has come to move from dialogue to politics, that the 
moment has come to stop discussion and start building” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
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that Europe will secure its prosperity, ensure its security
709. He further stressed the European position 
and its policy so far when he states that when Europe launched the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in 
1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate its interest in a South that it had neglected for too long. 
(…) And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at the centre of Europe’s concern to this 
extent
710. Whether he wanted to make good-weather policy, so that the Mediterranean can expect 
greater attention now in terms of aid from the European Union, or he wanted to present his policy pur-
pose in a shinier light, is questionable. Especially when he continued stating that it’s not only our po-
litical but moral responsibility to take up this challenge and that the single goal is to make the Medi-
terranean the world’s largest testing ground for co-development, where development is decided on 
together and managed together, where freedom of movement of people is built together and managed 
together, and where security is organized together and guaranteed together
711. The latter sentence 
contains the key purpose of the European Union. It is mantled in nice words, but still explicitly stated: 
bringing reforms and freedom to the people and assuring security. Sarkozy topped the discourse of 
beautiful words by formulating his demand: let us make this great Mediterranean dream our dream, 
one that has waited centuries for a youth worthy of its great past to size the dream and make it a real-
ity
712. He continued his persuasive discourse: And I promise you this: that if this Union for the Medi-
terranean becomes a reality, this union will change the world
713
. 
With this visionary approach Nicolas Sarkozy implemented a big thought to a big project. He mantled 
the European interests into a common vision, a shared future. His approach is coherent to the Euro-
pean policy approach, but what he explicitly did is augmenting the expectations of success of such a 
sensitive policy area.  
2.2 About the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy 
Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council there are little references to the offi-
cial aim. General formulations like it is the aim to promote long-term stability through economic de-
velopment and liberalisation
714 do not contribute to new findings. 
 
709  Comp. „it is in the Mediterranean that Europe will secure its prosperity, ensure its security” Sarkozy, (October 2007) 
Tangiers. 
710  Comp. „the European position and its policy so far when he states that when Europe launched the Euro-
Mediterranean dialogue in 1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate its interest in a South that it had neglected for 
too long. (…) And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at the centre of Europe’s concern to this extent” 
Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
711  Comp. „it’s not only our political but moral responsibility to take up this challenge and that the single goal is to make 
the Mediterranean the world’s largest testing ground for co-development, where development is decided on together 
and managed together, where freedom of movement of people is built together and managed together, and where se-
curity is organized together and guaranteed together” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
712  Comp. „let us make this great Mediterranean dream our dream, one that has waited centuries for a youth worthy of its 
great past to size the dream and make it a reality” Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
713  Comp. „And I promise you this: that if this Union for the Mediterranean becomes a reality, this union will change the 
world” Sarkozy, (April 2008) Tunis. 
714  Comp. to promote long-term stability through economic development and liberalisation” Kröll, (November 1998) 
Malta. 
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Interestingly, there are some statements which reflect the European’s aim how to handle the Mediter-
ranean Policy. For instance, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Foreign Minister and representative of 
the German Presidency stated: We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the foundations 
which we have built together
715. Renate Schimkoreit, Euromed-Coordinator of the German Presidency, 
said: We have no other option than to do our best – or at least, what we consider to be our best – to 
improve the prevailing situation in the interest of all of us
716. 
The official aim refers to a commitment to the European Policy expressed by the Member States and 
to the implicit necessity to succeed.  
 
3 Di scourse  ana lys is  –  Identi ty   
Forty-seven statements have been identified that refer to the identity of the European Union concern-
ing the Mediterranean Policy. Similar to the chapters before, the selected amount of references was 
divided into those which refer to the European Union in a wider context (self-denomination, self-
perception, vision) and those which refer to the political role of the European Union. More than half of 
the statements have been allocated to the sub-category “EU”. 
 
Speeches assigned to the European Council 
 "EU" "Role" Total 
IDENTITY 34 13 47 
 
3.1 The self-perception of the European Union 
Among the speeches of representatives of the European Council the self-perception of the European 
Union can not be reduced to single images or contexts because the Council also represents the inter-
governmental level of the European Union, namely the voices of all Member States. The references, 
which refer to the Mediterranean Policy, rather aspire to guarantee the backing position to the Euro-
pean Policy or contribute to the vision of a united Europe. 
Concerning the acceptance of the Mediterranean Policy, the countries underline their own position, 
especially as now all EU member states have become fully aware that the Mediterranean region as a 
single geopolitical entity is too important to be neglected
717. In 1998, one was convinced that to the 
EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and there is no EU-fragmentation policy
718. This convic-
tion is currently not valid anymore, as especially the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union has 
 
715  Comp. „We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the foundations which we have built together” Stein-
meier, (March 2007) Berlin. 
716  Comp. „We have no other option than to do our best – or at least, what we consider to be our best – to improve the 
prevailing situation in the interest of all of us” Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta. 
717  Comp. „Now all EU member states have become fully aware that the Mediterranean region as a single geopolitical 
entity is too important to be neglected” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
718  Comp. „To the EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and there is no EU-fragmentation policy. By no means a 
fault-line should develop between a prosperous north and a poor south” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
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demonstrated the enormous fragmentation potential within Europe. Nevertheless, the countries declare 
their cooperation and commitment to the European approach in the Mediterranean. The earliest refer-
ence in the document of 1998 concerned Austria and Germany: Austria sees its Southern Mediterra-
nean partners as neighbours, even more so with the entry to force of the Schengen Agreement (…) I 
think the Austrian Presidency has made clear that Europe as a whole – not just the southern parts of 
Europe – stands firm behind the Euro-Med Partnership (…) Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a 
“northern” country to hold a Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting in its own country (…) Germany will 
follow that line by holding the Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stuttgart in April 
1999
719. Finland also expressed its commitment to the European Mediterranean Policy when stating 
that even if Finland is situated geographically far away from the Mediterranean, the border of the 
Mediterranean is our common border and we are convinced of the need to cooperate with our neigh-
bours beyond it everywhere
720. Italy made a more implicit reference by expressing its vision for the 
European Foreign Policy, which can be allocated to the wish of a more proactive role in the Mediter-
ranean: Europe can be cured of its Hamlet syndrome and wholeheartedly decide to become an active 
placer on the world stage; it can acquire the diplomatic, economic and military means to fulfil that 
role convincingly, without calling into question its autonomy, its roots or the freedom-giving struc-
tures defended over the years in the framework of its Western alliances
721. In 2007, the Euromed-
Coordinator of the German Presidency, Renate Schimkoreit, took a stand to the reproach whether 
Germany would attach enough importance to the Mediterranean region as there were rumours that the 
German Presidency would turn its back to the Euromed and focus on Eastern Europe
722. She under-
mined the position by appreciating the Barcelona Process and made use of the opportunity to voice 
certain criticism: Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barcelona Process. At the same time 
– we think – this potential has not been exploit accordingly
723. While many EU member states are 
encouraged to back the European Policy, France challenged Europe with its own proposal of a Medi-
terranean Policy, the Mediterranean Union, and thus demonstrated the great fragmentation potential of 
 
719  Comp. „Austria sees its Southern Mediterranean partners as neighbours, even more so with the entry to force of the 
Schengen Agreement (…) I think the Austrian Presidency has made clear that Europe as a whole – not just the south-
ern parts of Europe – stands firm behind the Euro-Med Partnership (…) Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a 
“northern” country to hold a Euro-Med Ministerial Meeting in its own country (…) Germany will follow that line by 
holding the Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stuttgart in April 1999” Kröll, (November 1998) 
Malta. 
720  Comp. „even if Finland is situated geographically far away from the Mediterranean, the border of the Mediterranean 
is our common border and we are convinced of the need to cooperate with our neighbours beyond it everywhere” 
Valjento, (November 1999) Strasbourg. 
721  Comp. „Europe can be cured of its Hamlet syndrome and wholeheartedly decide to become an active placer on the 
world stage; it can acquire the diplomatic, economic and military means to fulfil that role convincingly, without call-
ing into question its autonomy, its roots or the freedom-giving structures defended over the years in the framework of 
its Western alliances” Berlusconi, (July 2003) Strasbourg. 
722  Comp. „There was the doubt whether Germany would attach enough importance to the Mediterranean region. Ru-
mours had it that the German Presidency would turn its back to the Euromed and focus on Eastern Europe” Schim-
koreit, (April 2007) Malta. 
723  Comp. „Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barcelona Process. At the same time – we think – this poten-
tial has not been exploit accordingly” Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta. 
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Europe. France aspired to overtake the direction imposing force in the Mediterranean when stating for 
example: for France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different from the Euro-Mediterranean proc-
ess; it will not be built to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built with them, with 
Europe and Africa (…) for France, the Mediterranean Union’s remit is not to take the place of all the 
already existing initiatives and projects, but to give them fresh impetus, a new lease of life
724. Al-
though Sarkozy stated that this Mediterranean Union will not be France’s project, that it will be every-
one’s project, developed by everyone, and that it will succeed only if everyone commits to it and 
makes an own individual contribution, France adopted a leading role and centred its position in the 
Mediterranean Union by speaking in the name of France instead of Europe: In the name of France (…) 
I invite all the heads of States and governments of the Mediterranean rim countries to meet France in 
June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the principle 
strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union. I invite all 
States which don’t border the Mediterranean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to partici-
pate, as observers, in this first summit and contribute to its success
725. Therewith, France not only 
assumed the European key role, but also attempted to exclude most of the European countries from 
Mediterranean Affairs. This explicit fragmentation attempt aroused a stern debate on principles, espe-
cially between Germany and France. Sarkozy, who searched for the support of other European coun-
tries bordering the Mediterranean, commented on this debate and the agreed solution: In Rome, this 
initiative has become a common one for Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched (…) 
This debate was first needed between France and Germany. We reached out to one another and made 
an agreement. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsibilities with a Union for the Mediterra-
nean that will be headed by a rotating co-presidency exercised simultaneously by a country from the 
northern shore and a country from the southern shore, who together will incarnate the general interest 
of the Union for the Mediterranean
726. Generally speaking, this outcome could be seen as victory for 
Europe and the European project. 
 
724 Comp. „for France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different from the Euro-Mediterranean process; it will not be 
built to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built with them, with Europe and Africa (…) for France, 
the Mediterranean Union’s remit is not to take the place of all the already existing initiatives and projects, but to give 
them fresh impetus, a new lease of life” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
725  Comp. „In the name of France (…) I  invite all the heads of States and governments of the Mediterranean rim coun-
tries to meet France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a political, economic and cultural union founded on the 
principle strict equality between the nations bordering the same sea: the Mediterranean Union. I invite all States 
which don’t border the Mediterranean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to participate, as observers, in 
this first summit and contribute to its success” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
726  Comp. „In Rome, this initiative has become a common one for Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched 
(…) This debate was first needed between France and Germany. We reached out to one another and made an agree-
ment. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsibilities with a Union for the Mediterranean that will be headed by a 
rotating co-presidency exercised simultaneously by a country from the northern shore and a country from the south-
ern shore, who together will incarnate the general interest of the Union for the Mediterranean” Sarkozy, (April 2008) 
Tunis. 
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3.2 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean 
Europe aspires to become a political heavyweight, which is able to measure itself with the other great 
powers. An indication for this ambition can be deduced from a statement by Herbert Kröll who com-
mented on this European aspiration: it is clear therefore that although Russia and the US wanted to be 
included they are not
727. Within the discourse of representatives of the European Council, it becomes 
obvious that Europe wanted and still wants to break new grounds. This approach requires courage. 
Courageous in the sense of becoming less paternalistic on the EU side728 and bringing up sensitive 
points: We should not dominate the EMP, but move a genuine partnership relationship and discuss 
also sensitive issues (…) we should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture problems, migration 
and excessive population growth, even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine spirit of 
partnership
729.  
The mandate that the European Union assumes in the Mediterranean is based on the certainty that the 
EU is based in the values of democracy and human rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign 
policy and external action as it believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is the cor-
nerstone of peace and security and sustainable development
730. Therefore, there exists the conviction 
that the EU has to take and takes on the responsibility for its neighbouring countries, since this is the 
very essence of its raison t’etre which is first of all a political one, to create a zone of peace and sta-
bility as big as possible
731. Nicolas Sarkozy spoke about the same, but in a more vivid way: By turning 
its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and 
spiritual sources, but also from its future
732. For the political identity of Europe, the Middle East Peace 
Process constitutes a major challenge, virtually a mission. On the one hand, certain limitations of the 
European influence are repetitively expressed such as: We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting 
parties to engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. However we can – and must – 
support and promote this desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assistance when they are 
unable to make progress on their own
733. On the other hand, the urgency that is ascribed to the 
 
727  Comp. „it is clear therefore that although Russia and the US wanted to be included they are not” Kröll, (November 
1998) Malta. 
728  Comp. „to become less paternalistic on the EU side” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
729  Comp. „We should not dominate the EMP, but move a genuine partnership relationship and discuss also sensitive 
issues (…) we should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture problems, migration and excessive population 
growth, even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine spirit of partnership” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta 
730  Comp. „the EU is based in the values of democracy and human rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign 
policy and external action as it believes that the promotion and protection of human rights is the cornerstone of peace 
and security and sustainable development” Pipan, (June 2008) Slovenia. 
731  Comp. „the conviction that the EU has to take and takes on the responsibility for its neighbouring countries, since this 
is the very essence of its raison t’etre which is first of all a political one, to create a zone of peace and stability as big 
as possible” Kröll, (November 1998) Malta. 
732  Comp. „By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral 
and spiritual sources, but also from its future” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
733  Comp. „We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for 
peace. However we can – and must – support and promote this desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assis-
tance when they are unable to make progress on their own” Steinmeir, (March 2007) Berlin. 
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development in the Mediterranean, leads to the following statements: we are obliged to succeed734 or it 
is essential that we succeed in making people understand that we cannot solve key issues of the future 
by cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by interacting with each other
735.  
In this context, Europe perceives itself as a factor of international stability and its responsibility in this 
respect starts at its immediate borders and depends on its capacity to become involved in increasingly 
advanced forms of cooperation with neighbouring countries
736. And especially with the newly consti-
tuted way of cooperation Europe aims to set off on the path of peace and fraternity737.  
XVIII INTE RINS T IT UT IONAL DIS COURS E – CONCL UDING REM ARKS 
“SP E E CHES” 
In its methodological consideration the speeches of representatives of the European Commission and 
the European Council complement the analysis of the official discourse of the European Union. While 
the EU documents at first provoke the establishment of the discourse in their finality, the speeches 
constitute a measure to implement the official discourse. Thus, the speakers per se are not as relevant 
as the political function they represent. The speeches assigned to the European Commission represent 
the institution, which sets the path for the European approach in the Mediterranean; the representatives 
of the European Council represent not only the mayor decision-making organ of the European Union, 
but also the intergovernmental level within the European Union because they act on the mandate of 
their home-countries. 
In total, 357 statements have been considered in the analysis of the speeches: 
 
Speeches: total number of statements 
 Commission Council Total 
EXPRESSION 89 50 139 
PURPOSE 47 33 80 
IDENTITY 91 47 138 
 227 130 357 
 
The fact that within the speeches that have been assigned to the European Commission nearly fifty 
percent more statements could be identified is due to the uneven number of speeches between the 
European Commission and the European Council. As the European Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, 
 
734  Comp. „we are obliged to succeed” Schimkoreit, (April 2007) Malta. 
735  Comp. „it is essential that we succeed in making people understand that we cannot solve key issues of the future by 
cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by interacting with each other” Steinmeier, (March 2007) Berlin. 
736  Comp. „The European Union is also a factor of international stability and its responsibility in this respect starts at its 
immediate borders and depends on its capacity to become involved in increasingly advanced forms of cooperation 
with neighbouring countries” Berlusconi, (July 2003) Strasbourg. 
737  Comp. „Europe set off on the path of peace and fraternity” Sarkozy, (October 2007) Tangiers. 
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Ferrero-Waldner, has been very active regarding the implementation of the Mediterranean Policy, the 
numbers do not suggest a statistical balance; however, this is not thematically relevant.  
Concerning the analytical category “expression”, 89 statements corresponding to the Commission and 
50 to the Council could be identified in the course of the discourse analysis. The statements concern-
ing the “other” (Commission: 5 – Council: 3) show that the Commission addresses the “other” more 
often, very respectfully and positions itself with an explanatory, convincing discourse in order to calm 
the “other” regarding the European intentions (enlargement, Eastern policy). The Council does not 
refer to the other with concrete descriptions; the references rather concentrate on the association with 
each other. The discourse expresses the conviction to support the “other” regarding the European ap-
proach and, especially since 2008, forces the claim of a shared responsibility. In order to overcome 
dissociative elements within the partnership, the Commission (17 statements) discursively encourages 
associative relations by directly appealing to the participating countries, by referring to common ties 
or shared interests and experiences or by directly addressing dissociative issues. In the discourse 
among representatives of the European Council, dissociative elements are not associated with the 
“other” per se, but ascribed to the socio-economic situation. Hence, the discursive strategy further 
leads to an association by bridging the socio-economic concern via a direct advice regarding a shared 
“destiny”. Therewith, it can be concluded that the Commission follows a more direct approach on a 
co-operational level, while the Council focuses on establishing relations via the bonds of a common 
destiny. In respect of the perception of the Mediterranean Policy (Commission: 46 – Council: 38), the 
Commission mostly refers to the singularity and uniqueness of the political initiative and only in few 
occasions to missionary and visionary components of the discourse. The statements allocated to the 
representatives of the European Council also refer in their perception of the Barcelona Process to a 
certain pride and singularity. Although they exclusively ascribe its existence to European endeavours 
and give room to their conviction of its historic significance and need, the references also contain 
criticism, especially in the last years. The harshest criticism was, not surprisingly, expressed by Nico-
las Sarkozy. Even if he aspired to push the French approach in the Mediterranean and challenged the 
unity of the European Union, his unmasked criticism was surprising. He explicitly mentioned the fail-
ures of the Barcelona Process and underlined the lack of partnership by demanding the predominance 
within the European approach. Concerning the last subcategory of this rubric, the “Mediterranean re-
gion”, 11 statements assigned to the Commission oppose 5 assigned to the European Council. While 
representatives of the Commission stress the challenge of defining a common identity by recalling on 
philosophers and humanists, the references of representatives of the Council link their perception of a 
Mediterranean region to the conception and wish of belonging together in order to “heal” the world. 
In the second category “purpose” a total number of 80 statements (Commission: 47 – Council: 33) 
have been identified. Within the 25 statements which assess the purpose and the motivation for the 
Mediterranean Policy, the established discourse uses verbs like: combat, reinvigorate, increase, bring, 
work and expand. These are verbs of action, expressing the European motivation to assure security
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and stability as it has repetitively been stated. The discourse of the representatives of the Commission 
also contains a component of self-motivation/ self-persuasion, which is expressed by applying phrases 
like “should continue working”, “forge new ways of working together” or “we need to” etc. In the 
same context, the discourse assigned to the European Council (22 statements) expresses the need of 
action in regard to its concern of the socio-economic situation and the wish to evolve something mean-
ingful. The necessity is expressed by enhancing adjectives like “rapid”, “vital” and “important” or 
verbal constructions like “have to”, “need for”, “important to encourage”. Concerning the officially 
stated aim, the Commission (22 statements) stresses the cooperative character of the Barcelona Proc-
ess and the improvement of the same by emphasizing the human and cultural aspect. The few refer-
ences allocated to the Council (11 statements) refer to the commitment of the EU countries to the 
Mediterranean Policy and implicitly to the necessity to succeed. 
Within the third category “identity” the total number of statements amounts 138, 91 on the Commis-
sion’s side and 47 on the Council’s side. The discourse by the representatives of the European Com-
mission stresses on the one hand the political ambition of the EU by referring to its success and the 
proudness of the achievements. On the other hand, the discourse gives insight into the struggle of the 
European Union for a consistent policy orientation and the vision to build a new Europe, which was 
challenged in connection with the outcome of the Barcelona Process. The main difference of the 
Council regarding the Commission’s position is that there is not a single discourse or approach on the 
political ambition of the European Union. At this point the discourses contain a strong intergovern-
mental component, as the single representatives also express their positions, which is mostly accep-
tance. Regarding the commitment to the European policy, Austria and Germany expressed that they 
stand behind the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Finland is also convinced of the need for coopera-
tion and Italy stresses the possibility for Europe to become a player on the world stage. While most 
countries back the European policy and just express national positions to a low degree, France caused 
a sever debate with its proposal to found a Mediterranean Union, on the principals Europe was found, 
just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. This provocative proposal inhered a strong fragmenta-
tion potential for the European Union. In respect to the history of the European Union, the separative 
forces, based on profound national interests, would be a study-worth undertaking for further research 
aspirations. For the present context it is meaningful as it illustrates the internal struggle of the Euro-
pean Union to gain a consistent and credible profile in its external relations. The statements, which 
refer to the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean, constitute a total number of 50 (Com-
mission: 37 – Council: 13). The discourse of the representatives of the Commission describes the EU 
as a proactive, comprehensive and foreseeing power, acting on the base of a donor who disposes of 
knowledge advancement. In regard to a possible competitive position to the USA in the Mediterra-
nean, the Commission expresses a precautious approach which suggests a cooperative attitude. The 
message stated by the representatives of the Council is decisive; Europe aspires to become a political 
heavyweight, which assumes responsibility, which can be equalised with mission, for its neighbours.
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PUBLIC DISCO URSE  
The public discourse constitutes the third analytical level of challenging the European discourse in the 
Mediterranean: the reception of the discourse. Journalists report and comment on the decisions and 
speeches of politicians representing European institutions. Therefore, the public discourse can be re-
garded as a public corrective because it evaluates certain happenings and then expresses agreement or 
disagreement about them. Thus, the analysis of the public discourse completes, from an analytical 
point of view, the empirical analysis proposed in the present work. 
In order to provide the biggest possible sample of the European public discourse, articles of seven 
countries have been considered in this research undertaking. The selection of the countries is only 
based on my language skills, not on any further considerations. Although the historic key players of 
Europe, decisive Mediterranean countries and all German speaking countries, even Switzerland as not 
being a member state of the European Union, has been regarded, an extension of the analysis of the 
public discourse to other European countries, especially the Eastern countries or even Mediterranean 
No-Member Countries, would be an interesting and probably fructuous undertaking. The present 
analysis constitutes a first step and hopefully sets the path for further investigations. 
The discourse within the considered countries is analysed by means of the previously assigned catego-
ries in order to provide the greatest possible comparability. Newspapers create publicity; they explain, 
comment or question certain happenings. Sometimes they concede their voice to politicians and intel-
lectuals, working on the Mediterranean Policy, and to other people who are no professional journalists. 
In the present investigation, the focus is on the transmitted message to the public rather than on the 
person who has composed it. Concentrating on the authors of the messages would definitely be an 
interesting undertaking for further and more profound discourse analyses, but would be misleading for 
the actual research question. 
NEWSPAPE R ARTICLES 
In the following chapter newspaper articles of Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain 
and Switzerland are assessed by means of the same methodological procedure as in the previous chap-
ters. A special emphasis is placed on the identification of the sources, the context analysis in regard to 
the selected newspapers and, of course, to the discourse analysis itself. 
XIX IDE NT IFICAT ION OF T HE S OURCE S 
The identification of the sources was based on several criteria to provide the greatest possible compa-
rability of the sources. According to recent developments, especially the identification of the newspa-
per articles was throughout the entire work a necessary concern. The accessibility was mainly pro-
vided via internet and the online archives of the corresponding newspapers. Unfortunately, since 1995,
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most archives do not provide articles. However, the following ways made it possible to overcome 
trans-national source collecting: 
For the German speaking countries (A, CH, D) I received the generous support of the Salzburger 
Nachrichten; I was permitted to use this database for identifying and printing the newspaper articles. 
In the case of Spain and Italy, the online research offer was sufficient. This was only partly true for 
France; thus it was necessary to use paying-modalities or even to become a contemporary subscriber 
for using their archives. The selected British newspapers only offer parts of their articles for free; but 
thanks to the discourse analytical procedure, it is not necessary to possess the entire article as long as 
there is enough text which facilitates the identification of discourse relevant statements. 
The area of interest for the public discourse analysis (A, CH, D, E, F, GB, I) demonstrates the neces-
sity of a systematic search profile to be able to select relevant articles. Obviously, it is not possible to 
provide completeness among all published articles in the newspapers. Thus, the systematic search was 
based on certain key words which correspond to the topical interest. These were for example: Barce-
lona Process, Conference of Barcelona, Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean, Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, Mediterranean Policy, Mediterranean Union, and compositions or slight 
deviations in the particular languages. In total, there have been 404 articles identified as relevant 
sources. 
 
Country Press No. of Articles Total 
AUSTRIA Salzburger Nachrichten 15  
 Presse 22  
 Standard 22 59 
SWITZERLAND Neue Zürcher Zeitung 26 26 
FRANCE Le Monde 25  
 Le Figaro 31 56 
GERMANY Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 57  
 Süddeutsche Zeitung 21  
 die Welt 13  
 TAZ 9  
 Financial Times Deutschland 18 118 
GREATBRITAIN The Independent 10  
 The Guardian 19 29 
ITALY la Repubblica 25  
 Corriere della Sierra 37 62 
SPAIN el Mundo 22  
 el País 32 54 
Total  404 404 
 
At a first glance, Germany constitutes a statistical outlier, not only because of the higher number of 
newspapers, but also because of the great number of articles that have been considered. The decision 
to aim at the greatest possible coverage of opinion-forming quality papers in German speaking 
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countries is based on the facilitated access to the data-base of the Salzburger Nachrichten. The result 
of the apprehended chance produces a statistical deviation, but has no significant bias on the results of 
the discourse analysis because the main strains of the discourse remain the same by a higher number 
of statements. The only deviation concerns the number of details which can be taken into considera-
tion. 
Of the 404 newspaper articles which have been considered, 1152 statements could be identified as 
relevant for the established analytical categories: 
Country Articles Statements 
Austria 59 141 
France 56 151 
Germany 118 402 
Great Britain 29 49 
Italy 62 128 
Spain 54 138 
Switzerland 26 143 
 404 1152 
 
The distribution of articles and statements per country indicates several notable aspects regarding the 
number of articles and the quality of the statements. Remarkable is the fact that within the newspapers 
of two small countries, Austria and Switzerland, a similar amount of statements could be identified, 
but, compared to Austria, only half as many articles concerned the Mediterranean Affairs in the Swiss 
newspaper. A further comparison with Great Britain indicates a similar image, but with an even 
greater significance. Although Great Britain is one of the leading countries in the European Union and 
a similar amount of articles like for Switzerland was consulted, only a third of the statements could be 
evaluated as relevant. Another interesting matter concerns the relative counterbalance of articles and 
statements among the Mediterranean countries. The indicated balance leads to the assumption that 
concern and quality of the newspapers are comparable. 
Among the selected countries several variants of the distribution of statements regarding the grouping 
of the countries offer several possible interpretations: 
Possible distributions of statements 
Options  No. Statements Total 
Variant 1: MC 417  
 NMC 735 1152 
Variant 2: F,D,GB 602  
 E,I 266  
 A 141  
 CH 143 1152 
Variant 3: EU 1009  
 no - EU 143 1152 
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Variant 1 concerns the distribution of statements between the Mediterranean countries (MC), France, 
Italy and Spain, and the non Mediterranean countries (NMC), Austria, Germany, Great Britain and 
Switzerland. The relation of three countries (MC) compared to four countries (NMC) would prelimi-
narily suggest a higher number of statements on the side of the NMC. However, the argument appears 
to be relative due to the fact that for Germany nearly as many statements have been identified as for 
the Mediterranean countries together. Variant 2 also delivers a quite surprising result. For France, 
Germany and Great Britain, all three political heavyweights in Europe, could only be as many state-
ments identified as for the other countries together. Disregarding Germany, the combined French and 
British press only offered 200 statements, which is considerable less than in Italy and Spain or in Aus-
tria and Germany. Variant 3 illustrates the relation between statements belonging to member states of 
the EU compared to the non-member Switzerland. In this regard, the discourse represented by the 
Swiss press will be taken into special consideration. 
XX CONT E XT ANAL YS IS 
The context analysis regarding the examination of the newspaper articles aims to provide an overview 
about the newspapers considered in the present work. The following table lists the selected media per 
country, refers to the year of the first publication, indicates the political inclination, provides numbers 
regarding the edition and states the editorial. Therewith, the major situational aspects in respect to the 
placing of the newspapers are provided738: 
 





A Die Presse 1848 conservative (mid-year 08) 83.315 Styria Media AG 




1945 liberal (center) (mid-year 08) 69.702 SN Verlagsgesell-
schaft 
F Le Monde 1944 left-liberal 05/06 353.000 Group La Vie-Le-
Monde 




2007 339.236 Socpresse-Verlag 
D Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 






(IVW)3rdQ/08 387.064 FAZ- Stiftung 






(IVW)3rdQ/08 104.101 Gruner+Jahr 
 Tageszeitung 1978 traditionally left (IVW)3rdQ/08 53.964 die Tageszeitung 
Verlagsgenossenschaft  
 
738  The data are taken from http://de.wikipedia.org, where a substantial overview on the data is provided per newspaper. 





1821 liberal (ten. con-
servative) 















2005 636.577 Grupo editoriale 
L'Espresso 
E EL Pais 1976 left-liberal 2006-2007 560.176 Grupo Prisa 
 El Mundo 1989 conservative 2006 330.634 RCS Media Group 
CH Neue Zür-
cher Zeitung 
1780 liberal (ten. con-
servative) 
 147.000 Neue Zürcher Zeitung 
 
The selection of newspapers is based on recommendations of an expert of the European newspaper 
scenery, namely Dr. Martin Stricker, who is a journalist and an expert for foreign policy affairs at the 
Salzburger Nachrichten. The main selection criteria for the newspapers concerned high coverage re-
garding opinion-forming and trans-national publicity. Additional attention was paid to a relative bal-
anced assortment concerning the political inclination of the newspapers. 
Among the seventeen selected newspapers range some of the eldest newspapers of Europe. The Swiss 
newspaper “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (NZZ) was first published in 1780 and is one of the oldest news-
papers in the German speaking ambit, the British newspaper “the Guardian” was first published in 
1821 and the Austrian newspaper “die Presse” dates back to 1848. Of the considered newspapers 
seven were first published before and in 1945 and ten afterwards. 
Concerning the edition, the ranking of the ten biggest newspapers would be: 1. Corriere della Sera (I), 
2. La Repubblica (I), 3. El País (E), 4. Süddeutsche Zeitung (D), 5. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(D), 6. The Guardian (GB), 7. Le Monde (F), 8. Le Figaro (F), 9. El Mundo (E) and 10. die Welt (D). 
Therewith, all newspapers which have been considered of Mediterranean Countries range among the 
ten biggest newspapers regarding their edition. 
To add a notable circumstance at the end of this chapter, the Italian newspaper “Corriere della Sera” 
and the Spanish “El Mundo” belong to the same editorial.  
XXI DIS COURS E ANAL YS IS 
The discourse analysis of the corresponding articles is carried out in the following chapters, which are 
alphabetically listed per country. The methodological procedure is applied upon the established ana-
lytical categories and related sub-categories. Subjected to the differing number of relevant statements, 
the remarks on the results of more than one sub-category can be summed-up under one heading. At the 
beginning of the analysis of each country, some facts about the individual characteristics of the coun-
try, the selected newspapers and the statistical information concerning the discourse will be given.  
At the end of the chapter a detailed comparison of the discourses of the distinctive countries consti-
tutes the conclusion. Further results, which are related to the present research-question, will be 
stressed in the final conclusion. 
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1 Aus tr ia  
For the Austrian public discourse analysis three mayor newspapers have been considered: the Stan-
dard, the Salzburger Nachrichten (SN) and the Presse. Therewith, the political spectrum from left 
(Standard), liberal (SN) and centre right, conservative (Presse) has been covered. A quite equal 
amount of statements has been considered from each newspaper: Standard (49), Presse (49) and Sal-
zburger Nachrichten (43): 
 
AUSTRIA number of articles per category and newspaper 
 Standard Presse SN Total 
Expression 20 26 21 67 
Purpose 9 4 8 21 
Identity 20 19 14 53 
 49 49 43 141 
 
From the total number of 141 statements, 67 were assigned to the analytical category “expression”, 21 
to “purpose” and 53 to “identity”. The detailed distribution concerning the sub-categories is illustrated 
in the following table: 
 
AUSTRIA number of statements per category 
the “other” ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 2 22 5 38 67 
purpose aim    
Purpose 10 11   21 
EU     
Identity 53    53 
 
The distribution of statements per year shows the following pattern: 
 
AUSTRIA Distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 13  2 4 2   5  4 7 1 3 26 67 
Purpose 11  1     2  1   1 5 21 
Identity 8  2 2 1   5  1 1  4 29 53 
Total 32  5 6 3   12  6 8 1 8 60 141 
 
The years 1995, 2002 and 2008 constitute culminations concerning the number of statements consid-
ered in the present analysis. Hence, 1995, the initiation year, 2002, the year after the terror attacks in 
the United States, and 2008, the year when Nicolas Sarkozy set the path for the revival of the Barce-
lona Process by founding the Mediterranean Union, constitute significant moments in the reporting of 
the Mediterranean Affairs.  
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1.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
The analyses of the statements which refer to the analytical category “expression” are basically the 
same as in the previous chapters. In case it is not misleading for the thematic approach, statements of 
the subcategories can be assembled if there are only few statements. 
1.1.1 The view of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements of the partnership  
While there are few statements which refer to the “other” and few associative elements, there are nu-
merous statements which concern dissociative elements within the European Policy in the Mediterra-
nean. 
Statements which explicitly refer to a view of the “other” are rare in the Austrian press. The earliest 
reference can be found in the Standard in 1995. It insinuated that the MNC countries, which originally 
had considerable concerns about the European initiative, only assisted because of the announced bo-
nus
739. Therewith, the journalist refers to a problem which can be found time and again throughout the 
entire Barcelona Process. Another problem is addressed with the second reference to the “other”, when 
describing that many representatives of the partner countries have not been elected democratically 
and that their political, unionised or human rights opponents are rather imprisoned than consulted for 
dialogue
740. These statements refer to distinctions among the partners and demonstrate the sensitive-
ness of the diplomatic undertaking of the Barcelona Process.  
In the discourse of the Austrian press there are only few associative references. One concerns the fact 
that the whole initiative is based on a mutual interest to succeed. The South does not refrain from the 
offered money and the north hopes for more stability
741. While this statement concerns the outcome of 
the Barcelona Process, the other one refers to a more practical matter, which indicates an implicitly 
stated associative element. In 1995, the Presse commented on the facts that Barak and Jassir Arafat 
emphasised that they are convinced to continue the peace process in the Middle East and that the, in 
Barcelona, accorded paths should be implemented. Another success was achieved in the relations 
between Israel and Mauritania, which acknowledged each other
742. The integrative character of the 
Barcelona Process in offering countries that are in conflict with each other, a diplomatic frame for 
dialogue is probably one of the most outranging successes. Nevertheless, this success may not be one-
 
739  Comp. „Dass sie trotz solcher Bedenken nach Barcelona kamen, liegt an der ausgelobten Prämie (...)“ Stackl, 
(27.11.1995) Standard. 
740  Comp. „Andererseits ist unübersehbar, dass es die neue Organisation auf der südlichen Mittelmeerseite mit Partnern 
zu tun hat, von denen viele weder demokratisch gewählt noch repräsentativ für ihre Länder sind und ihre politischen, 
gewerkschaftlichen und menschenrechtlichen Gegner eher hinter Gitter bringen, als mit ihnen Gespräche zu führen“ 
Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
741  Comp. „Beide Seiten sind am Erfolg interessiert. Der Süden will auf die angebotenen Gelder nicht verzichten, der 
Norden hofft auf mehr Stabilität“ Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard. 
742  Comp. „Barak und PLO-Chef Jassir Arafat betonten, sie seien entschlossen, den Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten 
fortzusetzen. Die in Barcelona vereinbarten Schritte sollten "in vollem Umfang umgesetzt" werden. Einen Erfolg gab 
es auch in den Beziehungen zwischen Israel und Mauretanien, die einander anerkannten.“ Krotky, (29.11.1995) Pres-
se. 
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sided examined, the conflictive relations, especially between the Palestinian Authorities and Israel, are 
often the reason for difficult outcomes of the Ministerial Meetings. For instance, this is demonstrated 
by a recent reference in the Presse, stating that Israel and Palestine strongly disagreed in the conclud-
ing text on the terminology “national state” in the context with Israel
743. 
From the beginning of the Barcelona Process there are explicitly stated contentious issues by the Aus-
trian press on the level of dissociative elements. The press commented on the outcome of the Confer-
ence in Barcelona in 1995 that the controversial subjects concerned the handling with democratic 
freedoms and that the aspired free-trade area should imply the agrarian products
744. The latter was a 
special concern of Egypt and Syria745. Another conflictive issue, which dominated the Mediterranean 
relations from its very beginning, concerns the definition of terrorism. Already in 1995, the Arabian 
Delegation did not agree on the suggested definition of terrorism because it would not have guaran-
teed the Palestinian self-determination and its right to continue the fight for its own state
746. Although 
there were considerable differences concerning the definition of terrorism the declaration of Barcelona 
was signed747. That signing of a concluding statement of a conference may contain strong dissociative 
tendencies and even challenge the continuity of the Barcelona Process, as a reference in the Salzburger 
Nachrichten in 1997 suggested. It was stated that with the justification “the need to bring something 
home”, Arabian Foreign Ministers demanded an annex in the conclusions of Malta, stating that one-
sided initiatives of violating international conventions have to be desisted. The Arabian Ministers were 
irritated that the EU countries agreed on this behalf but did not accept the annex in the conclusion of 
the meeting
748
. Even ten years after the launch of the Barcelona Process the concerns about terrorism 
have not diminished
749
 and the struggle of a commonly accepted definition of the term terrorism is as 
conflictive as ever, especially because the European countries do not want to distinguish between 
 
743  Comp. „(…) gerieten einander Israel und die Palästinenser in die Haare. Es spießte sich im Text an dem Wort "Nati-
onalstaat" im Zusammenhang mit Israel. Dies bereite Schwierigkeiten für die Rückkehr palästinensischer Flüchtlinge 
nach Israel.“ Editorial, (14.07.2008) Presse. 
744  Comp. „Wichtige Streitpunkte waren die Forderung nordafrikanischer Länder, die Garantie demokratischer Freihei-
ten von deren "legitimen Ausübung" abhängig zu machen (für die EU unakzeptabel), sowie der Wunsch des Südens, 
die kommende Freihandelszone solle auch Agrarprodukte beinhalten.“ Stackl, (28.11.1995), Standard. 
745 Comp. „Ägypten, das eben so ein Abkommen aushandelt, wehrte sich gegen den EU-Vorschlag, Agrarprodukte vom 
Freihandel auszunehmen.“ Stackl, (28.11.1995), Standard and „Insbesondere Ägypten und Syrien drängten nach An-
gaben von Diplomaten darauf, daß der Wegfall der Handelshemmnisse bei der Einrichtung der geplanten Freihan-
delszone im Jahr 2010 auch für landwirtschaftliche Produkte gelten müsse“ Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nach-
richten. 
746  Comp. „Arabische Delegationen waren mit dem Formulierungsvorschlag über die Terrorismusbekämpfung nicht 
einverstanden, weil er das Recht der Palästinenser auf Selbstbestimmung und auf die Fortsetzung des Kampfes für ei-
nen eigenen Palästinenserstaat nicht garantiere“ Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
747  Comp. „Trotz Differenzen (...) ist am Dienstag eine Schlusserklärung unterzeichnet worden“ Krotky, (29.11.1995) 
Presse. 
748  Comp. „Mit der Begründung, "etwas mit nach Hause bringen zu müssen", verlangten arabische Außenminister in der 
Schlußerklärung von Malta einen Zusatz, daß einseitige Initiativen zur Verletzung internationaler Abmachungen un-
terlassen werden sollten. Die Betreiber dieser Ergänzung wunderten sich sehr darüber, daß EU-Länder dies zwar auch 
sagten, aber nicht in der Erklärung haben wollten.“ Arens, (17.04.1997) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
749  Comp. „Die Terrorsorgen scheinen nach zehn Jahren nach Beginn der ersten Mittelmeer- Konferenz („Barcelona-
Prozess“) keineswegs geringer geworden zu sein“ Schulze, (28.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
XXI         Discourse analysis 
 
174 
“good” and “bad” terrorists
750. These issues include a dynamic so that summits could fail on old 
conflicts and new quarrels
751. 
Another sensitive topic concerns the regulation of the migration flows, where the North and the South 
have different interests
752. In this regard, the European concern is explicitly expressed by the Presse in 
1998: The real threat of a mass immigration does not menace from the eastern, but the southern bor-
der where the per-capita income mount just a twelfth from the European’s and the discrepancy is con-
tinuously rising
753.  
The politicians continue with their policy in the Mediterranean although there is the awareness that 
conflicts can not be solved by projects, it is to hope that with the realisation of concrete actions some 
barriers can be overcome
754, as the Salzburger Nachrichten quoted the Commissioner for Foreign 
Affairs, Benita Ferrero-Waldner. This approach demonstrates the will to overcome dissociative issues 
in order to implement more associative elements.  
1.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The statements, which refer to the Mediterranean Policy, concern either a definitional approach, a 
reference to its functionality or an evaluation of the policy. 
In regard to the definition of the Mediterranean Policy, journalists of the Standard described the Bar-
celona Process as a big political impulse, which can be compared to the Helsinki Conference in 1975 
because it also offers great chances
755. At another time the Barcelona Process was denominated as 
promising instrument
756
, standing for the huge expectations which are repetitively expressed. Concern-
ing the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union, journalists describe the French approach as a dip-
lomatic Club Mediterranée
757 or an exclusive club758. When the proposal was implemented with the 
 
750 Comp. „(…) Streit um eine gemeinsame Definition des Terrors (…). Die Europäer wollen diese Unterscheidung 
zwischen "guten und schlechten Terroristen", wie es ein EU-Diplomat nannte, nicht hinnehmen.“ Schulze, 
(28.11.2005) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
751  Comp. „Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem Zank zu scheitern.“ Eberling, (29.11.2005) Salzbur-
ger Nachrichten. 
752  Comp. „Auch bei der Regelung der Migrationsströme sind die Interessen von Süd und Nord nicht völlig parallel.“ 
Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
753  Comp. „Denn die wahre Gefahr der Massenimmigration droht der Union nicht von ihrem östlichen, sondern von 
ihrem südlichen Rand, wo das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen gerade ein Zwölftel des EU-Durchschnitts beträgt - und diese 
Schere geht stetig weiter auf“ Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse. 
754  Comp. „"Konflikte werden durch Projekte nicht behoben. Das war ja leider beim Barcelona-Prozess schon so", räum-
te Ferrero-Waldner bei der Präsentation des Konzepts im EU-Parlament ein. Sie hofft aber, dass durch die Verwirkli-
chung konkreter Vorhaben so manche Barriere überwunden werden kann“ Stoiber, (26.05.2008) Salzburger Nach-
richten. 
755  Comp. „(…) ein "großer politischer Impuls" vom Kaliber der Helsinki-Konferenz 1975,(…)“ and „Trotzdem bietet 
der in Barcelona eingeleitete Prozess ähnlich große Chancen, wie sie die Helsinki-Konferenzen für Osteuropa hat-
ten.“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard. 
756  Comp. „(…) Barcelona-Prozess (…) ein vielversprechendes Instrument“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
757  Comp. „(…) diplomatischen ‘Club Méditerranée‘ “ Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard. 
758  Comp. „Ursprünglich als exklusiver Club geplant“ gs, (14.03.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
XXI         Discourse analysis 
 
175 
support of the other European countries, the public voices quoted Angela Merkel who stated that the 
Child will be called Mediterranean Union
759 and spoke of a historic760 event.  
The finality and function of the Barcelona Process is referred to quite distinctly over the years. In the 
beginning, in 1995, the Salzburger Nachrichten stated that the EU is confident that the reached in-
volvement of the people in the south can improve their economic situation
761. In the following years 
the opinions are more critical. Thus, the Presse quoted that the Barcelona declaration was signed at a 
moment when everyone was optimistic regarding the peace process. Today (meaning 1998), such a 
declaration would fall through. Neither the Arabs nor Israel would agree on it
762. In the consecutive 
year the Standard quoted George Joffe, who stated that the Barcelona Process was only introduced to 
keep the North African countries on distance to the EU
763. Another statement of 2002 implicitly im-
plied the European purpose of the European Union: Who enhances the economic development, the 
evolvement of a civil society and the cultural exchange not only protects himself from the immigration 
flows of the southern Mediterranean, but possibly brings the partners closer to each other – in a long-
term perspective maybe also with Israel
764. Although these statements illustrate a critical approach 
regarding the European Policy in the Mediterranean, they also express hope and expectations. Am-
bivalent positions are also expressed in respect of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process. The 
Presse stated on the one hand that despite the intention of the Barcelona Process, the economic gap 
between both sides of the Mediterranean increased to a considerable degree; on the other hand, it was 
conceded that without such a partnership the situation would probably be even worse765. 
In 2008, the Presse quoted the Slovenian EU-President Janez Jansa, who assured that the Barcelona 
Process will not be replaced
766, but rather up-graded767. With the implementation of the Mediterranean 
Union the statements refer not as critical as expected to the vision, which especially the French Presi-
dent Nicolas Sarkozy attempted to transmit. The Standard, for instance, stated that the Mediterranean 
 
759  Comp. „[Merkel] "Das Kind soll Mittelmeerunion genannt werden" Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse. 
760  Comp. „Historisch“ Hahn, (13.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
761  Comp. „Dennoch ist die EU zuversichtlich, daß die in Barcelona erzielte "Einbindung" den Menschen an der Süd-
flanke bessere wirtschaftliche Perspektive bieten kann“ Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
762  Comp.“ Die Barcelona-Erklärung wurde zu einem Zeitpunkt unterschrieben, als alle voller Hoffnung für den Frie-
densprozeß waren. Heute könnten wir sie nicht mehr abschließen. Weder die Araber noch Israel würden sie mittra-
gen“ Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse. 
763  Comp. „Der 1995 begonnene "Barcelona-Prozess" diene lediglich dazu, die nordafrikanischen Länder von der EU 
abzuschotten“ Adams, (18.10.1999) Standard. 
764  Comp. „Wer die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, den Aufbau einer Zivilgesellschaft und den demokratischen Austausch 
fördert, schützt nicht nur sich selbst vor Strömen von Immigranten aus dem südlichen Mittelmeerraum. Er bringt viel-
leicht auch seine Partner untereinander näher - längerfristig sogar mit Israel“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
765  Comp. „Seit Beginn der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft vor zehn Jahren unter dem Namen "Barcelona-Prozess" ist die 
wirtschaftliche Kluft zwischen beiden Seiten des Meeres gewachsen“ and „Trotzdem sprechen die Diplomaten nicht 
von einem Scheitern des Barcelona-Prozesses: Ohne die angeschobene Partnerschaft zwischen den beiden Regionen, 
die ja nun weiter mit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Hilfe ausgebaut werden soll, "wäre die Situation wohl noch 
schlimmer" Schulze, (29.11.2005) Presse. 
766  Comp. „Wir ersetzen keineswegs den Barcelona-Prozess, wir erweitern ihn nur", sagte Jansa“ Editorial, (14.03.2008) 
Presse. 
767  Comp. „Es ist ein Upgrade des Barcelona-Prozesses", so beurteilte der slowenische EU-Präsident Janez Jansa die 
neue Mittelmeer-Union“ Pöll, (15.03.2008) Presse. 
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peoples should, how Sarkozy full-bodied explained it, realise a “dream of peace and civilisation”
768. 
The Salzburger Nachrichten just quoted the French Foreign Minister, who stated that a dream for 800 
million people is becoming true. The Presse, on the other hand, regarded the French idea as a big 
dream, which is able to change the world, but stated in the same context that it is to prove whether the 
Mediterranean Union is just a new edition of the Barcelona Process or something new indeed. The 
reception of the finality and function of the Mediterranean Policy was ambivalent. The reporting con-
centrated on current events, quotes critical point of views and referred to the potential and expectations 
which lie within this policy. However, the press voices transmitted the impression that the Barcelona 
Process was not tangible and aloof of reality. 
More concrete are the references evaluating the Barcelona Process. The few positive arguments are 
opposed by numerous critical ones. A positive statement on the Barcelona Process was reported by the 
Standard in 2002, which quoted Gunnar Wiegand, the spokesman of the EU Foreign Minister Chris 
Patten, who stated that it is a main achievement of the Barcelona Process that it has overcome each 
Middle East Crisis since 1995
769. Another positive evaluation was stressed in connection with the dis-
cussion of the Mediterranean Union in the Salzburger Nachichten in 2007: If the Mediterranean Union 
as independent consortium is necessary still has to be proved. After all, many ties across the Mediter-
ranean have been established thanks to the Barcelona Process
770. Among the other references, some 
claims on the Barcelona Process contain a positive connotation. One of them was expressed in 2008 
concerning the discussion of the Mediterranean Union: the Barcelona Process ought to remain the 
lynchpin of the Mediterranean Policy of the twenty-seven countries
771. Another aspect was stressed by 
the Salzburger Nachrichten in respect of the summit in Paris in July 2008. It stated that if the Mediter-
ranean Union aspires to become more than the Barcelona Process, the real work begins only now
772. 
Although the basic tenor remains critical, the statements contain the perspective of a positive outcome. 
In the very beginning of the Barcelona Process, the result of the conference in Barcelona was very 
critically commented: The summit in Barcelona will not change anything of the dissent regarding the 
human rights among the participating countries, it will not take the security in the Middle East area 
one step further, it will not reach a footstep towards the apparently aspired free-trade zone, and in 
regard to bridging – for instance between a secular world here and a world, where religion and state 
 
768  Comp. „Die mediterranen Völker des Mittelmeeres sollen, wie er vollmundig erklärt, einen "Traum von Frieden und 
Zivilisation" verwirklichen“ Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard. 
769  Comp. „[Gunnar Wiegand, der Sprecher von EU-Außenkommissar Chris Patten] Es ist eine der Haupterrungenschaf-
ten des Barcelona-Prozesses, dass er seit 1995 noch jede Nahost-Krise überstanden hat" Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Stan-
dard. 
770  Comp. „Ob die "Mittelmeerunion" als eigenständiger Zusammenschluss überhaupt notwendig ist, muss sich freilich 
erst noch erweisen. Immerhin sind dank des 1995 begonnenen "Barcelona-Prozesses" der EU bereits zahlreiche Ban-
de über das Meer geknüpft worden, (…)“ Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
771  Comp. „Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angelpunkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben“ as/pra, 
(14.03.2008) Standard. 
772  Comp. „Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr werden soll, als es der "Barcelona-Prozess" war, der 13 Jahre lang ein 
Schattendasein führte - wenn sie mehr bieten soll als einen ehemaligen großen und internationalen Auftrieb, dann be-
ginnt die eigentliche Arbeit der Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten erst jetzt“ Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
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come even closer –,information campaigns and tolerance are required and not big conferences, where 
results never exceed the so-called “atmospheric gain” and beforehand written conclusions
773. There-
with, a positive outcome was more than questionable in the perception of the Austrian press. Over the 
following years the tonality in the Austrian press was reserved, almost distant. The descriptions stated 
that the Barcelona Process has stagnated774 and never gained momentum775 or that a lot within the 
Barcelona Process proceeds only tenaciously
776. Due to a lack of results, the Barcelona Process was 
also regarded as etiquette of failure
777. Additionally, the Presse stated that the Foreign Ministers re-
garded the Barcelona Process as dead, but this did not impede them to revive it hectically after the 
terror attacks in New York in 2001
778. In almost the same manner, severely questioning the policy so 
far, a journalist of the Presse asked in July 2008 if the Mediterranean Union is just a neat version of 
the Barcelona Process
779. 
The Austrian Press perceives the European Mediterranean Policy quite critically and often does not 
take it seriously. The Barcelona Process is conceded as a positive objective, but the realistic outcome 
is perceived very critically. 
1.1.3 References to a Mediterranean region 
In the Austrian press, the references to a Mediterranean region contain a connotation, which implies a 
conflictive conception. Thus, the statements referred to a southern Mediterranean region which has 
evolved to a point of attraction for potential terrorists
780 or which continuously develops to a frontier 
between the poor and the rich world
781. The latter statement was underlined by a quote of Josep 
 
773  Comp. „Der Gipfel in Barcelona hingegen wird nichts an den "Meinungsunterschieden" einiger Teilnehmer in Sachen 
Menschenrechte ändern; er wird nicht einen Beistrich im Bereich Nahost-Sicherheit weiterbringen; er wird nicht ei-
nen Schritt in Richtung angeblich angestrebter "Freihandelszone" setzen; und was den Brückenschlag betrifft - etwa 
zwischen einer säkularisierten Welt hier und einer, in der Verschmelzung von Staat und Religion immer drängender 
wird -, da braucht es Aufklärung und Toleranz mehr als Großkonferenzen, deren Ergebnis nie über den sogenannten 
"atmosphärischen Gewinn" und vorher festgeschriebene Schlußerklärungen hinausgeht“ Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Pres-
se. 
774  Comp. „(…) um einen Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen 
Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben, (…)“ as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard. 
775  Comp. „(…) "Barcelona Prozess". Das Programm kam nie richtig in Schwung, (…)“ gs, (14.03.2008) Salzburger 
Nachrichten. 
776  Comp. „Vieles geht nur zäh voran im Barcelona-Prozess“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
777  Comp. „(…) braucht der Barcelona-Prozeß aber dringendst Erfolge, um das Etikett "Mißerfolg" loszuwerden“ Kraus, 
(24.09.1998) Presse. 
778  Comp. „Fünf Jahre später wurde er von den EU-Außenministern für "tot" erklärt, was diese aber nicht daran hinderte, 
ihn 2001 nach den Anschlägen in New York hektisch wieder beleben zu wollen“ Rohrer, (17.03.2004) Presse. 
779  Comp. „Ist die Mittelmeer-Union nur eine behübschte Version des Barcelona-Prozesses?“ Pöll, (15.03.2008) Presse. 
780  Comp. „Die südliche Mittelmeerregion hat sich - seit 1999 auch mit starker finanzieller Hilfe Saudi-Arabiens - trotz 
(oder wegen) aller Repression der Regime dort zum Anziehungspunkt für potentielle Terroristen entwickelt“ Rohrer, 
(17.03.2004) Presse. 
781  Comp. „Das Mittelmeer wird immer mehr zu einer Grenze zwischen der armen und der reichen Welt“ Schulze, 
(29.11.2005) Presse. 
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Borell, the designated president of the European Parliament, who stated in 2005 that the Mediterra-
nean is nowadays the world’s biggest frontier of inequality
782.  
In the Salzburger Nachrichten, the Mediterranean was described as the place where two civilisations 
clash, the rich Europe and the, in comparison, poor North Africa, Christianity and Islam and where it 
is necessary to work together for peace
783. Also the Standard referred to the high sensitiveness of the 
region, implying the potential of conflict; it described the Mediterranean as an extremely sensitive 
gateway
784. 
At this point it is doubtable whether this conflictive connotation of the Mediterranean is an inherent 
position of the Austrian perception; it is to assume that beside the conflicts, which might belong to the 
reporting of Mediterranean Affairs, it has proceeded to the stylistic description of the journalists. 
1.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
The statements which have been assigned to the analytical category “purpose” distinguish between the 
purpose of the Barcelona Process, which is perceived externally, and the officially stated aim of the 
policy. 
1.2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy 
In the Austrian newspapers the references concerning the purpose of the Barcelona Process are linked 
to the European fear of insecurity, namely the immigration issue. 
In 1995, on the occasion of the Conference in Barcelona, the Standard stated that although it is not 
said aloud in Barcelona, it is the purpose of the rich North to establish a barrier against the flood of 
immigrations
785. The Salzburger Nachrichten quoted the Spanish King Juan Carlos I, who expressed 
his conviction that with the meeting in Barcelona a crucial challenge, the unity of the Mediterranean, 
is targeted in the interest of the future generations
786. It was further added that the purpose of this ini-
tiative is to stop mass-emigration and the militant Islamic fundamentalism
787. The press reported that 
in Barcelona, where the politicians aim to demonstrate unity concerning the issues peace, stability and 
 
782  Comp. „‘Das Mittelmeer ist heute weltweit die größte Grenze der Ungleichheit‘, bilanziert Josep Borrell, Präsident 
des Europaparlamentes“ Schulze, (29.11.2005) Presse. 
783  Comp. „Dort, wo zwei Zivilisationen zusammenstoßen, das reiche Europa und das vergleichsweise arme Nordafrika, 
Christentum und Islam, müsse gemeinsam für den Frieden gearbeitet werden“ Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger 
Nachrichten. 
784  Comp. „Die Mittelmeerunion sei eine wichtige Initiative an einer "überaus sensible Schnittstelle" der Weltpolitik, 
(…)“ Brändle/Moravec, (14.07.2008) Standard. 
785  Comp. „In Barcelona wird es nicht laut gesagt, aber dem reichen Norden geht es darum, Barrieren gegen eine Flut 
von Einwanderern zu errichten“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard. 
786  Comp. „Der spanische König Juan Carlos sagte zur Eröffnung der zweitägigen Beratungen, er sei überzeugt, dass mit 
dem Treffen eine entscheidende Aufgabe im Interesse der künftigen Generationen angepackt werde: die Einheit des 
Mittelmeer-Raumes“ Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
787  Comp. „Damit könnte die Massenemigration gestoppt und dem militanten islamischen Fundamentalismus auf Dauer 
der Nährboden entzogen werden“ Editorial, (28.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
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economy and let the cultural bridging appear very simple
788, it is the purpose to encourage the devel-
opment in the South via economic reforms and the planned free-trade area and to stop the flood of 
immigrants to Europe
789. Although there is a triple partnership, in a political, economic and social 
sense, formulated as a goal, the statements of the following years continue to refer to the threats which 
are perceived in Europe. Hence, the Standard stated in 2002 that the finality of the Barcelona Process 
is to enhance the economic and political development in the southern Mediterranean non member 
countries, not least because of the fear of the immigration flows from this region towards the North
790. 
In 2008, it said that among the prior-ranking purposes of the Barcelona Process ranges the combat 
against illegal immigration, terrorism and criminality as well as the enhancement of economic devel-
opment in the partner countries
791. In total, the main aim is to prevent wars792, as stated in the Sal-
zburger Nachrichten. 
Therewith, within the Austrian press the European intention of the Barcelona Process is clearly linked 
to the perceived threats from Europe. 
1.2.2 About the officially stated aim 
The statements which refer to the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy are less explicit 
regarding the European purpose and demonstrate the officially alleviated versions. Thus, the aims of 
the Barcelona Process are: 
• to establish a Euro-Med-free-trade-zone with 800 million inhabitants
793
 
• to initiate a peace process
794
 
• to encourage peace and prosperity
795
 




788  Comp. „Jetzt also Barcelona, wo sich die Staaten der Europäischen Union mit (nicht allen) Mittelmeeranrainern 
treffen, um Einigkeit über Sicherheit, Stabilität und Wirtschaft zu demonstrieren und nebst her den kulturellen Brü-
ckenschlag wie einen Klacks aussehen zu lassen“ Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Presse. 
789  Comp. „Der Norden setzt den Akzent dafür auf die wirtschaftlichen Aspekte des Treffens: Bis zum Jahr 2010 soll ein 
Freihandelsabkommen die Grenzen der Mittelmeerstaaten für intensiven Austausch öffnen. Daraus soll dann die Ent-
wicklung des Südens folgen, die der Flut von Einwanderern nach Europa Einhalt bieten kann“ tau, (27.11.1995) 
Presse. 
790  Comp. „[BP] Sein Ziel ist, die wirtschaftliche - und politische - Entwicklung in den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer-
staaten zu fördern - nicht zuletzt auch aus Angst vor Migrationsströmen aus der Region in Richtung Norden“ Wo-
jahn, (28.02.2002) Standard. 
791  Comp. „(…) Barcelona Prozess (…), zu dessen vorrangigen Zielen die Bekämpfung von illegaler Zuwanderung, 
Terrorismus und Kriminalität sowie die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung in den Partnerländern zählen“ 
Moravec, (11.03.2008) Standard. 
792  Comp. „(...) und es gelte, Kriege zu verhindern“ Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
793  Comp. „(…), soll ebenfalls einen Prozeß einleiten, der bis zum Jahr 2010 eine Euro-Med-Freihandelszone mit 800 
Millionen Einwohnern bringen soll“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard. 
794  Comp. „Die EU-Mittelmeerkonferenz solle dagegen einen Friedensprozeß auslösen“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) Standard. 
795  Comp. „(…) Verabschiedung einer Deklaration zur Förderung von Frieden und Wohlstand sowie des Planes der 
Errichtung einer Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010 (…)“ Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
796  Comp. „Bis zum Jahr 2010 ist die Schaffung einer euro-mediterranen Freihandelszone geplant. Unabhängig davon 
sollen mit den 12 eingeladenen Ländern EU-Assoziierungsverträge abgeschlossen werden“ Stackl, (27.11.1995) 
Standard. 
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• to change many economic, social and cultural aspects to the better
797
 
In the discussion of the Mediterranean Union the discourse in the press also varied. Thus, the Standard 
stated that the Mediterranean Union has ambitious plans, like building a highway from Morocco to 
Egypt or the ecological decontamination of the Mediterranean Sea
798. The Salzburger Nachrichten 
reported that the plans of the Mediterranean Union are immense799. It further stated that the dream, 
referring to the diction of Nicolas Sarkozy, foresees a joint decontamination of the sea, an intensifica-
tion of the entrepreneurial cooperation and that the main threats of internal security, such as uncon-
trolled migration, drug traffic and terrorism are faced together
800. The Presse, on the other hand, just 
stated that it is the aim to revive the stagnated Barcelona Process801. 
The officially stated aims are taken as they are, namely as a make-up for the public. Criticism is ex-
pressed, and not too less, in the context of the Mediterranean Policy. 
1.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
The statements allocated to the analytical category identity refer by some means or other to the Euro-
pean Union because it is the aim to challenge its identity, both in the context of its political side, its 
internal struggle and its role perception. 
1.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition and internal struggle 
There are many distinctive references to the political approach of the European Union; moreover, 
nearly the same amount of references can be found that manifest the internal struggle which Europe 
experiences in the context of Mediterranean Affairs. 
At the beginning of the Barcelona Process the Standard referred to a European vision of a common 
economic space for 800 million consumers
802
, while the Salzburger Nachrichten postulated that the 
European Union pays for its vital interest concerning stability at its entry door with a transfer of bil-
lions and the opening of its markets. On the other hand, the EU assures itself a better economic acces-
 
797  Comp. „Ihr Projekt der Euromed-Kooperation soll wirtschaftlich, sozial, kulturell und damit auf lange Sicht auch 
politisch in den Staaten südlich des Mittelmeeres manches zum Besseren verändern“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
798  Comp. „Die (…) Mittelmeer-Union hat ehrgeizige Pläne. Eine Autobahn von Marokko bis Ägypten zählt ebenso 
dazu wie die ökologische Sanierung des Mittelmeers, (…)“ Moravec, (21.05.2008) Standard. 
799  Comp. „Die Pläne der "Union für das Mittelmeer", (…), sind gewaltig“ Stoiber, (26.05.2008) Salzburger Nachrich-
ten. 
800  Comp. „Der "Traum" sieht vor, dass die Anrainerstaaten sich gemeinsam um die "Entgiftung" des Meeres kümmern 
werden, dass sie ihre unternehmerische Zusammenarbeit intensivieren und dass sie gemeinsam gegen die vermeint-
lich größten Gefahren für die Innere Sicherheit kämpfen werden: unkontrollierte Migration, Drogenhandel und Terro-
rismus“ Hahn, (13.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
801  Comp. „(...) ein Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barcelona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mit-
telmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben“ Editorial, (13.03.2008) Presse. 
802  Comp. „Europa setzt dem die Vision eines gemeinsamen Wirtschaftsraumes für 800 Millionen Verbraucher entge-
gen“ Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard. 
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sion and continuous energy supply
803. A political vision with concrete intentions is expressed by these 
two newspapers. The Presse accentuated its criticism regarding the implementation of the policy. 
Thus, it stressed the opinion that big conferences happen more often when insufficient results are de-
plored and suggests that, even if it is not altruistic, small conferences would be more efficient
804. This 
argument was underlined by a quote of the Parisian Professor Kebabdjian, who attests the European 
concept a lack of ideas
805.  
Therewith, the Austrian public discourse certified the European Policy in its initial phase not only a 
lack of ideas, a spare outcome and a marginal form of implementation, but also a concrete intention. In 
the upcoming years, the public opinion in Austrian did not change notably. In 1998, the Presse 
stressed that the denomination “fortress Europe” is not willingly applied, neither internally nor exter-
nally; notwithstanding, it is the fear of migrations flows from poor neighbouring countries which is the 
motor behind many initiatives - this is explicitly demonstrated in the Barcelona Process
806 and that 
within the EU nobody cherished the illusion of its efficiency
807. Therefore, the Presse attested the 
European vision a rejection in terms of lack of commitment and motivation to succeed with the proper 
policy. In 2004, a similar position was stated: one has forgotten how many people hope that the Barce-
lona Process makes a start; if the European Union did not tranquilise itself with some million of Eu-
ros, one would have been more decisive regarding the entry of radicals in Europe
808. A lack of initia-
tive and a lack of consciousness about the own policy was also stressed by the Standard in 2008 in the 
context of the Mediterranean Union: a new project including new institutions will be launched in 
Europe, although many member states do not know the sense of the cause
809. The new policy direction 
is attested a pompous staging, but with a lot of improvisation behind the scenery810.  
 
803  Comp. „Die EU bezahlt ihr vitales Interesse an Stabilität vor der Haustür mit einem Milliardentransfer und einer 
Öffnung seiner Märkte. Andererseits sicherte sich die EU verbesserten wirtschaftlichen Zugang und laufende Ener-
gieversorgung“ Editorial, (29.11.1995) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
804  Comp. „Es hat den Anschein, als fänden internationale Großkonferenzen umso häufiger statt, je eindringlicher ihre 
mangelnden Ergebnisse beklagt werden (...)Nun ist fraglos das Bemühen Europas, vor allem in Nahost den Wirt-
schaftsaufbau zu puschen, ein hehres (wenngleich nicht selbstloses), das in kleineren Konferenzen weit effizienter 
vorangebracht wird“ Schwarz, (27.11.1995) Presse. 
805  Comp. „Für (…) Pariser Professor Kebabdjian aber beweist das Konzept nur Ideenarmut: ‚Es gibt kein europäisches 
Projekt für die armen Völker, die sich an Europas Türen drängen.‘“ tau, (27.11.1995) Presse. 
806  Comp. „Das Schlagwort von der "Festung Europa" wird nirgends gerne gehört - weder innerhalb der EU noch außer-
halb. Dennoch aber ist die Angst vor Migrationswellen aus armen Nachbarländern die treibende Kraft hinter vielen 
Initiativen der Gemeinschaft - und dies zeigt sich nirgends deutlicher als im "Barcelona-Prozeß", (...)“ Kraus, 
(24.09.1998) Presse. 
807  Comp. „Trotz dieses Vertrauensvorschusses für den Barcelona-Prozess macht sich aber auch in EU-Kreisen niemand 
Illusionen über die Wirksamkeit dieses Instruments für den Frieden in Nahost“ Kraus, (24.09.1998) Presse. 
808  Comp. „Dort hat man vergessen, wie viele Menschen darauf hofften, dass der Barcelona-Prozess in Gang kommt. 
Hätte sich die EU nicht selbst mit ein paar Millionen Euro beruhigt, wäre man gegen das Einsickern der Radikalen 
nach Europa entschlossener vorgegangen“ Rohrer, (17.03.2004) Presse. 
809  Comp. „Ein neues Projekt samt neuer Institution wird in der EU aus der Taufe gehoben, ohne dass den meisten Mit-
gliedstaaten der Sinn der Sache klar wäre“ as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard. 
810  Comp. „Eine pompöse Inszenierung, hinter den Kulissen aber viel Improvisation: (…)“ Moravec/Brändle, 
(14.07.2008) Standard. 
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Concerning interior European tendencies, two statements, which refer to the interest of a single Mem-
ber State, have been identified in regard to the Barcelona Process. It was reported that Spain wanted to 
use its EU-Presidency to realise its project of a EU-Mediterranean cooperation and that in 2002 it 
was worried about the success of the efforts
811. This demonstrates nothing less than that Spain claims 
to be the initiation force for the Barcelona Process. 
The references, which indicate the distinctive positions of the member states regarding the Mediterra-
nean Policy, were especially numerous in the discussion of the Mediterranean Union, because it pro-
voked a trial of strength, particularly between France and Germany. During its EU- Presidency, 
France wants to organise a foundation summit in Marseilles in 2008 in order to overtake the so-called 
Barcelona Process of the EU
812. Therewith, it was implicitly stated that France wanted to establish its 
own Mediterranean Policy which apparently provoked certain reactions. The French idea of an exclu-
sive club of Mediterranean States failed due to Germany
813. The dissent about the French solo attempt 
was not harmed by the fact that Sarkozy was supported by Italy and Spain and that the Spanish Presi-
dent Zapatero tried to calm the other states, saying that the proposal comes from the EU and serves the 
EU
814. The Standard stated quite unvarnished that in reality the fifty-three year old Frenchman dreams 
of becoming a great power and that it is his purpose to position his country better internationally by 
means of the Mediterranean Union
815. Due to the pressure of Berlin, Sarkozy had to curtail his pro-
posal considerably
816. The quarrel concerning the direction of the Mediterranean Policy comprised a 
strong fragmentation potential and, according to the stated view in the Austrian press, the internal 
struggle for a common position and the limitation of the European Union were clearly manifested. 
Thus, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel accomplished that all European Member States are able 
to participate in the Mediterranean Union. The Presse quoted Angela Merkel, saying that Europe has 
become more complicated and that it is not sufficient anymore that Germany and France agree on 
certain issues. However, if they disagree it will be difficult in Europe to reach an agreement
817. Sa-
 
811  Comp. „Dennoch bangen die Spanier, die 1995 in Barcelona das Projekt der EU-Mittelmeerkooperation auf den Weg 
gebracht hatten, dieses Mal um den Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
812  Comp. „Frankreich will während seiner EU-Ratspräsidentschaft im Juli 2008 in Marseille einen Gründungsgipfel der 
Mittelmeer-Union organisieren und damit wohl den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess der EU überholen“ Editorial, 
(24.01.2007) Standard. 
813  Comp. „Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber 
ablehnte (...)“ as/pra, (14.03.2008) Standard. 
814  Comp. „‘Mittelmeerunion‘ heißt das politische Projekt von Nicolas Sarkozy, dem sich nun in einem gemeinsamen 
"Aufruf von Rom", der italienische Ministerpräsident Romano Prodi und Spaniens Regierungschef José Luis Zapate-
ro angeschlossen haben. Aber dieses Vorhaben löst bei manchen nördlichen EU-Mitgliedern nicht wenig Argwohn 
aus“ and „Die Initiative, so beruhigt Spaniens Ministerpräsident Zapatero die Zweifler, "kommt aus der EU und dient 
der EU" Schulze, (22.12.2007) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
815  Comp. „In Wahrheit hegt der 53-jährige Franzose vor allem Großmachtträume. Mit der Mittelmeerunion will er sein 
Land international besser positionieren“ Brändle, (11.07.2008) Standard. 
816  Comp. „(…) musste Sarkozy sein Vorhaben besonders auf Druck Berlins gewaltig zusammenstreichen“ gs, 
(14.03.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
817  Comp. „[Merkel] "Europa ist komplizierter geworden, und es reicht nicht mehr aus, dass Deutschland und Frankreich 
etwas vereinbaren. Aber wenn beide Länder sich nicht einig sind, wird es in Europa schwierig, eine Einigung zu be-
kommen“.“ Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Presse. 
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kozy also admitted that Europe can not afford a disagreement between Germany and France818. These 
examples tell more about the real power of the national states and the limitations of Europe than any 
other statement. So, Germany prevailed over France, but complied in the denomination of the revived 
Barcelona Process
819. Although other European politicians, like the Austrian Chancellor Alfred 
Gusenbauer warned that the Union for the Mediterranean must not become a separate event to the 
Barcelona Process
820, and Jean Claude Junker expressed his doubt by stating that it still needs to be 
proved which surplus value the Mediterranean Union might have over the Barcelona Process
821, the 
Austrian press concordantly reported on the diplomatic victory of Nicolas Sarkozy in Paris. For exam-
ple, the Salzburger Nachrichten stated that at the foundation summit of the Mediterranean Union in 
Paris Sarkozy achieved something that appeared to be impossible for a long time: after overcoming 
all barriers within Europe, he united nearly all Heads of State of the Mediterranean ambit and the 
European Union
822.  
Although the Austrian press is quite critically regarding European initiatives in the Mediterranean, and 
reports the internal struggle unvarnished, the tonality concerning the French breath to achieve its am-
bitions has the aftertaste of being impressed. 
1.3.2 The role of the European Union 
The European Union is perceived as being not proactive enough and weak, which is indicated by the 
following statements: 
• The European Union must not longer ignore that there is a time bomb ticking beyond the 
Mediterranean Sea 
823. 




818  Comp. „[Sarkozy] "Europa kann sich keine Kluft zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich leisten“." Vieregge, 
(04.03.2008) Presse. 
819  Comp. „Merkel setzte sich in der Sache durch, fügte sich aber bei der Namensgebung“ Vieregge, (04.03.2008) Pres-
se. 
820  Comp. „Bundeskanzler Gusenbauer warnte, die "Union für das Mittelmeer" dürfe keine "Separatveranstaltung" wer-
den“ Editorial, (13.03.2008) Presse. 
821  Comp. „[Jean-Claude Juncker] Man müsse sehen, welchen Mehrwert eine "Mittelmeer-Union" im Vergleich zum 
bestehenden Barcelona-Prozess in der Zusammenarbeit der Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten habe“ Editorial, (13.03.2008) 
Presse. 
822  Comp. „Keine Frage: Nicolas Sarkozy hat am Sonntag in Paris einen diplomatischen Erfolg davon getragen. Mit dem 
Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeerunion ist ihm etwas gelungen, was lange unerreichbar zu sein schien: Nachdem er die 
(hohen) Hindernisse innerhalb der Europäischen Union überwunden hatte, hat er fast alle Staats- und Regierungs-
chefs des Mittelmeerraums plus jene aus den EU-Ländern zusammengebracht“ Hahn, (14.07.2008) Salzburger Nach-
richten. 
823  Comp. „Die EU darf nicht länger ignorieren, dass jenseits des Mittelmeers eine "Zeitbombe" tickt“ Egger, 
(05.04.1997) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
824  Comp. „Wenn das Projekt keine Fata Morgana bleiben soll, muß die EU aber auch bereit sein, ihre Märkte für den 
Süden zu öffnen“ Stackl, (29.11.1995) Standard. 
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• The EU can not reach a quick peace between the Israelis and the Arabs. To do so, it is too 
weak externally
825. 
• Although there is no military threat, the situation in the Mediterranean states is highly signifi-
cant for the European domestic security. After all, Europe depends on the raw material supply 
of its southern neighbours.
826  
The last mentioned statement indirectly forces the European Union to become more active. A more 
explicit example of a mission demand was expressed in an article, published in the Salzburger 
Nachrichten, which stated that progress only can be facilitated in combination with democracy and 
therefore the Mediterranean Union ought to strengthen the civil societies in the South and involve 
them in the process
827. Whether correct or incorrect, the thought remains euro-centric because it im-
plies that via knowledge and experience one knows what to do. Can the European way to guarantee 
and assure democracy be applied to the Islamic world, which corresponds to another reality and other 
dynamics? 
On the other hand, Europe is ascribed an initiator role. The Standard quoted Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
who stressed that the most important issue is the achievement of giving a crucial regional initiative 
new political impetus
828. Also the former Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik referred to the 




2 .   France  
France not only belongs to the strong political forces within Europe, it also constitutes a decisive 
player in Mediterranean Affairs, even more since the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. 
The newspapers Le Monde and Le Figaro are supra-national quality papers, which represent both the 
centre-left (Le Monde) and the centre-right (Le Figaro). In total, 151 statements have been considered, 
80 of them can be assigned to le Monde and 71 to le Figaro. This indicates that the distribution per 
newspaper is quite even:  
 
 
825  Comp. „Die EU kann zwischen Israelis und Arabern nicht den schnellen Frieden schaffen. Dazu ist sie außenpolitisch 
viel zu schwach“ Wojahn, (22.04.2002) Standard. 
826  Comp. „Es drohe zwar keine militärische Gefahr, doch die Verhältnisse in den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes seien 
von großer Bedeutung für die innere Sicherheit Europas. Immerhin sei Europa von den Rohstofflieferungen der süd-
lichen Nachbarn abhängig“ Adams, (18.10.1999) Standard. 
827  Comp. „Doch Fortschritt kann immer nur in Kombination mit Demokratie funktionieren. Deswegen muss die Mit-
telmeerunion darauf bestehen, die Zivilgesellschaften im Süden zu stärken und in den Prozess einzubeziehen“ Hahn, 
(14.07.2008) Salzburger Nachrichten. 
828  Comp. „Ferrero-Waldner: Das Wichtigste ist, dass es uns jetzt gelungen ist, eine ganz wichtige regionale Initiative 
mit einem neuen politischen Impuls zu versehen“ Standard Interview, (11.07.2008) Standard. 
829  Comp. „Eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten außerhalb der EU ist sicher wünschens-
wert. Aber um das zu erreichen, hat die EU bereits eine Reihe von Instrumenten wie die Nachbarschaftspolitik und 
den Barcelona-Prozess“ Moravec, (11.03.2008) Standard. 
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FRANCE number of articles per category and newspaper 
 le Monde le Figaro Total 
Expression 41 37 78 
Purpose 10 6 16 
Identity 29 28 57 
 80 71 151 
 
From the total amount of statements, the majority refers to the analytical category “expression” (78), 
followed by “identity” (57) and “purpose” (16). The detailed illustration including the sub-categories 
is shown in the following table: 
 
FRANCE number of statements per category 
the „other“ ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 4 8 12 54 78 
purpose aim    
Purpose 7 9   16 
EU     
Identity 
57    57 
 
The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern: 
 
FRANCE distribution of the statements per category and year 
 90 95 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 2 6  1 3 14 1 4 3 6 17  3 18 78 
Purpose  3   1 3   1 1 4   3 16 
Identity 4 1 1  1 5   5 5 4  10 21 57 
total 6 10 1 1 5 22 1 4 9 12 25  13 42 151 
 
The peak years concerning the number of considered statements are 1995, 2000, 2005 and, above all, 
2008; 1995 was the initiation year, 2000 was the year when Marseilles hosted the conference of the 
Foreign Ministers, 2005 was the tenth anniversary and 2008 was the year when France dominated the 
events taking place within the scope of the Barcelona Process. 
2.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
Within the French press 78 statements could be assigned to the analytical category “expression”. They 
refer to the “other”, to associative and dissociative forces within the partnership and to the Mediterra-
nean region; additionally, they indicate the public perception of the Mediterranean Policy.  
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2.1.1 The view of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements of the partnership 
Only few of the statements dealing with one of these sub-categories explicitly refer to the “other”; 
most of the statements concern associative and dissociative elements of the Euro-Mediterranean coop-
eration. This is the reason why both are conjointly regarded. 
An associative statement, which was stressed in November 1995 in le Monde, is the following: The 
Europeans, particularly France, argued that the new partnership does not pretend to become a new 
forum for the advancement of peace between Israelis and Arabs; these assurances were necessary, as, 
for one part, Syria and the Lebanon would not have assisted peace negotiations and, for the other 
part, in order to reassure the United States, which perceived the conference in Barcelona as a compet-
ing initiative. This precaution was also necessary to guarantee the long-term project a minimum of 
success.830 The associative character lies in the considerateness concerning the tensions among the 
participants and the external relations. Foresightedness is one of the basal requirements to assure a 
fructuous cooperation. 
Dissociative forces repetitively occur in the context of national moods. The most cited example consti-
tutes Libya, which follows a kind of a hot-cold policy towards the European Union and its Mediterra-
nean approach. It occurred in 2000 that Libya officially announces to boycott the Euro-Mediterranean 
conference and appeals to other Arab countries to follow its example
831. In 2003, it was stated that 
Gaddafi anew expressed his refusal with ostentation because he was the only one who did not applaud 
after the speech of Chirac; in this speech, Chirac stressed the providential circumstance of France to 
be able to establish a relation of confidence with Libya
832. Libya is up to now the only country which 
has continuously, but temporarily varying in its decisiveness, rejected the European approach towards 
cooperation. Another example was reported in 2000 in le Figaro, when a Turkish representative 
stressed that in reality the only and unique goal of Turkey constitutes the integration into the Euro-
pean Union
833. The distinctive national motivations for participating or not participating in the Barce-
lona Process are numerous and legitimate, but they indicate dissociative forces. In 1995, le Monde 
quoted an Algerian representative under the premise to accept his opinion as true that most countries 
in the southern Mediterranean were looking for the highest possible benefit of the new cooperation 
 
830  Comp. « Les Européens, la France en particulier, disent sur tous les tons que ce nouveau partenariat ne vise pas à 
s’ouvrir un nouveau forum pour favoriser l’instauration de la paix israélo-arabe. Ces assurances étaient nécessaires, 
d’une part pour que la Syrie et le Liban dont les négociations de paix avec Israël n’avancent pas acceptent de venir, et 
d’autre part pour rasséréner les Etats-Unis, qui voyaient dans la conférence de Barcelone une initiative concurrente de 
la leur. Cette précaution était aussi nécessaire pour garantir un minimum de succès à un projet à long terme » Naim, 
(28.11.1995) Le Monde. 
831  Comp. « Alors que la Libye a officiellement annoncé hier qu’elle boycottait la conférence euro-méditerranéenne 
(Euromed) et a appelé les pays arabes à ne pas y participer (…) » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro.  
832  Comp. « Le colonel Khadafi s’est à nouveau distingué en refusant de s’exprimer et en étant le seul à ne pas applaudir 
le discours du président Chirac qui venait d’exprimer le souhait de la France  ‘de pouvoir établir une relation de 
confiance avec la Libye’ » Rousselin, (06.12.2003) Le Figaro. 
833  Comp. « ‘Notre principal but, pour ne pas dire unique, c’est l’intégration à l’Union européenne’, affirme Cavit Dag-
das, secrétaire d’État au Trésor turc » Bele, (17.11.2003) Le Figaro. 
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with the European Union
834. The fact that the interest decreased over the years was indicated by the 
low participation of Arab countries at the anniversary conference in 2005. Some argued that this was 
the fault of the British presidency
835, others stated that the general indifference836 reached an impres-
sive level. 
In 2008, when the revitalisation of the Barcelona Process was commonly decided, le Monde stated that 
the perspective of peace in the Middle East has moved far away and that the prosperity gap between 
the North and the South has increased
837. This clearly points out that the dissociative forces are far 
from being diminished and that they will give source to further individual national concerns. 
2.1.2 References to a Mediterranean region 
The French press is concerned with the tangibility of the Mediterranean; this is proved by the number 
of statements which could be identified in this context. 
The discourse illustrates the struggle for a definition and the continuous effort to relate the Mediterra-
nean to France. In 1990, five years before the Barcelona Process was launched, le Monde stressed that 
if the Mediterranean is the garden of Europe, there will be no security in the common house, if there is 
no security in the garden
838. Further, the Mediterranean today is not much larger than the Rhine and 
the occidental basin constitutes a huge basis of employment; the demographic, economic, social and 
cultural development in the Maghreb renders more and more our dependency
839. Thus, already before 
the initiation of the Barcelona Process and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterraneann paradigm, 
the French press dealt with the conception of the Mediterranean. This did not change in the early years 
of the Barcelona Process. In 1999, Le Figaro stated that the Mediterranean is a paradox place, which 
separates and unites at the same time through wars and exchange
840. The same article referred to 
Amin Maalouf, an Egyptian journalist and author living in Paris, who perceives that in the Mediterra-
nean two principal lines, which fracture the word, coincide: “The line which separates the industrial 
world from the third world, and the line which separates the Occidental-Christian world from the 
 
834  Comp. « S’il est vrai, comme l’a souligné un diplomate algérien, que chaque pays du sud et de la Méditerranée voit 
midi à sa porte et cherche à bénéficier au maximum de cette nouvelle coopération avec l’UE » Bole/Naim, 
(30.11.1995) Le Monde. 
835  Comp. « Ce premier sommet de l’histoire du partenariat euro-méditerranéen lancé en 1995 à Barcelone a été entaché 
par le faible niveau de représentation arabe et marqué par les frictions entre pays européens. Ces tensions ont été avi-
vées du fait de la conduite des travaux par la présidence britannique, jugée particulièrement rigide par plusieurs délé-
gations, ont indiqué plusieurs sources » Editorial, (28.11.2005) Le Monde. 
836  Comp. « Ce qui est encore plus impressionnant dans ce naufrage, c’est qu’il se produit dans une indifférence quasi 
générale »Fabre, (03.12.2005) Le Monde. 
837  Comp. « Les perspectives de paix au Proche-Orient se sont éloignées. Les écarts de richesse entre le Nord et le Sud se 
sont accrus » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde. 
838  Comp. « Si la Méditerranée est le jardin de l’Europe, il n’y a pas de sécurité pour la « maison commune » s’il n’y pas 
de sécurité dans le jardin » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Figaro. 
839  Comp. « La Méditerranée n’est pas beaucoup plus large aujourd’hui que le Rhin. Son bassin occidental constitue de 
fait un seul et même gigantesque bassin d’emploi. L’évolution démographique, économique, sociale et culturelle du 
Maghreb nous en rend de plus en plus dépendants » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde. 
840  Comp. « La Méditerranée est un lieu paradoxal qui sépare et rassemble à la fois un nœud de guerres mais aussi 
d’échanges » Larminat, (29.07.1999) Le Figaro. 





. The description of Miguel Nadal, the Spanish Minister for European Af-
fairs, was quoted in le Figaro: The Mediterranean continues to be a sea of division rather than a sea 
of integration
842
. Therewith, the dissociative character, which is often stressed in the context of the 
Mediterranean, also plays a role in the French press. 
Other statements concern the visionary and fateful connotations which are mostly expressed by politi-
cians; however, they are published by the newspapers and therefore form part of their discourse. 
Le Monde published the perception of the Mediterranean of Chris Patten, European Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs between 1999 and 2004: It is mare nostrum, a sea between countries, a matrix of 
grand civilisations, a place of exchange and division with the South
843. The most flaming speech about 
the fateful connotation of the Mediterranean was held by Nicolas Sarkozy. It was stated by le Monde 
that he largely exaggerated the challenges: it is there, where we win or loose everything844. In 2008, le 
Monde quoted from Sarkozy’s discourse, stating that he is right that the ‘clash of civilisations’ men-
aces the rapprochement between the North and the South
845. In addition, the French Foreign Minister 
was given the voice in le Monde in 2008, stating that the Mediterranean is in the centre of all huge 
problems of this century; development, migration, peace, dialogue among civilisations, access to wa-
ter and energy, environment, climate change: it’s in the south of Europe where our future is put at 
stake
846.  
In summary, it can be stated that the discourse within the French press concerning the Mediterranean 
region is predominated by political voices, using the media to transport the fateful connotation of the 
Mediterranean in order to create a positive public atmosphere for the legitimation of their policy. 
2.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
Statements regarding the European Mediterranean Policy within the French press concern both, defini-
tional references and evaluative statements. 
 
841  Comp. « Elle concentre deux de principales lignes de fracture du monde, explique Amin Maalouf : « La ligne qui 
sépare le monde industrialisé des pays du tiers-monde, et la ligne qui sépare l’Occident chrétien du monde arabo-
musulman. » » Larminat, (29.07.1999) Le Figaro. 
842  Comp. « « La Méditerranée continue à être une mer de divisions plutôt qu’une mer d’intégration » a admis le ministre 
espagnole des Affaires européennes, Miguel Nadal »Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.  
843  Comp. « Elle est mare nostrum, mer à l’intérieur des terres, matrice de grandes civilisations, lieu d’échange et ligne 
de partage avec le Sud » Patten, (14.11.2000) Le Monde. 
844  Comp. « Et le président français de dramatiser l’enjeu : « Ici [en Méditerranée], nous gagnerons tout ou nous per-
drons tout. » Beaugé/ Ridet, (25.10.2007) Le Monde. 
845  Comp. « M. Sarkozy a souligné avec raison, dans son discours de Tanger, en octobre 2007, que le monde méditerra-
néen n’a pas cessé, depuis des siècles, d’être « écartelé » entre « l’esprit des croisades » et « l’esprit du dialogue ». 
Aujourd’hui, les divisions, voire les haines, l’emportent sur les solidarités. Le « choc des civilisations » menace le 
rapprochement entre le Nord et le Sud. Le Sud lui-même est déchiré. Le conflit israélo-palestinien est l’expression 
exacerbée de ces discordes, dont la persistance a fait échouer les précédents efforts de coopération » Ferenczi, 
(21.03.2008) Le Monde. 
846  Comp. « La Méditerranée est au cœur de toutes les grandes problématiques de ce début de siècle. Développement, 
migrations, paix, dialogue des civilisations, accès à l’eau et la énergie, environnement, changement climatique : c’est 
au sud de l’Europe que notre avenir se joue » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde. 
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The definitions range from an unemotional description like another of the economic and political pro-
grammes
847 to the ironic comparison of an economic manna848, or simply to an innovative process849, 
an ambitious project850, an original initiative851 and, to the truly outstanding accomplishment that it 
constitutes the only space of cooperation where Israel and Arab countries meet
852. The singular char-
acter concerning the political cooperation level between Israel and the Arab countries is repetitively 
stated: the Barcelona Process constitutes the only institutional frame which permits Israelis and Pales-
tinians to meet
853. It was further stated in this article of 2005 that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
defines an ambitious and also coherent policy; it is based on intense economic, political, historic and 
cultural ponds, which have the aim to advance the common project of development and cooperation
854. 
At the time of the summit in Paris, the Mediterranean Union was regarded as Union, which will be a 
multilateral partnership based on the shared political will to revitalise the efforts to transform the 
Mediterranean into a space of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity
855. The quoted statement 
of Bernard Kouchner, saying that the summit of Paris constituted an historic success856 was at least not 
differently commented by the French press. There was a positive tenor about the French success in 
respect of the high participation of Heads of State in July 2008: for the first time, all the countries 
bordering the Mediterranean have been united at a summit; from the forty-four invited Heads of State, 
forty-one turned up
857. With the exception of the Libyan president Mummer Al- Gaddafi all accepted 
the French invitation
 858. Beside these statements, there were only few positive evaluations of the 
European Mediterranean Policy. The only notable fact, which was at least partly positive, concerned 
 
847  Comp. « Le processus de Barcelone (…) outre des programmes économiques et politiques (…) » Marminat, 
(29.07.1999) Le Figaro. 
848  Comp. „le partenariat euro-méditerranéen reste essentiellement perçu comme une manne économique » Barluet, 
(30.11.2005) Le Figaro. 
849  Comp. « (...) le processus se veut novateur » Tuqoui, (26.11.1995) Le Monde. 
850  Comp. « (...) annonçant l’ambitieux projet d’  « un partenariat global » euro-méditerranéen (…) » Cressard, 
(15.11.1998) Le Monde. 
851  Comp. „Une initiative originale voyait enfin le jour : le partenariat euro-méditerranéen » Fabre, (03.12.2005) Le 
Monde. 
852  Comp. « (…) la Conférence euro-méditerranéenne reste le seul espace de coopération où l’on puisse à la fois ren-
contrer Israël et les pays arabes » Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro.  
853  Comp. « Barcelone constitue le seul cadre institutionnel permettant aux Israéliens et aux Palestiniens de siéger en-
semble » Patrie, (15.03.2005) Le Figaro.  
854  Comp. « Le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen, (…) définit une politique ambitieuse mais fondamentalement cohérente, 
en s’appuyant sur l’intensité des liens économiques, politiques, historiques et culturels, afin de faire avancer un projet 
commun de développement et de coopération » Charrette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro. 
855  Comp. « (…) l’Union sera « un partenariat multilatéral » basé sur « une volonté politique partagée de revitaliser les 
efforts visant à transformer la Méditerranée en un espace de paix, démocratie, coopération et prospérité » Nou-
gayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde. 
856  Comp. « Kouchner) (…) le sommet sera un « succès historique » » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde. 
857  Comp. « (…) pour la première fois, tous les pays riverains de la Méditerranée sont regroupés dans un sommet. Sur 44 
chefs d’État de gouvernement conviés, 41 devraient être présents » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde ; and 
also « Pour la première fois de l’histoire de la Méditerranée, une quarantaine de pays de l’Union européenne et de la 
Méditerranée se rassemblent le 13 juillet à Paris au plus haut niveau, représentés par leur chef d’État ou gouverne-
ment » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde. 
858  Comp. «Les chefs d’État ou de gouvernement de touts les pays d’Europe et du pourtour méditerranéen ont accepté 
l’invitation française à l’issue de difficiles tractations. Tous, à l’exception du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi » 
Oberlé, (13.07.2008) Le Figaro. 
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the matter that despite the conflicts, the cooperation continued859; in other words, it had survived860. 
Despite these undeniable difficulties, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership had not died861.  
 However, the overall tenor attested the Barcelona Process a meagre result:  
• The difficulty of the project is decisive for its ambition.862 
• The Barcelona Process is basically a failure in regard to its initial ambitions (…).
863
 
• [Anniversary] The evaluation is at least ambiguous
864. 
• The results of the Euro-Med are rather meagre
865




• [Conference in Marseille, after the Paris Summit in 2008] In three months nothing, or nearly 
nothing, has advanced.867 
Beside the latter, the most engrained criticism concerned a comment in le Monde in 2000, when it was 
stated that only 26% of the provided European funds have been triggered.868 Therewith, two funda-
mental successes within the Mediterranean initiative have been assigned server, and comprehensible, 
critics. The first concerns the success of bringing nearly all Heads of State together in order to revital-
ise the cooperation and until the meeting in Barcelona, three months later there are hardly any visible 
advancements? This falls severely back on the credibility of the renewed Mediterranean initiative. The 
second concerns another fundamental achievement, namely the provision of a multi-billion fund in 
order to implement the accorded programs and only 26% have been accessed? This resembles severe 
structural problems within the institutional setting of the Barcelona Process. Both critiques concern 
crucial and therefore vital issues of the European approach.  
The particular French perception of the Mediterranean Policy, based on the statements of the two 
newspapers, is quite distant and unemotional; surprisingly, this is also true at the time, when the 
French president pretended a change of the course of the Mediterranean Policy for the benefit of the 
French national interests. It seems as if the French Mediterranean policy has been introduced from 
above with no further consequences among the public. In general, the policy is critically perceived, but 
at the same time steps towards a cultural approximation are benevolently considered.  
 
859  Comp. « Pendant le conflit, la coopération continue » Gelie, (23.04.2002) Le Figaro. 
860  Comp. « (…)  « processus de Barcelone » (…) peut se targuer d’un résultat positif : avoir survécu » Gelie, 
(23.04.2002) Le Figaro. 
861  Comp. « Malgré ces difficultés indéniables, le Partenariat euroméditerranéen n’a pas succombé » Charrette, 
(07.12.2004) Le Figaro. 
862  Comp. « La difficulté du projet est à la mesure de son ambition » Naim, (28.11.1995) Le Monde. 
863  Comp. « Le processus de Barcelone est globalement en échec au regard de ses ambitions initiales » Zecchini, 
(17.06.2003) Le Monde. 
864  Comp. « De part et d’autre, on reconnaît aujourd’hui que le bilan est pour le moins mitigé » Ferenci, (27.11.2005) Le 
Monde. 
865  Comp. « …le bilan d’Euromed est plutôt maigre » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde. 
866  Comp. « (…) le bilan peut être jugé comme trop maigre » Patrie, (15.03.2005) Le Figaro. 
867  Comp. « En trois mois, rien, ou presque, n’a avancé » Barluet, (04.11.2008) Le Figaro. 
868  Comp. « Le bras séculier du processus de Barcelone est le programme communautaire MEDA. Son premier exercice 
couvrait la période 1995-1999, et son application a été exécrable : seuls 26% des aides ont été effectivement versés 
aux intéressés. » Zecchini, (17.06.2003) Le Monde. 
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2.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
The statements which refer to the analytical category “purpose” indicate the motivation behind the 
Barcelona Process and the officially stated aim. Interestingly, the discrepancy within the French dis-
course is minimal.  
 
The purpose and the officially stated aim of the European Mediterranean Policy  
The most explicit reference to the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy was stated five years 
before the launch of the Barcelona Process. The following security concern was expressed: the immi-
gration which accrues from the Mediterranean countries will, without any doubt, increase and evolve 
more severe problems for the French internal policy; and for the other part, the menace of fundamen-
talism could evolve a zone of instability, insecurity, and even hostility at our southern frontiers
869. In 
the same article it was stated that there is no future for the “Grand Europe”; it will be only simple 
“Europe” if peace, security, economic and social developments, respect of the human rights, democ-
ratic ideals and cultural identity will not be assured in the Mediterranean
870. These are the only refer-
ences which indicate an unmasked motivation of the European Union to establish a Mediterranean 
Policy, like the Barcelona Process. From the moment of its initiation, the discourse in this context is 
quite general. It underlines the outstanding ambition of the initiative and repeats the European inten-
tion to promote peace and stability in the Mediterranean region. Thus, it was reported in 1995, for 
instance, that the ambitions are immense, namely to counterbalance the relations between the Euro-
pean Union and the South
871; or some years later it was stated that the objective of the Barcelona Proc-
ess constitutes the reduction of the fosse between the two shores of the Mediterranean872. Additionally, 
Bernhard Kouchner expressed the intention of the Barcelona Process in le Monde in 2008 as follows: 
the idea is evident, namely to finally reconcile the two shores of this sea, which is at the same time 
united and divided by thousands of historical battles and nowadays confronted with the same hopes 
and dangers; the idea is evident and that is its grandeur
873. 
Within the discourse in the French newspapers the officially stated aim does not differ explicitly. The 
statements are kept even more general and refer to the ambitions of all three baskets of the Barcelona 
Process, which concern politics and security, economy with the perspective of the creation of a free-
 
869  Comp. « L’immigration en provenance de ces pays va sans doute accroître et poser à la France des problèmes de 
politique intérieure de plus en plus graves. D’autre part, la menace de l’intégrisme peut créer à nos frontières sud une 
zone d’instabilité et insécurité, sinon d’hostilité » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde. 
870  Comp. « Il n’y a pas d’avenir pour la „Grande Europe“, qui est tout simplement  « l’Europe », si la paix et la sécurité, 
le développement économique et social, le respect des droits de l’homme, des idéaux démocratiques et des identités 
culturelles ne sont pas assurés en Méditerranée » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde. 
871  Comp. « Son ambition est immense : rééquilibrer les relations de l’Union européenne vers le Sud » Tuquoi, 
(26.11.1995) Le Monde.  
872  Comp. « L’objectif : réduire le fossé entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée avec pour horizon, en 2010-2012, 
l’instauration d’une vaste zone de libre-échange » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro. 
873  Comp. « Le projet pour la Méditerranée (…) L’idée est évidente : réconcilier enfin les deux rives de cette mer, unies 
et déchirées par mille soubresauts de l’histoire, aujourd’hui confrontées aux mêmes espérances et aux mêmes dan-
gers. L’idée est évidente et c’est là sa grandeur » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde. 
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trade-zone until 2010, and social, cultural and human matters with the idea to approach the different 
cultures and societies
874.  
Although mainly implicitly expressed, the purpose and the officially stated aim of the European Union 
in the French press suggest further motivations than the mentioned ones. The security concern, which 
is masked by a discourse enhancing the terminology of peace and stability, can equally be perceived as 
the implicit wish to change the Mediterranean region according to the European convictions, even if 
based on international standards. 
2.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
In total, 57 references could be assigned to the analytical category “identity”. They refer to the politi-
cal ambition of the European Union, indicate a certain role-perception in the Mediterranean and stress 
the internal forces within the European Union. 
2.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition  
Few statements explicitly treat the political ambition or the European role perception. Implicitly, how-
ever, there are numerous references. Interestingly, the French press concedes within its discourse quite 
a lot space to references dealing with a possible Mediterranean identity.  
Five years before the Barcelona Process was launched le Monde stressed the importance of a Euro-
pean Mediterranean policy by demanding a sustained apprehension of an entity of a Euro-
Mediterranean space and stressed the need to gradually found a common policy, based on political, 
demographic, economic and cultural principals, which is powerful enough to form an essential ele-
ment in the necessitated equilibrium in order to defend peace and liberty in the world
875. It was further 
stated that the European engagement in the Mediterranean is essential for the proper future and that 
for France this challenge is vital
876. This indicates that the awareness of the necessity of a coherent 
Mediterranean Policy had to be aroused within the European consciousness and that France defended 
its position in this regard.  
Shortly before the conference in Barcelona took place, the fateful linkage between the two shores of 
the Mediterranean was stressed. If the European countries have an interest in the development of a 
zone of peace and wealth, the enterprises follow different objectives, but in any case, the outcome has 
an effect on the future of the countries in the South and therefore also on the neighbours in the 
 
874  Comp. « (…) politique et de sécurité ; économique, avec en perspective la mise en place d’une zone de libre-échange 
à l’horizon 2010 ; social, culturel et humain, avec l’idée de rapprocher les cultures et les sociétés » Fabre, 
(03.12.2005) Le Monde. 
875  Comp. « Il faut au-delà des discours, concevoir effectivement comme une entité l’espace euro-méditerranéen. Il faut 
fonder peu à peu un ensemble politique, démographique, économique, et culturel assez puissant pour former un élé-
ment essentiel des grands équilibres nécessaires à la défense de la paix et de la liberté dans le monde » Michel, 
(11.05.1990) Le Monde. 
876  Comp. «Au contraire, il s’agit pour l’Europe du Sud d’obtenir de l’Europe tout entière qu’elle prenne conscience de 
ses responsabilités vis-à-vis du monde méditerranéen et de ce que l’avenir de la Méditerranée est essentiel à son pro-
pre avenir. Pour la France, l’enjeu est vital » Michel, (11.05.1990) Le Monde. 




877. Although the European initiative per se is positively regarded, as stressed beforehand, the 
criticism about the European procedure is characteristic. On the one hand, the tardiness of Europe is 
postulated. The slowness of the European Union to relate with the people and to provide the promised 
assistance for the concerned countries is chronic
878
, as it was stated by le Monde in 2000.  Le Figaro 
stressed the same criticism in 2004, stating that the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is a long-term 
project for the European Union, which is based on solidarity rather than mistrust and confronta-
tion
879. The whole initiative is considered very encouraging and is perceived as a proof of the signifi-
cance of the southern countries for Europe; this is why it is essential not to disappoint them and that 
we must consequentially pass to a higher velocity
880 concerning the progress. Beside this tardiness, 
which is regarded as a structural problem, further criticism concerns the factual significance of the 
Mediterranean for the European Union: the difficulties of the European Union to revive the partner-
ship fortifies the impression that Europe is tired of defining the desirable relations with its neigh-
bours
881. In the same context, le Figaro expressed even more accentuated that the Euro-Mediterranean 
Policy, which is limited in numerous ways and currently (2004) of little efficiency, is reproached to 
focus too often on the security approach, to provide unequal financial instruments for the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the MNC, and to have a lack of an adequate political organisation, 
including a permanent secretary for the administration of the Euro-Mediterranean concerns, which 
makes all dependent on the EU’s administration; eventually, the partnership is predominated by the 
Eurocentric vision, the centre dominates and the neighbouring countries remain in the periphery
882. 
Here, it was repetitively referred to the possibility that Europe might forget about the Mediterranean in 
the context of its enlargement policy883 or its engagement in the East884. 
 
877  Comp. « De fait, si les États européens ont intérêt à la création d’une zone de paix et de prospérité au sud du conti-
nent, les entreprises poursuivent des objectifs différents. Pourquoi investir dans le Sud quand les pays d’Europe cen-
trale et orientale, demain, seront membres de l’Union européenne ? Pourquoi opter pour le pourtour méditerranéen 
quand les salaires asiatiques sont deux à trois fois plus bas ? C’est de la réponse à ces questions que dépendra l’avenir 
des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. Et, pour partie, celui de leur voisin du Nord. » Turquoi, (26.11.1995) Le Monde. 
878  Comp. « La lenteur avec laquelle l’Union européenne achemine aux populations et aux pays concernés l’assistance 
promise est chronique » Zecchini, (16.11.2000) Le Monde. 
879  Comp. « La coopération euro-méditerranéenne est pour l’Europe un projet porteur d’une vision politique à long 
terme, faisant primer la solidarité sur le repli, la méfiance ou la confrontation » Charette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro. 
880  Comp. « Tout cela est très encourageant et montre combien les pays du Sud sont en demande d’Europe. Il est essen-
tiel de ne pas les décevoir : il nous faut donc passer la vitesse supérieure! » Charette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro. 
881  Comp. « Car les difficultés de l’UE pour donner vie au partenariat euroméditerranéen concourent à renforcer 
l’impression que l’Europe peine à définir le type de relations qu’elle souhaite avoir ses voisins » Zecchini, 
(17.06.2003) Le Monde. 
882  Comp. «Cela étant, la politique européenne en Méditerranée souffre de nombreuses limites qui la rendent, actuelle-
ment, peu efficace. L’approche sécuritaire prédomine trop souvent ; les instruments financiers (Meda) mis en place 
ne sont pas à la hauteur puisque, en comparaison pour la période 2000-2006, l’Union européenne aura alloué trente 
euros par habitant aux Peco contre quatre pour les douze pays partenaires de la Méditerranée ; l’absence 
d’organisation politique adéquate et de secrétariat permanent rend le processus de coopération tributaire de 
l’administration de la Communauté européenne. Enfin, la vision euro centrique prime sur le partenariat, le centre do-
mine et les pays voisins restent périphériques » Guigou, (12.10.2004) Le Figaro. 
883  Comp. « L’élargissement de l’Union européenne (…). Il est aussi vécu comme une menace potentielle pour les pays 
en développement du pourtour méditerranéen » Marti, (02.12.2003) Le Monde. 
884  Comp. « L’Est ne doit pas faire oublier le Sud à l’Europe » Bele, (17.11.2003) Le Figaro.  
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This criticism attests the European Union severe conceptual difficulties concerning its political ambi-
tion in the Mediterranean. In the last years le Figaro stated in the context of the Mediterranean Union 
that the way of the anew policy is sowed by entrapments; without the substitution of the search for 
peace in the Middle East and the resolution of the other conflicts, it merits to be challenged by the 
hope to enhance harmony between the North and the South of the mare nostrum
885. Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, the European Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, stated in le Figaro that the European Union 
has taken the choice to approach the Mediterranean. And shortly before the Paris summit took place, le 
Monde commented the up-coming happening as follows: we live in a moment of a very particular 
equilibrium in the world, where for the first time since very long ago, Europe returns to the scenery
886. 
Within the French discourse there have surprisingly been several references to a possible Mediterra-
nean identity. Most of them relate to a common destiny, which serves as an association reference. In 
2000, le Figaro commented that our destinies are aligned887. Le Monde conceded its voice at the same 
time to Chris Patten, saying that the Mediterranean is in need of Europe, and Europe is in need of the 
Mediterranean; it is about our common interest
888. Another statement stressed that we are “con-
demned” to cooperate within a win-win situation
889. And in addition, the actuality does not cease to 
demonstrate that the destiny of Europe and its southern neighbours is henceforth inseparable
890. In 
2008, the reaffirmation of a common Mediterranean identity reached its climax when stating that the 
European civilisation evolved from the Mediterranean
891
. Bernard Kouchner similarly stated that we 
are all Mediterraneans in the heart and in peace
892.  
2.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle 
The statements which refer to the internal struggle of the European Union mainly concern the French 
role and do not offer a diverse insight into the power struggle among the Member states. 
The distinctive national positions within the French press mainly refer to the events after the French 
proposal to found a Mediterranean Union. The only statement beforehand concerns the estimation of 
the Quai d’Orsay893, stated in le Monde in 1997: in future Europe there will be a special role for those 
 
885  Comp. « La voie de l’Union méditerranéenne sera semée d’embûches. Sans se substituer à la recherche de la paix au 
Proche-Orient ou à la résolution des autres conflits, elle mérite d’être tentée, dans l’espoir de trouver l’harmonie au 
nord comme au sud de cette Mare Nostrum » Rousselin, (14.10.2007) Le Figaro. 
886  Comp. « Nous vivons un moment très particulier de l’équilibre mondial, où pour la première fois depuis bien long-
temps, l’Europe revient sur le devant de la scène » Adler, (11.07.2008) Le Figaro. 
887  Comp. « On réalise que nos destins sont liés (…) » Oualalou, (13.11.2000) Le Figaro. 
888  Comp. « les Méditerranéens ont besoin de l’Europe, et l’Europe a besoin des Méditerranéens. Il en va de notre intérêt 
commun » Patten, (14.11.2000) Le Monde. 
889   Comp. « Nous sommes « condamnés » à coopérer dans un rapport gagnant-gagnant » Guigou, (12.10.2004) Le Figa-
ro. 
890  Comp. « L’actualité ne cesse de le montrer, le destin de l’Europe est désormais inséparable de celui de ses voisins du 
Sud » Charlette, (07.12.2004) Le Figaro. 
891  Comp. « La civilisation européenne est née de la Méditerranée » Ferenczi, (21.03.2008) Le Monde. 
892  Comp. « Nous sommes tous des Méditerranéens de cœur et de paix » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde. 
893  Quai d’Orsay is the denomination for the French Foreign Ministry. http://www.diplomatie.gouv. 
fr/mae/visite_orsay/ind_orsay.de.html (10.02.2008) 
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countries that demonstrated a stronger determination than others and that France aspires to be 
among those countries
894. This indicates the official position of the French foreign policy, which Nico-
las Sarkozy proved to be true, also in the context of the Mediterranean Policy.  
Interestingly, the controversial debate of Sarkozy’s original proposal to found a Mediterranean Union 
only for countries bordering the Mediterranean after the model of Europe has not occupied an obvious 
place in the French press. Indeed, it was stated that proposals of these dimension do not scarce scepti-
cism895, but the severe debate, especially with Germany, was hardly mentioned; this is additionally 
remarkable due to the, at least in the German speaking media persisting, competition between France 
and Germany . The only reference to the German rejection of the French proposal was expressed a day 
before the Paris summit in 2008 by le Monde, stating that Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, 
opposed the French project because it excluded the countries which do not border the Mediterranean; 
she therefore perceived a strong division potential for the proper European Union
896. Before the pub-
lication of this statement, Bernard Kouchner wrote in le Monde that it was necessary to convince the 
Spanish and Italian partners that France will not make a clean sweep with the Barcelona Process, but 
contrarily wants to revive it; (…) to convince Germany that it was not the aim of the project to turn 
away from Europe
897.  
Other statements in the same context only refer to the French intentions, like the proposal has the fi-
nality to give the initiative a new élan898. At the same time, these honourable intentions are overlapped 
by unmasked statements like: in order to contribute to the normalisation of the relations between the 
countries in the Middle East, Paris aspires to become again an influent actor in the region where the 
role of the European Union had decreased
899. Even though the competition between France and Ger-
many did not find attention in the public discourse, the ambitions of France to become a more decisive 
player on the international stage and the apparent lack of awe to interfere in the ambit of the European 
 
894  Comp. « [Quai d'Orsay] Il est claire que, dans l’Europe de demain, il y aura un rôle particulier pour les pays qui 
veulent afficher une détermination plus forte que les autres. La France est au nombre de ces pays » Frachon/Vernet, 
(02.03.1997) le Monde. 
895  Comp. « [MU] Face à une entreprise aussi grandiose, le scepticisme est de mise » Rousselin, (14.10.2007) Le Figaro. 
896  Comp. « Angela Merkel, la chancelière allemande, s’oppose au projet français car il exclut les pays non riverains de 
la Méditerranée. Elle y voit un fermement de division au sein de l’UE » Beaugé, (12.07.2008) Le Monde. 
897  Comp. « Il fallut convaincre nos partenaires espagnoles et italiens que la France ne faisait pas table rase du Processus 
de Barcelone mais souhaitait au contraire le relancer; nous nous y sommes employés dès les premiers jours, à Rome 
comme à Portoroz lors de la rencontre des dix Européens de la Méditerranée. Convaincre l’Allemagne que ce projet 
n’était pas tourné contre l’Europe » Kouchner, (11.07.2008) Le Monde. 
898  Comp. «  le projet se contente de prendre appui sur le processus de Barcelone, forum de coopération inter méditerra-
néen lancé en 1995, aujourd’hui ensablé, et auquel la France souhaite donner un « nouvel élan » » Avril, (14.03.2008) 
Le Figaro. 
899  Comp. « En contribuant à normaliser les relations entre les nations du Proche-Orient, Paris espère redevenir un acteur 
influent dans la région où le rôle de l'Europe s'amenuise » Oberlé, (13.07.2008) Le Figaro. 
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foreign policy were unambiguously expressed900.  
 
 
3 Germany  
Germany is the country where the most newspapers have been considered: the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (FAZ), the Welt, The Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Financial Times Germany (FTD) and the 
Tageszeitung (TAZ). At the centre-right of the political spectrum are the FAZ, the Welt and the Finan-
cial Times Germany, while the SZ and the TZ are considered as left. 
From the 404 statements which have been identified in the German newspapers, far the most can be 
assigned to the FAZ, which has great news coverage on Mediterranean Affairs. The amount of the 
reporting in the SZ and the FTD is on average; a lower amount can be allocated to the Welt and the 
TAZ. 
 
GERMANY number of articles per category and newspaper 
 FAZ Welt SZ FTD TAZ total 
Expression 133 10 34 18 9 204 
Purpose 43 4 6 9 4 66 
Identity 77 14 15 17 9 132 
 253 28 55 44 22 402 
 
Concerning the distribution of the statements per category, most statements have been identified for 
the category “expression” and the sub-category referring to the perception of the Mediterranean policy 
(mmpol). 
  
GERMANY number of statements per category 
the other ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 25 57 14 108 204 
purpose aim    
Purpose 37 29   66 
EU     
Identity 132    132 
 
The distribution of the considered statements per year indicates the following pattern: 
 
 
900   This can be additionally traced in the references in the run-up to the Paris Summit where the invitation of the Heads 
of States by Sarkozy is stressed [Comp. “[Sarkozy] (…) il a invité tous les dirigeants méditerranéens à participer, 
« sur un pied d’égalité », à une conférence à Paris en juin 2008 » Editorial, 25.10.2007 le Monde] and the French role 
at the proper summit [Comp. « Même si le sommet du 13 s’appelle « sommet de Paris pour la Méditerranée », ce qui 
met un accent net sur le rôle de la France, le projet de Déclaration, lui, fait la part belle au processus européen dit « de 
Barcelone » (Euromed), lancé en 1995 et dont il s’agit de « renforcer les accomplissements et les éléments de suc-
cès » » Nougayrède/Ricard, (12.07.2008) Le Monde]. 
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GERMANY distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 36  17 1 18 15 9 9 2 7 28 1 13 48 204 
Purpose 23 1 6  9 12 2 4 1 6 16  20 32 132 
Identity 17  2  9 5 1 2 1  12  4 13 66 
Total 76 1 25 1 36 32 12 15 4 13 56 1 37 93 402 
 
The years in which an outstanding amount of statements has been identified are 1995, 2005 and 2008 
for obvious reasons. Notably, there are also high numbers of statements in 1997, 1999, 2000 and 2007. 
In 1997 the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers after the initiation conference took place, in 1999 
Germany hosted the consecutive conference in Stuttgart, already a year later the next Foreign Minister 
Meeting place, and in 2007 the press reported on the severe debate between Germany and France on 
the occasion of the French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the 
Mediterranean. 
3.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
In total, there have been 203 statements identified which can be assigned to the analytical category 
“expression”. 
3.1.1 The view of the “other” 
In the German press the statements, which refer to the “other”, describe their situation regarding the 
participation in the Barcelona Process. They contain the claims for a compensation of the predomi-
nantly Eastern policy of the EU, the legitimate scepticism, the difficult arrangement among the “other” 
and the partnership attitude. 
The initiation year of the Barcelona Process was marked by the demand for a coherent Mediterranean 
Policy of the European Union by the Mediterranean non-member countries. Thus, it was reported in 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) that the southern Mediterranean riparian states, especially 
the Maghreb countries, have already demanded more attention from Brussels for a long time and that 
it is supportive for their request that in the correspondent year France and Spain, two Mediterranean 
states, preside the European Council
901. Furthermore, the “others” think that the European Union has 
forgotten its southern border, due to its intense engagement in Middle and Eastern Europe
902. Corre-
sponding to the foundation moment the same newspaper stated that the North African states and those 
 
901  Comp. „Die südlichen Anrainer des Mittelmeers, vor allem die Maghreb Staaten, fordern schon seit langem mehr 
Brüsseler Aufmerksamkeit. Es kommt ihren Wünschen zugute, dass in diesem Jahr mit Frankreich und Spanien zwei 
Mittelmeerstaaten die EU-Präsidentschaft innehaben“ wha, (07.02.1995) FAZ. 
902  Comp. „Vergessen, so meinen sie, habe die Europäische Union ihre Südgrenze, da sie vornehmlich mit der Entwick-
lung in Mittel- und Osteuropa beschäftigt sei“ wha, (07.02.1995) FAZ. 
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in the Middle East preliminary hope for a multi-billion auxiliary programme from the EU
903. There-
with, the German discourse of the FAZ suggested that the motivation from the MNC countries was 
financially directed. Nevertheless, there were also references concerning the distrust of the “others”. 
One of them was stated in 1997: The distrust of the southern countries is the result of the pedantic 
bargaining for import guidelines for some tons of potatoes, rice, tomatoes and cut flowers by the 
European Union, including Germany
904. At the conference (Malta), the Maghreb-partners demon-
strated their legitimate expectations towards the countries of the European Union concerning their 
ambivalent position, as they plea for an unlimited access for industrial products and services in the 
southern markets while rejecting the free-trade for Agrarian products
905. The FAZ conceded the voice 
to Adel Tilli, board member of the Tunisian Agrar- and Fishery Association, who expressed his con-
cern about the difficulty to explain the domestic farmers how to become competitive when there are no 
additional markets
906. He further stated that this does not only lead to sentiments of repudiation, but 
also handicaps the economic opening; the FAZ interpreted Tilli’s statement as a clear warning for 
Europe
907.  
The relations among the Mediterranean partners were considered as complicated, especially because 
of the difficult relations among the Arab countries and notably with Israel
908. Even Tunisia, which is 
considered as a model student concerning the economic opening compared to other Mediterranean 
countries, has apparent difficulties with the economic and political liberalisation
909. Although the 
latter is not surprising, it is the only reference within the German press which deals with the expecta-
tions and the demanded reforms in the partner countries. 
Concerning the European role in the Middle East conflict, the FAZ reported that it is apparently ex-
pected that Europe obtains a counter-balanced position to the United States of America, which in the 
 
903  Comp. „Die Staaten Nordafrikas und des Nahen Ostens machen sich vor allem große Hoffnungen auf ein Milliarden-
schweres Hilfsprogramm aus Europa“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
904  Comp. „Der Argwohn in den südlichen Ländern wird nicht zuletzt durch das kleinliche Feilschen von EU-Ländern, 
darunter auch Deutschland, um die Einfuhr einiger hundert Tonnen Kartoffeln, Reis Tomaten oder Schnittblumen ge-
nährt“ Stabenow, (14.04.1997) FAZ. 
905  Comp. „Die Konferenz verdeutlichte, dass auch die Maghreb-Partner ebenfalls legitime Erwartungen an die EU-
Länder haben. Dies gilt besonders für die zwiespältige EU-Haltung, ungehindert Zugang für Industrieprodukte und 
Dienstleistungen zu den südlichen Märkten zu verlangen, andererseits aber Freihandel für Agrarprodukte zu verwei-
gern“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ. 
906  Comp. „Wie solle man es den eigenen Bauern vermitteln, wettbewerbsfähig zu werden, wenn es keine neuen Ab-
satzmärkte gebe, fragt der Adel Tilli, Vorstandmitglied der tunesischen Agrar- und Fischervereinigung“ Stabenow, 
(19.09.1997) FAZ. 
907  Comp. „Dies sorge nicht nur für ein "Gefühl der Zurückweisung", sondern erschwere die wirtschaftliche Öffnung. 
Tillis Warnung an die Europäer war knapp, aber eindeutig: "Achtung, Gefahr!"“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ.  
908  Comp. „Kompliziert wird das labile Gefüge in der Region zudem durch die schwierigen Beziehungen der arabischen 
Staaten untereinander und besonders zu Israel“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
909  Comp. „Selbst Tunesien, das Köhler im Vergleich mit anderen südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern als "Musterschüler" 
bei der wirtschaftlichen Öffnung betrachtet, tut sich mit dem Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischer und politischer 
Liberalisierung offenbar noch schwer“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ. 
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view of many Arab countries have taken sides with Israel
910. The FTD even stressed that the European 
Union is forced to engage itself more in the Middle East peace process and possibly take initiative for 
the Palestinian side
911. A year later, in 2001, another journalist of the same newspaper uttered exactly 
the same: the Arab world pushes the EU to position itself on the Palestinian side912. These statements 
underline the expectations of the Arab countries concerning the role of the European Union in the 
Middle East. The demand to form a counter-balance to the USA must not be underestimated. 
Concerning the “other” within the partnership, critical voices can be found in the German press when 
dealing with the Mediterranean partner countries. The Welt, for instance, stated that money flows from 
the North to the South, but politically there are few returns, because there is often a lack of part-
ners
913. Therewith, the lack of partnership within the Barcelona Process was also ascribed to the 
“other”. The SZ also referred to insufficient partnership tendencies among the “others”. In 2005, the 
anniversary year of the Barcelona Process, it was stated in the SZ: If the Southern border-countries 
continue to treat the partnership with the EU slovenly, the EU should cause them a painful awakening, 
for example through turning off the cash-flow
914. In the moderate-liberal newspaper the consideration 
of the “other” was consistently critical, which is proved by two other examples of 2007: the Moroc-
cans, who demonstrated sympathy for the Mediterranean Union, have no high expectations regarding 
its success
915
; Algerians are figuratively satisfied with the numerous programs offered by the EU and 
is not willing to give them up for something that is still to define
916. The latter implies that the southern 
countries are also acting with foresight and individual purposes. So far, this has rarely been expressed 
in the analysed documents. 
3.1.2 Associative and dissociative elements 
The statements allocated to this category treat few associative issues and numerous dissociative mat-
ters of the Mediterranean Policy. Notably, the German press focuses on the events at the Ministerial 
conferences and therewith enables an additional perspective on the workings of the Barcelona Process.  
 
910  Comp. „Von den Europäern wird offenbar erwartet, dass sie ein gewissen Gegengewicht zu den Vereinigten Staaten 
bilden, die in den Augen vieler arabischer Länder bei ihren Vermittlungsbemühungen zu sehr auf der Seite Israels 
stehen“ bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ. 
911  Comp. „Die arabische Welt drängt die Europäische Union (EU), sich stärker für den Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten 
zu engagieren und zudem möglichst Partei für die Seite der Palästinenser zu ergreifen“ Knust, (17.11.2001) FDT. 
912  Comp. „Die arabische Welt drängt die EU, sich eindeutig auf die Seite der Palästinenser zu schlagen“ Jennen, 
(05.11.2001) FTD. 
913  Comp. „Geld fließt von Nord nach Süd, aber es kommt politisch wenig zurück, weil es oft an Partnern mangelt“ Lau, 
(04.03.2008) Welt. 
914  Comp. „Wenn die südlichen Anlieger des Mittelmeeres ihre Partnerschaft mit der EU weiterhin so schludrig behan-
deln, sollte die EU ihnen ein böses Erwachen bereiten. Etwa durch Drehen am Geldhahn“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ. 
915  Comp. „Für einen Lieblingsplan des Präsidenten, die Mittelmeer-Union, haben die Marokkaner viel Sympathie. Aber 
sie schätzen deren Aussichten nicht hoch ein“ chi, (24.10.2007) SZ. 
916  Comp. „Vor allem wollen die Algerier wissen, was der neue Pakt ihnen brächte. Immerhin gibt es bereits jetzt eine 
Reihe von Bündnissen: die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft (Barcelona-Prozess) zwischen der EU und ihren südlichen 
Nachbarn sowie das Mittelmeer-Forum und den Fünf-plus-Fünf-Dialog der Außenminister als informelle Konferen-
zen. Diese Spatzen in der Hand will Algerien für keine Taube auf dem noch nicht gebauten Dach über dem Mittel-
meer aufgeben“ Chimelli, (07.12.2007) SZ. 
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The SZ stated in 2008 that when neighbours come closer to each other, there is both attraction and 
threat
917. The few associative issues concerned for example the complaisant appraisal that if trusting 
the politicians’ avowals, the approach towards the rules which determine modern capitalism has 
changed. The other side of the Mediterranean appears to have conceived its position within a global-
ised economy, and the investors do not come to their country because of colonial ponds or new friend-
ships, but because of the perspective of chances of profit
918. Additionally, the reputed change of atti-
tude in the MNC is due to the European influence and both can and should be questioned; as a matter 
of fact, the stated change contributes to a better working climate.  
The 11.09.2001 provoked another associative element within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It 
manifested the necessity of cooperation between Europe and the MNC. The FAZ constituted that due 
to the Islamic attacks, the riparian states in the southern Mediterranean again gained importance for 
the European Union
919 and that the Maghreb States and the Arab countries did what had been ex-
pected: they supported the fight against terrorism and took care of the stability in their own coun-
tries
920.  
Within the discourse of the German press the dissociative issues are diverse. They concern: 
• Different perceptions on a certain topic. For example, it was stated in the FAZ at the beginning 
of the Barcelona Process: in European countries circulates the fear that a close cooperation 
with the Arab countries and Europe could strengthen the fundamentalist groups. In contrast, 
the Islamic participants in Barcelona stressed their conviction that radical fundamentalism is 
primarily nourished by poverty and underdevelopment. The FAZ added that there were no 
fundamentalists in Barcelona, however
921
.  
• Different perceptions regarding the cooperation level. In 1999, the FAZ stated that it belongs 
to the Mediterranean tradition, equally on the southern and on the northern shore, not to talk 
 
917  Comp. „Nachbarn kommen sich nahe, darin liegen Reiz wie Gefahr“ Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ. 
918  Comp. „Geändert hat sich, wenn man den Politiker-Bekenntnissen trauen darf, auch die Einstellung zu den Regeln, 
nach denen der moderne Kapitalismus funktioniert (...)Jedenfalls scheint man auf der anderen Seite des Mittelmeers 
inzwischen begriffen zu haben, dass man in der globalisierten Wirtschaft in einem Standortwettbewerb steht und dass 
Investoren nicht wegen alter kolonialer Verbindungen oder neuer Freundschaften ins Land kommen, sondern auch 
die Aussicht auf Gewinnchancen angezogen werden müssen“ Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ. 
919  Comp. „Die Anschläge islamistischer Terroristen haben die Nachbarländer der Europäischen Union (EU) am südli-
chen Ufer des Mittelmeeres wieder an Bedeutung gewinnen lassen -nachdem bei der letzten Außenministerkonferenz 
in Marseille im vergangenen November die EU-Mittelmeer-Zusammenarbeit von vielen für "tot" erklärt worden war“ 
Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ. 
920  Comp. „Die Regierung der Maghreb-Staaten wie die der arabischen Mittelmeeranrainer haben in den vergangenen 
Wochen das getan, was in Europa von ihnen erwartet wurde: Sie unterstützten den Kampf gegen den Terror und sorg-
ten für Stabilität im Inneren ihrer Länder“ Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ. 
921  Comp. „In europäischen Ländern hört man häufig die Befürchtung, eine enge Zusammenarbeit der islamischen Staa-
ten am südlichen Mittelmeer mit Europa könne dort die fundamentalistischen Gruppen stärken. Die Teilnehmer aus 
den islamischen Ländern waren in Barcelona anderer Ansicht: Der radikale Fundamentalismus nähre sich vorwiegend 
aus Armut und Unterentwicklung. Allerdings waren auch keine Fundamentalisten in Barcelona dabei“ wha, 
(07.02.1995) FAZ. 
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about inconvenient issues or disarm them with flowery phrases
922. A year later, the German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer praised the impressive debate between Israeli and Palestin-
ian representatives, who defined their position in the “spirit of dialogue”
923. 
• The increasing economic gap across the Mediterranean: The economic gap towards the south 
is a lot higher than towards the countries in Central and Eastern Europe; the average income 
in Europe is approximately twenty times higher than in the Arab countries in North Africa
924. 
In 2008, the Welt stated that according to the Commission, the prosperity gap between the 
European Union and the Mediterranean countries has increased over the last years
925. 
• The lack of interest concerning the Mediterranean Policy. It was stated by the Welt in 2008 
that there is an apparent lack of interest among the Heads of State as the provided billions 
have not been completely retrieved
926. The TAZ stated that even in Europe, the interest con-
cerning the Mediterranean Policy is weighted differently
927.  
• Mistrust. The SZ stated in the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process that the North African 
participants reacted sensitive on the suspicion that the European already feared Islamism and 
immigration at the moment of the initiation of the Barcelona Process
928. It further expressed 
the opinion that the hugest barrier for a notable progress of the Mediterranean Policy is the 
lack of confidence
929 among the partners. 
• The conflicts in the Mediterranean region. The SZ stated in 2007 that never before existed 
more conflicts in the region
930. Another conclusion of the German press was that the problems 
of the Barcelona Process were not so much based on its structure, but on the discord among 
the southern and eastern MNCs
931. The FTD stated that the reason for the stagnation of the 
 
922  Comp. „Zur kulturellen Tradition des Mittelmeerraumes gehört es, übrigens am südlichen wie am nördlichen Ufer, 
über unangenehme Dinge wenn möglich nicht zu sprechen, oder sie mit höflichen Floskeln zu entschärfen“ Nonnen-
macher, (18.11.1999) FAZ. 
923  Comp. „(Marseille) Außenminister Fischer lobte die "beeindruckende Aussprache" bei der vor allem der israelische 
Außenminister Ben-Ami und der Vertreter der Palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde, Schaath, offen, "aber im Geist 
des Dialogs" die Standpunkte beider Seiten dargelegt hätten“ bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ. 
924  Comp. „Das wirtschaftliche Gefälle zum Süden hin ist viel größer als das zu den Reformländern Mittel- und Osteuro-
pas; das Durchschnittseinkommen in der EU ist etwa zwanzigmal so hoch wie das in der arabischen Staaten Nordaf-
rikas“ Brender, (21.03.1995) NZZ. 
925  Comp. „Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeerländern ist laut Kommission in den vergangenen 
Jahren noch gewachsen“ Schiltz, (19.05.2008) Welt. 
926  Comp. „Das Interesse der Regierungschefs war gering, die von der EU bereitgestellten Milliarden wurden nicht 
vollständig abgerufen (...)“ Schiltz, (19.05.2008), Welt. 
927  Comp. „Einmal ist das Interesse im Inneren der EU durchwachsen“ Hahn, (13.07.2008) TAZ. 
928  Comp. „Empfindlich reagierten die nordafrikanischen Teilnehmer auch auf den Verdacht, schon bei der Gründungs-
konferenz in Barcelona vor zehn Jahren hätten die Ängste der Europäer vor Islamismus und Einwanderung nach Eu-
ropa Paten gestanden“ Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ. 
929  Comp. „Das größte Hindernis für nennenswerte Fortschritte ist der Mangel an Vertrauen“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ. 
930  Comp. „Nie gab es mehr Konflikte in der Region“ chi, (24.10.2007) SZ. 
931  Comp. „Europäische Diplomaten hoffen, dass die Mittelmeerpolitik nun einen "neuen Schub" bekommt. Allerdings 
weisen sie auch darauf hin, dass deren bisherige Probleme weniger mit den Strukturen des Barcelona-Prozesses zu 
tun hätten als damit, dass die südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeeranrainer untereinander zerstritten und an einer enge-
ren Bindung an Europa nicht immer interessiert seien“ Winter, (13.03.2008) SZ.
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Barcelona Process lies, beside the unsolved Middle East Conflict, in the continuous jealousy 
between the northern and southern engagement within the European Union
932. 
 
Within the German press numerous statements refer to happenings at the Ministerial conferences 
which manifest the difficulties at the working level of the Barcelona Process. Thus, they represent a 
possible dissociative dynamic because it was more than once that the cooperation nearly failed. There 
was the matter of agreeing on a common definition and on certain terms or formulations of the con-
cluding statement. Already in 1995 there were references to the Middle Eastern Peace Process and the 
treaty on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while by contrast the formulations 
regarding human rights and democracy are generally kept so that there is no offence
933. Most of the 
times, also in 1995, the participants agreed on a compromise934. At the conference in Malta the situa-
tion was even more precarious because the Arab participants threatened for hours to refuse to agree 
on a common statement in case the Europeans did not include a moderate, but definite, criticism on 
the Israeli settlement policy
935. The Stuttgart conference also demonstrated the difficulties of the par-
ticipants to act in concert
936. The FAZ reported that the Syrian Foreign Minister, the spokesman of the 
Arab States, did not want to appear in public together with the Israeli representative
937. Nevertheless, 
this conflict did not have a stagnating consequence for the conference itself and, beside some ex-
pressed dissonances of diplomats, the results have been considered as positive
938. In 2002, the ex-
pected commotion between the Arab States and Israel already took place at the opening session when 
the Arab representatives left the room
939. In 2004, the FAZ quoted a participant, who stated that at the 
 
932  Comp. „Nicht nur der ungelöste Nahostkonflikt wirft die Annäherungsbemühungen zwischen beiden Seiten immer 
wieder zurück. Die Förderung des Mittelmeerraumes ist Gegenstand ständiger Eifersüchteleien zwischen der Nord- 
und Südschiene in der Europäischen Union selbst“ Koch, (14.11.2000) FTD. 
933  Comp. „Als heikel hatten sich zuletzt besonders die politischen Passagen zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und 
zum Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen erwiesen. Dagegen scheinen die vorbereiteten 
Klauseln zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie so allgemein gehalten zu sein, daß sie keinem Teilnehmer unüber-
windbare Probleme bereiten dürften“ now/wha, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
934  Comp. „Die Teilnehmer verständigten sich schließlich auf Kompromißformeln“ now, (29.11.1995) FAZ. 
935  Comp. „Die arabischen Teilnehmer hatten stundenlang damit gedroht, keinerlei gemeinsamen Erklärung ihre Zu-
stimmung zu geben, falls die Europäer nicht zu einer zwar im Ton gemäßigten, aber dennoch eindeutigen Kritik an 
der israelischen Siedlungspolitik bereit sein sollten“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) FAZ. 
936  Comp. „Auch die Stuttgarter Konferenz dürfte jedoch zeigen, wie schwer sich die Nachbarn beiderseits des Mittel-
meers tun, an einem Strang zu ziehen“ Stabenow, (15.04.1999) FAZ. 
937  Comp. „Schwierig war es in Stuttgart geworden, nachdem Israel offenbar den syrischen Außenminister, der zugleich 
Sprecher der arabischen Staaten ist, nicht ohne israelische Beteiligung vor den Journalisten auftreten lassen wollte. 
Mit dem Israeli Scharon zusammen wollte wiederum al Scharaa nicht auf die Bühne treten“ Rößler, (17.04.1999) 
FAZ. 
938  Comp. „Im Gegensatz zu der Außenministerkonferenz im April 1997 auf Malta, als der Streit um die israelische 
Siedlungspolitik sogar die Verständigung über eine Abschlusserklärung vereitelte, wirkte sich der Konflikt im Nahen 
Osten auf der Stuttgarter Konferenz nicht lähmend aus (...)Ungeachtet der zum Ende der Konferenz aufgetretenen 
Misstöne zogen Diplomaten aus der EU, aber auch aus den südlichen Partnerländern am Freitag eine positive Bilanz“ 
now, (17.04.1999) FAZ. 
939  Comp. „Zum ersten erwarteten Eklat kam es schon bei der Eröffnungssitzung: Arabische Außenminister verließen für 
einige Minuten den Raum, nachdem der stellvertretende Außenminister Melchior (…) das Wort ergriffen hatte. Die 
Organisation hat Araber und Israelis über 40 Kilometer voneinander entfernt untergebracht“ Haubich, (24.04.2002) 
FAZ. 
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two-day meeting, the severe dispute between the two parties contributed to a general exhaustion, be-
cause the same arguments were repeated as ever
940. Anyhow, it was a value per se that representa-
tives of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority met and talked to each other, as it was 
stated by the German Foreign Minister
941. In the anniversary year of the Barcelona Process it was 
stated that not everyone was in the mood for celebration942. The tenth anniversary should have been 
the first occasion of a meeting of all Heads of State, but most of them sent their Foreign Ministers 
again
943. The SZ moaned that the summit called and nobody of the invited appeared944. The FAZ also 
stated that open and stern disputes between representatives of Israel and Palestine already belong to 
the ritual of the meetings
945. 
3.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The statements which refer to the perception of the European Mediterranean Policy concern defini-
tional statements, references regarding its significance and functionality and evaluative considerations. 
Distinctive definition statements refer to the European Mediterranean Policy as follows: 
• The Mediterranean forum wants to be perceived as a regional cooperation body and appears 
as a new lobby for the Mediterranean region
946. 
• [Mediterranean Policy before Barcelona] A patchwork of relations in the south947. 
• The only forum where Israelis and Arabs continue to sit on one table
948. 
• Almost over night the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership advanced to the prime example of the 
European fight against terrorism
949. 
 
940  Comp. „Während des zweitägigen Treffens war es zu hitzigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem israelischen 
Außenminister Silvan Schalom und dem Chefunterhändler der Palästinenser im Nahost-Konflikt, Nabil Schaath, ge-
kommen. Beide hätten zur allgemeinen Ermüdung die "seit langem bekannten Positionen vorgetragen", berichtete ein 
Teilnehmer“ bc, (07.05.2004) FAZ. 
941  Comp. „Außenminister Fischer sagte, obwohl beide Seiten an ihren Positionen festgehalten hätten, bleibe es doch 
"ein Wert an sich", wenn sich hohe Vertreter der israelischen Regierung, der Palästinenser und der arabischen Staaten 
treffen und miteinander reden könnten. Außerhalb der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der EU gebe es kein anderes Forum, 
auf dem das möglich sei“ bc, (07.05.2004) FAZ. 
942  Comp. „Nicht allen, scheint es, ist nach Feiern zumute“ Bacia, (28.11.2005) FAZ. 
943  Comp. „Diesmal sollte es ein Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs werden, das erste überhaupt. Doch viele 
der Geladenen aus den Partnerländern hatten anscheinend Wichtigeres zu tun. Die meißten schickten wieder ihre Au-
ßenminister“ Bacia, (28.11.1995) FAZ. 
944  Comp. „Der Gipfel ruft und fast keiner der Eingeladenen erscheint“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ. 
945  Comp. „Ein offener, harter Schlagabtausch zwischen den Vertretern Israels und der arabischen Länder gehört indes-
sen immer noch zum Ritual der Euromed-Außenministertreffen“ Bacia, (28.11.1995) FAZ. 
946  Comp. „Das Mittelmeer-Forum sieht sich als regionales Kooperationsgremium, will aber auch als neue Lobbygruppe 
für den mediterranen Raum auftreten“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ. 
947  Comp. „das Beziehungs-Flickwerk im Süden“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ. 
948  Comp. „Der Barcelona-Prozess ist das einzige Forum, an dem Israelis und Araber weiterhin an einem Tisch sitzen“ 
Rößler, (05.11.2000) FAZ and „Mittlerweile ist der Barcelona-Prozess praktisch das einzige Forum, wo, wie jetzt 
wieder in Valencia, Israelis und Araber noch an einem Tisch sitzen“ Rößler, (24.04.2002) FAZ and Die euro-
mediterrane Partnerschaft ist das einzige Forum, in dem regelmäßig Regierungsvertreter Israels und der arabischen 
Staaten zusammenkommen“ bc, (05.05.2004) FAZ. 
949  Fast über Nacht wurde deshalb ein bis dahin wenig beachtetes Kooperationsprogramm der Europäischen Union (EU) 
die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft zum Musterbeispiel europäischer Terroristenbekämpfung“ Busse, (11.01.2005) 
FAZ. 
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• A European approach
950. 
• [Solana in the FAZ] An integral component of our response to the end of the Cold War and the 
globalisation challenges
951. 
• [Solana in the FAZ] First and foremost a project of hope and a medium to banish despera-
tion
952. 
• A policy of empty chairs
953. 
• [the foundation of the Mediterranean Union] a rare historic event954. 
These definitions demonstrate that the Mediterranean Policy is perceived as a forum, fulfilling peace-
making tasks concerning the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Arab countries and as a Euro-
pean dominated initiative, which is not explicitly successful.  
The significance of the Mediterranean Policy was expressed in the FAZ, for example, stating that the 
conference in Barcelona took place in the very own interest of the EU955. In 2001, the significance was 
argued in respect of the terror attacks in the US, saying that since the 11th of September, the purpose 
of establishing a space of stability and peace is not a vision of imperturbable optimists anymore, but 
an urgent necessity
956. In 2002, the importance was based on facts, stating that an overall cooperation 
across the Mediterranean is not needless, as the newest numbers demonstrate
 957. Javier Solana also 
referred in the FAZ to the significance of the Barcelona Process because it is based in our common 
interest and responsibility to display the whole potential of this policy
958. In 2008, the newspaper re-
ported that the Union will change the world and avoid a confrontation between the cultures959. The SZ 
stated that although the Union for the Mediterranean is actually something different than the Mediter-
ranean Union, it still remains important
960. Concerning the functionality, the press voices were mea-
 
950  Comp. „Leider wird immer deutlicher, dass dieser "europäische Ansatz" keine Früchte trägt“ Busse, (11.01.2005) 
FAZ. 
951  Comp. „Der Barcelona-Prozess war ein integraler Bestandteil unserer Antwort auf das Ende des Kalten Krieges und 
die Herausforderungen der Globalisierung“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ. 
952  Comp. „Für mich ist der Barcelona-Prozess in erster Linie ein Projekt der Hoffnung und ein Mittel, die Hoffnungslo-
sigkeit endgültig zu verbannen“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ. 
953  Comp. „Diese Politik der leeren Stühle zeigt, wie es wirklich steht um das ehrgeizige Projekt der EU, am Mittelmeer 
eine Zone des Friedens und der Partnerschaft zu bauen“ wtr, (28.11.2005) SZ. 
954  Comp. „(...)die für den 13. Juli geplante Gründung der Mittelmeerunion als "seltenes historisches Ereignis"(...)“ 
Editorial, (02.05.2008) FAZ. 
955  Comp. „Die Konferenz in Barcelona wird Zeichen zur Stabilisierung eines Unruheherds vor der Haustür Europas 
setzen - im ureigenen Interesse der Gemeinschaft“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
956  Comp. „Seit dem 11. September ist ihr Ziel, einen Raum für Stabilität und des Friedens auf beiden Seiten des Mittel-
meers zu schaffen, nicht mehr nur eine Vision für unerschütterliche Optimisten, sondern eine dringende Notwendig-
keit“ Rößler, (05.11.2001) FAZ. 
957  Comp. „Überflüssig ist die das Mittelmeer übergreifende Zusammenarbeit jedoch nicht geworden -im Gegenteil das 
illustrieren neue Zahlen“ Rößler, (22.04.2002) FAZ. 
958  Comp. „Es liegt in unserem gemeinsamen Interesse und in unserer Verpflichtung, das gesamte Potential des Barcelo-
na-Prozesses zu entfalten“ Solana (28.11.2005) FAZ. 
959  Comp. „Die Union werde "die Welt verändern" und eine Konfrontation der Kulturen verhindern“ Editorial, 
(02.05.2008) FAZ. 
960  Comp. „Union für das Mittelmeer ist tatsächlich etwas anderes als eine Mittelmeerunion - aber trotzdem sehr wich-
tig“ Jouyet, (02.02.2008) SZ. 
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gre, saying that the states of the Mediterranean come closer961, that the policy contains brave projects 
and fantasies
962 or that there are concrete measures for the handling of the southern neighbours963. 
The perception of the significance and the functionality of the Barcelona Process are not really rich as 
far as the content is concerned. Beside the confession of the need and certain formulations, which trace 
back to politicians, the public opinion seems to be more indifferent than engaged. A more emotional 
debate can be expected regarding the evaluation of the Mediterranean Policy, which contains few posi-
tive statements but a number of diverse criticisms. 
The few positive voices perceived the Barcelona Process as a starting signal for the departure in a 
new region and as the first occasion that so many states demonstrate a common sense of commu-
nity
964. In 1999, a journalist of the FAZ stated that step by step the mosaic of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership is taking form
965. Another expressed that in Stuttgart it was definitely proved that the 
partnership is sustainable, despite precarious and difficult circumstances
966. The SZ contained the last 
positive statement in 2005: on that day the Barcelona Process is considered a success story967. In con-
trast, there were many other negative voices:  
• At the Barcelona conference much will be said but few decided
968. 
• Critical observers predict that Barcelona will be a fata morgana summit, where castles in the 
air are built with a lot of EU-money, while there is hardly any entrepreneur who wants to in-
vest in this crisis region
969. 
• Also the conventional exaggeration can not delude that the Partnership is just at the begin-
ning
970. 
• The atmosphere of departure has already gone long ago
971. 
 
961  Comp. „Die Staaten des Mittelmeerraums rücken enger zusammen“ wwe, (31.07.1995) FAZ. 
962  Comp. „Kühne Projekte und Phantasien“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
963  Comp. „Hinter diesem sperrigen Begriff verbirgt sich ein Bündel von Maßnahmen der EU im Umgang mit ihren 
südlichen Nachbarn - über Migrationsfragen und Anti-Terror-Politik bis hin zu Strukturhilfen“ Kornelius, 
(06.03.2008) SZ. 
964  Comp. „Die Optimisten dagegen sehen in Barcelona den Startschuss zu einem Aufbruch in der Region. Erstmals 
kämen alle Staaten an einen Tisch und demonstrierten damit ein regionales Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein“ Weimer, 
(27.11.1995) FAZ. 
965  Comp. „Stück für Stück nimmt dennoch das Mosaik der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft Gestalt an“ Stabenow, 
(15.04.1999) FAZ. 
966  Comp. „(…), in Stuttgart sei der "eindeutige Nachweis erbracht worden, dass die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft 
"auch unter manchmal heiklen und schwierigen Umständen tragfähig ist"“ Rößler, (17.04.1999) FAZ. 
967  Comp. „Heute ist der "Barcelona-Prozess", wie er in dem unausrottbaren Hang der EU zu sperrigen Begriffen heißt, 
durchaus eine Erfolgsgeschichte“ Winter, (26.11.2005) SZ. 
968  Comp. „(...)in Barcelona dürfte viel gesagt und wenig entschieden werden“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
969  Comp. „Kritische Beobachter unken schon im voraus etwas von Fata-Morgana-Gipfel; mit dem großen EU-Geldtropf 
am Horizont würden Luftschlösser gebaut, eigene Finanzmittel wolle dagegen kaum ein Unternehmer in der Krisen-
region investieren“ Weimer, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
970  Comp. „Auch die übliche Schönfärberei wird nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen können, dass die Euro-Mediterrane 
Partnerschaft erst am Anfang steht“ Stabenow, (14.04.1997) FAZ. 
971  Comp. „Die Aufbruchsstimmung, (…), ist längst verflogen“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ. 
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• The Barcelona Process has hardly advanced
972; the Barcelona Process is stuck973. 
• The greatest weakness of the auxiliary programmes (MEDA I) is that between 1995 and 1999 
only 26% of the granted funds have been triggered
974. In this context, further programs which 
aimed to enhance trade and cultural exchange did not advance; funds have not been triggered 
and no summit has dealt with this issue for years
975. 
• A glance on the agenda of the conference in Valencia indicates the threat that the EU is going 
to get lost in its numerous projects
976. 
• The meetings in Barcelona and Valencia did not come up with brilliant results; the outcomes 
of this conference will be similar
977. 
• The Barcelona Process remains without notable political success
978; nice in its formulation, 
but mediocre in its success
979
. 
• All three cooperation areas obtain incompleteness
980. 
• In Paris, the results of the Barcelona Process will be regarded as disappointing
981. 
• Migration, fight against terrorism, energy supply, traffic or climatic policy – these were the 
only more or less successful political projects, but which lacked of a big political bracket
982. 
• Nobody has nightmares if he does not know anything about the Barcelona Process
983. 
• Sarkozy stated that the Barcelona Process was not successful because it was based on the ine-
quality between the North and the South
984. 
• Instead of a regrouping of the states, the Union just accepted a new etiquette for an old thing, 
now called “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”. The existing cooperation  
 
 
972  Comp. „Die in Barcelona anvisierte engere politische Zusammenarbeit ist kaum vorangekommen“ Nonnenmacher, 
(18.11.1999) FAZ. 
973  Comp. „Der 1995 beschlossene Barcelona-Prozess steckt fest“ chi, (24.10.2007) SZ. 
974  Comp. „Die größte Schwäche des bisherigen Hilfsprogramms (Meda I) ist, dass im Zeitraum 1995 bis 1999 nur 26 
Prozent der von der EU zugesagten Mittel abgerufen wurden“ Bc, (17.11.2000) FAZ. 
975  Comp. „Die Programme, die Handel und kulturellen Austausch fördern sollen, kamen aber nicht recht voran. Fi-
nanzmittel wurden nicht abgerufen, seit Jahren befasste sich kein Gipfel mehr mit der Sache“ Busse, (15.03.2008) 
FAZ. 
976  Comp. „Geht es um die eigentliche Gestaltung der Partnerschaft, die die Ost-Erweiterung der EU zumindest ansatz-
weise ergänzen soll, laufen sie Gefahr, sich mit ihren zahllosen Vorhaben zu verzetteln, wie auch ein Blick auf die 
Tagesordnung des Treffens in Spanien verdeutlicht“ Rößler, (22.04.2002) FAZ. 
977  Comp. „Nachdem die Treffen zwischen Barcelona 1995 und Valencia 2002 nicht gerade glanzvolle Ergebnisse gezei-
tigt hatten, wird auch diese Konferenz nur wenige konkrete Resultate erreichen“ Haubrich, (24.04.2002) FAZ. 
978  Comp. „Der "Barcelona-Prozess" wurde 1995 gegründet und hatte keinen Erfolg“ Schlitz, (19.05.2008) Welt. 
979  Comp. „Schön die Formulierungen, mäßig jedoch der Erfolg bislang“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ. 
980  Comp. „Auf allen drei Partnerschaftsgebieten bestünden "Unvollkommenheiten"“ Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ. 
981  Comp. „In Paris werden die Ergebnisse des Barcelona-Prozesses als enttäuschend bewertet“ mic, (22.12.2007) FAZ. 
982  Comp. „Migration, Terrorbekämpfung, Energieversorgung, Verkehr oder Klimapolitik - das waren einzelne mehr 
oder weniger erfolgreiche Projekte, denen aber die große politische Klammer fehlte“ Lau, (04.03.2008) Welt. 
983  Comp. „Niemand schläft schlecht wenn er nichts vom Barcelona-Prozess weiß“ Lau, (04.03.2008) Welt. 
984  Comp. „Sarkozy sage in Tunis, der 1995 vereinbarte Barcelona-Prozess habe nicht funktioniert, weil er "auf der 
Ungleichheit von Nord und Süd" gründete“ Editorial, (02.05.2008) FAZ. 
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programs have been upgraded, but nothing more
985. 
• At least the name is a progress. “Mediterranean Union” is more appealing than “Barcelona 
Process”
986. 
The criticism concerning the European Mediterranean Policy is numerous and pertains to many dis-
tinctive aspects. On the one hand, the actual content and outcome is regarded as incomplete, not 
nameable and without any recorded progress. The political ambition of the European Union is per-
ceived as reaction to security concerns and other strategic considerations, but lacks both concept and 
consistency. On the other hand, the apparent failure – due to only few results – is postulated and 
stressed in different ways. Notably, the fact that only one-third of the multi-billion auxiliary programs 
have been triggered emphasises the low progress and probably also the need for this kind of policy. 
Among the German speaking press, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung was the only newspaper that 
commented on this crucial matter. The confidence in the success of the recently launched Mediterra-
nean Union is rather marginal than enthusiastic, which can also be stated for the European Mediterra-
nean Policy in general. 
3.1.4 References to a Mediterranean region 
Within the German press the references to a Mediterranean region mainly concern the often stressed 
frontier issue and security matters.  
In 2007, the TAZ published a long description of the Mediterranean: looking at the globe, the Mediter-
ranean appears to be a small inland sea. But its shores are densely populated and a prosperity gap, 
even a civilisation gap, forms a strong border, which one would like to make impassable for the 
shabby masses that are coming from Africa. But the system of the North is increasingly challenged. In 
the South there is chaos – in the best case, hostile and violent groups, which are disposed to war, form 
up in the name of Islam
987. This perception reflects the frontier issue as well as the security concern. 
The frontier issue has continuously been dealt with since 1995. In that year the FAZ stated that the 
Mediterranean is and remains a huge prosperity frontier
988. In 1999, the FAZ considered the Mediter-
ranean to be more a frontier than a bridge
989. And in 2008, the SZ voiced the French Foreign Minis-
ter, stating that since the 11
th
 of September 2001, the Mediterranean is the main break line between 
 
985  Comp. „Statt einer neuen Staaten-Gruppierung akzeptierte die Gemeinschaft nur ein anderes Etikett für eine alte 
Sache, nunmehr "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer" genannt. Die bestehenden Kooperations-Programme 
zwischen Nord und Süd wurden damit aufgewertet, nicht mehr“ chi, (21.05.2008) SZ. 
986  Comp. „Zumindest der Name ist ein Fortschritt. Eine "Mittelmeer-Union" ist anschaulicher als ein "Barcelona-
Prozess"“ Weingärtner, (15.03.2008) TAZ. 
987  Comp. „Schaut man auf den Globus, dann ist das Mittelmeer nur ein kleines Binnenmeer. Aber seine Ufer sind dicht 
besiedelt, und ein Wohlstands-, ja Zivilisationsgefälle schafft mittendurch eine harte Grenze, die man gerne unpas-
sierbar machen würde für die verwahrlosten Massen aus Afrika. Doch die Ordnung des Nordens wird zunehmend 
herausgefordert. Im Süden herrscht Chaos - dort organisiert sich bestenfalls eine feindliche, kriegslüsterne, gewaltbe-
reite Ordnung im Namen des Islam“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ. 
988  Comp. „Das Mittelmeer ist und bleibt wohl auf absehbare Zeit eine scharfe Wohlstandsgrenze“ Weimer, 
(27.11.1995) FAZ. 
989  Comp. „Noch ist das Mittelmeer mehr eine Grenze als eine Brücke“  Behrendt/Hanelt, (16.04.1999) FAZ. 
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two worlds. This is why we need bridges between the European Union and North Africa as well as the 
African Union
990. The latter expressed vision is diametric to the security concern which is widely 
spread in Europe. According to the FTD in 2000, the Mediterranean is conceived through the lens of 
security policy not only by the USA, but also by the three European great powers, France, Germany 
and Great Britain
991. 
In 2005, Javier Solana stated in the FAZ that in many ways the Mediterranean is exposed to become a 
dangerous gateway for the threats of the modern world, namely poverty, governments in need of im-
provement, terrorism, human trafficking and political extremism
992. In the same year the SZ consid-
ered the Mediterranean having become a problematic region for Europe993. And in 2008, the SZ 
quoted the author Predrag Matvejevic, who perceives the Mediterranean as a sea of neighbourhood, 
while the Atlantic and Pacific oceans are seas of distance
994. 
From these partly distinctive references to a Mediterranean region derives the impression that the 
Mediterranean space, in other words the politically established Mediterranean region, is not yet tangi-
ble. Within the German press there is no clear position about the conception of the Mediterranean; 
there is only a distant and diffuse perception, which is linked to political events and persons. 
3.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
The statements that have been allocated to the category “purpose” focus on the European motivation 
for the Mediterranean Policy and the officially stated aim.  
3.2.1 The purpose of the Mediterranean Policy 
Within the German press the purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy is strongly linked to the 
security concern. In 1995, regarding the political partnership, the considerations of Brussels implied 
security issues
995 and the significance of the meeting in Barcelona was explained by the FAZ with a 
statement of Alfred Sauvy, French scientist in the field of demography, saying that if richness does not 
 
990  Comp. „[Kouchner] Das Mittelmeer ist seit dem 11. September 2001 die wichtigste Bruchlinie zwischen zwei Wel-
ten. Deshalb brauchen wir Brücken zwischen der Europäischen Union und Nordafrika sowie der Afrikanischen Uni-
on“ Kornelius, (24.01.2008) SZ. 
991  Comp. „Diesen Raum betrachten nicht nur die USA, sondern auch die drei EU-Großmächte, Frankreich, Deutschland 
und Großbritannien überwiegend durch das Brennglas der Sicherheitspolitik“ Koch, (01.03.2000) FTD. 
992  Comp. „In vielerlei Hinsicht droht die Mittelmeerregion zu einer gefährlichen Schnittstelle der Gefahren der moder-
nen Welt zu werden: Armut, verbesserungswürdige Regierungsführung, Terrorismus, Menschenhandel und politi-
scher Extremismus. Gleichzeitig bildet die Region unser gemeinsames Erbe und eine einmalige Plattform für Koope-
ration“ Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ 
993  Comp. „Mittelmeer zu einer Problemregion (für Europa) geworden war“ Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ. 
994  Comp. „Das "Meer der Nachbarschaft" nennt Predrag Matvejevic das Mittelmeer, Atlantik und Pazifik sind für den 
Autor hingegen Meere der Distanz“ Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ. 
995 Comp. „Die politische Partnerschaft soll nach Brüsseler Vorstellungen Fragen der "Sicherheit" einschließen“ Bren-
der, (21.03.1995) FAZ. 
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come to the people, the people will go to the rich
996. Therewith, it is unmistakably noticed that the 
Barcelona Process is based on security issues. In this context the purpose was explicitly expressed to 
enhance a greater political stability and an increase of prosperity997. Who wants to assure lasting 
security and prosperity, needs a close partnership with the neighbours in the South
998. It was the aim 
to disarm the potential of crisis999 in the region. In order to reach this purpose, the following expres-
sions were used: enhance the creation of a zone of economic and political stability1000; give impetus to 
the case of peace in the Mediterranean
1001; strengthen democracy, enhancement of education and lib-
eralisation of trade and services
1002; enhance security, political and economic exchange and cultural 
cooperation
1003; better cooperation1004.  
Beside this approach, based on economic relations and exchange, and a dialogue, which should facili-
tate the understanding at some rare occasions, the German press dealt with the political visions which 
are expressed in the context of the Mediterranean Policy. For example, with this initiative one of the 
biggest economic spaces of the world, with thirty states and 800 million consumers could be cre-
ated
1005; or, the new policy should be a complete new model of association of third countries1006; and 
further, the effort of a new Mediterranean Policy is to overcome the historically evolved differences 
between Europe and many of its neighbours
1007. The press utters the vision to create a common space 
of peace, prosperity and respect of the human rights. Therewith, the approach of the European Union 
is not only classified as being a reaction towards the challenges that it is facing in the South, but also 
as an integral part of its world-power vision to become/remain a decisive power. 
 
996  Comp. „Wer angesichts des erwarteten Medienspektakels nach dem Sinn des Treffens fragt, sollte sich eines Satzes 
des französischen Bevölkerungswissenschaftlers Alfred Sauvy entsinnen: "Wenn der Reichtum nicht zu den Men-
schen kommt, werden die Menschen zum Reichtum gehen."“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
997  Comp. „Ziel der zweitägigen Konferenz ist es, die Herausbildung einer Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabili-
tät rings um das Mittelmeer zu erleichtern“ now/wha, (27.11.1995) FAZ. 
998  Comp. „Wer dauerhaft Sicherheit und Wohlstand garantieren wolle, benötige eine enge Partnerschaft auch mit den 
Nachbarn südlich des Mittelmeers“ now, (17.04.1999) FAZ. 
999  Comp. „(BP) (…),sollte dabei helfen, am südlichen Ufer des Mittelmeers ein Krisenpotenzial zu entschärfen“ Non-
nenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ. 
1000  Comp. „(...)der zu größerer politischer Stabilität und zu einem Zugewinn an Wohlstand insbesondere in den südlichen 
Anrainerstaaten führt“ Behrendt/Hanelt, (16.04.1999) FAZ. 
1001  Comp. „Ziel aller Teilnehmer sei es, "der Sache des Friedens im Mittelmeerraum einen großen Impuls zu geben"“ 
now, (29.11.1995) FAZ. 
1002  Comp. „(…), bei der Unterstützung politischer Reformen zur Stärkung der Demokratie, der Förderung der Bildung, 
sowie der Liberalisierung des Handels und der Dienstleistungen neue Schwerpunkte zu setzen“ bc, (13.04.2005) 
FAZ. 
1003  Comp. „Ziel ist es, durch sicherheitspolitische und wirtschaftliche Kooperation sowie kulturelle Zusammenarbeit die 
Stabilität der Region zu fördern“ Behrent/Handelt, (11.09.2000) FTD. 
1004  Comp. „Die EU und die südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer hatten 1995 den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess initiiert, um 
die Kooperation in der Region zu verbessern“ Finkenzeller, (29.11.2005) FTD. 
1005  Comp. „Damit könne einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Welt mit 30 Staaten und 800 Millionen Konsumenten 
geschaffen werden“ wwe, (27.10.1995) FAZ. 
1006  Comp. „Die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft soll ein neues Modell der Assoziierung von Drittstaaten mit der Gemein-
schaft sein“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
1007  Comp. „Dies soll zur Überwindung der im Lauf der Geschichte entstandenen Gegensätze zwischen Europa und vie-
len seiner Nachbarn, aber nicht zuletzt auch zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern beitragen“ now, 
(29.11.1995) FAZ. 
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3.2.2 About the officially stated aim 
The officially stated aim does not greatly differ from the purpose; however, it is less expressive re-
garding the motivation behind. The newspapers also referred to the policy’s aim to enhance a regular 
political dialogue, an economic cooperation and an exchange of experiences
1008 and that it is the am-
bitious goal to create a zone of political and economic stability
1009. These kinds of statements are 
highly repetitive and have a strong persuasive connotation. The press covers the aims, but rarely 
comments on them. At some points there are indications which again refer to a security concern or to 
ambitions that have been introduced on the political level. The aim to decrease the prosperity gap 
should end up in the containment of the flood of immigrants
1010 exemplarily referred to the security 
concern, while there was also the EU’s ambition expressed to counteract the separative force among 
the cultures after the 11
th
 of September
1011 or to banish the inequality between the North and South1012. 
According to the German press, the European Union moves towards the ambivalent ambition to assure 
peace by monitoring and to enhance peace by transforming the world. 
The only statement which implies a certain reference to the European predominance and the territorial 
appropriation was stated in the run-up to the Barcelona Process: The Romans called the Mediterranean 
Sea Mare nostrum, our sea. This is what it should be again for the southern Europeans, who saw its 
Mediterranean space disregarded due to the opening towards the East and the northern enlargement 
of the EU
1013. 
3.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
 Concerning the discourse witch targets at the identity of the European Union, namely its political 
ambition, its internal struggle, its role perception and assumed mandate (mission statement), about 139 
statements could be identified within the German press. 
3.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition  
The references which correspond to the European political ambition deal with the European policy 
approach in the Mediterranean, its proceeding and its strategic considerations.  
 
1008  Comp. „Die Partnerschaft soll auf drei Säulen beruhen: regelmäßiger politischer Dialog, wirtschaftliche Kooperation 
sowie Erfahrungsaustausch“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
1009  Comp. „Ehrgeiziges Ziel ist es, den Mittelmeerraum in eine Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität zu ver-
wandeln“ now, (28.11.1995) FAZ. 
1010  Comp. „Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen Nord und Süd, das sich zur Zeit noch in Disparitäten wie ein Verhältnis von 
zehn zu eins in den Pro-Kopf-Einkommen niederschlägt, soll dadurch abgebaut werden -nicht zuletzt in der Absicht, 
die Flüchtlingswelle in die Union über Marokko, Tunesien und die Türkei einzudämmen“ Behrendt/Hanelt, 
(16.04.1999) FAZ. 
1011  Comp. „Die EU will der Spaltung der Kulturen nach dem 11. September entgegenwirken und ihrerseits ein Signal der 
Solidarität mit der arabischen Welt setzen“ Jennen, (05.11.2001) FTD. 
1012  Comp. „[Jouyet] Wir wollen damit das Ungleichgewicht zwischen Nord und Süd beseitigen“ Jouyet, (02.02.2008) 
SZ. 
1013  Comp. „Die Römer nannten das Mittelmeer Mare nostrum, unser Meer. Das soll es für die Südeuropäer wieder wer-
den, die ihren mediterranen Raum nach der Ostöffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des neuen Europas ge-
drängt sehen“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ. 
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In the run-up to the Barcelona Conference in 1995, the journalists in the German press stressed the 
launch of a new Mediterranean Policy as the purpose of the European Union. The press commented 
that Europe must turn towards the Mediterranean, if it wants to banish the threats based in that re-
gion, namely the prosperity gap and the migration pressure
1014. The FAZ also agreed upon the fact 
that the EU finally requires a mature Mediterranean Policy
1015
 and emphasised that this represents an 
important test of the will of all Europeans to establish a common Foreign Policy
1016. Nevertheless, the 
main voices within the German press focused on emphasising the intended approach. The patronising 
chequebook diplomacy with semi-colonial attitudes is perceived as a threat that nourishes Islamic 
fundamentalism
1017 and due to the consolidation need of the northern enlargement, the European Un-
ion can not afford expensive developmental projects
1018. The FAZ further stated that the watering-can 
principle is the wrong approach; multi-billion governmental auxiliary programmes are the invention 
of politicians and diplomats
1019
; with money alone problems can not be solved1020; in Brussels, there 
exists the ambition to act on the principle of carrot and stick; the one who introduces reforms early 
will receive more financial benefits than the agreed basal amount. However, it seems doubtable if 
former colonial rulers should behave like taskmasters. More promising seems to be the consideration 
to make free access to the EU-market, dependent on the willingness for a regional cooperation
1021. At 
the time when the conference in Barcelona took place, the FAZ repeated that the EU is again subject 
to the fallacy of regularising everything with its chequebook; indeed, security is not for free, but it can 
neither be bought only with money
1022. From the European side it was stated that the meeting alone 
was perceived as success
1023. These statements show that the European approach was already critically 
perceived in the run-up to the Barcelona Process. In 1999, on the occasion of the conference in Stutt-
 
1014  Comp. „Inzwischen zeigt sich, dass sich Europa auch dem Süden stärker zuwenden muss, wenn es die von dort aus-
gehenden Gefahren bannen will“ and „Wenn das Wohlstandsgefälle nicht abgebaut werde, drohten breite Wande-
rungsströme, begründete die Kommission ihre Vorstellungen“ Brender, (21.03.1995) FAZ. 
1015  Comp. „Richtig an der neuen Südinitiative ist, dass Europa endlich eine durchdachte Mittelmeerpolitik braucht“ 
Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ. 
1016  Comp. „Die Mittelmeer-Konferenz Ende November in Barcelona kann nach spanischer Auffassung eine wichtige 
Probe sein für den Willen aller Europäer -ohne Ausnahme-, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik zu finden“ Haubrich, 
(22.09.1995) FAZ. 
1017  Comp. „Eine gönnerhafte Scheckbuch-Diplomatie der Europäer mit semikolonialen Attitüden kann dabei dem islami-
schen Fundamentalismus sogar neuen Nährboden geben“  Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ. 
1018  Comp. „Die EU hat auf der anderen Seite nach ihrer Nord-Erweiterung Konsolidierungsbedarf und kann sich kost-
spielige Entwicklungsprojekte im Süden gar nicht leisten“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ. 
1019  Comp. „Allerdings - die Gießkanne ist dazu das falsche Instrument. Milliardenschwere staatliche Hilfsprogramme 
sind die schnellen Einfälle von Politikern und Diplomaten“ Weimer, (08.06.1995) FAZ. 
1020  Comp. „Mit Geld allein lassen sich die Probleme nicht lösen“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
1021  Comp. „In Brüssel gibt es Bestrebungen, dabei mit Zuckerbrot und Peitsche zu verfahren. Wer schneller Reformen 
einführe, solle über einen festgelegten Sockelbetrag hinaus in den Genuss weiterer finanzieller Hilfen kommen. Ob 
sich die ehemaligen Kolonialherren aus Europa als Zuchtmeister aufführen sollten, lässt sich bezweifeln. Erfolgsver-
sprechender erscheint da schon die Überlegung, den freien Zugang zum EU-Markt von der Bereitschaft zur regiona-
len Kooperation abhängig zu machen“ Stabenow, (24.11.1995) FAZ. 
1022  Comp. „Die EU unterliegt auch hier wieder dem Trugschluss, dass mit dem Scheckbuch alles zu regeln sei. Sicher-
heit ist zwar nicht gratis zu haben, doch auch nicht mit Geld allein“ Editorial/“Berliner Zeitung“, (29.11.1995) FAZ. 
1023  Comp. „Dass es überhaupt zu dem Treffen kam, mag man schon als Erfolg der Europäischen Union anerkennen“ 
wha, (29.11.1995) FAZ. 
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gart, it was stated that the MNC partner countries demanded a signal of the European countries to 
demonstrate that the historic changes in the East will not provoke the turning away from the South
1024. 
Concerning the European ambition, it was reflected that the European Union has its reasons for re-
suming the dialogue with its southern neighbours, especially as the chances for a long-term and stable 
improvement of the political situation have not been so promising for a long time
1025. In 2004, the po-
litical ambition of the European Union was described as follows: the EU supports projects in the 
MNCs to enhance democratisation, the constitutional conditions and the evolvement of civil societies. 
With some of these countries even the combat against terrorism and migration issues are dis-
cussed
1026. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the FAZ gave voice to 
Javier Solana, who stated that the enhancement of democracy, pluralism and human rights constitutes 
an integral part of the Barcelona initiative and that for the Europeans these are fundamental values, 
which they try to advance abroad
1027. Therewith, the newspaper gave room to a political mission 
statement, which was not further treated, commented or emphasised by the press. Around the same 
time, other newspapers commented on the European motivation for the Mediterranean Policy in con-
nection with security concerns and stressed criticism about the approach. For example, it was stated in 
the SZ that long before the pictures of African boat people and migrants in the barbwire of Ceuta and 
Melilla awaked the European consciousness, the European Union had conceived that the Mediterra-
nean, the former mare nostrum of the Romans, had become a problematic region
1028. The SZ further 
noted that the European policy in the Mediterranean yields unexpected fruits; in the beginning, the 
European calculus was simple: people who are doing business together can more easily be convinced 
to reconcile; to discuss with these people issues like democracy, human rights, refugees or the combat 
against terrorism was not thought of at that time
1029. Concerning the actual interest in the region, the 
FTD critically stated that the EU-northern-lights conceive the Mediterranean as a vacation destination 
 
1024  Comp. „Außerdem forderten die Mittelmeeranrainer unter den EU-Staaten, es müsse ein Signal gesetzt werden, um 
zu zeigen, dass Europa sich, nach dem historischen Umbruch in seinem Osten, nicht vom Süden abwenden werde“ 
Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ. 
1025  Comp. „Doch solche Schwierigkeiten ändern nichts daran, dass die Europäische Union allen Grund hat, den Dialog 
mit ihren Nachbarn am südlichen Mittelmeerufer neu aufzunehmen. Schon lange nicht mehr waren die Chancen so 
gut, dass sich die politische Lage dort langfristig und stabil verbessern könnte“ Nonnenmacher, (18.11.1999) FAZ. 
1026  Comp. „Die EU unterstützt in diesen Staaten auch Projekte zur Demokratisierung, zur Verbesserung der rechtsstaatli-
chen Verhältnisse und zur Förderung der Zivilgesellschaft. Mit einigen von ihnen wird auch über die Bekämpfung 
des Terrorismus und Fragen der Migration gesprochen“ bc, (01.12.2004) FAZ. 
1027  Comp. „Die Förderung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und Menschenrechte war schon immer Teil der Barcelona-
Initiative. Für uns Europäer sind dies fundamentale Werte, weshalb wir diese auch im Ausland zu fördern suchen“ 
Solana, (28.11.2005) FAZ. 
1028  Comp. „Lange bevor die Bilder afrikanischer Boat People oder von Migranten im Stacheldraht der spanischen Exkla-
ven Ceuta und Melilla die Nordeuropäer aufschreckten, hatte die Europäische Union begriffen, dass das Mittelmeer, 
das einstige Mare Nostrum der Römer, für sie zu einer Problem-Region geworden war“ Chimelli, (03.11.2005) SZ. 
1029  Comp. „Die europäische Politik für das Mittelmeer trägt Früchte, die sich die EU am Anfang gar nicht gewünscht 
hatte (...)Das europäische Kalkül war schlicht: Wer miteinander Handel treibt, lässt sich eher zur Beilegung von Kon-
flikten bewegen. Daran, mit diesen Ländern auch ein Gespräch über Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Flüchtlinge oder 
den Kampf gegen den Terrorismus einzutreten, dachte damals noch keiner“ Winter, (26.11.2005) SZ. 
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rather than anything else
1030 and that the Europeans have not reached their goal to bind the MNC 
politically and economically closer to them
1031. The FTD additionally expressed the conviction that 
Europe should accompany the development in the Arab countries as a partner rather than a conduc-
tor
1032. It infers from this that the perception of the European approach is everything but altruistic, 
even predominant. Concerning the official political ambition to transport European values, the TAZ 
stated that it is not in the preliminary interest of the European Union to export democracy, but to as-
sure security in its own territory
1033. In the concrete context of the foundation of the Mediterranean 
Union, the SZ attested Europe a strategic confusion1034 and stated that the problems all have the same 
root: Europe lacks of orientation, it misses a final profile, a concrete goal
1035. 
Although the need for a political approach in the Mediterranean is recognized and the European effort 
is considered to point towards the right direction, the methodological approach and the strategic con-
sideration are critically stressed.  
3.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle 
Although the articles in the German press also stress the time span before the conference in Barcelona, 
the statements, which refer to the internal struggle, mainly treat the separative character which is in-
herent in the original French proposal of a Mediterranean Union only for countries bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea. 
The FAZ stated that only after the criticism of the German Chancellor Merkel, saying that a Mediter-
ranean Union without a great part of the European countries would be a severe test for the European 
Union, Sarkozy conceded the perspective of a Mediterranean Union in which all EU-countries are 
participating
1036. Beforehand, Sarkozy tried to find a majority for his project and could win Spain and 
Italy for his position. Spain expressed that it wants the Mediterranean countries to become decisive 
protagonists parallel to the EU
1037; and Italy stated that the war of cultures can only be won with con-
crete initiatives
1038. Anyhow, Sarkozy accepted that his Mediterranean Union could only be launched 
 
1030  Comp. „Die EU-Nordlichter betrachten das Mittelmeer eher als Urlaubsgegend“ Koch, (01.03.2000) FTD. 
1031 Comp. „Die Europäer sind ihrem Ziel, die Mittelmeerstaaten politisch und wirtschaftlich näher an sich zu binden, 
nicht viel näher gekommen“ Koch, (14.11.2000) FTD. 
1032  Comp. „Europa hat das Ziel ihre Entwicklung [arab. Länder] als Partner nicht als Dirigent zu begleiten“ Hanelt, 
(25.11.2005) FTD. 
1033  Comp. „Europa geht es bislang nicht darum, Demokratie zu exportieren, sondern in erster Linie um die Sicherung 
eigener Hoheitsgebiete. Das sind Ausbesserungsarbeiten an der Festung Europa“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ. 
1034  Comp. „Europa ist strategisch verwirrt“ Weidenfeld, (8.11.2008) SZ. 
1035  Comp. „All die Probleme deuten auf eine gemeinsame Wurzel: Europa fehlt die Orientierung, es fehlt ein finales 
Profil, ein eindeutiges Ziel“ (08.11.2008) SZ. 
1036  Comp. „Erst nach der Kritik von Kanzlerin Merkel, dass eine Mittelmeer-Union unter Ausschluss eines Teils der EU-
Mitgliedstaaten eine schwere Belastungsprobe für die EU darstellen würde, hat Sarkozy in Aussicht gestellt, die Mit-
telmeer-Union anderen Mitgliedsstaaten zu öffnen“ Wiegel, (08.12.2007) FAZ. 
1037  Comp. „[Zapatero] "Wir wollen, dass die Länder des Mittelmeers parallel zur EU entscheidende Protagonisten wer-
den"“ mic, (22.12.2007) FAZ. 
1038  Comp. „[Prodi] "Der Krieg der Kulturen kann nur mit konkreten Initiativen gewonnen werden", (…)“ mic, 
(22.12.2007) FAZ. 
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within the scope of the Barcelona Process.1039 He was quoted in the FAZ, stating that Angela wanted 
all European countries to have the possibility to participate. In contrast, he thought that the process, 
launched in 1995, was stuck and that one would have to evolve a real partnership with the countries of 
the South
1040. It was a long struggle and the German government finally achieved that the French pro-
ject was imbedded in the already existing structures.1041  
 Nevertheless, the dissociative character of this debate was also subject of the German newspapers. 
Bernard Kouchner stated in an interview in the Welt that France has demonstrated that it had found 
back to the diplomatic way of dialogue
1042 and that France today is playing a proactive role in the 
world
1043. The Welt further commented that France wants to be bigger as it is1044. The TAZ also ac-
centuated the French position critically, stating that in reality Sarkozy incorporates the decline of the 
model of a visionary European statesman
1045; in the context of the Mediterranean Policy, Sarkozy was 
never really concerned with the EU and Turkey; his concerns are the French national interests, which 
he wants to appear more valuable as they are by mantling them with the etiquette of modernisation
1046.  
The criticism on the French procedure was less discussed than expected. The historic rivalry between 
Germany and France did not dominate the articles in the considered newspapers. The criticism was 
objective and the tonality concerning Angela Merkel benevolent but not exuberant, although it was her 
reaction that forced Sarkozy to change his mind. 
3.3.3 The role of the European Union in the Mediterranean 
The statements assigned to this category within the German press concern, on the one hand, the differ-
ent roles the European Union assumes in the Mediterranean and stress, on the other hand, the EU as a 
counter-balance to the United States. 
The most decisive role of the EU in the Mediterranean is the one as a financier and an investor. In 
2005, the FAZ reported that in the past ten years a total of 6.2 billion Euro had been paid to the part-
ner countries, which makes the European Union the largest non-military auxiliary donor in the Middle 
 
1039  Comp. „Sarkozy hat offenbar akzeptiert, dass seine Mittelmeerunion nur unter dem Dach des Barcelona-Prozesses 
gebildet werden darf“ Schmiese, (04.03.2008) FAZ. 
1040  Comp. „(Sarkozy) "Angela wollte, dass alle europäischen Länder im Rahmen des Barcelona-Prozesses mitmachen 
können. Und ich dachte, dass dieser Prozess, 1995 begonnen, stecken geblieben sei und dass man eine wirkliche Part-
nerschaft mit den Ländern des Südens schaffen müsse"“ flf, (07.03.2008) FAZ. 
1041  Comp. „Nach einigem Hin und Her gelang es der Bundesregierung schließlich, dem französischen Projekt die Spitze 
zu nehmen, in dem sie dessen Einbettung in die bestehenden Strukturen der EU durchsetzte“ Busse, (15.03.2008) 
FAZ. 
1042  Comp. „Bernard Kouchner: Wir haben gezeigt, dass Frankreich zu einer Diplomatie des Dialogs zurückgefunden hat“ 
Hehn, (20.07.2008) Welt. 
1043  Comp. „(B. Kouchner): Frankreich spielt heute weltweit eine aktive Rolle“ Hehn, (20.07.2008) Welt. 
1044  Comp. „Frankreich will größer sein, als es ist“ Schmid, (31.07.2007) Welt. 
1045  Comp. „In Wirklichkeit verkörpert Sarkozy den Niedergang der Figur des visionären europäischen Staatsmanns“ 
Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ. 
1046  Comp. „Nein, Sarkozy geht es weder um Europa noch um die Türkei. Ihm geht es um scheinbare französische Natio-
nalinteressen, die er mit dem Etikett der Modernisierung wertvoller zu machen versucht, als sie es in Wirklichkeit 
sind“ Senocak, (06.08.2007) TAZ. 




1047. Of course, this aspect provokes reactions on the public level, which have already been men-
tioned before to a certain extent. At this point, not the fact per se shall be stressed, but the reactions 
which relate to the EU’s actual role as a main financier in the region. The SZ, for example, indirectly 
referred to the power that this role implicates and the lack of results on the MNC side, stating that the 
patience of the Europeans is big, but may not be endless
1048. In another context, the fact that the Euro-
pean Union put conditions on its auxiliary programmes was stressed with the following question: what 
would the EU be if it renounced to combine aid and credits with the demand for democracy and trans-
parency in the South?
1049 It was commented in the FAZ that the EU-offices know about the reciprocal 
dependences, which is why it may not comport itself like a schoolmaster
1050. The ambivalent applica-
tion and endorsement of conditions in connection with the role of being the mayor financier reflects 
the ambivalent position regarding a more proactive or distant role of the European Union abroad in the 
German press.  
Other references demand a more proactive role of the European Union. If this concerns the fact that 
the EU should make more use of the existing instruments of the Barcelona Process1051, in the context 
of the closure of association agreements it is suggested that the EU should be more convincing1052. The 
proactive role was also repetitively stressed in connection with the Middle East Peace Process, where 
the EU is among the players in the peace process as it is a member of the Middle East quartet
1053. The 
request to become more proactive and play a more effective role in the Middle East is a central aim of 
the European Foreign Policy, to a great extent due to distinguishing itself. This appears to be difficult, 
as from time to time the lack of concept becomes obvious. Thus, it was stated in 2000 in the FTD that 
the European Mediterranean strategy to enhance prosperity in the eastern Mediterranean region is 
not linked to the Gulf region. This demonstrates a lack of concept how the Iran and the Iraq could 
peacefully be integrated in the region
1054. The FTD further accentuated that the European Union must 
ascertain its priorities and conduct them consequently
1055.  
 
1047  Comp. „(…) Seit 1995 insgesamt 6,2 Milliarden Euro an die Partnerländer gezahlt. (…) Das macht die EU zum 
größten nicht militärischen Hilfegeber im Mittelmeerraum und im Nahen Osten“ Busse, (11.01.2005) FAZ. 
1048  Comp. „Die Geduld der Europäer ist groß, aber sie darf nicht unendlich sein.“ Wtr, (28.11.2005) FTD. 
1049  Comp. „Was aber wäre die EU, wenn sie im Süden darauf verzichten würde, Hilfen und Kredite mit Ansprüchen 
nach Demokratie und Transparenz zu verbinden?“ Schlötzer, (23.01.2008) SZ. 
1050  Comp. „Am EU-Sitz weiß man jedoch, daß sich Europa angesichts der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit nicht als Schul-
meister gebärden darf“ Stabenow, (19.09.1997) FAZ. 
1051  Comp. „Zudem habe man durch den Barcelona-Prozess bereits ein Instrumentarium, das genutzt werden müsse“ 
Caceres, (01.02.2008) SZ. 
1052  Comp. „Hier muss die EU Überzeugungsarbeit leisten“ Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD. 
1053  Comp. „(...)ist die EU heute als Mitglied des Nahost-Quartetts ein Mitspieler im Friedensprozeß“ Bacia, (28.11.2005) 
FAZ. 
1054  Comp. „Außerdem fällt auf, dass die Mittelmeerstrategie Wohlstand und Sicherheit im östlichen Mittelmeerraum 
nicht mit den Entwicklungen in der Golfregion verknüpft. Es fehlt ein Konzept wie Iran und Irak in Zukunft friedlich 
an die Region angeschlossen werden können“ Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD. 
1055  Comp. „Die Europäische Union muss in ihrer Mittelmeerstrategie Prioritäten setzen und diese konsequent verfolgen“ 
Berenth/Hanelt, (11.09.2000) FTD. 
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Especially in respect of the Middle East the role of Europe in the world power concert has to be 
stressed. For years the EU has been requested to obtain a more proactive role in the Mediterranean, 
also for the reason that the Arab countries seek for a counter-balance to the United States. Concerning 
the Mediterranean Affairs, the relation to the USA is also treated in the German press; for example, in 
the run-up of the Barcelona Process, where the main dissent, especially between Spain and France, 
concerned the participation of the United States and Russia at the conference in Barcelona
1056. It was 
obvious for all that there was no protagonist role conceded to the USA1057. In 1996, the EU made an 
effort to explain its position that neither the USA nor Europe should aim for a false protagonism in the 
Middle East and that both powers could complement each other well in their work
1058. In 1997, it was 
stated that the absence of representatives of the United States minimises the hope to implement a new 
dynamic in the Middle East Peace Process
1059. At the same time the EU remained unimpressed in 
regard to the US-warning not to mix the Middle East Conflict with the process of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership
1060. In 2003, it was stated that the USA hopes to avoid through their con-
cept similar problems which are contained in the European approach
1061. Additionally, in 2004 the 
European Union apparently made clear that it wanted to contribute a proper approach to the, from the 
United States, suggested initiative to democratise and modernise the Middle East
1062. 
These statements indicate the aim of the European Union to advance to a serious world power. Al-
though it struggles with its concept, coherence and consistency, the EU tries to self-confidently posi-
tion itself opposed to the predominating United States. The German Press relates to these happenings 
and basically finds an encouraging tone.  
 
 
4 Great  Bri tain  
Far the fewest statements have been identified in the British Press, in the Guardian (liberal with con-
servative tendency) and in the Independent (moderate liberal). The distribution of statements per 
 
1056  Comp. „Über die Teilnahme der Vereinigten Staaten und Russlands an der Mittelmeerkonferenz der Europäischen 
Union und der südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer in Barcelona (27. und 28. November) gibt es noch Meinungsverschie-
denheiten zwischen Frankreich und dem Veranstalterland Spanien“ wha, (07.10.1995) FAZ. 
1057  Comp. „Eine Protagonistenrolle hätten wir den Vereinigten Staaten sicher nicht zugestanden“ wha, (07.10.1995) 
FAZ. 
1058  Comp. „Es sollte im Nahen Osten kein falscher Protagonismus gesucht werden, weder von den Vereinigten Staaten 
noch von Europa. Beide Mächte können sich dort in ihrer Arbeit sehr gut ergänzen“ Haubrich, (08.11.1996) FAZ. 
1059  Comp. „Da die Konferenz ohne amerikanische Präsenz stattfindet, sind die Hoffnungen auf eine von der Mittelmeer-
insel ausgehende neue Dynamik im nahöstlichen Friedensprozess gering“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) FAZ. 
1060  Comp. „Unbeeindruckt blieben die Europäer durch die jüngsten Mahnungen aus Washington, die Nahost-
Problematik nicht mit dem Prozess der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft zu vermischen“ Stabenow, (17.04.1997) 
FAZ. 
1061  Comp. „Die USA hoffen, dass durch ihr Konzept Probleme, mit denen die EU-Initiative zu kämpfen hat, vermieden 
werden“ Alden/Khalaf, (12.05.2003) FTD. 
1062  Comp. „An der von den Vereinigten Staaten vorgeschlagenen Initiative zur Demokratisierung und Modernisierung 
des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens will sich die Europäische Union mit einem eigenständigen Ansatz beteiligen“ Bc, 
(06.03.2004) FAZ. 
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newspaper shows that more statements could be identified in the regarded articles of the Guardian (30) 
than in the Independent (19):  
 
GREAT BRITAIN number of articles per category and newspaper 
 Independent Guardian Total 
Expression 9 4 13 
Purpose 2 3 5 
Identity 8 23 31 
 19 30 49 
 
The distribution per category indicates that by far the most statements have been allocated to “iden-
tity” (31). Only five statements gave an insight into the purpose/aim of the European Mediterranean 
Policy: 
 
GREAT BRITAIN number of statements per category 
the other ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 1 6 0 6 13 
purpose aim    
Purpose 2 3   5 
EU     
Identity 31    31 
 
The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern: 
 
GREAT BRITAIN distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression      1    2 7   3 13 
Purpose           3   2 5 
Identity          4 4  4 19 31 
Total      1    6 14  4 24 49 
 
Within the British press articles were found from the year 2000 onwards1063. Not surprisingly, in the 
years 2005 and 2008 the highest density of considered statements was noted. 
4.1 Discourse analysis - Expression 
 The few statements which have been assigned to this category concern the British perception of asso-
ciative and dissociative elements within the co-operational relations with the MNC and the European 
Mediterranean Policy per se. 
 
1063  Due to the fact that there were a higher number of articles identified, for example, in Switzerland, the lack of acces-
sion to previous articles, which would have been an expensive undertaking, was regarded as not predominantly 
significant.  
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4.1.1 The view of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements of the partnership 
Considering the identified statements, both subcategories melt to a single examination, as the mes-
sages of the discourse largely interfere. Basically, the British press focuses on four aspects, dealing 
with the “other” in reference to associative and dissociative, respectively elements of cooperation. 
The first aspect concerns the reported conviction that the Arab countries are desperate for a strong 
European role
1064 in the Mediterranean. From this derives the basal consideration of the British dis-
course that the European engagement finds support in the Arab world; hence, the associative issue 
would be a voluntary and volitional position, a consent, regarding the European engagement. 
The second element refers to the Turkish request to join the European Union1065 and the British con-
viction that the Barcelona Process needs to play a major role in supporting Turkish aspirations to join 
the EU. This position indicates the possibility of an associative, an integrative element of the coopera-
tion, which the British newspaper the Independent supports.  
A dissociative character and third issue is mentioned in connection with the definition of terrorism. 
The Independent, which published the speech of the secretary general of the League of Arab States, 
quoted: no, we don’t believe and we refuse to accept the superficial and bad faith interpretations of 
the origins of terrorism as a product of Islamic thought and education
1066
.This statement constitutes 
one of the rare occasions that facilitates an insight into the “other”. As it was already stated in the con-
text of the analysis of other documents, the agreement on a common formulation and on the definition 
of terms like “terrorism” is a sensitive part among the partners. Therefore, it is remarkable that the 
secretary of the Arab League was given the voice in the British press. 
The last aspect in the British discourse concerning these categories can be found at the time of the 
Paris summit in 2008, where the partner countries raised their concerns over the Mediterranean Union: 
Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new union was just a means of reasserting French colonial 
ambitions in North Africa and of keeping the pressures of immigration into southern Europe at bay. 
Other Arabs were suspicious that, by inviting Israel, the project was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy’s 
hopes of integrating Israel into a wider Europe. Human rights remain conspicuous by their absence 
from the agenda. And worries that this was all a French plot under European disguise were hardly 
allayed by the choice of initial co-operation schemes – solar power, nuclear energy and cleaning up 
 
 
1064  Comp. „And since the Arabs are desperate for a strong European role – and maybe a European multilateral force – 
that left the Israelis with their usual veto” Fisk, (17.11.2000) the Independent. 
1065   Comp. „The same could also be said on the issue of the Turkish request to join the European Union. This issue has 
cultural and civilisational dimensions“ Secretary general of the League of Arab States, (14.09.2005) Independent.  
1066  Comp. „No, we don’t believe and we refuse to accept the superficial and bad faith interpretations of the origins of 
terrorism as a product of Islamic thought and education” Secretary general of the League of Arab States, (14.09.2005) 
Independent.  
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the sea – in all of which French industrial presence is strong
1067. Another statement, published in the 
Guardian, deals with the reaction of the Libyan president Muammar al-Gaddafi: Gaddafi dismissed a 
French proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to Arabs and Africans. “This is tak-
ing us for fools,” he said. “We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the 
African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo an 
Addis Ababa.”
1068   
These statements are remarkable insofar, as they again provide a rare insight into the concern of the 
“other”. The expressed incommodities of course inhere also a strong dissociative character, because 
they indicate a predominant European position and an uncertainty regarding the intentions of the 
European Union. The best example in this respect is Libya, which currently still rejects the coopera-
tion within the existing political frame. 
4.1.2  How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
Less statements than expected refer to the Mediterranean Policy. Beside some definitional references, 
there is clear request on what the Mediterranean policy should fulfil and there are also evaluative 
statements. 
On the occasion of the tenth anniversary, a general definition of the Mediterranean Policy was pub-
lished in the Guardian: an ambitious attempt to strengthen links with the countries on its southern 
flank, from Morocco in the west to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, boldly taking in Israel 
and the Palestinian territories
1069. However, in the same context the policy was also defined as lop-
sided partnership
1070
, including certain criticism about the poor outcome so far. Anyhow, in 2004 an 
unambiguous positive statement regarding the Barcelona Process could also be found. It stressed that 
it’s not dramatic and its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. But it is working, as recent 
developments in Iran and North Africa have shown, because it offers inducement without  
 
 
1067  Comp. „Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new union was just a means of reasserting French colonial ambi-
tions in North Africa and of keeping the pressures of immigration into southern Europe at bay. Other Arabs were sus-
picious that, by inviting Israel, the project was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy’s hopes of integrating Israel into a wider 
Europe. Human rights remain conspicuous by their absence from the agenda. And worries that this was all a French 
plot under European disguise were hardly allayed by the choice of initial co-operation schemes – solar power, nuclear 
energy and cleaning up the sea – in all of which French industrial presence is strong” Editorial, (12.07.2008) Inde-
pendent. 
1068  Comp. „dismissed a French proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to Arabs and Africans. “This is 
taking us for fools,” he said. “We do not belong to Brussels. Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the African Un-
ion is located in Addis Ababa. If they want cooperation they have to go through Cairo an Addis Ababa.”” Black, 
(12.06.2008) Guardian. 
1069  Comp. “(…) launched an ambitious attempt to strengthen links with the countries on its southern flank, from Mo-
rocco in the west to Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, boldly taking in Israel and the Palestinian territories” 
Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian. 
1070  Comp. „Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more construc-
tive one“ Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian. 





Concerning critical evaluations of the Barcelona Process, there are several statements which stress its 
failure. One was published on the occasion of the anniversary conference in 2005, when it was de-
nounced that at least eight of the non-EU 10 failed to send their leaders1072. This constituted an herb 
reversal for the Barcelona Process and indicated the unmasked support of the initiative among the 
participating countries. The Middle East conflict is also perceived as a harming factor for the initia-
tive1073, due to the fact that the lack of efficiency in general is critically evaluated and seen as a reason 
why the Barcelona Process has run into the sands1074.   
The British discourse mentions the predominant European role in the Barcelona Process; moreover, it 
values its positive effects and its final aim despite the poor results. 
4.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
The fewest statements have been identified for the analytical category “purpose”.  
 
The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy  
Within the British press the purpose of the Mediterranean Policy is assigned to security concerns and 
the wish to define the European Foreign Policy. The security concern can be derived from statements 
like: self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export stability into Europe’s “Club Med” back-
yard or see instability imported into the EU’s own house
1075
; or, the policy seeks to align governments 
with the concerns of a myopic global security agenda
1076
. Therewith, the ambivalence of the European 
purpose is made clear. On the one hand, there is the security concern which forms the main motiva-
tion, namely the self-interest; on the other hand, there is the wish to fulfil a properly assumed mission. 
Criticism becomes also apparent when it is stated that the policy is regarded to be myopic. 
The officially stated aim mainly expresses the European altruistic plan, as it was formulated in 2005: 
the launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed at forming a new community of nations 
with their Mediterranean identity as the common denominator and the dialogue between its several 
 
 
1071  Comp. „It’s not dramatic and its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. But it is working, as recent develop-
ments in Iran and North Africa have shown, because it offers inducement without imposition” Hamilton, 
(18.03.2004) Independent. 
1072  Comp. „European leaders turned out in force, including Tony Blair, but at least eight of the non-EU 10 failed to send 
their leaders” MacAskill, (28.11.2005) Guardian. 
1073  Comp. „(…) the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to haunt the scene because biased policies have pushed the conflict 
into a dead end” secretary general of the League of Arab State, (14.09.2005) Independent. 
1074  Comp. „The existing drive towards closer relationship with North Africa in the Barcelona process of 1995 has run 
into the sands” Editorial, (12.07.2008) Independent. 
1075  Comp. „Self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export stability into Europe’s “Club Med” backyard or see 
instability imported into the EU’s own house.” Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian. 
1076  Comp. „(…) seeks to align governments with the concerns of a myopic global security agenda” Bin Talal, 
(06.02.2008) Guardian. 
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civilisations a priority item, along with security, culture and social development
1077
; or in 2008: the 
new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to set up common approaches to, among other things, 
global warming, investment, solar energy, water shortages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, 
road and sea transport and university exchange programmes
1078. These statements indicate a lot of the 
will and the ambitions, which make the Mediterranean Union attractive for the co-operating countries; 
however, the actual purpose of the European Union is difficult to be deduced. 
4.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
The statements regarding the analytical category “identity” concern references to the political ambition 
and role of the European Union and also to the internal forces and national interests of the member 
states. 
4.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition 
All thirty-one statements which refer to this category have been published after 2004. Concerning the 
European political ambition, this means that the EU enlargement of 2004 had already been taken 
place, the ENP had already been introduced and the Barcelona Process was confronted with its most 
criticised moment in the anniversary year 2005, three years before Sarkozy expressed its vision of a 
Mediterranean Union. 
The European political ambition was stressed in connection with its approach in the Mediterranean. In 
the Guardian, it was stated that the European Union has pressurised Maghreb countries into economic 
liberalisation to create opportunities for European business, but these have not improved the lives of 
the majority
1079
. This statement implicitly scrutinized the efficiency of the European method. The 
Guardian further stated that the expanded EU is offering its new neighbours greater cooperation and 
assistance – but also keeping them at arm’s length
1080. On the occasion of the tenth anniversary, the 
Guardian expressed the following in a less metaphoric way, but with a remarkable portion of criticism: 
EU financial aid has not been made conditional on reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, 
scaremongering about Islamists, to democratise. Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the  
 
 
1077   Comp. „The launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed at forming a new community of nations with 
their Mediterranean identity as the common denominator and the dialogue between its several civilisations a priority 
item, along with security, culture and social development” secretary general of the League of Arab States, 
(14.09.2005) Independent. 
1078  Comp. „The new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to set up common approaches to, among other things, 
global warming, investment, solar energy, water shortages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, road and sea 
transport and university exchange programmes” Lichfield, (14.07.2008) Independent. 
1079  Comp. „The European Union has pressurised Maghreb countries into economic liberalisation to create opportunities 
for European business, but these have not improved the lives of the majority” Landor, (07.03.2004) Guardian. 
1080  Comp. „The expanded EU is offering its new neighbours greater cooperation and assistance – but also keeping them 
at arm’s length” Black, (13.05.2004) Guardian. 





In the same context a concrete request was expressed, stating that Europeans must try harder to over-
come the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more constructive one
1082. 
Thus, the European Union is dedicated to a political ambition in the Mediterranean, which the Inde-
pendent described as a perfectly sensible course of its own through the Barcelona process which tries 
to bring North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe through trade and in-
vestment agreements tempered by human rights requirements
1083; but the criticism, which had been 
directed towards the efficiency of the initiative in the Mediterranean, was also perceived as challenge 
for the entire concept of the European Foreign Policy: in one sense for Europe to go along with the 
Greater Middle East initiative requires no more than melding this policy with US might. But in an-
other sense, it wraps a policy of patient diplomacy in a new language of demand which could bring 
about the very conditions of conflict that it seeks to resolve
1084. In addition, it was even more explicitly 




Beside the threat, which a project of such an immense dimension always might to entail for the initia-
tor, the European role in the Mediterranean is positively perceived by the British press: funding from 
the EU and from member states has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassionate community-
building efforts by European individuals and organisations have highlighted the true closeness of all 
who share a common Mediterranean history. It is vital that Europe’s experience, commitment and 
heritage of hope be framed in a vision for the Middle East that becomes a model for its future
1086. This 
implies a mission character and aims to legitimate the European approach to represent a role-model, 
beside the technical and co-operational assistance.  
 
1081  Comp. „EU financial aid has not been made conditional on reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, scare-
mongering about Islamists, to democratise. Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the Euro-Med dialogue” Leader, 
(29.11.2005) Guardian. 
1082  Comp. „Europeans must try harder to overcome the obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into a more construc-
tive one” Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian. 
1083  Comp. „The European Union has so far pursued a perfectly sensible course of its own through the Barcelona process 
which tries to bring North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe through trade and invest-
ment agreements tempered by human rights requirements” Hamilton, (18.03.2004) Independent. 
1084  Comp. „In one sense for Europe to go along with the Greater Middle East initiative requires no more than melding 
this policy with US might. But in another sense, it wraps a policy of patient diplomacy in a new language of demand 
which could bring about the very conditions of conflict that it seeks to resolve” Hamilton, (18.02.2004) Independent. 
1085  Comp. „The European Union’s policy in the Middle East is the litmus test of its common foreign and security policy” 
Bin Talal, (21.10.2007) Guardian. 
1086  Comp. „Funding from the EU and from member states has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassionate com-
munity-building efforts by European individuals and organisations have highlighted the true closeness of all who 
share a common Mediterranean history. It is vital that Europe’s experience, commitment and heritage of hope be 
framed in a vision for the Middle East that becomes a model for its future” Bin Talal, (21.10.2007) Guardian. 
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4.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle 
The distinctive forces within the European Union are based on the individual interests of the member 
states. In respect of the Mediterranean Policy, the British press outlined that France, Spain and Italy 
had long looked across the Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Britain’s role stretched 
back decades; all Europeans share interests in the region
1087. Therewith, the internal struggle was pre-
programmed. The most determined phase within the discourse of the British press was the time after 
the original French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union only with countries bordering the Medi-
terranean. The following debate was mainly conducted by France and Germany. Germany, the EU 
paymaster, balked at that and also suspected a Sarkozy scheme to divide the EU into zones of influ-
ence where Berlin would take charge to its east and Paris would play the main role in the south
1088. 
The Independent commented on the German rejection of Sarkozy’s plan as follows: Berlin has been 
especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy’s determination to push ahead with a so-called “Club Med” or 
formal union of countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that such an 
organisation would be either a pointless distraction or a threat to the unity of the EU
1089. Great Britain 
also opposed the French plan, less because of the threat to the conception of Europe, but because of 
the question concerning the Turkish integration: Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was de-
signed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the EU. Britain is Turkey’s biggest supporter in the EU, 
while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara joining
1090.  
Beside this clear statement, the British press also commented on the suggested policy direction, stating 
that the idea is to create a permanent institutional link between Europe and all countries with Medi-
terranean coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is 
that the union will boost economic and security cooperation
1091. And further: Despite the fanfare in 
Paris, Sarkozy’s new “Club Med” will be a long haul if it is to amount too much beyond a talking 
shop and a channel for transferring EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East
1092. These critical 
voices imply a distant and irritated position regarding the French proposal because of the uncertainty 
 
1087  Comp. „France, Spain and Italy had long looked across the Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Britain’s 
role stretched back decades; all Europeans shared interests in the region” Leader, (29.11.2005) Guardian. 
1088  Comp. „Germany, the EU paymaster, balked at that and also suspected a Sarkozy scheme to divide the EU into zones 
of influence where Berlin would take charge to its east and Paris would play the main role in the south” Traynor, 
(14.07.2008) Guardian. 
1089  Comp. „Berlin has been especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy’s determination to push ahead with a so-called “Club 
Med” or formal union of countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that such an or-
ganisation would be either a pointless distraction or a threat to the unity of the EU” Lichfield/Paterson, (28.02.2008) 
Independent. 
1090  Comp. „Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was designed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the EU. 
Britain is Turkey’s biggest supporter in the EU, while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara joining” Traynor, 
(14.03.2008) Guardian. 
1091  Comp. „The idea is to create a permanent institutional link between Europe and all countries with Mediterranean 
coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is that the union will boost 
economic and security cooperation” Tisdall, (10.07.2008) Guardian. 
1092  Comp. „Despite the fanfare in Paris, Sarkozy’s new “Club Med” will be a long haul if it is to amount too much be-
yond a talking shop and a channel for transferring EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East” Traynor, 
(14.07.2008) Guardian. 
XXI         Discourse analysis 
 
224 
concerning the expectations and because of the fact that main issues, like the Turkish question, are not 
in line with the British official policy.  
Within the British press, the handling of the French proposal concerned, on the one hand, statements 
which aimed to stress the French purpose. For example, the following was commented on the French 
attempt to position itself well within the European power concert: (…) Sarkozy’s grand initiative is 
acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-marking after years 
of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south
1093. It was further stated 
that, according to critical voices, Sarkozy’s grand project is a vainglorious attempt to increase French 
influence in a region it has manipulated and exploited since Napoleonic times. They say Sarkozy is 
merely trying to boost his own battered standing and France’s EU presidency
1094.  
On the other hand, the matter was stressed in connection with the strategic aim of the French proposed 
Mediterranean Union. In this regard the French initiative was classified as follows: (…) Sarkozy’s 
grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign policy-
marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south
1095. 
And, combined with a historic reference: Sarkozy’s big idea is to use imperial Rome’s centre of the 
world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries that are home to 800 million people
1096. 
Beside all these reactions on the French proposals, the discourse in the British press regarding the Brit-
ish position within the European Union is remarkable low-key. Nevertheless, it offers a clear confir-
mation on the existence of an internal struggle within the European Union due to the national interests 
of the member states. 
 
 
5 I taly  
The analysis of statements published in la Repubblica (moderate liberal) and the Corriere della Serra 
(liberal with conservative tendency) represents the Italian public discourse in the present work. These 
newspapers range on the first and second place, respectively in the ranking of the newspapers, which 
have been considered in this thesis, with the highest circulation.  
In the newspaper la Repubblica (72) slightly more statements have been considered than in the Corri-
ere della Serra (56). 
 
1093  Comp. „(…) Sarkozy’s grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign 
policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south” Traynor, 
(14.07.2008) Guardian. 
1094  Comp. „Critics – (…) – say Sarkozy’s grand project is a vainglorious attempt to increase French influence in a region 
it has manipulated and exploited since Napoleonic times. They say Sarkozy is merely trying to boost his own battered 
standing and France’s EU presidency – (…)” Tisdall, (10.07.2008) Guardian. 
1095  Comp. “(…) Sarkozy’s grand initiative is acutely political, claiming a pole position for France in European foreign 
policy-marking after years of drift and seeking to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the south” Traynor, 
(14.07.2008) Guardian. 
1096  Comp. „Sarkozy’s big idea is to use imperial Rome’s centre of the world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries that 
are home to 800 million people.” Traynor, (14.07.2008) Guardian. 




ITALY number of articles per category and newspaper 
 la Repubblica Corriere della Sera Total 
Expression 26 16 42 
Purpose 14 9 23 
Identity 32 31 63 
 72 56 128 
 
Most statements have been assigned to the category “identity” (63), followed by “expression” (42) and 
“purpose” (23). 
 
ITALY number of statements per category 
the other ass./diss. mmr Mmpol Total 
Expression 1 6 7 28 42 
purpose aim    
Purpose 12 11   23 
EU     
Identity 63    63 
 
The distribution of the statements per year indicates the following pattern: 
 
ITALY distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 9 1  4 1    3 3 11 6 4  42 
Purpose 8 3  2 1     5 2  2  23 
Identity 10 2 3 9     4 5 7 8 14 1 63 
total 27 6 3 15 2    7 13 20 14 20 1 128 
 
By far the most statements have been considered as relevant in 1995, the initiation year of the Barce-
lona Process. Many statements can be found in 2005, the anniversary year, and, surprisingly, also in 
2007, while there has only one statement been identified in 2008. The reason therefore partly lies in 
the position Italy that wants to aspire in Mediterranean Affairs. This is why the debate before the 
13.07.2008, the Paris Summit, is more significant for the Italian discourse than the current reporting of 
the events.  
5.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
Statements, which are assigned to the analytical category “expression”, give indications for the co-
operational level by stressing associative and dissociative elements and for the perception of the Medi-
terranean as a region; moreover, some of them define and evaluate the European Mediterranean Pol-
icy. 
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5.1.1 The view of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements of the partnership 
Interestingly, there are no significant statements which indicate a special image of the “other” within 
the Italian press. The references to the “other” and to associative or dissociative elements mainly con-
cern situational difficulties, which contain dissociative elements for the cooperation. The main issue 
that has been stressed within the articles refers to the immigration concern. In 1996, it was stated that 
due to the overt position towards Libya, the clandestine immigration could lead in Italy and in any of 
the other Mediterranean countries to the severe risk of provoking incidents within the public order
1097. 
This explicit reference and other implicit ones indicate that Italy is worried about a possible instability 
in the Mediterranean region and that there is the need to take measures against these developments. 
The reason for the lack of explicit statements at this point can be found in the fact that Italy considers 
its identity to belong to the Mediterranean, sometimes even more than to Europe. This issue will be 
investigated in the chapter about the European Union and its internal struggle. 
5.1.2 References to a Mediterranean region 
The statements which deal with the Mediterranean are quite inhomogeneous. They refer to its signifi-
cance for the European future, stating that the Mediterranean could return to being useful for 
Europe
1098. The frontier issue is stressed when it is said that the Mediterranean constitutes, and it is 
unavailing to negate, a southern frontier of the European Union
1099. Another reference deals with the 
situational context in the Mediterranean: the southern shore of the Mediterranean experiences indeed 
a precautious situation which is caused by the economic underdevelopment and the adjoined menace 
of religious fundamentalism having violent tendencies
1100. The strategic importance of the Mediterra-
nean is also stressed: for Italy and Spain the principal ambit of interest abroad constitutes the Medi-
terranean; the geo-strategic location of this region contains challenges of such relevance that it urges 
a major commitment on the part of the Union
1101. One metaphor unmistakably describes the signifi-
cance and the relevance that the Mediterranean has for Italy: “il Mediterraneo lambisce il duomo”1102.  
The few but very distinctive messages of the statements indicate that the Mediterranean occupies a 
central concern within the Italian discourse. 
 
1097  Comp. „Dalla apertura alla Libia ai problemi dell'immigrazione clandestina che in Italia e negli altri paesi del Medi-
terraneo rischia seriamente di provocare incidenti di ordine pubblico” Zinti, (10.11.1996) la Repubblica. 
1098  Comp. „(…) il Mediterraneo può ritornare utile anche all'Europa del futuro” Cassano, (31.01.1998) la Repubblica. 
1099  Comp. „Il Mediterraneo constituisce - è inutile negarlo - la frontiera meridionale dell' intera Unione europea” Cange-
losi, (5.02.1998) la Repubblica. 
1100  Comp. „La sponda Sud del Mediterraneo vive infatti una situazione preoccupante, in cui ai problemi causati dal 
sottosviluppo economico si aggiunge la minaccia di un fondamentalismo religioso incline all'uso della violenza” 
Carioti, (19.02.2006) Corriere della Sera. 
1101  Comp. „Per Italia e Spagna il primo ambito di proiezione esterna è la regione mediterranea. La centralità geostrategi-
ca di quest' area comporta sfide di una rilevanza tale da rendere necessario un impegno maggiore da parte dell' Unio-
ne” Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica. 
1102  Comp. „Il Mediterraneo lambisce il Duomo” Querze’, (17.07.2007) Corriere della Sera. 
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5.1.3 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
Beside numerous evaluative statements, there are only few statements within the Italian press which 
concern a definitional description of the European Mediterranean Policy.  
A general definition about the European policy was published in the Corriere della Sera on the occa-
sion of the conference in 1995: it is an event of great symbolic value which should have concrete ef-
fects
1103. The meeting is difficult, but very important, as it is the first time that the countries of Europe 
and the so-called Mare Nostrum meet in order to find a common way to improve the rules of cohabit-
ing
1104. Beside these descriptions, which primarily stressed the necessity and the difficulty of the un-
dertaking, the definitional references assigned the Barcelona Process to be a predominant European 
initiative, stating that it is a European project1105 or referred to its outstanding achievement as a forum 
which also includes the dialogue with Israel
1106. The forum character was also stressed in connection 
with its instrumental finality by Romano Prodi and José Luis Zapatero, who were quoted by la Repub-
blica: the Barcelona Process is further an excellent forum where the common challenges of high sig-
nificance, like the menace of terrorism or the intensification of the migration flow, can be faced
1107. 
These latter definitions provide an implicit reference to the purpose of the European Mediterranean 
Policy. The fact that its success has been critically perceived over the years is implicit inherent in the, 
to this day, latest definitional reference by the Corriere della Sera, which denominated the Barcelona 
Process as Euro-Mediterranean laboratory1108. 
In the thirteen years of its existence, the initiatives and the outcome of the Barcelona Process have, 
most of the time, critically been evaluated by the Italian press. In the year of its foundation, the Corri-
ere della Sera argued that the initiative will only be successful if it is a long-term project1109. Even 
more critically, it was stated that the agreed denomination was bureaucratically defined as “partner-
ship”: in fact, it is all but less than an association and more than a traditional, infamous coopera-
tion
1110. In 1998, la Repubblica stated that until now the Barcelona Process persists on a pure formal 
level, because the European non-Mediterranean countries have little to no interest in the Mediterra-
 
1103  Comp. „Si tratta di un evento di grande valore simbolico che dovrebbe produrre effetti concreti” Guiseppe, 
(22.11.1995) Corriere della Sera. 
1104  Comp. „E' un appuntamento difficile, ma molto importante. Per la prima volta l' Europa e i Paesi al di là del cosiddet-
to Mare nostrum si trovano insieme per fissare migliori regole di convivenza” Botti, (27.11.1995) Corrriere della Se-
ra. 
1105  Comp. „Il progetto dell' Europa (…)“ Tropea, (19.10.1999) la Repubblica. 
1106  Comp. „Il "processo di Barcellona" è il foro di dialogo che include anche Israele, ma Israele è prigioniero di un'altra 
formula, il "processo di pace", ovvero la "road map", ovvero lo scontro con i palestinesi” Nigro, (19.11.2004) la Re-
pubblica. 
1107  Comp. „Il Processo di Barcellona è altresì un eccellente foro nel quale affrontare sfide comuni di grande importanza 
come la minaccia del terrorismo o l’intensificazione dei flussi migratori” Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica. 
1108  Comp. „"Laboratorio Euro-Mediterraneo", cercando un approccio sociale "non solo il punto di vista economico ma 
culturale, religioso, artistico"” Jacchia, (16.07.2006) Corriere della Sera. 
1109  Comp. “È solo a lungo termine che l'operazione potrà funzionare” Stefanelli, (29.09.1995) Corriere della Sera. 
1110  Comp. „La formula da raggiungere viene burocraticamente definita "partenariato": in realtà si tratta di qualcosa di 
meno di un’associazione e qualcosa di più della tradizionale, malfamata cooperazione” Botti, (27.11.1995) Corriere 
della Sera. 
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nean Affairs; it is time to move together from the theory to the operation, or to retract it and organise 
another, more serious and cohesive, initiative
1111. This criticism, which attested the Barcelona Process 
already in 1998 a lack of efficiency, has repetitively been stressed in similar ways over the years, as 
the following statements indicate: problems in the region have even augmented1112; the initiative is 
semi-paralysed
1113 or simply thin (in content) and insufficient1114; or, the Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership does not pass a felicitous moment
1115. These statements all lead to the same conclusion, 
namely that the Barcelona Process is a failure. 
Notably, there are hardly any positive references regarding the European Mediterranean Policy within 
the Italian press discourse. Beside the implicitly expressed necessity of an efficient policy in the Medi-
terranean, the Italian perception is rather critical in regard to the European purpose. 
5.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
Within the Italian press discourse the statements, which refer to the analytical category “purpose”, 
give an indication of the European motivation for the Barcelona Process. The references of this chap-
ter display whether there is a discrepancy between the officially stated aim and the implicit purpose. 
 
The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy  
The statements assigned to these categories are less numerous and explicit than expected. Regarding 
the purpose of the Barcelona Process, the Italian press implicitly reduces the European motivation for 
its engagement in the Mediterranean to security concerns, primarily caused by the demographic devel-
opment. The policy, which constitutes a “pact of stability”1116, is perceived as an answer to the multi-
ple challenges in the Mediterranean, which could threaten the security and stability within Italy and 
also within Europe. In 1998, la Repubblica stressed the demographic issue by raising the question 
whether the “fortress Europe” will be able to resist such a strong demographic pressure, which is 
accompanied by the challenges of the globalisation and the economy
1117
. Some years later, in 2004, la 
Repubblica quoted Romano Prodi, stating that it has to be considered that within the next generation, 
 
1111  Comp. „Ma finora è rimasta a livello di pura accademia, anche perché ai paesi non mediterranei dell’Unione europea 
interessa poco o nulla. Ora è giunto il momento di passare dall’accademia all’operatività; oppure di disdirla e orga-
nizzarne un’altra, più seria e più serrata” Garimberti, (30.07.1998) le Republicca. 
1112 Comp. „Il processo di Barcellona non ha quasi inciso su queste tendenze: anzi, i problemi sono aumentati, mentre la 
questione della sicurezza è diventata il tema centrale nell’approccio alle questioni mediterranee” Foud Allam, 
(5.12.2003) la Repubblica. 
1113 Comp. „ci punta perché un’altra formula, "il processo di Barcellona", da tempo è semi-paralizzato” Nigro, 
(19.11.2004) la Repubblica. 
1114  Comp. „La politica da sviluppare è quella delle reti, ancora troppo esili e insufficienti“ Pitella, (24.01.2004) la Re-
pubblica. 
1115  Comp. “Il partenariato euro-mediterraneo non attraversa un momento felice” Crioti, (19.02.2006) Corriere della Sera. 
1116  Comp. „L'intesa, che prevede di lavorare per la costituzione di una grande area di libero scambio entro il 2010 e per 
la creazione di un nuovo "Patto di stabilità", era rimasta impigliata su alcuni punti della dichiarazione politica” Tede-
schini Lalli, (29.11.1995) la Repubblica. 
1117  Comp. „Ma quale "fortezza Europa" potrebbe resistere a una così forte pressione demografica accompagnata dalla 
sfida della globalizzazione dell'economia?” Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica. 
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the population at the shore of the southern Mediterranean will be superior to the one at the shore of 
Europe
1118. It was considered as important that the policy alludes to crucial issues like economy, secu-
rity, cultural dialogue etc. in order to be prepared for the challenges which have to be faced in the fu-
ture.1119 Thus, it was indicative that the discourse repetitively stressed that a future in peace favours 
Europe
1120
. This emphasises the fact that security and stability concerns are the main purpose of the 
European Mediterranean Policy. 
Regarding the officially stated aim, general formulations were stressed that have already been exten-
sively mentioned in the previous discourse analysis: to make of the Mediterranean a common space of 
peace, stability and a zone of shared prosperity
1121. Or, as Romano Prodi and José Luis Zapatero were 
quoted in la Repubblica: the intercultural dialogue constitutes the primary channel to reach the objec-
tive to change the Mediterranean into a space of peace, security, stability and shared prosperity
1122. 
Other references referred to the aim of establishing a free-trade area until 2010; in 2007, the Italian 
press modified the aspired date: it will not be 2010, as indicated, but 2012 that a market for 600 mil-
lion people is aspired
1123. Therewith, the perception of the officially stated aim does not largely devi-
ate from the references to the purpose of the Mediterranean Policy. They are only more generally ex-
pressed. 
5.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
The statements concerning the category “identity” within the Italian press refer to the perception of the 
political ambition of the European Union and to its internal struggle, namely the internal forces within 
its member states.  
5.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition 
The political ambition of the European Union in the Mediterranean is regarded in connection with its 
attention to the eastern countries, with the strategic importance of the Mediterranean for the European 
Union and with few statements that also refer to the conception of the European Union as a whole. 
Thus, the Italian discourse evaluates the political ambition from both, an internal and an external per-
spective. 
 
1118  Comp. “Senza contare che, nello spazio di una generazione, la sponda sud del Mediterraneo avrà una popolazione 
superiore a quella della sponda europea” Bonanni, (28.04.2004) la Repubblica. 
1119 Comp. „In realtà a ben guardare l'iniziativa tocca settori cruciali come l'economia, la sicurezza, il dialogo culturale e 
perfino la difesa su uno scacchiere geopolitico essenziale sia per la crisi mediorientale sia per la sfida dell'islamismo 
radicale” Dal nostro inviato, (17.06.2006) la Repubblica. 
1120  Comp. „Un futuro di pace favorisce l’Europa“ Stefanelli, (29.09.1995) Corriere della Sera. 
1121  Comp. “(…) a fare del Mediterraneo "uno spazio comune di pace e stabilità" e una "zona di prosperità condivisa"” 
Tedeschini Lalli, (29.11.1995) la Repubblica. 
1122  Comp. „Il dialogo interculturale è un canale prioritario per il conseguimento dell’obiettivo di fare del Mediterraneo 
uno spazio di pace, sicurezza, stabilità e prosperità condivise” Prodi/Zapatero, (20.02.2007) la Repubblica. 
1123  Comp. „Non sarà il 2010 come indicato ma dal 2012 si aprirà un mercato di 600 milioni di persone »  Jacchia, Anto-
nia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera. 
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In 1995, the Corriere della Sera stated that the importance of the conference in Barcelona lies in the 
assumption that it represents the cornerstone for the advancement of the relations
1124 with the MNC. 
Consecutively, it was mentioned that the European Union identifies itself a bit less in the north and a 
bit more in the Mediterranean
1125. Thus, the Italian public perceived that the European identity is 
linked to the Mediterranean. The argument was emphasised by the statement that the Mediterranean 
policy constitutes a “common destiny”1126, or when la Repubblica conceded the voice to Pedrag Mat-
vejevic, who enjoys stating that Europe without the Mediterranean is like a man without childhood
1127. 
In this context the discourse also included a persuasive character, which was proved by a statement in 
la Repubblica in 1998, saying that the stability, prosperity and peace is not solely an Italian problem, 
it concerns the entire Europe
1128; if the necessity – for Europe – to build a bridge over the respective 
sea is ignored, it means negating the geography, history and politics
1129. 
The European engagement in the Mediterranean was also stressed in combination with the assurance 
of peace and stability, which consequentially implies a certain security issue. First, it was stated that 
Europe’s preliminary motivation in the Mediterranean is to protect itself from the immense migration 
flow or the recurrent terrorist menaces. The equation “the Mediterranean represents a defensive fron-
tier” is just one aspect of the euro-mediterranean policy
1130. Second, the European Union is, as it was 
stated by Tony Blair and José Luis Zapatero, despite all the thwarted obstacles, strongly committed to 
enhance its ambition for assuring peace
1131. 
Another aspect within the Italian discourse concerns the EU’s political ambition in connection with an 
implicit criticism of the conception of Europe as a whole. For example, la Repubblica stated in 2003 
that the European Union is divided: regarding the Iraqi question, the quasi not existing peace process 
between Israel and Palestine and the constant asymmetry to the United States
1132. Further criticism of 
the European conception was expressed in 2006, saying that Europe is a complex machinery, which 
 
1124  Comp. „l'importanza della Conferenza Euro-Mediterranea che si svolgerà a Barcellona il 27 e 28 Novembre e che 
servirà proprio a chiarire gli indirizzi politici dell’UE verso il lato Sud. "Nella nostra visione, Barcellona dovrebbe 
già porre. Ha spiegato. le basi per l'ulteriore sviluppo delle relazioni"” Editorial, (9.11.1995) Corriere della Sera. 
1125  Comp. „(…), l’Europa si ritrova " un po' meno nordica e un po' più mediterranea"” Vignolo, (29.11.1005) Corriere 
della Sera. 
1126  Comp. „[MMPOL] (…) c' è un "destino comune"” Taino, (19.1.1997) Corriere della Sera. 
1127  Comp. „Pedrag Matvejevic ama dire che un’Europa senza Mediterraneo è come un uomo senza infanzia” Cassano, 
(31.01.1998) la Repubblica. Pedrag Matvejevic is a contemporary intellectual with Croatian and Russian roots, living 
in Italy and France. 
1128  Comp. „La stabilità, la prosperità, la pace di questo "lago interno", per ripetere la citazione di Braudel, non è sola-
mente un problema italiano. Riguarda tutta l'Europa“ Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica. 
1129  Comp. “Ignorare quindi la necessità - per l'Europa - di "creare ponti" su questo mare è ignorare la geografia, la storia, 
la politica” Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica. 
1130  Comp. „(…) cui all’Europa interessa prevalentemente premunirsi dagli ingenti flussi migratori o dalle ricorrenti 
minacce terroristiche. L’equazione "Mediterraneo uguale frontiera difensiva", è solo una faccia della politica euro-
mediterranea” Pitella, (24.01.2004) la Repubblica. 
1131  Comp. „L'Ue, nonostante tutti gli ostacoli frapposti, rimane fortemente impegnata a supportare la loro ambizione di 
pace » Blair/Zapatero, (28.11.2005) la Repubblica. 
1132  Comp. „Perché ritraggono un’Europa doppiamente divisa: spaccata sulla questione irachena, quasi assente nel pro-
cesso di pace israelo-palestinense, e sempre più asimmetrica rispetto agli Stati Uniti” Fouad Allam, (05.12.2003) la 
Repubblica. 
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continuously is penetrated through subterraneous tensions concerning both, its dynamics and its static 
status
1133. 
Within the Italian discourse the internal and external influences on the political ambition of the Euro-
pean Union are critically perceived. Thus, the significance of the Mediterranean is beyond question, 
the strategic considerations of the approach are not exposed to explicit criticism, and only the ailing 
overall conception of the European Union is challenged at some points.  
5.3.2 The European Union – the internal struggle 
The statements which refer to the internal struggle of the European Union, based on the individual 
interests of the Member States, concern the Italian position regarding the Mediterranean and the EU; 
in addition, to a lesser extent, they comment on the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union and its 
consequences. 
Shortly before the conference in Barcelona took place, the Corriere della Sera stated that it was impos-
sible that Rome could not have been selected to host the conference, which unites all countries of the 
inland sea
1134. The implied deception was comprehensible considering the strong Italian interests in 
the Mediterranean Affairs, which have explicitly been demonstrated. In May 1995, in the run-up to the 
Conference, la Repubblica stated that the proposal for strengthening the relations with the Mediterra-
nean countries was provided by Spain and Italy. While in literature and in the public perception the 
initiation of the Barcelona Process is preliminarily allocated to Spanish efforts, the Italian press clearly 
sticks to an Italian participation. At the moment of the conference la Repubblica quoted the former 
Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli, saying that it’s a big satisfaction that Europe turns a bit less to-
wards the north and a bit more towards the Mediterranean
1135. The chronological consecutive state-
ments assured the Italian position, stating that Italy is a peninsula which is enclosed by the Mediterra-
nean
1136
, or that the role of Italy is not to serve as a sentinel, but as a bridge between Europe and the 
Mediterranean
1137. An even more explicit reference to the Italian struggle to defend its position was 
expressed by means of a mixture of frustration due to power rejection and a certain power request: an 
Italy, which rejects its historic and political rule in the Mediterranean, is destined for a marginal posi-
tion on the European continent, and searches for the benevolent acceptation of the powers in the 
 
1133  Comp. „Ma l’Europa è una macchina complessa, continuamente percorsa da tensioni sotterranee sia nella sua dinami-
ca sia nella sua statica” Dal nostro inviato, (17.06.2006) la Repubblica. 
1134  Comp. „E Roma non poteva non essere scelta come la sede di una conferenza che unisce proprio tutti i Paesi del 
Mare Interno” Pullara, (22.11.1995) Corriere della Sera. 
1135  Comp. “„Un altro aspetto di quell’attenzione al sud del mondo che Paesi come l'Italia chiedevano da tempo ai partner 
e che oggi fa dire a Susanna Agnelli con "grande soddisfazione" che "l'Europa è diventata un po' meno nordica e un 
po' più mediterranea"” Teteschini Lalli, (29.11.1995) le Repubblica. 
1136  Comp. „L'Italia è una penisola tuffata nel Mediterraneo (...)” Cassano, (31.01.1998) la Repubblica. 
1137  Comp. “In questo contesto il ruolo dell’Italia non è quello di sentinella, ma di "ponte" tra Europa e Mediterraneo” 
Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubblica. 




1138. Similar statements were also expressed within the discourse of the Corriere della Sera, 
which, in the anniversary year, mentioned that our (the Italian) economic development, the recupera-
tion of the competitiveness of our system we owe the Mediterranean, where we could achieve the pro-
tagonist role, even more than France and Spain
1139. Furthermore, in 2006 it was repetitively stated that 
Italy confirms its leadership in the Mediterranean
1140, in the Mare Nostrum1141. In the same context the 
Italian position and power request was defended by stating that it constitutes a natural bridge between 
Europe and the southern Mediterranean, a secure port for commercial exchange; Italy is the leader in 
Europe in regard to the exchange with the countries of North Africa
1142. Defending its influence in the 
Mediterranean, the public discourse also saw the United States as a role model: even the United States 
have positioned themselves well in Morocco. Italy may not lose that train; it could play an essential 
part
1143. This hard struggle to defend and retrieve a significant position within the Mediterranean or 
even within the European Union demonstrates that the Italian public is strongly concerned with the 
foreign policy of the country. According to the analysed statements, Italy should aim to play a more 
influential role and has implicitly been provided with a public mandate to do so. 
At the time when the French overtook the decisive role in guiding the European Mediterranean Policy, 
the Italian press commented initially that the Mediterranean Union is above all an ambitious plan of 
the Foreign Policy of Nicolas Sarkozy and that (originally) it is not about a simple partnership be-
tween the shores of the Mediterranean, but about a very concrete one. Something is proposed that is 
not identical but similar to the existing instrument of the European states in the Mediterranean
1144. 
The German reaction was unemotionally commented as follows: the criticism was very clearly and 
directly expressed by Angela Merkel
1145, who rejected the Mediterranean Union1146. The Italian posi-
tion regarding the redefinition was unambiguously expressed by the statement that for Italy and Spain 
it is important to be protagonists of the Mediterranean troika
1147
. Thus, further happenings are in their 
interest. This demonstrates that, sooner or later, the European Union will have to deal with the strong 
 
1138  Comp. „Un'Italia che abdichi al suo ruolo storico e politico nel Mediterraneo è destinata a posizioni marginali nel 
contesto europeo, alla ricerca della benevola accettazione dei potenti del Nord” Cangelosi, (05.02.1998) la Repubbli-
ca. 
1139  Comp. „Il nostro sviluppo economico, lo stesso recupero di competitività del nostro sistema, passa dal Mediterraneo, 
dove possiamo avere un ruolo da protagonista più di quanto non lo siano Francia e Spagna” Radice, (05.07.2005) 
Corriere della Sera. 
1140  Comp. „Italia, Paese leader del Mediterraneo” Jacchia, (16.07.2006) Corriere della Sera. 
1141  Comp. „l'Italia si conferma Paese leader del Mare Nostrum” Jacchia, (18.07.2006) Corriere della Sera. 
1142  Comp. „Un ponte naturale tra l’Europa e il Sud del Mediterraneo. E un porto sicuro per gli scambi commerciali. 
L’Italia è leader in Europa per l’interscambio con i Paesi del Nord Africa” Jacchia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera. 
1143  Comp. „Persino gli Stati Uniti si stanno ben posizionando in Marocco. L’Italia non può perdere questo treno. E i 
media possono giocare un ruolo fondamentale“ Jacchia, (30.03.2007) Corriere della Sera. 
1144  Comp. „(…), l'Unione mediterranea è senz'altro il disegno di politica estera più ambizioso di Nicolas Sarkozy. Non si 
tratta di un semplice partenariato tra le due sponde (come quello previsto dal cosiddetto "processo di Barcellona" nato 
dodici anni fa e mai seriamente decollato), ma qualcosa di molto più concreto ed esteso. Il progetto propone relazioni 
non identiche ma simili a quelle esistenti tra i membri dell’Unione europea“ Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica. 
1145  Comp. „Ma le critiche più nette, più dirette sono state espresse da Angela Merkel“ Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica. 
1146  Comp. „Angela Merkel rifiutava l’Unione mediterranea” Valli, (10.12.2007) la Repubblica. 
1147  Comp. „Per Italia e Spagna è importante essere i protagonisti della troika mediterranea“ Fregonara, (21.12.2007) 
Corriere della Sera. 
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national interests of its member countries; in regard to a Common Foreign Policy it will especially 
have to struggle with three countries, namely with France, Italy and Spain. 
 
 
6 Spa in  
Spain is also a European country which has strong historic, cultural and economic relations to the 
MNC countries, primarily to the North African countries. The discourse analysis focuses on articles of 
the newspapers el País (left) and el Mundo (conservative). The distribution of the statements within 
both newspapers is quite even: 73 could be assigned to el País and 65 to el Mundo. 
 
SPAIN number of articles per category and newspaper 
 El Pais El Mundo Total 
Expression 28 30 58 
Purpose 14 10 24 
Identity 31 25 56 
 73 65 138 
 
From the 138 statements which have been considered in total, nearly the same amount concerns the 
categories “expression” and “identity”. 
 
SPAIN Number of statements per category 
the other ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 3 18 1 36 58 
purpose aim    
Purpose 14 10   24 
EU     
Identity 56    56 
 
The distribution of the statements per year illustrates the following pattern: 
 
SPAIN distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 13  2   7  1  1 10   24 58 
Purpose 6    2  3   2 3   8 24 
Identity 15    1  3   3 2   32 56 
total 34  2  3 7 6 1  6 15   64 138 
 
The years 1995, 2005 and 2008 constitute the main years regarding the number of statements. By far 
the most statements date in 2008 which is explained with the strong engagement of France in the 
Mediterranean Policy. Until 2007 Spain considered itself as a decisive driving force in the Barcelona 
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Process; the rivalry with France is also symbolically expressed by the number of identified statements 
in that year. 
6.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
Within the Spanish press a total number of 58 statements point to the discourse regarding the percep-
tion of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements within the partnership and the perception of the 
Mediterranean Policy. 
6.1.1 The view of the “other , associative/dissociative elements of the partnership 
The few statements which refer to the “other” concern the level of cooperation and do not indicate a 
certain image of the “other”. The non-European countries are perceived as being cooperative, which is 
exemplified by a reference of the newspaper el Mundo in 2000, where it was stated that the African 
countries agreed nearly on the whole document of the conference, which is interpreted by the assump-
tion that compromises concerning the paper will never be accomplished
1148. Another indication for the 
cooperative aspect of the description of the “other” is based on the integration of the Arab League in 
the Mediterranean Union
1149
. The form of this project still has to be found, but the fact that the matter 
appears in the Spanish discourse indicates an openness towards the integration of further representa-
tives, whether politically grouped or not, into the Mediterranean Policy. 
The statements, which refer to associative and dissociative elements within the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership, are also focused on the co-operational aspect. Among the dissociative issues, the conflic-
tive relation with Libya was extensively stressed in 2000. The basic opinion of the Libyan president, 
Muammar Al Gaddafi, was stressed in el Mundo, saying that he considers the relation between 
Europe and Africa to be necessary and therefore a mutual confidence is also necessary
1150. At the 
same time he delivered an eccentric speech full of anti-occident, anti-colonial and anti-American is-
sues and actually demonstrated scarce interest in the existing co-operational frame, the Barcelona 
Process, when he apparently stated that “in the name of Barcelona you can not unite North Africa 
with Europe, don’t come to separate us with the excuse of Barcelona”, as it was commented by  
 
 
1148  Comp. „Los países africanos han dado el visto bueno a la casi totalidad del documento, asumiendo, al menos sobre el 
papel, compromisos que nunca cumplirán” Cruz, (03.04.2000) El Mundo. 
1149  Comp. „La propuesta también introduce una "fórmula" para la participación de la Liga Árabe en el proyecto, según 
indicaron fuentes diplomáticas que, sin embargo, evitaron aclarar en qué grado asistiría esta organización. Hasta aho-
ra, la Liga Árabe ha practicado como 'observador' en reuniones de Exteriores y países árabes han defendido una pre-
sencia mayor de este órgano, especialmente en otras reuniones de ministros sectoriales” Europa press, (04.11.2008) 
El Mundo. 
1150 Comp. „El presidente libio, Muamar Al Gadafi, ha indicado al presidente en funciones español, José María Aznar, 
que la cooperación entre Europa y Africa es "necessaria" y que, para ello, debe existir "la confianza mutua que no ha 
existido en el pasado".” EFE, (04.04.2000) El Mundo. 




1151. A general separative issue, which has been existing since the beginning of the dis-
course, constitutes the fact of the economic disparity between the North and the South. El País ex-
pressed it as follows: Economically, the difference between the North and the South is enormous: more 
than 87% of the gross domestic product of the Mediterranean basin is concentrated on the northern 
shore
1152. The European economic policy approach continued being a fact in the discourse of the me-
dia, which was criticised by el Mundo in 2005, saying that the economic agricultural trade agree-
ments in the Mediterranean can not be reciprocal from equal to equal between countries, which are 
apparently unequal, as it is internationally based in the standards of the World Trade Organisa-
tion
1153. Therewith, the Spanish public opinion takes a clear position in regard to the European ap-
proach and reasons based on facts.  
On the occasion of the revitalisation of the Barcelona Process and its renaming as Mediterranean Un-
ion, el País expressed the probably strongest existing associative argument: all European and southern 
Mediterranean countries have affirmed their will of reorienting the process in question and deepen 
it
1154.  
6.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
The statements which refer to the European Mediterranean Policy constitute definitional references 
and provide an evaluative insight into the Spanish perception. 
Interestingly, the definitional references are in its form of expression mostly linked to the significance 
which the Spanish press ascribes to the Barcelona Process. In the run-up to the conference of Barce-
lona in 1995, El País stated that it will all be about a development, based on the reciprocal will of 
large-scaled interests of both sides of the Mediterranean
1155 and that although the idea did not emerge 
in the last months, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference will probably constitute the most important 
 
1151 Comp. “(…), el coronel Gadafi ha tomado la palabra en la primera sesión de trabajo de la cumbre euro-africana para 
pronunciar un "discurso excéntrico, repleto de todos los tópicos antioccidentales, anticoloniales y antiamericanos". Al 
parecer, el discurso no contenía ninguna de las aperturas solicitadas por la Ue, es decir, mención alguna a la acepta-
ción por Tripoli de los principios de la Declaración de Barcelona, por la que se regula desde 1995 el diálogo euro-
mediterráneo. Todo lo contrario, Gadafi ha mostrado escaso interés por lo que representa el proceso de Barcelona. 
(...)"Ustedes no pueden en nombre de Barcelona unir el norte de Africa con Europa, No vengan a dividirnos con la 
excusa de Barcelona", ha afirmado Gadafi, según testigos de su intervención, celebrada a puerta cerrada” EFE, 
(04.04.2000) El Mundo. 
1152  Comp. „Económicamente, la diferencia entre el Norte y el Sur es enorme: más del 87% del producto interior bruto 
total de la cuenca mediterránea está concentrado en la orilla norte” Naïr, (08.08.1995) El País. 
1153 Comp. „Los acuerdos comerciales agrícolas dentro de la cuenca del Mediterráneo no pueden ser recíprocos de igual a 
igual entre países desiguales-, tal y como marcan los estándares de la Organización Mundial del Comercio. Si las 
negociaciones impiden a los países del sur del Mediterráneo proteger sus sectores más vulnerables, especialmente 
para defenderse de las exportaciones agrícolas subsidiadas de la Ue, la producción agrícola podría caer alrededor de 
un 2% y, al mismo tiempo, se reducirían los ingresos de la población que depende de la agricultura para su 
subsistencia” Edirotial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo. 
1154  Comp. „Todos los países europeos y mediterráneos del sur han afirmado su voluntad de reorientar dicho proceso y 
profundizarlo” Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País. 
1155  Comp. „se trata de un desarollo basado en la complementariedad voluntaria de los intereses a largo plazo de las dos 
orillas” Naïr, (08.03.1995) El País. 
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event of the Spanish presidency
1156. At the time the conference took place, the press classified the Bar-
celona Process to be a very important novelty1157. The significance of the Barcelona Process for Spain 
was again explicitly stated in 2004, when el Mundo announced that the process is considered as vital 
for Spain and its interests and that in the upcoming year an important commemoration on the occa-
sion of its tenth anniversary will be taking place
1158. Beside the expressed importance for the Spanish 
interests, the Barcelona Process was considered as a forum, which unites the countries of the European 
Union with those of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean
1159. It was also considered 
as an alliance, which means that the countries respect the requirements of those who are most 
needy
1160. Therewith, the Spanish press unmistakably establishes a strong linkage between the Barce-
lona Process and the national policy and emphasises the approach that the European policy in the 
Mediterranean is able to change the situation for the better. 
In 2008, el País stated that anyhow, the new policy is on the political agenda as a continuation of the 
Barcelona Process
1161. On the occasion of the conference in Marseille, it was recapitulated in el País 
that the Barcelona Process in question was a first step to unite one part of the world, the Mediterra-
nean, which forms a major mergence of different cultures, great contrasted identities and contrary 
religious roots
1162. This positive evaluated ambition of the European Mediterranean Policy was one of 
the few positive statements regarding the Barcelona Process in the Spanish press. Another one was the 
acknowledgement that the Barcelona Process had initiated a constructive debate in three fundamental 
areas: politics and security, economics and finance, and social and cultural issues
1163. Other positive 
statements, which indicate the strong national relation of Spain to the Barcelona Process, have been 
stated in 2008. At the time of the Paris Summit, it was said that it had given an important historic and 
positive impulse, similar to the contribution of the Conference of Barcelona thirteen years before
1164. 
Another reference stated that the positive effect of the Mediterranean Union is the consciousness of the 
 
1156  Comp. „La Conferencia Euromediterránea es, probablemente, el acontecimiento más llamativo del semestre español 
al frente de la UE, pero no es una idea nueva surgida en los últimos meses” Cembrero, (01.07.1995) El País. 
1157  Comp. „Esto es una novedad muy significativa” Altable, (27.11.1995) El País. 
1158  Comp. „[BP] Ese proceso es considerado vital por parte de España para sus intereses en la zona y pretende que el 
próximo año haya una significativa conmemoración de su décimo aniversario” EFE, (08.09.2004) El Mundo. 
1159  Comp. „(…) 'Proceso de Barcelona', es un foro que reúne a los países de la Ue y a los de las orillas sur y este del 
Mediterráneo (…)” EFE, (25.11.2005) El Mundo. 
1160 Comp. „[Ariane Arpa] (…) "el acuerdo se llama a sí mismo una 'alianza', lo que significa que los países tienen que 
tener en cuenta las necesidades de los que más lo necesitan.” Editorial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo. 
1161  Comp. „En cualquier caso, ya está en la agenda política europea como una continuación del Proceso de Barcelona” 
Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País. 
1162  Comp. „El denominado Proceso de Barcelona era una primera piedra para unir alrededor del Mediterráneo una de las 
partes del mundo con mayor confluencia cultural diferente, grandes identidades contrastadas y raíces religiosas 
opuestas” Foguet, (05.11.2008) El País. 
1163  Comp. „(…) el proceso de Barcelona, (…), "ha propiciado un productivo debate en los tres ámbitos fundamentales 
que cubre esta iniciativa: el político y de seguridad, el económico y financiero y el social y cultural"” EFE, 
(25.11.2005) El Mundo. 
1164  Comp. „"Se ha dado un impulso cualitativo importante, histórico y positivo a lo que fue la Conferencia de Barcelona 
hace trece años", resumió (…) Moratinos“ Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo. 
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deceleration and stagnation of the Barcelona Process
1165. This illustrates that the return of politics to 
the real status quo of the policy, including all its failures, was rewarded by the Spanish press.  
 Anyhow, most of the statements express criticism. Already in 1995, the glamour of a successful posi-
tive launch of the Barcelona Process did not avoid critical press voices. It was stated that the policy is 
far from being a real strategy of cooperation and development between the Mediterranean shores and 
that it rather appears as a clever costume for a simple opening of the southern markets
1166. In 2000, it 
was stated in el Mundo that the European implicitly admitted their failure to provide effective aid for 
the MNC countries. In summary, there is a notable ambivalent position regarding the Mediterranean in 
the Spanish press. There is a strong national association to the Barcelona Process, but, at the moment 
of failure, the distant tonality in the public discourse could suggest that Spain is not an integrated part 
of Europe.  
The prosperity gap and the poverty issue is also criticised in connection with the Barcelona Process, 
which is considered as not being an effective instrument against poverty. It is lamented that ten years 
after Barcelona little has changed for the people in the south. This expresses the Spanish press’ hu-
manitarian request concerning the policy. 
By far the most criticism occurred in 2008, when the frank evaluation of the Barcelona Process was 
provoked by the French proposal to found a Mediterranean Union just for countries bordering the 
Mediterranean. It was stated in el Mundo that the Summit in Barcelona in 2005 was the beginning of 
the end
1167; the moribund Barcelona Process received its deathblow in 2005, when numerous repre-
sentatives of the Arab countries were absent at the conference and no substantial agreement could be 
reached
1168. Further criticism arose with the new French proposal, which some diplomats depreciat-
ingly called “Club Med” in reference to the French hotel chain
1169. Others stressed that the only thing 
which has changed was the etiquette
1170
, while the important thing is not the renaming but the con-
tent
1171. After recalling the already often stressed criticism of Nicolas Sarkozy, a journalist stated in el 
Mundo that after twelve years of ups and downs, nearly 20.000 million Euro, few results and some 
 
1165  Comp. “En primer lugar, implicaba una toma de conciencia de la ralentización y el estancamiento del proyecto estra-
tégico de Barcelona” Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País. 
1166  Comp. „Lejos de constituir una verdadera estrategia de cod'esarrollo entre las dos riberas, resulta ser sobre todo un 
hábil disfraz de una mera apertura de los mercados del Sur” Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País. 
1167  Comp. „La cumbre de noviembre de 2005 en Barcelona fue el principio del fin del proceso que lIeva su nombre para 
el diálogo de la UE con los países árabes” Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1168  Comp. „(...) Ia creación de una nueva organización para firmar acuerdos comerciales o migratorios con los países del 
sur del Mediterráneo, en sustitución del moribundo Proceso de Barcelona, cuyo golpe de gracia fue la reunión aquel 
cálido otoño de 2005 donde fallaron numerosos Iíderes árabes y no se lIegó a ningún acuerdo sustancial” Ramírez, 
(13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1169  Comp. „(...) esta nueva organización el 'Club Med', el apodo despreciativo que utilizan algunos diplomáticos en 
referencia a una cadena de hoteles francesa- (...)” Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1170  Comp. „Lo primero que se ve es que cambia la etiqueta: de proceso de Barelona a Unión para el Mediterráneo” Mis-
sé/ Rituerto, (13.03.2008) El País. 
1171  Comp. „Lo importante no debería ser el nombre, sino el contenido.” Editorial, (15.03.2008) El País. 
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failed summits, the Barcelona Process has been converted into the Mediterranean Union, an invention 
of Paris with an uncertain future in the hands of Nicolas Sarkozy
1172. 
The discourse of the Spanish press leaves the mark that the Barcelona Process belongs to the national 
competence of Spain. Although in case of severe criticism, it raises the impression that with the 
French initiative the discourse is quite disappointed and distant regarding its outcome. A more recon-
ciliatory discourse within the Spanish press could be perceived from the moment onwards, when Bar-
celona was elected to be the domicile of the Mediterranean Policy and was thus denominated as the 
Euro-Mediterranean capital1173. 
6.2 Discourse analysis - Purpose 
The statements which have been assigned to the analytical category “purpose” refer to the European 
motivation for the Mediterranean Policy and the officially stated aim. As there are relative few state-
ments allocated to this category, the two aspects are summed up in the following sub-chapter. 
 
The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy  
The most general references regarding the purpose of the Barcelona Process are implicitly related to 
the European security concern. One of them was expressed in the run-up to the Barcelona Process, 
when the principal ambition was to exchange cooperation for stability1174. It is the aim to establish a 
free-trade area until 2010, encouraged by the motivation to support the elimination of the socio-
economic imbalance of the countries in the South and to stimulate the regional integration
1175. This 
was generally and extensively expressed in an article in el Mundo in 2001: One goal is “to create a 
Euro-Mediterranean zone of security, stability and wealth”, a second is “to enhance social, cultural 
and human contacts in a wide range of ambits with the full respect of the cultures, religions, costumes 
and traditions”, and the last is “to progress with the perspective of a common vision for the future of 
the region, which is essential for all of us”
1176. In 2004, it was stated that in order to assure peace, the 
 
1172  Comp. „El Proceso de Barcelona, tras más de 12 años de altibajos, cerca de 20.000 millones de euros invertidos, 
pocos resultados y alguna cumbre fallida, se convirtió anoche en la Unión para el Mediterráneo, un invento de París 
con un futuro incierto en manos de Nicolas Sarkozy” Ramírez, (14.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1173  Comp. „El proceso euromediterráneo, que lleva 13 años de resultados muy mejorables, necesitaba una sede perma-
nente y un organismo impulsor, equitativamente representativo de todas las partes, que lo visualizase.” Editorial, 
(07.11.2008) El País; and comp. “[el principe Felipe] esta iniciativa, que data de 1982, de "audaz y valiente", y afir-
mó que supuso una gran visión de futuro, porque después dio paso al denominado Proceso de Barcelona y ahora a la 
designación de Barcelona como capital euromediterránea” Editorial, (13.11.2008) El País. 
1174  Comp. „Cooperación a cambio de estabilidad” Cembrero, (01.07.1995) El País. 
1175  Comp. „Su objetivo se define claramente: "La creación de un espacio euromediterráneo en el horizonte del 2010". 
También sus ejes centrales: apoyo a la transición economica para establecer una zona de libre comercio de aquí a 10 
o 15 años (...) apoyo para un mejor equilibrio socio-economico en las sociedades del Sur (...), y, por último, apoyo a 
la integración regional” Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País. 
1176  Comp. „Uno es "constituir una zona Euromediterránea de seguridad, de esabilidad y de bienestar"; el segundo, "favo-
recer los contactos sociales, culturales y humanos en una amplia gama de ámbitos y con el pleno respeto de cultura, 
religiones, costumbres y tradiciones respectivas" y, por último, "progresar con la perspectiva de una visión común por 
el futuro de la región que, para todos nosotros es esencial"” EFE, (06.11.2001) El Mundo. 
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dialogue between both shores has to be reinforced
1177. In the anniversary year of the Barcelona Proc-
ess it was further stated that peace and security have been the objectives of the meeting and it contains 
the purpose to unite the occidental countries with the Arabs and Muslims, which is an attempt to fight 
together against terrorism
1178. In 2008, the principal stated purpose regarding the Mediterranean Pol-
icy was to inject a new and forceful impulse1179. Within the Spanish press the following demand was 
expressed: reorient it and deepen it!1180 It is remarkable that within the Spanish public discourse the 
statements regarding the purpose do not refer to the Middle East Peace Process or provide no explicit 
indication of the threats perceived from the Mediterranean, which would explain the security concern. 
Most references indirectly deal with the security concern and mainly handle peace and stability issues. 
Is not the repetitive argument of the purpose to assure peace and stability just an implicit reference to 
the assumption of the threat of a destabilizing Mediterranean region? Why are altruistic arguments 
more obviously stated than the explicit motivation for the Mediterranean Policy? However, the state-
ments referring to the officially stated aims do not provide any further insights into the Spanish dis-
course.  
6.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
Within the Spanish public discourse few statements refer explicitly to the European political ambition, 
the possible self-perception or, figuratively, to the European identity. Implicitly, the Spanish press 
discourse indicates the importance of the Mediterranean Policy in relation to the national interests and 
therefore to the position of France in the European Union. The total number of selected statements 
(56) indicates that the Mediterranean is essential to Spain – that it is a vital concern. 
6.3.1 The European Union – the political ambition  
The political ambition and role of the European Union is ambivalently perceived in the Spanish press. 
In the run-up to the conference in Barcelona, el Pais stated that this initiative constitutes a new im-
pulse, for this time a decisive impulse
1181
. This attested the European approach a positive perception, 
although it was at the same time said that the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean space remains extremely 
nebulous and ambiguous
1182. Therefore, the question if Europe is now discovering the Mediterranean 
 
1177  Comp. „(…) al 'Proceso de Barcelona' que nació para reforzar el dialogo entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo y que 
en noviembre de 2005 cumpirá diez años” Europe Press, (02.10.2004) El Mundo. 
1178  Comp. „La paz y la seguridad son los objetivos fijados en esta propuesta que pretenden unir a los países occidentales 
con los árabes y musulmanes en un intento de luchar conjuntamente contra el terrorismo” Taules, (25.11.2005) El 
Mundo. 
1179  Comp. „(…) de inyectar un nuevo y vigoroso impulso al proceso iniciado en Barcelona en 1995” Naïr, (16.10.2008) 
El País. 
1180  Comp. „Reorientar y profundizar!” Naïr, (16.10.2008) El País. 
1181  Comp. „Ahora se habla de un nuevo impulso, esta vez  decisivo, de la Unión Europea al refuerzo de la política medi-
terránea” Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País. 
1182  Comp. „, la idea de espacio euromediterráneo es extremadamente borrosa y ambigua” Naïr, (20.09.1995) El País. 
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has to be answered with “nearly”
1183
. To put it in a nutshell, Europe’s political ambition and engage-
ment in the Mediterranean was benevolently perceived.  
It was considered to be a big challenge for Europe to debate with the countries of the southern Medi-
terranean
1184. At the tenth anniversary, el Mundo commented the political ambitions above all criti-
cally: Europe is perceived as a rich country which exploits its poor neighbours and does not offer any-
thing more than empty words and promises
1185. Therewith, the political ambition of Europe is seen as 
predominant and selfish. What constitutes the ambivalence of the Spanish press discourse? 
In 2000, Europe was described as a country of rich people, a country which is alarmed by the floods of 
immigrants, a country which disingenuously competes on the international markets, a country which is 
horrified by television programmes showing images of death and destruction far away, which calls on 
programmes for a macroeconomic adjustment, compromises on the liberal market and plans of politi-
cal stability
1186. This was one of the rare statements which described a conception of what Europe 
possibly is. Due to the results of the present analysis, the ambivalent perception of the Spanish dis-
course regarding the European engagement in the Mediterranean leads to a crucial question: what is 
Spain’s position within Europe? The results so far suggest that in the public perception the European 
Mediterranean approach is assimilated to the national concerns of the Spanish interests. It would in-
deed be a study-worth undertaking to assess the roots of the ambivalent position of Spain in regard to 
the European Mediterranean Policy in combination with its predominant linkage to the Mediterranean. 
6.3.2 The European Union – its internal struggle 
In the perception of the Spanish press, the internal struggle is not that much focused on the French- 
German confrontation regarding the proposal of the Mediterranean Union. It rather offers a storyline 
of the positioning of Spain within the European discussion to find a way towards a coherent Mediter-
ranean Policy. 
Previous to the Barcelona Process, the Spanish press made clear that the existence of the initiative was 
based on the interference of Spain: Spain demanded, through Javier Solana, that a principle of equi-
librium was ratified between the East and the South
1187. In 2004, el Mundo reported that Zapatero 
 
1183  Comp. „Descubre ahora Europa el Mediterráneo? Casi“ Vidal-Floch, (20.11.1995) El País. 
1184  Comp. „(…) el gran reto de Europa es el diálogo con los países del sur del Mediterráneo, (…)” Europa press, 
(02.10.2004) El Mundo. 
1185  Comp. „De lo contrario nos encontraremos con un nuevo ejemplo en el que un país rico, en este caso la UE, se lleva 
todo lo que quiere de sus vecinos más pobres y no les ofrece a cambio nada más que palabras y promesas vacías” 
Editorial, (29.11.2005) El Mundo. 
1186  Comp. „La Europa de los ricos, la que vive alarmada por el flujo de inmigrantes del sur, la que compite deslealmente 
en los mercados internacionales, la que se horroriza frente al televisor contemplando lejanas imágenes de muerte y 
destrucción, reclama de Africa programas de ajuste macroeconómico, compromisos con el libre mercado y planes de 
estabilidad política” Cruz, (03.04.2000) El  Mundo. 
1187  Comp. „España exigía, por boca del ministro Javier Solana, que se ratificase el principio de "equilibrio" entre el Este 
y el Sur aprobado en Essen” Vidal – Folch, (13.06.1995) El País. 
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travelled to Tunisia in order to find consent for reactivating the Barcelona Process
1188. Some months 
later, el Mundo quoted Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Foreign Minister, who apparently solic-
ited not to forget about the Mediterranean and that they will do everything necessary so that the Medi-
terranean receives enough funds to face the future challenges
1189. Therewith, the continuous Spanish 
effort to support the Barcelona Process was unmistakeably demonstrated. 
More subtle, but not less explicit, are the press voices at the moment of the French proposal of a Medi-
terranean Union. The first reaction within the identified statements was in the beginning of 2008, 
when it was stated that an alternative to the Barcelona Process would be negative for Spain and the 
European Union as whole
1190. After a severe debate between Germany, supported by the other mem-
ber states, and France, Sarkozy was forced to reduce its ambitious plan.1191  
El Mundo further uttered that for Spain, the French- German alliance was a surprise coup, “un golpe 
de mano”, with which France could overtake the control of the forum (Barcelona Process); according 
to diplomats, Zapatero agreed on the idea as long as it included the name of the Barcelona Proc-
ess
1192. With a certain satisfaction it was further stated that the French have to face similar fundamen-
tal problems like the Spanish, namely the participation
1193. Finally, Spain supported the French pro-
posal: Spain wants to reinforce this process, as it was us, who had created it (…)1194 and demonstrated 
a certain acknowledgement, expressing that all the problems can not be solved that night (at the Paris 
summit), but that this meeting is a step in the right direction1195. About the summit in Paris it was 
commented that the French president celebrated it like a victory, despite the lack of concretions re-
garding its content
1196. Anyhow, the Spanish government demonstrated satisfaction regarding the 
 
1188  Comp. „Rodríguez Zapatero viajará hoy a Túnez (…) compromiso con el Maghreb y pedirá colaboración para reacti-
var el Proceso de Barcelona” EFE, (02.10.2004) El Mundo. 
1189  Comp. „Moratinos, (…) ha pedido que "el Mediterráneo no sea un mar olvidado".  "Necesita recuperar la atención y 
el esfuerzo financiero de los 25. En ese sentido haremos todo lo necesario para que, dentro de los capítulos que se ne-
gocien en las diferentes estructuras de la UE, el Mediterráneo obtenga los recursos suficientes para afrontar los retos 
y desafíos del futuro"” Europa Press, (02.10.2004) El Mundo. 
1190  Comp. „(…), una alternativa al Proceso de Barcelona "sería negativa para España y para la Unión en su conjunto"” 
Missé, (11.01.2008) El País; Notably Spain is chronologically quoted before the European Union. 
1191  Comp. „El gran plan inicial de Sarkozy -que soñaba con crear una "unión política, económica y cultural" entre ambas 
orillas mediterráneas cerrada a los demás socios comunitarios- ha quedado reducido a la mínima expresión en una ta-
rea de zapa ejecutada por la Alemania de Angela Merkel con el apoyo de todos los demás” Rituerto/Missé, 
(14.03.2008) El País.  
1192  Comp. „Para Espana, la alianza galo-germana es un golpe de mano por el que Francia toma el control del foro, pero, 
según fuentes diplomáticas españolas, Zapatero está dispuesto a aceptar la ldea mientras se incluya en el nombre Pro-
ceso de Barcelona -un subtítulo formal, que, de todas formas, se evaporará rápidamente- en la nueva Unión Medite-
rránea” Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1193  Comp. „(…) Kouchner, promete un formidable puente entre las dos orillas, el mundo occidental y el mundo árabe", 
pero los galos se encontrarán con los mismos problemas básicos que sufrían los españoles, como la participación” 
Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1194  Comp. „"España quiere reforzar este Proceso. Fuimos los que lo creamos…” Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El Mundo. 
1195  Comp. „Todos los problemas no se van a solucionar esta noche, pero esto ya es un paso” Ramírez, (13.03.2008) El 
Mundo. 
1196  Comp. „Con todo, el presidente francés celebró la creación de la Unión como un éxito, a la vez que rechazó críticas 
sobre la falta de definición en la cuestión del financiamiento del nuevo bloque, uno de los aspectos de la UPM que 
todavía necesita concreción” Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo. 
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success of the meeting in Paris and conceded that its effect has been an historic impulse
1197. This con-
ciliatoriness was honoured by making Barcelona the permanent domicile of the Euro-Mediterranean 
affairs. El Mundo stated that beside all received strokes, Barcelona reached to deliver - with the 
French impulse – an important symbolic achievement; even if it is more symbolic than efficient
1198. 
With all these statements the strong linkage between the Spanish national interests and the Mediterra-
nean Affairs seems evident. Nevertheless, a few questions still have to be assessed: What are the con-
temporary driving forces for such a strong commitment to the Mediterranean Policy? In the same con-
text, what is the relation between historic and economic interests? Do the national interests in the 
Mediterranean influence the Spanish position within the European Union, and, if yes, to what extent? 




Switzerland is the only non-EU country which has been considered in the present research undertak-
ing. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (liberal with conservative tendency) is not only a leading Swiss news-
paper, but also represents an important opinion leader in the German speaking ambit and in Europe. 
From the 26 articles, which have been considered from the Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), a total of 
143 statements have been identified as being appropriate for the present analysis.  
 







By far the most statements concern the category “expression” (83), followed by “identity” (41) and the 
“purpose/aim” (19) of the European Mediterranean Policy: 
 
SWITZERLAND number of statements per category 
the other ass./diss. mmr mmpol total 
Expression 14 24 2 43 83 
Purpose aim    
Purpose 10 9   19 
 
1197  Comp. „En cualquier caso, el gobierno español se ha mostrado hoy "muy satisfecho" con el éxito que, a su juicio, ha 
tenido la reunión de Paris para el Mediterráneo, al considerar que da un "impulso histórico" al Proceso de Barcelona” 
Editorial, (13.07.2008) El Mundo. 
1198  Comp. „Ahora Barcelona, pese a todos los golpes recibidos, ha logrado redimirse - con el impulso de Francia - al 
obtener un éxito de mayor peso simbólico que efectivo en la realidad” Oms, (04.11.2008) El Mundo. 
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EU     
Identity 41    41 
 
The distribution of the selected statements per year indicates the following pattern: 
 
SWITZERLAND distribution of the statements per category and year 
 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 Total 
Expression 27  5 1  13 4 6   2   25 83 
Purpose 8   1  3  1   1  1 4 19 
Identity 11  2   2  1     2 23 41 
total 46  7 2  18 4 8   3  3 52 143 
 
Most of the statements have been considered in 1995 and 2008. The remarkable high number of 
statements in these years is due to repetitively stressed reasons: the Barcelona Conference in 1995 and 
the Paris Summit in 2008.  
7.1 Discourse analysis – Expression  
Considering the same subcategories as in the previous analysis, there have been 83 statements identi-
fied in the Swiss newspaper. 
7.1.1 The view of the “other”, associative/dissociative elements of the partnership 
Concerning the “other”, the Swiss press explicitly referred to the situation of the Arab countries, Is-
rael, Syria and Libya. There were only implicit interpretations how the “other” per se is perceived. In 
this context it was reported that the interest on the part of the Arabs is demonstrated by the participa-
tion of representatives of the Arab League and the Maghreb-Union
1199. It was also commented that the 
Arab countries had less reservations at the Conference in Barcelona than at the summit on economy in 
Amman a month earlier
1200. Syria was also reproached of boycotting the meeting in Amman, while 
negotiating with Israel even questions of security in Barcelona
1201. The reason therefore was stated by 
the Syrian representative: in contrast to the meeting in Amman, the conference in Barcelona does not 
take place within the limits of multilateral peace negotiations
1202. It was generally stated that the Arab 
countries expect a counterbalance to the predominance of the USA from the European engagement in 
 
1199  Comp. „Das Interesse der Arabischen Welt wird, neben der Präsenz der jeweiligen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten, durch 
die Teilnahme von Vertretern der arabischen Liga und der Maghreb-Union dokumentiert“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1200  Comp. „Die arabischen Länder sind mit weniger Vorbehalten zur Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona aufgebrochen als 
einen Monat zuvor zum Wirtschaftsgipfel in Amman“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1201  Comp. „Damaskus musste sich am Rande der Konferenz von Amman vorwerfen lassen, sein Boykott dieser Wirt-
schaftsveranstaltung sei unverständlich, zumal es in Barcelona am gleichen Tisch wie die Israeli nicht nur ökonomi-
sche, sondern auch Sicherheitsfragen diskutieren werde“ Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1202  Comp. „Die etwas papierene syrische Rechtfertigung ist, dass die Konferenz in Barcelona im Gegensatz zu derjeni-
gen in Amman nicht im Rahmen der multilateralen Friedensverhandlungen stehe, welche die frühzeitige Normalisie-
rung mit dem jüdischen Staat betrieben“ Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 




1203. Nevertheless, reaching a consensus is often very difficult, as it was reported in 
2008 that the Arab countries are not yet disposed to agree on a charter on security concerning secu-
rity issues in the Mediterranean
1204. The Libyan representative Ghadhafi stated, referring to Libya’s 
exclusion of participating at the conference in Barcelona in 1995 that he would not have assisted either 
way, because in Barcelona the predominant North will repetitively impose its will on the weaker 
southern countries
1205. Ghadhafi has not changed his opinion over the years; he did not participate at 
the Paris Summit and at the conference in Marseilles in 2008 either. According to the estimation of the 
Swiss press, the absence of Libya (at the conference in Marseilles) contributed to a surprising har-
monic progress of the meeting
1206. 
A difficulty for the relations across the Mediterranean was explicitly stated early in 2008: it must have 
attracted the attention of Sarkozy, but figuratively also Europe, that the Mediterranean countries be-
came increasingly less interested in the multi-billion offer of the EU in the last years
1207. A dissocia-
tive issue of the Mediterranean relations was stated in 2008 in connection with the “other” , when the 
Swiss newspaper argued that the “other” countries are economically weak and additionally at odds 
with each other, not only with Israel: Algeria with Morocco, Syria with Lebanon and Libya with all 
the others
1208. 
Remarkably, the Swiss press voices did not explicitly mention associative elements of the relations 
across the Mediterranean. Thus, it was stated in 1995 that while the economic guidelines were beyond 
controversy, the political formulations regarding terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process and 
regarding the refugee issue were part of severe negotiations
1209. Especially the dissent according the 
migration concern, which was expressed within the scope of a meeting after Barcelona in 1995, was 
extensively dealt with in the Swiss press. Thus, it was commented that a Tunisian participant re-
proached the impression that Europe seems to perceive immigration in the same way as the (pseudo) 
religious motivated terrorism and the drug traffic
1210. And further, that the image, whereupon each 
 
1203  Comp. „Die Araber erhoffen sich von Engagements der Europäer ein Gegengewicht zur Dominanz der USA“ Ko-
cher, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1204  Comp. „Die arabischen Staaten sind offenbar noch nicht bereit, sich in einer Grundsatzakte über die Sicherheitsbe-
ziehungen im Mittelmeergebiet festzulegen“ Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.2008) NZZ. 
1205  Comp. „[Ausschluß Libyen] Der Revolutionsführer Ghadhafi versicherte einem Radioreporter, er hätte ohnehin nicht 
teilgenommen, weil in Barcelona erneut der dominante Norden den schwachen Ländern des Südens seinen Willen 
aufzwingen wolle“ Kocher, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1206  Comp. „Nur Libyen war nicht vertreten und hat auf diese Weise zum überraschend harmonischen Verlauf der Begeg-
nung beigetragen“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
1207  Comp. „Doch es hätte auch Sarkozy auffallen müssen, dass das Interesse der Mittelmeeranrainer an den milliarden-
schweren Angeboten der EU über die Jahre erlahmte“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1208  Comp. „Diese Staaten sind wirtschaftlich schwach und noch dazu untereinander nicht nur mit Israel, sondern auch 
sonst zerstritten: Algerien mit Marokko, Syrien mit Libanon und Libyen mit allen übrigen“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) 
NZZ. 
1209  Comp. „Während die Leitlinien für die wirtschaftliche Kooperation unbestritten sind, sorgen politische Formulierun-
gen zum Terrorismus und zum Nahost-Friedensprozess sowie Flüchtlingsfragen für Verhandlungsstoff“ Rist, 
(28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1210  Comp. „(Ein Diskussionsteilnehmer aus Tunesien beklagte), dass in Europa die Immigration im selben Licht gesehen 
werde wie der (pseudo)religiös motivierte Terrorismus oder der Drogenhandel“ Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ. 
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North African and each Turk wants to live in an EU country is wrong
1211. As far as Europe was con-
cerned, it was stated that the southern and eastern countries have to understand that Europe may not 
permit an uncontrolled immigration
1212. In the last years, the migration issue has remained and still 
remains one of the central concerns of the Mediterranean Policy. 
Other reasons for dissociative elements within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have been stressed 
in connection with an explanation about why the Barcelona Process has not succeeded so far. For ex-
ample, the press commented in 2000 that the goals were not reachable and the economic, political and 
military asymmetries were underestimated
1213. Also the conviction that the partnership can only pro-
gress when the Arabian-Israeli conflict is succeeding is postulated as an excuse
1214. Also the pon-
derosity of the bureaucratic structures, the reciprocal mistrust and the diverging interests
1215 were 
repetitively stressed as dissociative matters.  
In 2008, the discourse also in the Swiss media stressed the evaluation and revitalisation of a Mediter-
ranean Policy. The NZZ stated that primarily the Middle East Conflict and also the old rivalries 
among the Maghreb countries turned out to be insuperable barriers for a real, multilateral Mediter-
ranean Policy
1216. Whether these, other or new dissociative elements will disturb the progress of the 
direction, agreed in November in Marseille, has to be proved. 
7.1.2 How the Mediterranean Policy is described 
In the Swiss press the description of the Mediterranean Policy concerns either definitional or evalua-
tive statements. 
At the beginning of the Barcelona Process in 1995, the definitional statements referred to a joint dec-
laration which founds the base for a new multilateral policy and represents a formal begin for a new 
cooperation between the European Union and the Mediterranean non member countries and also the 
Palestinian Authority
1217. At this moment, the Mediterranean Policy is regarded as a promising reori-
 
1211  Comp. „(es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes 
als in einem EU Land leben“ Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ. 
1212  Comp. „(es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes 
als in einem EU Land leben“ Ammann B, (01.12.1995) NZZ. 
1213  Comp. „Die Ziele seien am Anfang zu hoch gesteckt, die wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Asymmet-
rien unterschätzt worden, konstatierte Roberto Aliboni, der Direktor des Instituto Affari Internationali“ iwe, 
(28.06.2000) NZZ. 
1214  Comp. „Das verbreitete Argument, mit der Partnerschaft könne es nur vorangehen, wenn der arabisch-israelische 
Friedensprozess erfolgreich verlaufe, sei ein Ausrede“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ. 
1215  Comp. „Dass der "Barcelona-Prozess" ungeachtet der nach jeder Euromed-Konferenz offiziell beschworenen Fort-
schritte in der Praxis so harzig verläuft, liegt sicher an den hüben und drüben schwerfälligen bürokratischen Struktu-
ren, am gegenseitigen Misstrauen und, wie das gescheiterte Fischereiabkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko il-
lustrierte, auch an unterschiedlich wahrgenommenen Interessen“ Lautenschütz, (07.11.2001) NZZ. 
1216  Comp. „In erster Linie der Nahost-Konflikt und alte Rivalitäten zwischen den Maghreb-Staaten erwiesen sich als 
unüberwindbare Hindernisse für das Formulieren einer echten, multilateralen Mittelmeerpolitik“ win, (21.05.2008) 
NZZ. 
1217  Comp. „Eine gemeinsame Erklärung, die die Basis für eine neue multilaterale Mittelmeerpolitik legt,(…) Sie verkör-
pert im Urteil der Teilnehmerstaaten den formellen Beginn einer neuen Kooperation zwischen der Europäischen Uni-
on und den Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten sowie den palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
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entation of the EU Foreign Policy
1218. Later, in 2000, the Barcelona Process was described as a new 
chapter in the economic, security-political and social cooperation
1219. In 2008, the agreement on the 
French proposal was denominated as a German-French compromise proposal1220. The European poli-
ticians, who wanted to revive the Barcelona Process, agreed at the Ministerial Meeting in Marseilles in 
November 2008 that the term “Barcelona-Process” will be eliminated as the denomination of the 
Mediterranean Policy and that Union for the Mediterranean will be the official appellation
1221. 
Therewith, the definitional statements in the Swiss press are basically inoffensive, as they do neither 
refer to the aspired novelty character of the Barcelona Process in an exaggerated way, nor do they 
indicate any strategic finality. 
The evaluative references are predominantly negative. The few positive statements only referred to the 
Mediterranean Union, which appears to have started off well1222, and to the fact that the successful 
kick-off concerning the implementation of the Mediterranean Union has inspired the fantasy
1223. The 
claim of the Mediterranean Policy already contained certain criticism, because it was stated that it 
should revive the Barcelona Process, and not reinvent it
1224. 
Critical voices already mentioned in 1997 that the intended intensification of a cooperation of all 
countries in the Mediterranean stagnated due to the paralysis of the Israeli – Palestinian peace proc-
ess and was even threatened by an abrupt end as the Middle East conflict got worse, which attested 
the Barcelona Process an uncertain future
1225
.The stagnation of the Barcelona Process was also 
stressed in 19981226 and in 2001, when it was reported that the integration among the Mediterranean 
countries is not advancing
1227. The reasons for this were assumed to result from the differing expecta- 
 
 
1218  Comp. „Die angestrebte Partnerschaft wird (…) als vielversprechende Neuorientierung der EU-Aussenpolitik gewer-
tet!“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1219  Comp. „(…) euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft ein neues Kapitel in der ökonomischen, sicherheitspolitischen und 
sozialen Kooperation zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern(…)“ iwe, (28.06.2008) NZZ. 
1220  Comp. „Der neueste deutsch-französische Kompromissvorschlag zu dieser Union (...)“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1221  Comp. „Die Diplomaten hätten sich ausserdem geeinigt, das Wort Barcelona-Prozess aus dem Namen zu streichen 
und nur von der Union für das Mittelmeer zusprechen“ Editorial, (04.11.2008) NZZ. 
1222  Comp. „Die Mittelmeer-Union sei "sehr gut gestartet", bescheinigte Kanzlerin Merkel am Sonntag -nachdem sie zu 
Beginn die schärfste Kritikerin des Projektes war“ ap, (14.07.2008) NZZ. 
1223  Comp. „Der auch sonst gelungene Auftakt zur Errichtung der Mittelmeerunion hat die politische Phantasie beflügelt“  
Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
1224  Comp. „Neu beleben, nicht neu erfinden“ win, (21.05.2008). 
1225  Comp. „Die beabsichtigte Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen allen Ländern des Mittelmeerraumes kommt 
seit der weitgehenden Lähmung des israelischen-palästinensischen Friedensprozesses nicht mehr voran (...)Die Ver-
schärfung der Nahostkrise führte aber die Konferenz und den gesamten Barcelona-Prozess gefährlich nahe an ein ab-
ruptes Ende (...)Die Zukunft der Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und dem Mittelmeerraum ist ungewiss“ Foreign 
Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ. 
1226  Comp. „(…)Bestrebungen waren wegen der Probleme bei den Friedensverhandlungen im Nahen Osten ins Stocken 
geraten“ ap, (04.06.1998)NZZ. 
1227  Comp. „Kaum voran kommt hingegen die Integration der Mittelmeeranrainer unter sich“ Lautenschütz, (07.11.2001) 
NZZ. 
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tions of the participants
1228, the insufficient infrastructure in the region and the political tensions1229. 
Furthermore, the moderate success of the Barcelona Process was explained by the lack of verve and 
visions among the partners
1230. Thus, in 2008, the only way was to re-launch the Barcelona Proc-
ess
1231
 . In this context the NZZ reported that the EU Commissioner of Foreign Affairs Ferrero-
Waldner indirectly admitted that the Barcelona Process could not fulfil the expectations
1232. In regard 
to a revival of the Barcelona Process within the limits of a Union for the Mediterranean, the Swiss 
press repetitively stated that forms seem more important than content1233 and added with a certain 
irony its own perception that maybe it would be enough to develop the Mediterranean Union to a kind 
of club, because in a club style and conventions are more important than common rules and em-
powerments of enacting binding decisions.
1234  
By and large, the criticism of the Swiss press in this respect appears to be quite harmless and unemo-
tional.  
7.2 Discourse analysis – Purpose  
Due to the low number of references concerning the actual purpose of the European Policy in the 
Mediterranean and the officially stated aim, both aspects are treated under a single subheading. 
 
The purpose and the officially stated aim of the Mediterranean Policy  
Within the Swiss Press the purpose of the European Policy in the Mediterranean includes the assur-
ance of peace and stability and also the amalgamation of the peoples. On the occasion of the initiation 
of the Barcelona Process, the NZZ stated that nearly all speakers on the conference expressed their 
belief that without a peaceful partnership in the Mediterranean it will be impossible to assure peace in 
Europe
1235 and that it is the purpose to increase prosperity and wealth in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean, in order to enhance a zone of political stability and regional integration
1236. The 
 
1228  Comp. „Das Kernproblem der Partnerschaft ortete George Joffe von der London School of Economics bei den unter-
schiedlichen Erwartungen der Partner“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ. 
1229  Comp. „Die Bilanz der bisherigen Zusammenarbeit ist bescheiden. Erste Integrationsschritte haben die wirtschaftli-
chen und sozialen Disparitäten nicht vermindert“ pgp, (28.11.2005) NZZ. 
1230  Comp. „Fünf Jahre nach der Konferenz von Barcelona (…) ist (…) nur noch wenig von den einstmals großen Euro-
med-Perspektiven zu entdecken gewesen“ Müller, (17.11.2000) NZZ. 
1231  Comp. „(…) es nur noch darum gehe, eine vor 13 Jahren in Barcelona beschlossene Strategie der EU zum Einbezug 
der Mittelmeeranrainer -im EU-Jargon "Barcelona-Prozess"genannt- neu zu lancieren“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1232  Comp. „Ferrero-Waldner gab indirekt zu, dass die bald 13 Jahre dauernde Erfahrung mit diesem Barcelona-Prozess 
die Erwartungen nicht erfüllen konnte“ win, (21.05.2008) NZZ. 
1233  Comp. „Formen statt Inhalte“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1234  Comp. „Vielleich genügt es, die Mittelmeerunion zu einer Art Klub zu entwickeln (...)In einem Klub sind Stil und 
Konvention wichtiger als für alle geltende Regeln und Ermächtigungen zum Erlass verbindlicher Entscheidungen“ 
Meesse, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
1235  Comp. „In nahezu allen Grußadressen (…) kam zum Ausdruck, dass ohne eine friedliche Partnerschaft rund ums 
Mittelmeer in Europa kein dauerhafter Frieden herrschen könne“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1236  Comp. „Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande besteht aus EU-Sicht darin, im südlichen und östlichen 
Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort letztlich eine Zone politischer Stabilität und regionaler 
Integration zu erreichen“ Gemperle, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
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Swiss press attested the multilateral aspect of the initiative the purpose of merging the peoples by ex-
plicitly respecting traditions and national singularities
1237. The purpose to assure peace and stability 
via economic support and a cultural dialogue
1238 was continuously stressed in the discourse over the 
years. 
Other arguments, which refer to the European purpose, expressed the wish to enhance the policy with 
a new impetus
1239 and to intensify the Mediterranean Policy1240. The identified statements in the Swiss 
newspaper were similar to the official statements and only to a moderate extent self-reflective, also 
when it was reported that the French President demands more effort for an early recognition and arbi-
tration of conflicts, but also wants to strengthen the civil and military means for fending off unwanted 
consequences of climatic changes and also the millions of immigrants in Europe
1241. 
The officially stated aims that have been identified in the Swiss press are uncontroversial. Thus, it was 
stated in 1995 that it is the aim to initiate a closer economic and political cooperation1242 and to sup-
port the partner countries with high donated funds
1243. The only deviance of the common formulations 
concerned the consideration that the aims can be regarded as ambitious1244 and, as it was critically 
stated in 2008, that the Barcelona Process must exceed a one-sided implemented and bureaucratic 
operated auxiliary programme and must embody an equitable partnership
1245. And further, that the 
structure of the Mediterranean policy should be in accordance with its challenges
1246. Therewith, a 
self-reflective argument concerning the officially stated aim was stressed.  
7.3 Discourse analysis – Identity  
The statements which are allocated to the analytical category “identity” in the Swiss Press refer to the 
political ambition of the European Union, its internal struggle and its role perception. 
 
1237  Comp. „Das dritte Element des kooperativen Geistes, der in Barcelona geherrscht hat, schlägt sich in einem umfang-
reichen Katalog von Absichtserklärungen nieder, der letztlich das Zusammenführen der Völker bezweckt, ausdrück-
lich aber Traditionen und nationale Eigenheiten respektiert“ Rist, (29.11.1995) NZZ. 
1238  Comp. „(…) "Barcelona-Prozess" genannte Euromed-Initiative sollte den Mittelmeerraum dank europäischer Wirt-
schaftshilfe und einem Dialog der Kulturen zu einer Zone des Friedens und der Stabilität machen“ Editorial, 
(24.04.2002) NZZ. 
1239  Comp. „[Palermo] Das informelle Treffen soll dem sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess neuen Auftrieb geben“ Editorial, 
(04.06.1998) NZZ. 
1240  Comp. „[F] Frankreich möchte die im Jahr 1995 mit der Konferenz in Barcelona begonnene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik 
intensivieren, über die vor kurzem selbst Bundeskanzlerin Merkel sagte, diese bleibe weit hinter den Erwartungen zu-
rück“  eg, (04.08.2007) NZZ. 
1241  Comp. „(…) ruft er zu mehr Anstrengung bei der Früherkennung, Verhütung und Schlichtung von Konflikten auf, 
aber auch zur Stärkung der zivilen und militärischen Mittel zur Abwehr unerwünschter Folgen des Klimawandels. 
Dazu gehören auch Migrationsströme in Millionenstärke in Richtung Europa“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1242  Comp. „(…) eine engere wirtschaftliche und politische Kooperation initiiert werden“ Rist, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1243  Comp. „(...), sowie die Verpflichtung der EU, den Partnerstaaten milliardenhohe Finanzhilfen zu gewähren“ Gemper-
le, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1244  Comp. „(…) Ziele können tatsächlich als sehr ehrgeizig bezeichnet werden“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ. 
1245  Comp. „Der von der EU 1995 initiierte Barcelona-Prozess muss über ein einseitig verordnetes und bürokratisch 
gesteuertes Hilfsprogramm hinausführen und partnerschaftlicher Parität Ausdruck geben“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) 
NZZ. 
1246  Comp. „Die Struktur sollte den Aufgaben entsprechen“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
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7.3.1 The European Union – its political ambition and its internal struggle 
In 1995, a Swiss journalist stated that the new Mediterranean policy is a reaction on the European 
policy in eastern and middle Europe and that beside economic interests, the main motivation is based 
on security-political concerns
1247. Although Europe is –at least demographically – in a declining posi-
tion and Europe therefore depends on immigrants, the conference in Barcelona can be considered to 
have been part of a defence strategy
1248. Therewith, the European political intention in the Mediterra-
nean was unmistakably expressed. 
Nevertheless, the outcome of the Swiss perception of the European political ambition is very critical. 
For instance, the NZZ stated in 1997 that the European Union does not dispose of a real common For-
eign and Security Policy and that the Union is still incapable to deal with acute crisis
1249. Hence, the 
European Union is implicitly assessed as being weak and not having a coordinated Foreign Policy. At 
another moment, in 2002, in the context of a Ministerial Conference in Valencia, the Swiss newspaper 
remarked quite ironically that due to the European perception, it is already considered to be a success 
that the Conference even took place
1250
. This statement does not implicate a confidential opinion re-
garding the European policy approach. In 2008, it was stated in regard to the discussion of the Medi-
terranean Union that the fundamental question why the Barcelona Process failed was not even 
raised
1251. And that beside the festiveness which was demonstrated at the Paris Summit the essential 
political massage was missed
1252. Therewith, the Swiss press unambiguously expresses its opinion of 
the European Policy in the Mediterranean; that it is of questionable seriousness, that it lacks of content 
and, implicitly, that the European Union is too weak to change this circumstance. 
Concerning the internal struggle, the different national interests, the Swiss press is equally discerning. 
The particular national positions regarding the Mediterranean Policy were stressed for two occasions: 
the initiation in 1995, and 2007 and 2008, respectively in connection with the French proposal of a 
Mediterranean Union. In 1995, the Spanish position was ostensibly emphasised, namely that the Medi-
terranean constitutes a special concern of Spain regarding the European Foreign Policy and that 
Madrid is emphasising the position that Europe does not only have precarious frontiers in the East, 
 
1247  Comp. „Die von der EU angestrebte sogenannte Neue Mittelmeerpolitik ist zu einem guten Teil die Reaktion der EU 
auf ihre Öffnung gegenüber Ost- und Mitteleuropa (...)Es dürfen mit anderen Worten -abgesehen von den wirtschaft-
lichen Interessen- eher sicherheits- als entwicklungspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser gewordene EU-
Mittelmeerpolitik maßgebend gewesen sein“ Gemperle, (28.11.1995) NZZ. 
1248  Comp. „(…),dass Europa -zumindest demographisch- gleichsam auf dem absteigenden Ast sei, weswegen der alte 
Kontinent auf Einwanderer angewiesen sei (...)Die Euro-mediterrane Konferenz der Minister war aus europäischer 
Sicht Teil einer Abwehrstrategie“ Ammann, (01.12.1995) NZZ. 
1249  Comp. „Es gibt gegenwärtig noch keine wirkliche gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, und die Union 
ist nach wie vor unfähig, akute Krisen zu meistern“ Foreign Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ. 
1250  Comp. „Nach Ansicht der europäischen Union ist es deshalb schon ein Erfolg, dass sie überhaupt stattgefunden hat“ 
Editorial, (24.04.2002) NZZ. 
1251  Comp. „Doch die Grundfrage, warum denn der "Barcelona-Prozess" derart Rost ansetzte, kommt nicht zur Sprache“ 
win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1252   Comp. „Bei aller zur Schau gestellten Fröhlichkeit ging eine wichtige politische Botschaft aus“ Editorial, 
(14.07.2008) NZZ. 
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but also in the South
1253. Further, that the Conference of Barcelona represents a core element of the 
Spanish policy, which is explained with the apparent interests due to its geographical location
1254. 
Therewith, the Spanish claim to belong to Europe’s voice leading countries is unambiguous1255.  
Nevertheless, Spain is not the only country which tries to gain profile over issues of the Mediterranean 
Policy. The Swiss newspaper also extensively referred to the French and German power struggle, 
which took place on the occasion of the French proposal to build a Mediterranean Union just for the 
countries bordering the Mediterranean. The consecutive struggle for a common position contained a 
considerable separative force and demonstrated the frailness of the European Foreign Policy, and thus 
figuratively of the European Union. In its external affairs France and Germany focus of differing pri-
orities
1256, namely France is more linked to the South, while Germany is more inclined to the East. 
However, the initial French proposal provoked a notable malaise between Paris and Berlin1257. Ger-
many was not amused about the French initiative and was not only alarmed by the separative charac-
ter, which the French proposal could have entailed, but also that Sarkozy is about to create an instru-
ment to establish the French claim for the leading position within Europe
1258. Even clearer expressed a 
month later, the NZZ stated that the background of the dissent between France and Germany is the 
concern that France aspires to build itself a new scenario with EU-funds, where it would doubtless 
assume the chief part
1259. The next statement which indicated the internal struggle attested a symbolic 
stage win for France
1260, despite the reduced concept and the participation of all European countries, 
as Sarkozy organised the Paris Summit around the national holiday. 
The Swiss perception of the differing national interests can be summed up with the still valid state-
ment of 2000, saying that within Europe, France attempts to distinguish itself in the role of the procu-
rator for the Mediterranean countries, Germany makes an effort to demonstrate its compromise to lip 
 
1253  Comp. „Ein besonderes Anliegen Spaniens stellt die Außenpolitik der EU im Mittelmeerraum dar (...)Madrid will 
seinen Partnern zu verstehen geben, dass Europa nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch im Süden eine heikle Grenze hat“ 
Ammann, (05.07.1995) NZZ. 
1254 Comp. „Die im November in Barcelona vorgesehene Konferenz (…) stellt einen Kernpunkt der spanischen Politik 
(…)dar“ und „wegen seiner geographischen Lage hat Spanien ein offensichtliches Interesse daran(…)“ Ammann, 
(05.07.1995) NZZ. 
1255  Comp. „Der Anspruch Madrids, zu den führenden Ländern der EU zu zählen, ist unzweideutig“ Ammann, 
(05.07.1995) NZZ. 
1256  Comp. „Was die Politik der EU gegenüber ihren Nachbarn im Osten und im Süden angeht, setzen Deutschland und 
Frankreich inzwischen recht unterschiedliche Prioritäten“ eg, (24.04.2002) NZZ. 
1257  Comp. „Zwischen Paris und Berlin herrscht ein Malaise(…)“ cm, (27.02.2008) NZZ. 
1258   Comp. „Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles 
andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy 
wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen“ cm, 
(27.02.2008) NZZ. 
1259  Comp. „Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles 
andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy 
wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen“ cm, 
(27.02.2008) NZZ 
1260  Comp. „Frankreichs Präsident Sarkozy hat den Nationalfeiertag in einen diplomatischen Coup verwandelt“ Editorial, 
(14.07.2008) NZZ. 
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services of the same direction, while Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries have a lack of en-
thusiasm for a cooperation with the Mediterranean countries
1261.  
7.3.2 The role of the European Union 
The evaluation of the role of the European Union in the Mediterranean contains a lot of criticism from 
the Swiss press. One of the stressed points of criticism concerned Europe’s role as a sponsor and fin-
ancier. In this context it was stated in 1997 that the relative strength of the European Union in the 
Mediterranean is clearly based on the economic dimensions
1262 and, in 2008, that the influence of the 
EU is based on the “soft power” of money
1263. The latter suggests that the role as a financier is not 
always altruistic, which in regard to the Mediterranean Policy, has to be affirmed. This was clearly 
expressed in 2000, when it was stated that the EU acted on behalf of security-political and strategic 
interests; the EU wanted to stop migration and oppose the American predominance in the Middle East 
and, additionally, it wanted to calm the southern neighbours because of the conducted eastern pol-
icy
1264. Concerning the competing position with the United States in the Mediterranean, the NZZ stated 
in 2008 that the French President made use of the political vacuum after the presidential elections in 
the United States in order to redefine the international role of France and the European Union
1265. 
The concluding evaluation, on the other hand, expressed that the United States maintain, despite all 
awkwardness and severe mistakes, the leading power in the Middle East
1266. The criticism concerning 
the European politics mentions the assumption that Europe is used to act on a short-term base, instead 
of act foresighted and on a long-term base
1267. In regard to the predominant French role within the 
revive of the Barcelona Process, the Swiss press acknowledged the strong governmental influence 
within the European Foreign Policy as counterproductive to the European Union’s attempt to speak 
with one voice and represent a coherent political entity
1268.  
 
1261  Comp. „Innerhalb der EU sucht Frankreich sich stets in seiner Sachwalterrolle zugunsten der Mittelmeeranrainer zu 
profilieren. Deutschland bemüht sich zumindest um in die gleiche Richtung weisende Lippenbekenntnisse, während 
Großbritannien und die skandinavischen Mitgliedstaaten der EU nach französischer Ansicht es weiterhin in hohem 
Masse an Enthusiasmus für die Kooperation mit den Mittelmeerstaaten fehlen lassen“ Müller, (17.11.2000) NZZ. 
1262  Comp. „Die relative Stärke der EU im Mittelmeerraum fusst eindeutig in der wirtschaftlichen Dimension“ Foreign 
Authors/AA, (08.07.1997) NZZ. 
1263  Comp. „Natürlich stützt sich der Einfluss der EU auf die "sanfte Gewalt" des Geldes, im Gegensatz etwa zur militäri-
schen Macht“ win, (14.03.2008) NZZ. 
1264   Comp. „(…)die EU habe aus sicherheitspolitischen und strategischen Interessen gehandelt. Ihr sei es darum gegangen 
der Migration einen Riegel zu schieben und der amerikanischen Dominanz im Nahen Osten etwas entgegenzusetzen. 
Zudem habe man im Auge des nach Osten wandernden europäischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesses die 
südlichen Nachbarn besänftigen wollen“ iwe, (28.06.2000) NZZ. 
1265  Comp. „Der französische Staatschef nutzt das Vakuum, das durch die amerikanische Präsidentschaftswahl entsteht, 
geschickt aus, um die internationale Rolle Frankreichs und der EU neu zu definieren“ Editorial, (14.07.2008) NZZ. 
1266  Comp. „Allen Ungeschicklichkeiten, ja groben Missgriffen zum Trotz sind die Vereinigten Staaten im Nahen Osten 
weiterhin die führende Macht“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
1267  Comp. „Europa pflegt bestenfalls kurzatmig zu reagieren, anstatt langfristig vorausschauend zu agieren“ Meessen, 
(05.11.2008) NZZ. 
1268  Comp. „Der Rückgriff auf mitgliedstaatliche Aussenpolitik läuft jedoch den Bemühungen der europäischen Union, in 
der Aussenpolitik mit einer Stimme zu sprechen, diametral entgegen“ Meessen, (05.11.2008) NZZ. 
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XXII CROSS-COUNT RY DIS COURS ES - CONCL UDING RE M ARKS 
The discourse analysis of each country provides a detailed characterisation of the specific perception 
of the European Union and its Mediterranean Policy in each of the considered countries. The conclud-
ing reflection is divided into two parts: the non-Mediterranean countries and the Mediterranean EU 
countries. Additionally, the possible distinctions of the discourse of the German speaking ambit and 
the discourse of a non-EU country, Switzerland, can be considered. The analysis of the British, 
French, German, and Italian public perception of the Global Mediterranean Policy between 1972 and 
1979 constitute a promising opportunity to stress the results of the discourse analysis between 1995-
2008 in regard to continuity and discontinuity.  
 
The non-Mediterranean countries 
Among the considered non-Mediterranean countries are Austria, Germany, Great Britain and Switzer-
land.  
Austria represents the smallest of the European member countries. Within the three selected newspa-
pers, 59 articles have been considered as relevant and a total of 141 statements have been identified. 
Within the Austrian discourse the MNC partner countries are considered with few statements. These 
statements indicate that the participation of the MNC countries in the Barcelona Process is due to the 
promised benefits and that the continuous dissent among the “other” displays the high degree of sensi-
tiveness of the process. Although the “other” per se is not mentioned, a distant and mistrusting attitude 
can be perceived. Associative elements of the cooperation are mentioned in connection with determin-
ing mutual interests and the special integrative character of the Barcelona Process. The difficulties 
which occur on the operative level are considered as the main dissociative forces. The public opinion 
can be subsumed by the following statement: summits can fail on old or new quarrels1269. In general, 
by emphasising its singular character, the Mediterranean Policy is considered to be a “promising in-
strument”. Nevertheless, its functionality regarding the efficiency is critically perceived, although the 
discourse is nourished by expectations concerning what the Barcelona Process could achieve. The 
overall estimation of the Mediterranean Policy within the Austria discourse conveys the impression 
that the Barcelona Process is aloof of reality. In the Austrian opinion, the European “purpose” for this 
kind of policy is strongly linked to European fears, like insecurity due to immigration, while the re-
ported official aim is a stylistic make-up rather than a meaningful aspect. The political ambition of the 
European Union, and therefore the Austrian perception of the EU as a whole, is attested a lack of 
ideas, meagre outcomes and few implementations. This can be reduced to the estimation of a lack of 
commitment and initiative to succeed. Overall, the Austrian discourse regarding the Mediterranean 
Affairs can be considered as distant and quite unemotional. It is rather reporting than commenting, 
 
1269  Comp. „Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem Zank zu scheitern.“ Eberling, (29.11.2005) Salzbur-
ger Nachrichten. 
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although it has to be said that the extent of the coverage is surprisingly large. The discourse is rela-
tively balanced among all three newspapers; the political inclination of the newspapers is not impor-
tant for the weighting of certain issues. 
Within the five newspapers which represent the German public discourse in this thesis, 118 articles 
and 404 statements have been identified. Among the newspapers, most articles with extraordinary 
coverage derive from the FAZ. The SZ, FTD and Welt contribute relevant statements, but the sharpest 
objections are formulated by the left inclining TAZ. Germany is the biggest non-Mediterranean coun-
try which is also notable in the press discourses. Detailed coverage with a focus on the conception of 
the European policy suggests that the German discourse is one of a voice-leading power. Within the 
discourse of all four newspapers, the MNC are covered by estimations on their positions, concerning 
whether they want the EU engagement in the Mediterranean region as a counterbalance, or concerning 
their motivation, which is considered as insufficient for a partnership and that the calculus on benefits 
constitutes the decisive driving motor for them. Associative elements are especially claimed in con-
nection with the combat against terrorism. Differences are perceived regarding the consistent dissent 
on certain topics, the increasing prosperity gap, the regional conflicts and the general mistrust. A sin-
gularity of the German discourse is the insight into the co-operational level at several Ministerial con-
ferences, which have mostly been considered in order to ascertain the associative and dissociative 
elements of cooperation. The importance of the Mediterranean Policy is repetitively highlighted in the 
context of stressing terrorism. Positive evaluative statements concern the novelty aspect of the policy 
and its significance regarding the cooperation on sensitive challenges of our times; however, most of 
the statements express criticism. The numerous common criticisms can be reduced to the German 
evaluative perception that much has been said, but few has been done, which is considered to be a 
substantial problem on the part of the EU. The purpose for the policy is regarded as a reaction to the 
challenges and as a part of the European world power vision to become/remain a decisive power. The 
officially stated aim is less explicit regarding the purpose, saying that peace has to be assured by trans-
forming the world. This explicitly stated aim deduces a strong need for recognition of the EU. The 
German public discourse criticises the European check-book diplomacy in the same way than its mis-
sion statement. Additionally, the EU is attested a strategic confusion because of its lack of concept. 
The internal struggle within the European Union covers a special position in the German public dis-
course, as it was due to Angela Merkel that the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union just for 
countries bordering the Mediterranean was rejected. Concerning this debate, Germany is regarded as 
“guardian of Europe, the European thought”, while France is perceived as a “greedy separatist”. Any-
way, the criticism of France is less pronounced than expected and the role of Angela Merkel is just 
commented in a benevolent and not exuberant way. Overall, the German discourse resembles the dis-
course of a great power, as it is actively concerned with security considerations of Europe and places 
its criticism regarding the overall conception of the European Union and less on singular aspects. A 
similar consideration was already made by Detlef Puhl, who evaluated the German press coverage for 
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the period of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP). He lined out that the criticism on the EEC 
mainly concerned its limited action-ability due to its long-winded search for compromises. He further 
concluded that although Germany is not directly socio-economically affected by the Mediterranean 
affairs, the German press is less distant than, for example, the French one; moreover, at most points it 
is even more critically because its concerns are focused on the development of the EEC. The detailed 
German press coverage paid the main attention to the conception and the factual based happenings and 
Puhl thus concluded that “for Germany it is more a Mediterranean POLICY than a MEDITERRA-
NEAN policy”.1270 
Switzerland, as the only non-European country, is regarded with one press, the Neue Zürcher Zei-
tung; within 26 articles a total of 143 statements have been considered for the discourse analysis. The 
Swiss discourse completes the preliminary expectations because it offers a more accentuated evalua-
tion of the European Union within the limits of an external scope. The MNC as cooperation partners 
are only stressed in their situational context, with no references of certain associative elements within 
the partnership. A special emphasis is on the dissociative forces among the European and Mediterra-
nean participating countries, like the increasing lack of interest of the MNC on multi-billion offers, the 
economic disparities, the multiple conflict potential in the region, the ponderosity of the European 
Union and the miss-leading reciprocal perception of both sides; for example, the MNC reject the 
European perception that their countries are a real threat for Europe. The definitional description of the 
Mediterranean Policy is basically inoffensive, while the evaluation of the Barcelona Process is pre-
dominantly negative. The process is critically perceived in connection with stagnation, the different 
expectations and the lack of enthusiasm among the partners. Concerning the Mediterranean Union it is 
stated that forms appear to be more important than context; this consideration can be overtaken for the 
whole European Mediterranean Policy within the Swiss public discourse. The reflection on the pur-
pose of the European engagement in the Mediterranean is less accentuated than expected; the com-
ments seem to be overtaken of press agencies and official statements from the EU side rather than self-
reflective. The purpose is assigned to both, the European will of assuring peace and stability and the 
coalescence of peoples. In general, the outcome of the European Mediterranean Policy is regarded as 
questionable because it lacks of content and the European Union is considered as too weak to change 
this circumstance. According to the Swiss perception, the weakness of the EU is due to its inability to 
implement a coordinated foreign policy. Its role as a primary financier in the Mediterranean and its 
“soft power” (money) approach is critically contextualised, especially as it seems obvious that the EU 
acts on the basis of strategic considerations. Overall, the Swiss public discourse is quite unemotional 
towards the Barcelona Process and, based on its status as non-European member, provides accentuated 
criticism on the European Union. 
 
1270  Comp. PUHL, Mittelmeer, 220f. The following German newspapers have been considered in his analysis: Frankfur-
ter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Handelsblatt, General-Anzeiger, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine, 
Der Spiegel, Stuttgarter Zeitung. Comp. Ibid. 215. 
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For assessing the public opinion in Great Britain, two newspapers, 29 articles and 49 statements have 
been considered. The British public perception of the European Mediterranean policy is in general 
rather unemotional, even demonstrating little interest. This is additionally underlined by the fact that 
although the same amount of articles has been considered for the British press than for Switzerland, 
only about one-third of the statements have been identified as relevant. Due to the British perception, 
the Mediterranean countries search for a greater EU engagement in the Mediterranean. Despite all 
difficulties (reach an agreement, regional conflicts), which are perceived as dissociative elements of 
the cooperation, the British newspapers suggest that the Barcelona Process, which up to date is con-
sidered as little effective, should play a major role in supporting Turkey to become a European mem-
ber. The actual purpose of the EU policy in the Mediterranean is discursively related to the European 
security concerns, which are seen as the main motivation, but also the European attempt of defining its 
performance in foreign policy affairs. Beside all the criticism regarding the Barcelona Process and its 
efficiency, it is considered to be a challenge for the whole EU to define its foreign policy conception. 
Further it is suggested that the EU should, additionally to its technical and financial assistance, act as a 
role model in the Mediterranean. Interestingly, the British press does not really participate in the de-
bate concerning the Mediterranean Union and the German-French dissent. The British rejection of the 
French proposal is due to its individual-national support of an entry of Turkey; to impede such an en-
try was one of the crucial points of the French argumentation to found a Mediterranean Union on the 
example of the European Union, but just for countries bordering the Mediterranean. Detlev Puhl 
stressed also the British public opinion in the context of the GMP. The press coverage was predomi-
nately based on a chronological reporting of the facts, which left the impression of a distant and con-
tained British approach towards the GMP and the Mediterranean Policy. Puhl suggested that this atti-
tude is based on the fact that its conception took place before Great Britain became a member of the 
European Union.1271 Between 1995 and 2008, the British discourse is also evaluated as unemotional, 
but not contained because the British press follows decided political interests in the region, such as the 
Turkish entry into the European Union. Britain participates and, at the same time, does not participate, 
it is part and its not. This is also an explanation why the public attention often refers to the role of the 
USA in the Middle East.  
 
The Mediterranean Countries 
The European Mediterranean countries which have been considered in the present discourse analysis 
are France, Italy and Spain. 
The French perception of the Barcelona Process is based on the consideration of 59 articles and 151 
statements in two newspapers. The cooperation between the EU and the Mediterranean non-member 
 
1271  Comp. Puhl, Mittelmeerpolitik, 222f. The British newspapers which were considered by Puhl were: Financial Times, 
The Times, The Economist, Guardian, Daily Telegraph. Comp. Ibid. 221.  
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countries is generally regarded as difficult, due to the national moods, especially of Libya, the Middle 
Eastern Conflict, the distinctive motivations for the participation and the increasing economic gap. 
Associatively regarded is the mutual considerateness of the tensions among the partner; this kind of 
foresightedness is especially important at the time of the ministerial conferences. Overall dominate the 
critical evaluations of the Barcelona Process. Although the French newspapers consider it as an ac-
complishment of the Barcelona Process to have survived despite the conflicts, the prevailing evalua-
tions stress its meagre results, its stagnation and even its failure; that only 26% of the provided EU 
funds have been drawn on implies severe structural criticism on the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
engagement of the EU in the Mediterranean, which implicitly is admitted to be due to security con-
cerns, is considered to be vital for France; not its existence but the European procedure and ineffi-
ciency are criticised. Concerning the distinctive internal forces in the EU in regard to the Mediterra-
nean affairs, the French press mainly focuses, not surprisingly, on the French position. The opposition 
and the debate on Nicolas Sarkozy’s proposal are not conceded as much room in the discourse as ex-
pected. In fact, the debate rather gives reason to criticise the own government and to stress the general 
French ambition to become an even more decisive player in Europe and the world, which is unmis-
takably supported by the French press in both newspapers.  
Detlev Puhl stressed the French public voice regarding the Global Mediterranean Policy and con-
cluded that the concept of the GMP was never adopted by the French and was therefore not absorbed 
in the public discourse. The public opinion seemed to have been critical, distant and little sensitised 
regarding the European Mediterranean policy approach.1272 Since 1995 the French public discourse has 
also been perceived as distant and the Mediterranean Policy has seemed to be rather introduced from 
“above” than publicly supported. The latter derives from the exemplar struggle regarding a possible 
Mediterranean identity. Within the French discourse, the definitions regarding the Mediterranean re-
gion and its significance are not clearly defined; the discourse is based on the political voice which 
aims to legitimate rather than to establish a relation. Consequentially, the struggle to handle the defini-
tions of a possible common identity related to a common destiny is overtaken in the discourse. 
For the present discourse analysis two newspapers of Italy have been considered; in them, 62 articles 
and 128 statements enhance the impression that the Italian public discourse is strongly linked to the 
Mediterranean affairs because it considers Italy to be a part of the Mediterranean. The cooperation 
with the MNC is perceived as especially difficult due to the immigration issue, which also constitutes 
the mayor dissociative element of the Barcelona Process. The Italian press unmistakably expresses the 
need of a European Mediterranean Policy although it is admitted that this is a difficult undertaking. 
Hence, the purpose of the policy approach is reasoned with the general security concern due to the 
demographic development and the high diversity of challenges in the region. The European ambition 
 
1272  Comp. Puhl, Mittelmeerpolitik, 214f. Puhl regarded to the following French newspapers: Le Monde, La Croix, Vi-
sion, Le Quotidien de Paris, Le Nouvel Observateur, Combat, L’Humanité , Le Matin de Paris, La Nation, Le Fiagro, 
France-Soir, Le Point, Le Nouvel Economiste, Les Echos, L’Aurore. Comp. Ibid. 209. 
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to intensify its engagement in the South is benevolently perceived because it is interpreted as an act of 
Europe to become “a bit less north and a bit more south”. Regarding the overall conceptual perception 
of the European Union, the Italian press stresses the inherent struggle of the EU to define its position 
in crucial questions of the foreign policy. The Italian position in Europe is of significant concern 
among the Italian public. Both newspapers contain the claim to defend the Italian position in the Medi-
terranean and in the European Union; at this point it is ambiguous what constitutes the preferential 
option. Nevertheless, it is determinately requested that Italy should be more engaged and “may not 
loose the train”, even if that means a stronger cooperation with the USA. According to Puhl, the Italian 
press preliminary concentrated on the specific national interests and a stronger position in the EC al-
ready in the analysis of the Italian public opinion regarding the GMP.1273 
Spain is represented by the consideration of two newspapers, 54 articles and 138 statements, which 
unmistakably consider the Mediterranean Policy as a national policy concern. The cooperation level of 
the Barcelona Process is basically regarded to be difficult. It includes a strong dissociative element, 
which is determined by the increasing socio-economic disparity; the most significant associative issue 
concerns the reaffirmation of the commitment to the Mediterranean Policy in 2008. The definitional 
references to the European Mediterranean Policy are linked to its significance, which is considered as 
vital for Spain. Within the Spanish discourse there is a remarkable linkage between the Barcelona 
Process and national politics - the Barcelona Process is seen as it belongs to the Spanish policy. When 
France proposed the Mediterranean Union, the Spanish public discourse signalised disappointment and 
affected proud. Nevertheless, Zapatero supported the French proposal due to the determined interests 
in the region. The discourse was reconciling when Barcelona was elected to be the host town of the 
newly established permanent institutions, which were set up at the Ministerial Conference in Novem-
ber 2008. Overall, the European engagement in the Mediterranean is considered as a necessity because 
its purpose is interpreted to be based on security concerns, thus non-altruistic motives.  
 
Among the Mediterranean and non-Mediterranean country discourses the most remarkable distin-
guishing features concern the significance of the European Mediterranean Policy approach and the 
relation of the countries to the European Union.  
The Mediterranean countries are closely involved in the Mediterranean Policy, as its finality and suc-
cess is regarded to be vital for their nation. Due to the interference of their socio-economies, the exis-
tence of the Barcelona Process is beyond question. On the other hand, its evaluation and poor results, 
so far, are worth debating. The destiny approach of the Mediterranean for their countries is in Italy 
unmistakably expressed and in Spain even linked to domestic affairs; in France, the public opinion is 
 
1273  Comp. Ibid. 208f. Puhl considered the following Italian newpapers: Il Sole 24, Il Tempo, La Voce Repubblicana, 
Gazetta del Mezzogiorno, La Stampa, La Nazione, La Repubblica, Il Mesaggero, Gazetta del Popolo, Paese Sera, Il 
Giorno, Il Globo, Corriere della Sera, Mondo Economico, L’Unità, Il Giornale, Il Giornale d’Italia, Il Popolo, Avanti. 
Comp. Ibid. 200. 
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quite distant regarding a possible identity-building in and with the Mediterranean. A possible reason 
therefore constitutes the position of these countries in the Mediterranean. While Spain and especially 
Italy, aim for a more decisive role in the Mediterranean and fear a marginalisation of their influence 
within Europe, France’s ambitions go further: France aspires a leading role within the European Union 
and even in the world.  
The non-Mediterranean countries, on the other hand, take the Barcelona Process as an integral part of 
the European foreign policy approach and focus on its conceptual consistency rather than on its actual 
significance for their countries. This is apparently due to the lack of dependency of their national 
economies. Germany stands out because it is the only of all considered countries, which disposes of a 
discourse that equals to a discourse of a great power. Its conceptual approaches concern the European 
approach as a whole. Austria and Germany, countries of central Europe, do not at any moment reflect 
on their position within the European Union, they take it for granted. The British public opinion is 
generally more distant towards the Mediterranean Policy and rather concerned about assuring their 
national policy interests, which in regard to Mediterranean affairs is the admission of Turkey to the 
European Union and the solution of the Middle East Peace conflict; in this concern, the British posi-
tion is also willing to cooperate with other powers, like the United States of America, to achieve their 
interests. This observed dynamics leave the question open if the countries, which are predominately 
situated at the continent borders, do have fewer sentiments to form a part of the European unity – also 
in a political sense.  
The non-European voice of the Swiss public also stresses the Mediterranean Policy in a distant and 
conceptual approach. What distinguishes the Swiss discourse from the other non-Mediterranean coun-
try discourses is that its criticism regarding the European Union is, not surprisingly, more accentuated.  
Above all it can be stated that the discourse analysis of the public perception in the Mediterranean 
indicates the struggle of the European Union to actually form a union. The lack of commitment, trust 
and the sense of forming an integral part of the European policy do not only paralyse the progress of 







Many questions have been raised, many issues have been stressed and 2001 statements have been ana-
lysed.1274 The approach of the European Union to launch the Barcelona Process, which in literature is 
severely criticised most of the time, can be considered as basically correct1275 and even as a promising 
attempt. As initially stated, the focus of the present work is not on stressing the detailed content of the 
Barcelona Process or its political context regarding the Middle East Peace Process, but on emphasising 
the European discourse in the context of its policy approach in the Mediterranean. The following ques-
tions have been raised throughout the work: 
Where does the necessity for the initiation of the Barcelona Process accrue? Which interests pursue 
the participating countries? Does this approach mean a continuity of historic interests in the Mediter-
ranean or is it a new way of dealing with each other? What kind of partnership does the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership refer to? How do the political powers face the apparent inequality among 
the participants? What does that mean for the European political understanding in the Mediterranean? 
Which kind of political role does the European Union aspire in the Mediterranean? How does the EU 
deal with its ‘responsibility’ in the Mediterranean? What about the consciousness of its predominance? 
Is there a power claim? What is the significance of the region building issue? Thus, is the Barcelona 
Process a result of post colonial politics? 
The answers to these questions are based on the results of the discourse analysis and will be stressed in 
the following three sub-chapters. The concluding remarks concern the suggestion on further research 
proposals.  
 
The reasons for this effort - what is the purpose of the Barcelona Process? 
The response to this crucial question is simple as in both, the official discourse and the public percep-
tion there is one constant: the main purpose of the European Mediterranean Policy is determinately 
linked to European security concerns, basically in respect of terrorism and demographically caused 
migration. Another important motivation concerns a so-called mission statement, which is due to an 
inherent wish of the European Union to transport its values and change the world for the ‘better’ in the 
name of peace. 
The consecutive considerations stress the analytical results of the level of the discourse establishment 
and implementation for the European discourse and also its perception according to the public level. 
 
1274  Of the 2001 statements belong 492 to the European Documents, 357 to the speeches and 1152 to the newspaper arti-
cles. 
1275  This consideration is shared with the assumption of Stephen Calleya who stated that „The EU approach therefore 
seems to be basically correct.“ Comp. Stephen C. CALLEYA, Eberhard RHEIN, The Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship needs a strong push. In: Andreas JACOBS (ed.), Euro-Mediterranean co-operation: enlarging and widening the 




Subsequently, some argumentation streams which could explain the European position will be out-
lined. The latter just forms a suggestion of an approach which should encourage further research be-
cause there are a lot of valuable and promising approaches in this field.  
The establishment of the discourse is empirically represented by the documents assigned to the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Council. Regarding the security concern, it is unmistakably stated 
that the Mediterranean Policy, the Barcelona Process, is of strategic importance and that the conse-
quences of instability in the regarded region may not be under-estimated (Commission). The Council 
is even more explicit, stating that a serious threat emanates from terrorism and illegal immigration and 
that the main strategic concern for the Barcelona Process is based on the socio-economic disparities. 
The so-called mission statement rather accrues from the security concern, as the motives are regarded 
as noble. The Commission and the Council suggest that shared values enhance the cultural dialogue 
and that the Union is disposed to contribute to the solution of the tensions in that area. Therewith, the 
participating countries and the public should be discursively convinced of the necessity of the Euro-
pean approach in the Mediterranean. The implementation of this discourse is carried out by representa-
tives of the European Commission and Council who hold speeches in distinctive contexts. Regarding 
the security concern as a driving force for the Barcelona Process, the analysis of these documents has 
shown that another discursive component is added: urgency. Both, Commission and Council stress 
that the advancement of the policy is timely urgent, that there is a need of action and that there is a 
need to speed up on the operational level by means of concluding Association Agreements. The le-
gitimation for this policy approach is in the fact that a common understanding of a common region and 
future is regarded as essential, that the EU disposes of not only a political but also a moral responsibil-
ity and that there is a common destiny, which very expressively has recently been mentioned by Nico-
las Sarkozy. The public perception, based on the analysis of several European (Mediterranean and 
non-Mediterranean) countries, indicates that the European motivation for this kind of policy approach 
is unambiguously linked to its security concerns. While this is especially in Italy and Spain an inherent 
aspect of their domestic policy, France is more concerned with positioning itself well. The German 
speaking countries (Austria, Germany and Switzerland) and Great Britain contribute more conceptual 
considerations than stressing individual security concerns. Another noticeable circumstance, which 
underlines the argument of the security concern as a preliminary purpose, constitutes a fact that is 
unique for the Barcelona Process, namely that the multilateral – cultural – dimension is only margin-
ally stressed in the public discourse.1276 
From this short outline of the research results derives that the security issue is the preliminary concern 
for the European engagement in the Mediterranean. The so-called mission statement has two kinds of 
fins: the legitimation of the proceeding, which is internally than externally relevant, and the inherent 
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wish of the European Union to evolve something meaningful. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is 
considered as an important and, due to the increasing regional and global problems, indispensable 
instrument for the European security policy in the Mediterranean region.1277 An assessment of the con-
sistency of this argument can not be provided at this point because there have been no verifying re-
sults; nevertheless, the need for a security approach in the Mediterranean appears to be evident.1278  
Basal indications for the apparent European security issue derive from socio-economic developments. 
The crucial point accrues from the demographic dynamic: Europe lacks of a demographic motor, 
while the population in the MNC is exploding and lacks of a future perspective; this is nourished by 
the high discrepancy of the GDP between Europe and the MNC. 
The pessimistic demographic prognosis in Europe relates to the proceeding demographic decline, 
caused by a low birth rate next to a simultaneous over-aging of the society. In a notification of the 
European Commission on the demographic alteration in 2005, a clear picture of the demographic chal-
lenge was portrayed. 
 
Basic Scenario Eurostat. EU-25 (in %) 2005-2050 2005-2010 2010-2030 2030-2050 
Total population -2,1% +1,2% +1,1% -4,3% 
Children (0-14) -19,4% -3,2% -8,9% -8,6% 
Adolescent (15-24) -25,0% -4,3% -12,3% -10,6% 
Young adults (25-39) -25,8% -4,1% -16,0% -8,0% 
Adults (40-54) -19,5% +4,2% -10,0% -14,1% 
"Elder Employee" (55-64) +8,7% +9,6% +15,5% -14,1% 
"Seniors" (65-79) +44,1% +3,4% +37,4% +1,5% 
Very old persons (80 and older) +180,5% +17,1% +57,1% +52,4% 
Source: KOM(2005)94 
 
According to Eurostat, the total population will decrease by 2.1% until 2050. This does not appear to 
be dramatic at a first glance but contains trend-setting developments. The demographic contrasts will 
be intensified with regard to the demographic prognosis in the candidate and acceding countries: 
While the estimation for Bulgaria, Rumania and Croatia assumes a demographic decrease between 11 
and 21% until 2030, the forecast for Turkey anticipates a population increase of 25% which is equiva-
lent to 19 million people.1279 From the same thematic context derives the immigration concern of the 
European Union, which is also considered as a security issue. The European Union is more than ever 
confronted with the dilemma of needing immigration and facing a continuously growing migration 
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pressure of poor people from the south. It was estimated that in the year 2004 there were 20-50 million 
potential migrants. Of this sum 16.3 million were supposed to be Africans. According to estimations in 
2005, one of ten people wants to emigrate from Africa.1280 Even though the numbers seem relatively 
low, it has to be considered that the tendency is increasing. The International Centre for Migration 
Policy Development (ICMPD) states that annually about 100,000 – 120,000 people illegally cross the 
Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. Their origin is assumed to be apportioned as follows: 35,000 peo-
ple emanate from the Sub-Saharan region, 55,000 originate from the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean and 30,000 come from other countries – for example from Asia.1281  
This short insight on numbers and socio-economic developmental tendencies attempts to provide an 
approximation of the European motivation to develop an efficient policy for the Mediterranean. Re-
garding the socio-economic developments in Europe and in the Mediterranean, Europe has become 
vulnerable because there is a necessity to adequately respond to the present challenges. The concep-
tion of the Barcelona Process seems correct; it is questionable if it is enough to promote European 
standards in the MNC and export financial assistance and ‘western’ know-how or if it also urges to 
reassess some basic values on the European side as well. With a glance at the family and integration 
policy in the European countries it is doubtable whether the countries of the European Union have an 
adequate approach for themselves and therefore for the European Union. 
 
The European Union in the Mediterranean – an imperialistic approach? 
Stressing the European role as crucial constitutes the putative predominant role of the European Union 
in the Mediterranean, which reminds of imperialistic patterns. Is it possible that the former ‘colonial’ 
claim has changed among the former colonial empires which are now associated in a political union, 
where the assurance of peace is regarded as the preliminary premise? Maybe the maintenance of 
power does not align to the direct predominance in an imperial sense, but build on the experience of 
dominance. The actions of the EU in the Mediterranean non-member countries are based on the expe-
rience that not long ago it domineered over these countries. Europe looks at the Mediterranean with a 
new appearance, a new mask - a different intention than in former imperial times. It relies on power 
and dominance, which aspire to suggest trust. For the European Union this is not only a matter of pre-
dominance and power maintenance but also a crucial moment of proving credibility – in front of its 
internal criticism and the international political scenery.  
Herfried Münkler raised the question how Europe must be characterised to defend the status of a self-
consistent political power beside the USA on the one hand and to be able to secure its instable and 
overwhelming borders on the other hand; he concluded that Europe can not avoid to overtake imperial 
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characteristics and develop imperial features and, if looking closely, this has already begun.1282 Does 
this resist verification on the gained results? 
According to the Barcelona Process, the frontier issue of the imperialistic theory has to be assessed at 
this point. In this concern, imperial frontiers constitute a graduation of power and influence and are 
semi-permeable in the sense that a) who enters the imperial space has to fulfil other requirements than 
those who leave it and b) more people aim to immigrate, which has a consequence on the frontier-
regime.1283 The increasing frontier-policy-concern in Europe, which starts to resemble the United 
States in respect of their distinction of who may access and who may not, indicates that there are in-
creasing imperial tendencies. The most recent example forms the implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, which was introduced in 2004 to better coordinate the border situations after 
the enlargement. The Barcelona Process was included in the super-ordinated structures of the ENP.  
On the co-operation level of the partnership, are there also indicators of such a predominant European 
role? Three different aspects shall be highlighted in this examination: the perception of the “other”, 
associative and dissociative elements among the partners and the perception of the European role. 
Within the official European discourse, on the level of its establishment, there are references to the 
non-European partner countries, which indicate a change of attitude; in the beginning, the discursive 
statements were quite distant (these individuals), over the time the denomination inhered even an as-
sociative character because they are described as partners or even friends (European documents of the 
Commission). The Council, on the other hand, disposes of an elevated discourse, which perceives that 
the cooperation with countries requires reforms. The discourse changes at the implementation level. In 
the speeches of representatives of the Commission and the Council the “other” is addressed with re-
spect and considerateness; their importance for Europe is explicitly expressed. A very inhomogeneous 
image of the “other” can be deduced from the cross-country analysis of the public opinion: Austria 
perceives the MNC as searcher for benefits, Germany constitutes a lack of partnership sense due to - 
even comprehensible - legitimate scepticism, Switzerland relates to the conflictive situations of the 
countries and the region, Great Britain emphasises the incommodities of certain countries like Libya, 
France stresses the considerate handling of tensions with the “other”, Spain perceives the partner 
countries to be cooperative and Italy hardly refers to the “other”, as the public discourse assumes that 
Italy forms a part of them.  
In the discourse the Commission and the Council stress common challenges in order to suggest a 
common identity. On the implementation level, there exists the conviction to overcome barriers by 
addressing them directly. Within the public discourse, EU documents and speeches, the discourse em-
phasises the commitment to respect each other, even if the most dissociative issue is regarded to be the 
socio-economic disparity. Concerning associative and dissociative issues among the partners, the re-
 
1282  Herfried Münkler, Imperien. Die Logik der Weltherrschaft – vom Alten Rom bis zu den Vereinigten Staaten (Berlin 
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sults of the discourse analysis show that the public discourse mainly focuses on situational arguments 
which inhere a dissociative element or the lack of conception and consistency of the European policy 
abroad. 
Even if “most peoples and most governments on both sides of this sea have come to the conclusion 
that Europe needs the Mediterranean and the Mediterranean needs Europe”1284, the assessment of the 
European role indicates the degree of consciousness of its predominance and consequentially its ap-
proach. Regarding the European self-perception, which forms a part of the discourse of the European 
Commission and European Council, the EU is seen as a pacifier, a guardian of prosperity and a de-
fender in times of threat. Beside its urges to become proactive and its assumed responsibility – the EU 
is a power which cannot ignore threats –, it is its inherent wish to become a decisive player in the 
world and also in the Mediterranean. This wish is supported by the aspirations of the member states 
and by the proper ambition to break new grounds. The latter derives from the belief in the dialogue as 
a possibility to solve conflicts and the conviction that there is a need for interaction with each other in 
the Mediterranean. Discursively manifested, there exists the vision to build a new Europe. At the same 
time, there are self-critical connotations, which suggest the difficulties to break with former patterns. 
The official discourse deals with the expressed necessity to recall on the open-mindedness, the human 
rights and values, to assure its knowledge advancement, to preserve the image internally and exter-
nally and to demonstrate both power and generosity. Although there is an attempt to overcome the 
past, the European Union still struggles with the internal and conceptual problems. This does not only 
harm the outcome of policies like the Barcelona Process, but does also negatively affect its credibility 
within Europe and in the world. The clearly traceable high degree of individual interests of the mem-
ber states, which contain a strong dissociative force, constituted an unexpected result. Concerning the 
European role in the Mediterranean, the results of the public discourse analysis show that the countries 
attest the European approach a right direction, but a questionable procedure. Austria is convinced that 
the European vision lacks of commitment; France perceives the conceptual difficulties of the Euro-
pean approach similar to Italy; Switzerland even considers the EU as too weak to develop a proper 
foreign policy concept; Great Britain basically supports the European approach by putting a special 
emphasize on its support of the entry of Turkey into the European Union; Germany perceives the 
European check-book policy and the water-can principle as even dangerous; and in Spain the public 
discourse leaves open whether Spain is closer to Europe or to the Mediterranean. Regarding possible 
imperialistic indicators on the co-operational level of the Barcelona Process, it can be stated that ex-
plicit imperialistic signs are deducible. If Europe has imperialistic tendencies, in the best case it consti-
tutes an imperial power that is desperate to define its political identity. 
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According to Münkel, imperialism means that there is a will for an empire, no matter if it is nourished 
by political or economical motives.1285 Hans-Heinrich Nolte stresses the European position within the 
world system, saying that there are no indicators that the EU will become a political opponent or chal-
lenger of the USA. He further argues that the European enlargement policy does not reflect an aspira-
tion to grow to a superpower: “If the EU aimed at growing into a power capable of counterbalancing 
the USA in the new political concert of powers, the Community would have tried, after 1991, to en-
large till it included Russia.”1286 In regard to the conclusions of the present analysis, there is an am-
bivalent evaluation of the European ambitions. First, there are discursive indicators which suggest an 
inherent wish of becoming a decisive political actor on the world power stage. This is again based on 
the political vision of a ‘new Europe’ that is able to change the world, as suggested by Nicolas 
Sarkozy when he promoted his policy approach in the Mediterranean and on the remaining power 
interests of former political leaders, who now are a part of the European Union. The challenge of an 
unsure outcome of the European project must not be under-estimated. Second, the main purpose for 
the European Neighbourhood Policy is based on security concerns, which aspire to assure peace, sta-
bility and wealth. If the main intension cannot be regarded as imperialistic, but the approach is ques-
tionable, what does this mean? The conclusion at this point considers that the European Union repre-
sents a power which searches for its political identity, which aspires to become a serious player, which 
feels encouraged by the Arab world wishing Europe to turn into a counter-balance to the US policy in 
the Middle East, but which also struggles in respect of the concept and the internal support. The at-
tempt, or more concrete the procedure, might be imperialistic, but in the end the European Union faces 
the severe problem of lacking a cultural denominator, namely an identity. In the words of Hans-
Heinrich Nolte: “Today there is no superpower without identity and cultural influence”.1287 
 
Is the Barcelona Process a result of postcolonial politics? 
This question, which also titles the present work, is provocative to some extent because it suggests that 
the Barcelona Process could be a result of postcolonial politics. The reason why it is formulated as a 
question relates to the discrepancy between the approach and the implementation, which is inherent in 
the Barcelona Process and represents the essence of the actual research undertaking: to scrutinize the 
European approach towards its historic continuity or discontinuity. 
Doing a discourse analysis in the context of postcolonial theories was thematically determined because 
it forms the historic bridge across the Mediterranean and it constitutes a new approach on the topic. 
The elasticity of the postcolonial concept allowed the thematic extension to focus on the European 
side, as former colonial rulers, and the temporal transport to a contemporary setting. According to the 
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empirically gained results, it was possible to highlight intersections of interest, diverse political posi-
tions and perceptions within the European Union and to provide an estimation of the European role in 
the Mediterranean. In order to relate to the initial question, the main focus was on outlining the pattern 
of the European approach regarding possible ruptures or continuities. As the term “postcolonial” con-
ceptually suggests when reading it in two ways, one concern focused on a possible change in power 
and structure after the end of colonialism, while the other stressed its continuing effects. To this point 
of the research it must be concluded that since 1957, the European powers have experienced a pro-
found change in the power perception and the structure. The foundation of the European Union, which 
relates to the premise of peace as its highest principle, clearly constitutes a rupture within the so-called 
postcolonial time. The point of departure, the setting and the actors appear differently associated. 
Thus, the crucial question of possible continuities must refer to the level of the policy approach. In this 
context three main issues could be identified: appropriation, dominance and mission statement. All 
three constitute super-ordinated categories, which could easily be amplified with numerous details that 
have been extensively outlined in the course of the present work. Here, possible dynamic regarding the 
continuity or discontinuity of the approaches within these ambits shall be sketched. 
The appropriation issue is related to the European region-building approach within the frame of the 
Barcelona Process. Since its foundation, the synonymously denomination of Euro-Mediterranean Part-
nership has suggested references to a common space, and further even to a common identity. It has 
been previously concluded that the Mediterranean region per se constitutes a European political con-
struct, which the discourse of a common destiny, a common responsibility and even a common iden-
tity is built on. The discursively argued references form historic and socio-economic interlaces, which 
in all three stages of the discourse analysis are not considered as sufficient to legitimate the European 
region-building. Within the European discourse the so-determined common challenges (security con-
cerns) legitimate the European approach. Therewith, the question is if the political construct and the 
establishment of a political-paradigm, which aim to suggest a common identity, are more of the old, 
but newly dressed. The security and monitoring approach per definition do not have the finality of a 
territorial appropriation. This is tried to be achieved and can be considered as a form of appropriation 
because it aspires to bind the countries closer to the European Union in order to influence, and maybe 
even control, their transformation. 
The predominant position of the European approach accrues from their superior understanding of the 
socio-economic development and their superior presumed know-how advance. Money and knowledge 
are the main instruments which the European Union uses when dealing with other countries with a 
lower socio-economic standard. According to the research results, the predominant position of the 
European Union compared to the Mediterranean non-member countries is beyond question. The struc-
ture of the Barcelona Process is dominated by the Europeans due to the knowledge advantage Europe 
believes to have. An indicator for the argument that the European approach really constitutes a new 




launched in 2008. Anyhow, it is the attempt to reform the structures of the Barcelona Process regard-
ing an increasing co-responsibility of the MNC. If the Barcelona Process was a first step in the right 
direction and the Union for the Mediterranean forms a second one still has to be proved. 
The mission statement refers to the European approach to stress the ambition of enhancing democracy 
and human rights in the Mediterranean non-member countries. The approach to better the world in 
Europe’s sole discretion is often traceable in European history. In the contemporary context the mis-
sionary approach has two main connotations: firstly, the inherent reference that Europe, the European 
Union, is the guardian of peace, stability and wealth, which has to be defended regarding its credibil-
ity; and secondly, the whish that the European vision and values are spread among other countries. 
Both aspects have been an integral part of the discourse analysis, and both, the defence of a self-
perception and the implementation of a vision, can be considered as patterns which have already been 
known before the foundation of the European Union. What has changed is the disposition to reach its 
goals; however, they might be defined, not with military measures, but based on a dialogue. One of the 
most outstanding accomplishments of the Barcelona Process is that it constitutes a forum where repre-
sentatives of the Arab countries, the Palestinian Territories and Israel continuously meet. In a short 
term perspective, peace could not have been reached, as it is anyhow aloof of the Barcelona Process; 
but in a long term perspective, the approximation of these countries will enhance the international and 
trans-cultural dialogue. 
The attempt to transport the differing sceneries of appropriation and power claims by nations to the 
20th/21st century, which Wolfgang Schmale referred to, lacks of apparent comparability, but draws a 
conclusion of the results of the present work: the European Union approached the Mediterranean 
which has been politically defined beforehand, under the premise to assure security and peace. The 
Barcelona Process was launched in 1995 and revitalised in 2008 under the symbolic mantle of peace 
and cooperation. The Mediterranean non-member countries voluntarily participate and have already 
signed two declarations of their commitment to the European Policy until now. They agreed to coop-
erate under the label of a “Euro-Mediterranean” denominator. The mission of the European Union is 
clear, to transform the Mediterranean in a zone of peace, stability and wealth based on mainly Euro-
pean conceptions. The legitimacy of this approach is based on the free participation of all countries 
and on the socio-economic challenges which can not be longer ignored. 
According to the present results, the Barcelona Process constitutes a postcolonial policy. With its ap-
proach the European Union interrupts historical ponds and sets the path for a new way of relating with 
each other. Nevertheless, the European Union stumbles across “old” conceptions and approaches, 
which mark a continuing effect of the times of imperialism and colonialism. But the successful revival 
of the Barcelona Process and the proposed structural changes support the belief that there is a process 
of change, which permits the assumption of a continuous dissociation of the European approach of the 
postcolonial context. This optimistic consideration has to be proved in upcoming years.
  
FURTHER RESEARCH PROPOSALS 
The present work has offered a historic approach on the Barcelona Process. During the working proc-
ess several aspects and further leading questions have been come across, which would be a study-
worth undertaking. The following outline is provided in order to encourage further research on this 
fascinating topic. The issues concern the socio-economic dimension, the methodological procedure 
and the Barcelona Process as a whole. 
 
The socio-economic context 
The present discourse analysis has shown that socio-economic concerns mark the preliminary motiva-
tion for the European approach in the Mediterranean. It would be a promising undertaking to design a 
research project which focuses on the socio-economic development in the context of the Barcelona 
Process. Up to date, no work covers the economic and demographic indicators on a sustainable com-
parative base for all participating countries. This mainly sociological approach could be an enriching 
contribution to the numerous socio-political works and even further historic approaches. Such an un-
dertaking would reassess the real dimension of the European security concern. 
 
The dimension of the methodological scope “discourse analysis” 
The discourse analysis constitutes a promising undertaking regarding the bridging of contemporary 
settings and a historic scope. The present approach is a first attempt to assess the main discursive 
streams of the EU in respect of its policy in the Mediterranean. The next step demands a further, deep-
ening assessment, meaning a narrower thematic scope or source sample.  
Possible approaches could be: 
• Assessing the discourse in the Euro-Mediterranean countries concerning their ambivalent 
situation in regard to their socio-economic dependency in the Mediterranean and their position 
within Europe. This would be especially interesting for countries which formerly were among 
the leading nations like France and Spain. Thanks to the analysis of the public discourse, the 
insight into the struggle of their positioning provides one of the most surprising results of the 
present work. 
• In order to complete the discursive perception of the Mediterranean Policy, a profound exami-
nation of the public opinion of the eastern European countries or even of the non-European 
participating countries of the, now called, Union for the Mediterranean would be an especially 
interesting undertaking. 
• Surprisingly, there was hardly any distinction among the different political inclinations of the 
newspapers regarding their consideration of the Barcelona Process. It would be study-worth to 
Further research proposals 
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expand the scope to an analysis, which compares the political positioning of the newspapers 
with the opinion of the different political parties. 
 
The Barcelona Process and its revived form, the Union for the Mediterranean 
Assessing the Barcelona Process regarding the consistency of the innumerable ambits it aspires to 
affect and the projects it has initiated or aims to launch under the premise of evaluating the costs and 
the implementation status. Sketching the money flow in regard to the outcome could be a meaningful 
undertaking, as it would highlight the structural deficits of the European Union and provide substantial 
indicators of the efficiency of the Barcelona Process. 
With clear words Nicolas Sarkozy declared the failure of the Barcelona Process with its lack of part-
nership and the predominant European position, which was manifested in the structure of the policy 
frame. The launch of the Union for the Mediterranean attempted to correct this asymmetry by intro-
ducing the principle of co-presidency in order to implement a higher degree of structure-based shared 
responsibility. If this approach is followed up, it would be interesting question if the European Union 
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1.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION (COMM) 
COMM – EXPRESSION 
(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
94(427) 3 Gemeinschaft .. mit den Mittelmeerländern 
94(427) 6 Gemeinschaft.. Ihre(r) südlichen Nachbarn 
94(427) 7 Zusammenarbeit zwischen den nördlichen und südlichen Mittelmeerländern 
94(427) 7 Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer 
94(427) 8 Union und den Mittelmeerpartnern 
94(427) 9 Zusammen mit der EU und den interessierten Mittelmeerpartnern 
94(427) 11 Europa und die Mittelmeerländer 
94(427) 12 Zwischen unseren Partnern und den ärmeren Mitgliedstaaten der Gemeinschaft im Mittel-
meer  
94(427) 13 Die Partner in Europa und im Mittelmeerraum 
95(72) 1 Europe's priorities 
95(72) 9 a permanent forum for dialogue 
97(68) 1 The European Union's strategic approach 
97(68) 1 Barcelona Process...an indispensable instrument 
97(68) 2 in the spins of partnership 
97(68) 5 [political and security dialogue] an entirely new area of cooperation 
97(68) 8 Progress is largely contingent upon the willingness of the Mediterranean Partners them-
selves 
97(68) 8 the promotion of mutual understanding between the peoples of the region is one of the 
cornerstones of the BP 
2000(497) 2 [Die Beziehungen der EU spiegel wider], von welcher politischen und strategischen Bedeu-
tung diese Region für die EU ist 
2000(497) 2 stellt (...) einen Neuanfang dar 
2000(497) 4 das einzige Forum, in dem Israel, Syrien und der Libanon auf Ministerebene zusammentref-
fen 
2002(159) 2 The Barcelona Process has become a major strategic political and economic asset 
2002(159) 6 [freedom, justice and governance] working together in these areas is not only a sign of a 
new maturity and closeness in the EMP, but will also require new approaches between 
administrations 
2002(159) 6 [migration and human exchanges]are of vital importance to the Partnership 
2002(159) 7 EMP presents a unique asset 
2002(159) 9 EMP suffers from los visibility and a leak of understanding including by the media 
2002(159) 9 Partnership as a unique framework 
2002(159) 10 [conclusion of eleven of twelve AA] opens a new chapter in the Euro-Mediterranean rela-
tions 
2002(159) 17 One of the unique features of the process, and ist strengh, has been ist inclusive nature, 
bringing together all twenty seven partners to work together regionally 
2003(WP) 1 [Valencia Action Plan] agreed unanimously 
2003(WP) 4 The new Neighbourhood Policy sets out a means to reinforce the Barcelona Process 
2003(WP) 4 the Association Process remains at the core of the Partnership 
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2003(294) 8 Since 1992(…)Human Rights and democracy as "essential elements" 
2003(104) 6 If the EU is to work with its neighbourhood to create an area of shared prosperity and sta-
bility, proximity policy must go hand-in-hand with action to tackle the root causes of the 
political instability, economic vulnerability, institutional deficiencies, conflict and poverty 
and social exclusion. 
2003(104) 8 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership offers a strong policy framework(…) 
2003(104) 15 the new neighbourhood policy should not override the existing framework for EU rela-
tions(…) 
2003(376) 3 The political desire to develop a special relationship of cooperation with the countries of 
the Mediterranean basin is not new, but the specific issue of extending the trans-European 
network to these countries is very new. 
2003(610) 4 These process is in practice already irreversible. 
2005(139) 2 (…)European Union and its neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediter-
ranean. 
2005(139) 2 A partnership was launched which is comprehensive, both in its geographical coverage and 
in its sectoral scope, and forward-looking in its political, economic and social ambitions. 
2005(139) 2 The Barcelona Process has developed a strong partnership on a basis of joint ownership, 
dialogue and cooperation. 
2005(139) 3 In this way the ENP and the Barcelona Process will work in a complementary and mutually 
reinforcing way. 
2005(139) 7 This clause will ensure that all Mediterranean partners are guaranteed to get the best offer 
made by the EU in any sector to any country. In return the participating countries will open 
their sectors to each other as well as to the EU. 
2005(139) 8 An indispensable component of the Barcelona Pocess is to strenghen trade ties between 
Mediterranean countries themselves.  
2005(139) 9 South-South regional integration, in partnership with consolidated North-South links, is key 
to achieving dynamic and diversified economies in Mediterranean counties. 
2006(475) 10 Only by working together can we hope to protect our common Mediterranean heritage. 
2006(620) 2 For more then ten years the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been a central framework 
of relations between Europe and Southern Mediterranean Partners. 
2006(620) 2 (…)the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership assumes even greater importance as an inclusive 
structure of regional cooperation. 
2006(620) 3 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is entering a critically important new phase(…) 
2006(620) 3 (…)the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains the only regional forum where political 
and security dialogue among all Euro-Mediterranean partners is possible. 
2006(620) 12 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been successful in creating long-term political and 
institutional links between Europe and its Mediterranean Partners in two complementary 
dimensions: a) a multilateral dimension(…) b) a bilateral dimension(…) 
2006(620) 12 (…)it is widely recognised that the regional and multilateral dimensions(…) 
2007(598) 2 (…)the Barcelona Process has developed into a comprehensive and encompassing regional 
partnership. 
2007(598) 2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a key feature (…) 
2007(598) 5, 
6 
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is the only forum within which all Mediterranean 
partners exchange views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting 
conflict in the Middle East and in other parts of the region. 
2008(319) 2 The Commission has consulted with all partners involved in the European Union and the 
Mediterranean(…) 
2008(319) 2 The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Mediterranean partners exchange 
views and engage in constructive dialogue(…) 
2008(319) 4 The "Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean" will be a multilateral partnership. 






(COMM) Expression – the “other” 
94(427) 3,7 Diese Länder  
94(427) 5 Den Mittelmeerpartnern  
94(427) 2x8 Betreffenden Länder 
95(72) 1 These individuals 
97(68) 1 twelve Mediterranean Partners (1st time the number is quoted) 
2000(497) 4 die Länder der Region sind (...) sehr unterschiedlich 
2000(497) 16 Der Barcelona Process kann sein volles Potential nur dann entfalten, wenn man sich in 
der Region  der "Mitverantwortung" für den Prozess bewusst ist (impliziert, dass der 
Partner sich nicht gänzlich der Wichtigkeit der EU Initiative bewusst ist 
2003(WP) 5 certain partners are more interested that others, co-operation should be developed with 
those most willing, a non-exclusive basis, with others welcome to join at a later stage 
2003(294) 19 our partners in the Mediterranean 
2003(104) 4 neighbourhood- a "ring of friends" 
2003(104) 16 Partners will start from variable, in some cases limited, capacity to undertake rapid re-
form and comprehensive transition. 
2006(475) 3 Countries bordering the Mediterranean can be grouped according to their political 
raltionship to the EU. 
2006(620) 10 All Euro-Med partners(…) 
2007(598) 2 All Mediterranean Partners consider the Barcelona Process to be te cornerstone of their 
collective relations with the EU. 
2008(319) 2 All of the EU's Mediterranean partners have close historical and cultural links with 
Europe. 
2008(319) 4 Another area to be addressed is the lack of institutional balance between the weight of 
the EU on one side, and the Mediterranean partners on the other. 
94(427) 10 Ihr allgemeines Entwicklungsniveau ist sehr viel niedriger 
94(427) 10 Sie haben mit einem hohen Bevölkerungswachstum zu kämpfen 
94(427) 11 Sie besitzen keine gut ausgebildeten Facharbeiter 
94(427) 11 Hinzu kommen Unterschiede in den kulturekken und sozialen Traditionen, die Verände-
rungen erschweren 
94(427) 12 Zypern, Malta, die Türkei, Israel ... die größten Fortschritte machen 
97(68) 3 the partner countries are at different stages of development 
97(68) 6 Participation by the Mediterranean Partners has been extremely good, regular and at a 
high level 
2000(497) 3 fast alle Mittelmeerpartner (haben) ihre Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert,...diese Fort-
schritte sind jedoch unzureichend und instabil 
2000(497) 3 die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen ein dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen kön-
nen, wenn sie... 
2002(159) 3 Consious (...) of the desire of our partners for a closer and deeper relationship with the 
EU 
2002(159) 5 [human rights and democracy]With the exception of Cyprus and Malta none of the 
Mediterranean partners has an entirely satisfactory record in this respect. 
2002(159) 5 [human rights and democracy] the situation avries from one partner to another 
2002(159) 17 The EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one 
voice while the differences between Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them 
from having similar co-ordination mechanisms on their side. 
2002(159) 17 As long as this situation prevails it is difficult to see how co-chairmanship arrangements 
could work effectively. 
2003(WP) 1 an extremly difficult situation in the region 
2003(104) 4 [The course of the 20th century] These forces have not necessarily led to greater conver-
gence. 
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2003(104) 7 What is perhaps less known is that the Mediterranean has also had a very poor rate of 
growth in GDP per capita. 
2003(104) 7 Yet political reform in the majority of the countries of the Mediterranean has not pro-
gressed as quickly as desired. 
2003(376) 17 As in the past, the Mediterranean has the potential for being a crossroads of transport 
and trade. 
2005(139) 2 The enduring fragmentation of Southern Mediterranean markets is holding back signifi-
cant investment, both domestic and foreign. 
2005(139) 3 Partners have at times not appeared wholly commited to implementing the principles to 
which they have signed up, partly also because of the difficulties caused by the continu-
ing conflicts in the region, and because the search for consensus has sometimes acted as 
a brake on those wishing to move forward more rapidly. 
2005(139) 6 In view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean(…) 
2005(139) 7 In return the participating countries will open their sectors to each other as well as to the 
EU. 
2005(139) 9 In this context Mediterranean Partners are encouraged to make full use of the Economic 
Dialogues provided for (…)[A sound macroeconomic environment] 
2000(497) 3 (…)da fast alle Mittelmeerpartner ihre Ungleichgewichte nun korrigiert haben. Darüber 
hinaus hat seit 1992 eine gewisse Öffnung ihres Handels stattgefunden, wobei ihre In- 
und Exporte rascher stiegen als ihr BSP. Diese Fortschritte sind jedoch unzureichend 
und instabil. 
2000(497) 3 Die Mittelmeerpartner brauchen dynamisches Wachstum, das sie nur erreichen können, 
wenn sie eine doppelte Strategie verfolgen: Beschleunigung der Reformen(…) 
2000(497) 8 (…)fordert die Kommission die Mittelmeerpartner auf, das harmonisierte Protokoll über 
die Ursprungskumulierung anzunehmen(…) 
2000(497) 9 Die Partner, die den Beitritt zur WTO noch nicht beantragt haben, sollten dies 
(…)nachholen(…) 
2000(497) 9 Jedes Land, das ein Assoziationsabkommen mit der EU unterzeichnet, sollte spätestens 
innerhalb von fünf Jahren danach Freihandelsabkommen mit allen übrigen Unterzeich-
nern von Assoziationsabkommen schließen. 
2000(497) 6 Die Kommission fordert Ägypten auf, das Assoziationsabkommen zu unterzeichnen, und 
ersucht den Libanon, Syrien und Ägypten, mit der Union zusammenzuarbeiten,(…) 
2000(497) 7 Die Kommission fordert die Mitgliedstaaten auf, Maßnahmen zur Beschleunigung der 
Ratifizierung des Abkommens mit Jordanien zu ergreifen und sicherzustellen, dass künf-
tige Abkommen innerhalb von zwei Jahren nach der Unterzeichung ratifiziert werden. 
 
 
(COMM) Expression – Mediterranean region 
94(427) 2,8,9 Südlichen und östlichen Randregionen des Mittelmeers 
94(427) 5 Mittelmeerbecken 
94(427) 6 Drittländern im Mittelmeerraum 
94(427) 6 Dieser Region 
94(427) 12 Europäisch- mediterrane Zone 
2006(475) 2 The Mediterranean is the largest European sea, uniting the peoples of the countries that 
share its waters. 
2000(497) 2 diese Region 





(COMM) Expression – associative/dissociative elements 
2002(159) 2 The countries of the Mediterranean region are bound together by geography, but we are 
near neighbours in many other ways, too. 
2002(159) 2 We face innummerable common challenges 
2002(159) 2 We need to work closely together to help achieve lasting peace in the Middle East 
2002(159) 4 to intensify this process, concrete follow up should be given to Tunisia's request 
2002(159) 6  [9/11] all of these areas directly affect our populations 
2003(WP) 6 While the major effort to improve the region's attractiveness to investors needs to come 
from the partners themselves, the EU should explore what further initiatives it can take 
(Arbeitsteilung) 
2005(139) 12 (…)we should work together to develop a system of recognition of both academic and vo-
cational qualifications. 
2002(159) 7 (…)of our common cultural heritage; 
2003(294) 18 The EU and its Mediterranean partners have an impressive array of instruments at their 
disposal to allow them to persue their shared, core objectives of promotion of the rule of 
law, democratisation and the respect of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. This 
Communication has identified ten areas where these existing instruments can be more ef-
fectively put to use:(...) 
 
(COMM) Expression – European predominance 
95(72) 8 The Community has two main kinds of instruments to achieve the objectives outlined 
above, namely budget resourses and EIB loans 
2000(497) 10 Auch die Mittelmeerländer müssen jedoch ihren Beitrag leisten, indem sie sich im Pro-
grammierungsdialog stärker engagieren und glaubwürdige und ausgereifte Projektvorschlä-
ge vorlegen 
2000(497) 10 [finanzielle Hilfe], wird sich die künftige Programmierung schwerpunktmäßig auf eine 
geringe Anzahl unmittelbar mit den Abkommen verknüpfter Prioritäten konzentrieren und 
stärker berücksichtigen, inwieweit die Partner bereit sind, ihre Entschlossenheit zru Intensi-
vierung des regionalen Handels und der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit sowie zu den 
notwenigen Wirtschaftsreformen, vor allem den im Finanzsektor, durch Taten zu unter-
mauern, um den wirtschaftlichen und politischen Übergang zu vollenden 
2000(497) 10 , dass sie maßgeblich Bereitschaft zeigen, die Verhandlungen über die Assoziationsab-
kommen zum Abschluss zu bringen 
2000(497) 11 muss sich in künftigen Mittelszuweisungen die Bereitschaft der Partner zur Verwirklichung 
der Ziele der Abkommen - vor allem zur Beschleunigung der Wirtschaftsreformen - und zur 
Ausweitung ihrer Aufnahmekapazitäten 
2002(159) 14 the benefits to be obtained from the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area will only be relaised if the Mediterranean partners continue their efforts to improve 
the framework consitions for attracting investment, including foreign investment, and help-
ing create and develop business 
2003(104) 10 Common rules and standarts are vital to ensure that our neighbours can access and reap the 
benefits of the enlarged EU internal market as well as to create a more stable environment 
for economic activity. 
2003(104) 16 They will need to show a strong commitment to building up their administrative, institu-
tional and legal capacity. 
2003(104) 16 In the absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities. 
2003(610) 7 The region must be made more attractive to investors by the maintenance of a stable macro-
economic framework, substantial regulatory and institutional reforms and aproximation 
with iternational best practices. 
2003(610) 7 Successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners. 
2005(139) 5 Partners should consider how to pursue this, including developing policies to promote gen-
der equality, fundamental and social rights, and to associate and engage social partners and 
civil society, as well as incourage its development. 
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2005(139) 6 Partners should now take the necessary measures to expand the scope of this core free trade 
area, in deepening trade liberalisation in agriculture and fish products and in further open-
ing markets to new areas such as services and establishment. 
2005(139) 9 The Mediterranean countries should therefore accelerate the conclusion of genuine Free 
Trade Agreements between themselves, in order to achieve the objective of a wide Euro 
Mediterranean free trade area by 2010,(…) 
2005(139) 12 (…)Mediterranean partners have an interest in deepening knowledge of European integra-
tion. 
2006(475) 10 Those partner countries that show the greatest readiness to work with the EU on environ-
ment issues should be those with whom the Commission moves ahead first. 
95(72) 3 The effectiveness of such action will increase in proportion to the MNC's readiness to im-
plement appropriate social and economic policies. 
94(427) 12 Wie die Erfahrung Europas(…) 
 
 
COMM – PURPOSE 
(COMM) Purpose – purpose 
94(427) 2, 
4 
...geographischen Gebieten, die für die Union hinsichtlich Sicherheit und sozialer Stabilität 
von großem Interesse sind. 
94(427) 3 Der Dialog sollte sich auch auf Sicherheitsfragen erstrecken und Maßnamen zur Festigung 
des Friedens ermöglichen. 
94(427) 3 ...weitreichende Zusammenarbeit… 
94(427) 4 ...kurz- und mittelfristige Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik... 
94(427) 5 (…)in vielen Bereichen eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit,(…) 
94(427) 5 Die Interessen Europas in der Region sind sehr vielfältig und betreffen Bereiche wie Ener-
gieversorgung, Migration, Handel, und Investitionen. 
94(427) 6 (…)die Gemeinschaft eine Politik verfolgt, um ihnen zu helfen(…) Herausforderungen zu 
bewältigen 
94(427) 6 Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht(…)gesteuert, so könnte es nur zu leicht zu Spannungen 
kommen,(…) 
94(427) 6 (…)ist es an der Zeit, Möglichkeiten für die Förderung des Friedens über Zusammenarbeit 
und beiderseitiges Verständnis aufzuzeigen. 
94(427) 6 Die Zeit drängt(…) 
94(427) 7 [Leitlinien für die künftigen Beziehungen] Benötigt wird eine langfristige Strategie. 
94(427) 9 [im Sicherheitsbereich] ist die Verbreitung nichtkonventioneller Waffen für uns Anlass zu 
großer Sorge. 
94(427) 9 Der politische Dialog mit den Mittelmeerpartnern der Union sollte daher intensiviert und 
auf Sicherheitsfragen ausgedehnt werden. 
94(427) 9 Ein Verhaltenskodex der Mittelmeerländer zur Streitbeilegung wäre ebenfalls eine nützli-
che Initiative,(…) 
94(427) 12 Die Zone wird schrittweise, flexibel und auf freiwilliger Basis geschaffen. 
94(427) 12 …Verwirklichung der Freihandelszone Europa-Mittelmeer wird(…)zu einer kräftigen In-
tensivierung des Handels führen, und zwar sowohl zwischen Europa und den Mittelmeer-
ländern, als auch- und dies ist mindestens ebenso wichtig- zwischen den Mittelmeerländern 
untereinander. 
94(427) 17 Eine derartige Ministerkonferenz sollte ein Forum für eine intensive Erörterung der lang-
fristigen Aussichten einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer für die wirtschaftliche und 
politische Zusammenarbeit(…)bieten. 
95(72) 1 The Mediterranean is strategically important to the European Union. 
95(72) 1 All the Member States would benefit from an improvement in the region's stability and 
prosperity,(…) 
95(72) 2 The Commission takes the view that the new direction of financial and technical coopera-
tion should first and foremost benefit the MNC embarking on modernizing and reforming 
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their economies to culminate in free trade, which is the key stage in establishing  true Euro-
Mediterranean economic area,(...) 
95(72) 4 The prospect of the emergence of an area of free trade between Europe and the Mediterra-
nean naturally makes the latter more attractive to European private investment. 
95(72) 4 Making European investment in energy easier and involving the MNC in the European 
Energy Charter would have positive consequences for cooperation. 
95(72) 5 However, the scale of the financial needs and the problems that would result for the Com-
munity if the social situation worsened mean that it will have to help stop the decline by 
providing financial support, know how and exchanges of experience. 
97(68) 8 The strengthening of links between the Mediterranean Partners themselves through the 
establishment of free trade should be regarded as a top priority. 
2002(159) 2 (…)the terrible events of 11 September 2001 have imparted new urgency and even greater 
importance to those efforts. 
2002(159) 5 The situation in the region with regard to respect for human rights and democracy continues 
to give cause for concern. 
2002(159) 6 The events of 11 September have dramatically highlighted vulnerability to acts of terrorism 
and the need for close international co-operation to combat it. 
2002(159) 10 The pace of economic modernisation should continue and will even need to accelerate in 
order to produce the expected results in terms of economic growth and increased industrial 
competitiveness. 
2002(159) 10 The challenges facing the Mediterranean in the coming years are considerable. 
2002(159) 15 More generally, as the economic and financial partnership progresses there is an increasing 
need to develop environmental integration strategies for the different sectoral priorities in 
order to promote sustainable development. 
2002(159) 18 All partners should emphasise their willingness to continue with this process. 
2003(WP) 1 The meeting should confirm and reinforce this commitment in the light of "Wider Europe", 
which should be seen as a deepening and strengthening of the Barcelona Process(…) 
2003(294) 19 The practical measures proposed in this Communication will achieve greater coherence and 
consistency between Community actions and CFSP, and allow synergies to be realised on 
all levels of action:(…) 
2003(104) 6 The EU and the neighbours have a mutual interest in cooperating, both bilaterally and re-
gionally,(…) 
2003(104) 9 The negative effects of conflict on economic and political development, especially where 
sustained over a long period, cannot be over-estimated. 
2003(104) 9 The EU has a clear interest in ensuring that these common challenges are addressed. 
2003(104) 9 The establishment at pan-European level of an open and integrated market functioning on 
the basis of compatible or harmonised rules and further liberalisation would bring signifi-
cant economic and other benefits to both the EU and the neighbourhood. 
2003(104) 10 (…)the EU's neighbourhood should benefit from the prospect of closer economic integra-
tion with the EU. 
2003(104) 12 Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to 
institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way for closer and more open dia-
logue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
2003(104) 16 Engagement should therefore be introduced progressively, and be conditional on meeting 
agreed targets for reform. New benefits should only be offered to reflect the progress made 
by the partner countries in political and economic reform. 
2003(610) 2 Furthering a process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mutual understand-
ing (…) 
2003(610) 3 In addition, the Partners willing to implement such plans would receive a premium in their 
national allocations under MEDA. 
2005(139) 2 the partnership has been driven by a common political will to build togeher a space of dia-
logue, peace, security and shared prosperity. 
2005(139) 3 The UNDP(…)and the declarations of(…)in Tunis in 2004 have all stressed the need to 
move forward in areas such as political and economic reform, women's rights and education 
if the region is not to lag behind. 
2005(139) 5 (…)to raise awareness 
2005(139) 5 The Commission urges Partners to mobilise governmental and non-governmental chan-
nels(…) 
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2005(139) 14 (…)there remains much to be done to build the confidence necessary to step up exchanges 
of information on the threat from organisations and individuals. 
2006(475) 10 The Mediterranean Sea can only be properly protected if all bordering countries assume 
their responsibilities to protect it and restore its ecosystems to the extent possible. 
2006(620) 11 The political commitments undertaken at the Barcelona Summit must be translated into 
concrete measures and actions(…) 
2007(598) 4 A new partnership on tourism 
2007(598) 4 Developing a more systematic approach to cooperation in the field of employment 
2007(598) 6 The Commission believes it is of paramount importance to further deepen practical steps to 
implement the jointly agreed Code of Conduct on countering terrorism. 
2007(598) 7 (..)the Commission identifies the Mediterranean as a key region in respect of cooperation 
towards resource management and maritime governance on account of the common respon-
sibility over the seas, which Europe shares with its closest neighbours.  
2008(319) 4 There is a need to reassert in political terms the central importance of the Mediterranean on 
the political agenda of all participants. 
2008(319) 4 By focusing on regional and trans-national projects it should increase the potential for re-
gional integration and cohesion. 
94(427) 15 …die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraumes in eine Zone relativen Wohlstands(…)erfordern. 
94(427) 2 In vielen Bereichen besteht(…) eine gegenseitige Abhängigkeit. 
94(427) 4 (…)hat die Gemeinschaft in Folge der raschen geopolitischen Veränderungen ihre Auf-
merksamkeit auf die politischen Maßnahmen konzentriert,(…) 
94(427) 5 Das Mittelmeerbecken stellt einen Raum von strategischer Bedeutungfür die Gemeinschaft 
dar. Frieden und Stabilität in dieser Region sind für Europa von grundlegendem Interesse. 
95(72) 1 Instability in the region cannot fail to have negative consequences for all the countries of 
the European Community. 
95(72) 2 (…)bringing about paece, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region is one of 
Europe's first priorities. 
2000(497) 16 Um die Sichtbarkeit der im Rahmen der Partnerschaft geförderten Projekte zu erhöhen, 
werden alle Projekte mit dem Label "Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft" versehen. 
2002(159) 2 (…)recognising the potential still locked up in the Euro-Mediterranean area, and the need to 
generate new momentum. 
2003(104) 6 Geographical proximity presents opportunities and challenges for both the EU and for its 
neighbours 
95(72) 9 This approach will also give impetues to rapid and harmonious economic and social devel-
opment in the countries concerned, thus closing the "prosperity gap" between the nothern 
and southern shores of the Mediterranean. 
 
 
(COMM) Purpose – aim 
94(427) 2 Das Ziel sollte darin bestehen, eine Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer zu entwickeln. 
94(427) 3 rascher Abschluss 
94(427) 6 (…)gemeinsam gelöst werden müssen, da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu 
gegenseitigen Beschuldigungen geben. 
94(427) 7 Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Gemeinschaft sollte "multidimensional"sein, und viele Berei-
che der beiderseitigen Interdependenz abdecken. 
94(427) 8 (…)eine engere Zusammenabeit(…) 
94(427) 8 Das Hauptziel der Mittelmeerpolitik der Union ist die Sicherung von Frieden und Stabi-
lität in der Region. Dieses Ziel sollte mit allen der Union zur Verfügung stehenden Mit-
teln(…)verfolgt werden. 
94(427) 8 Vorrangig sollte daher der politische Dialog zwischen der Union und den Mittelmeer-
partnern gefördert werden,(…) 
94(427) 9 (…)um frühzeitig die Ursachen von Destabilisierung und potentiellen Konflikten zu 
erkennen. 
95(72) 2 (…)the Commission expressed the view that the key objective of the European Commu-
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nity's Mediterranean policy, the establishement of a Euro.Mediterranean area which is 
politically stable and safe(…) 
95(72) 3 The establishement of a free trade area would moreover entail getting rid of existing 
barriers in transport(…) 
95(72) 6 the Community must take integrated steps to back rural development. 
95(72) 6 It must strive to improve the effectiveness of all actions and to achieve a more visible 
impact on the wellbeing of the people concerned. 
95(72) 7 These actions and others like them, will not only increase European awareness of the 
challenges facing the peoples of the South, but will also land impetues to North-South 
relations by encouraging the direct participation of key players among those peoples. 
95(72) 7 There can be no question of creating a Mediterranean economic area in any real sense 
without a major integration drive among the Mediterranean countries themselves, not to 
mention greater intergration between Europe and those countries. 
97(68) 1 The Partnership was created in a spirit of equality, cooperationand solidarity, the aim 
being to bring the Partners closer together and so reduce sources of conflict. 
97(68) 1 The European Union's strategic approach(…)was defined in the(…)Barcelona Process, 
which is seen as an indispensable instrument for the achievement of a common area of 
peace and stability. 
97(68) 3 It will be a gradual process and should be facilitated by economic adjustment policies 
based on market economy principles. 
97(68) 4 Talks between the Mediterranean Partners themselves should be stepped up and financial 
support from the Union, whether from budget funds or via the European Investment 
Bank, should be fully exploited by the Mediterranean Partners in order to quicken the 
pace of reform. 
97(68) 5 (…)it would be appropriate to improve the visibility of national efforts to control the 
export of sensitive products through the exchange of information. 
97(68) 6 All activities must be conducted with a view to guaranteeing interaction and synergies 
between bilateral and regional schemes. 
97(68) 6 (…)that the first objective of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers should be to 
emphasize the will and desire of the 27 Partners to set up an area of shared prosperity 
and to give firm impetus to the establishment of free trade(…) 
97(68) 7 A second objective should be the adoption of a targeted approach to intensify the har-
monization of policies (…) 
97(68) 7 A third objective should consist of actively preparing the Mediterranean Partners for the 
changes under way in the Union, to enable them, as our Partners, to adjust their eco-
nomic policies accordingly, should they so wish, and to air their views. 
97(68) 7 A systematic effort should be made to promote European private investment in the re-
gion,(…) 
2000(497) 2 (…)die historischen und politischen Bindungen zwischen der EU und den Mittelmeer-
ländern zur vollen Entfaltung zu bringen. 
2000(497) 2 Die drei Hauptziele der Mittelmeerpolitik der EU sind: [Schaffung eines Raumesdes 
Friedens und der Stabilität(…); Schaffung eines Raumes des gemeinsamen Wohlstands 
durch die schrittweise Errichtung einer Freihandelszone(…);Verbesserung des gegensei-
tigen Verständnisses der Völker in der Region und Aufbau einer aktiven Zivilgesell-
schaft.] 
2000(497) 9 Die diagonale Kumulierung sollte unverzüglich zwischen allen Partnern eingeführt wer-
den, die untereinander den Freihandel und identische Ursprungsregeln anwenden. 
2000(497) 9 (…)sollte bis 2002 ein Zeitplan für die binnenmarktähnlichen Harmonisierungsmaßnah-
men(…)festgelegt werden. 
2000(497) 12 Die Kommission schlägt vor, die multilaterale Dimension der regionalen Kooperations-
programme stärker zu nutzen, indem Projekte mit einer geringeren Anzahl von Mitglied-
staaten und Mittelmeerpartnern ausgearbeitet werden können,(…). 
2002(159) 2 (…)the region must be a source of dynamism, creativity and exchange, which has been 
the harvest of cultural diversity through the ages. 
2002(159) 3 It is now the moment to deepen and strengthen Marseilles' decisions and also to put 
forward new initiatives aimed at increasing Euro Mediterranean wealth and prosperity. 
2002(159) 5 In current circumstances, a key element of the dialogue should be the fight against terror-
ism. 
2002(159) 6 The political and security dialogue between partners relates not only to external policy 
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but increasingly requires close co-operation on the cross border dimension of issues(…) 
2002(159) 6 The EU is seeking to develop two way channels of communication which will enable it 
to take account of the needs and aspirations of its partners as well as its own developing 
policies(…)  
2003(104) 4 (…)the EU should aim to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood -a 
ring of friends- with whom the EU enjoys close, peaseful and co-operative relations. 
2003(104) 10 all the neighbouring countries should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's Inter-
nal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of -
persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).  
2003(610) 10 The common goal of the Partnership is a stable, more prosperous Southern Mediterra-
nean in close, positive interdependence with Europe. 
2005(139) 4 The aim is to advance political reforms towards human rights, democracy, peace and 
security(…) 
2005(139) 5 Raising visibility requires a number of jointly agreed, clear and consistent messages(…) 
2005(139) 12 To facilitate exchange of people between the EU and partner countries(…) 
2005(139) 13 Preventing further loss of life needs to be a clear priority in the framework of the part-
nership. 
2006(475) 2 As no single country can be held responsible for the deterioration of the Mediterranean 
environment, no single country can protect it by acting alone. 
2006(620) 2 to advance political dialogue and reform; tackle the regional and global threats to secu-
rity and stability; support sustainable socio-economic development; accelerate moves 
towards a free trade area; work toward the de-pollution of the Mediterranean; increase 
cooperation in the field of education and culture; and address migratory flows by way of 
a comprehensive and integrated approach. 
2006(620) 3 The priority of the Barcelona Process is to develop the regional dimension of a compre-
hensive Partnership between Europe and the Southern Mediterranean based on the result-
oriented European Neighbourhood Policy. 
2006(620) 11 In terms of intercultural dialogue the Barcelona Process should be capable of delivering 
a series of new actions designed to act as a pole of attraction and to counteract attempts 
to drive a wedge between our cultures and societies.  
2007(598) 5 As a complementary partnership building measure, the Commission is offering to estab-
lish a partnership between the Comission and Mediterranean partner country administra-
tions in the exchange of professional experience. 
2008(319) 2 (…)the centrality of the Mediterranean for Europe, the importance of our links, the depth 
of our cultural and historical relations and the urgency of the strategic common chal-
lenges we face, needs to be revisited and given greater political prominence. 
2008(319) 4 More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to transform the objectives of the 
Barcelona Declaration into tangible realities. 
2008(319) 5 (…)it has become clear that all countries agree on the need to build a stronger partner-
ship that should come through greater co-ownership of the different processes. 
2008(319) 5 Establishing a co-presidency will increase and improve the balance and the joint owner-
ship of our cooperation. 
94(427) 10 [Integration dieser Länder in das] paneuropäische Freihandelsnetz 
94(427) 17,18 Die Konferenz sollte (…)dazu beitragen, unter den Führungskräften in Politik und Wirt-
schaft weltweit stärker das Bewusstsein dafür zu wecken, dass der Mittelmeerraum bereit 
ist, sich auf eine gewagte Reise zu begeben, die ihn schrittweise in eine Region von 
Stabilität und Frieden, von raschem Wirtschaftswachstum, sozialen Veränderungen und 
auch von politischen Pluralismus verwandeln wird.  
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COMM – IDENTITY 
(COMM) Identity – EU 
94(427) 15 Die Union sollte ihrerseits zu einem regelmäßigen politischen Dialog(…)bereit sein. 
94(427) 15 [rascher Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue Abkommen] Dies wird eine gewisse Fle-
xibilität auf seiten des Rates erfordern,(…) 
94(427) 2 Die Beziehungen zu jeder Region basieren auf den jeweiligen spezifischen Bedürfnissen 
und Kapazitäten 
94(427) 6 Dagegen wäre ein Mittelmeerraum, in dem Stabilität und Wohlstand herrschen, für alle 
Mitgliedstaaten von Vorteil 
94(427) 6 (…) da hier die Gefahr besteht, dass sie Anlass zu gegenseitigen Beschuldigungen geben. 
[zB. drogenprobleme, die gemeinsam gelöst werden müssen] 
94(427) 6 Wird der Migrationsdruck nicht sorgfältig über eine gezielte Zusammenarbeit mit den 
betreffenden Ländern gesteuert, so könnte es nur leicht zu Spannungen kommen, die so-
wohl den internationalen Beziehungen als auch den Einwanderern selbst schaden.  
95(72) 3 The comunity must make clear its wish to see the countries in question enter into similar 
negotiations with each other and with European countries which are not members of the 
Comunity.  
95(72) 3 To offer incouragement, the comunity should propose that there be a comulation of origin 
and that identical rules of origin apply to all countries entering into agreements of that type. 
In order to maximize the economic benefit to all the parties involved, (...) 
95(72) 4 …the comunity must be prepared to provide large-scale technical assistance (particularly 
for SME)in order to improve the quality of products and services (including tourism), the 
organisation of production, the techinical abilities of the staff, etc. 
95(72) 6 the Commission is trying to encourage a policy of efficient fishery management in the re-
gion. 
95(72) 8 To improve the efficiency of cooperation, the Commission proposes that the annual meet-
ings of the cooperation councils should henceforth be held at technical level, while at po-
litical level the Community and the body of MNC should hold an annual ministerial meet-
ing covering issues of common interest. 
97(68) 5 If a document is signed by Ministers there must also be a commitment to gradually deepen 
its content.   
97(68) 5 (…) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is at the heart of the EU's 
international policy. 
97(68) 10 No moves have been made in this direction since the Barcelona Conference and the Com-
mission strongly urges the European Parliament to take the initiative. Dialogue between 
social partners should also be encouraged. 
2000(497) 5 Der Rat hat mehrfach eine weitere Intensivierung der Europa-Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft 
gefordert. 
2000(497) 10 Die Kommission muss eine wichtige interne Reform in Bezug auf die Erbringung der Aus-
landshilfe durchführen und das Parlament und der Rat müssen der EU eine wirksamere 
MEDA-Verordnung an die Hand geben. 
2000(497) 5 Die Assoziationsabkommen bieten Möglichkeiten, jedoch keine Garantien, und ihre Vortei-
le können nur von denjenigen Ländern uneingeschränkt ausgeschöpft werden, die bereit 
sind, ihre Wirtschaft zu modernisieren und zu öffnen. 
2000(497) 8 Die europäische Erfahrung mit der Errichtung eines Binnenmarktes sollte genutzt wer-
den(…) 
2002(159) 6 The Comission will provide technical assistance [to the Mediterranean partners to improve 
information and statistics as part of ongoing co-operation on legal migration(…) 
2002(159) 7 Experience has shown that centrally managed programms have not always been able to 
respond with sufficient flexibility and efficiency to facilitate dynamic, timely exchange. 
2002(159) 17 The EU has internal mechanisms for co-ordinating positions and speaking with one voice 
while the differences between Mediterranean partners have to date prevented them from 
having similar co-ordinations mechanisms on their side. 
2002(159) 5 The Commission made a number of recommendations on this subject to(…) which have not 
been adequately followed up. 
2003(104) 12 The EU also needs to make a greater effort to create a positive image in the neighbourhood 
and act to combat stereotypes which affect perceptions of the neighbouring countries within 
! 283 
the EU. 
2003(104) 14 The EU's cooperation insruments must be sufficiently flexible to address the entire range of 
needs. 
2005(139) 3 It should be stressed that the Communication focuses on proposals to stregthen and deepen 
the partnership in the future. 
2005(139) 7 Against this backround, the EU should be prepared to invite its Mediterranean partners to 
embark on a new chapter of integration by engaging negotiations not on the traditional 
("hub and spoke") model that has been followed since 1995, but in a way that would com-
bine North.South and South-South trade integration. 
2005(139) 6 In view of the high rates of population growth in the Mediterranean, injecting a new dyna-
mism into market integration, with a view to generating more investment, higher growth 
rates and job cration must be a priority for the reltionship(…) 
2006(475) 10 The Commission cannot take over the environment responsibilities of its partners but it can 
assist them to meet those responsibilities. 
2007(598) 2 For the Commission it is essential that the European Union and the European institutions 
are fully involved in this collective effort. 
94(427) 6 Die Integration muss den Bedürfnissen der ärmeren Regionen der Gemeinschaft Rechnung 
tragen, von denen viele zu den Mittelmeerländern gehören. 
94(427) 8 Um erfolgreich zu sein, sollte die Union so weit wie möglich als Ganzes auftreten und 
Einzelinitiativen vermeiden.  
94(427) 8 Heute gefährden die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen in vielen die-
ser Länder die Stabilität und führen zu Massenauswanderungen, fundamentalistischem 
Extremismus, Terrorismus, Drogensucht und organisiertem Verbrechen. 
94(427) 13 Die Gemeinschaft kann diese Probleme natürlich nicht alle alleine lösen. 
94(427) 17 [Komission ist der Auffassung], dass das Endergebnis ein angemessenes Gleichgewicht 
zwischen den beiden Regionen, die für die Union die höchste Priorität darstellen, wieder-
spiegeln und einen Ausbau der betreffenden Politik und damit eine ausreichende Antwort 
auf den Bedarf ermöglichen muss, der im Zuge der Durchführung dieser Politik zuttage 
tritt, damit die Union bei ihren Partnern glaubwürdig bleibt. 
95(72) 3 The Comunity must give its unreserved backing to progress down this path by promot-
ing:(…)   
95(72) 6 A massive and uncontrolled rural exodus could have disastrous social, political and envi-
ronmental consequences for the country of the region and for the Community. 
97(68) 4 The Commission will continue to take the ncessary measures to fulfil the undertakings 
given in the Cannes agreement and the Barcelona Declaration. 
97(68) 6 Priorities have not, however, been properly focused and the content of the dialogue has 
proved difficult to define. 
2002(159) 6 The EU is willing to provide financial assistance through the MEDA programme for tech-
nical assistance(…) 
2003(WP) 1 (…)the Union's continuing common commitment to the Barcelona Process as a demonstra-
tion(…) 
2003(WP) 6 The dialogue of cultures and civilisations instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of the 
EU's major contributions to the promotion of mutual understanding and to opposing inter-
pretations of present events as a conflict between Western society and Islam. 
2003(294) 5 This will require a special effort by the EU and the setting up of an appropriate strategy. 
94(427) 15 Gleichzeitig muss die Gemeinschaft eine Vielzahl von Maßnahmen auf dem Ge-
biet(…)durchführen. 
94(427) 15 Kurzfristig hofft die Komission auf einen raschen Abschluss der Verhandlungen über neue 
Abkommen(…) 
94(427) 15 Mittelfristig wird die Umwandlung des Mittelmeerraums in eine Zone relativen 
Wohlstands(…)erfordern. 
95(72) 1 Europe's interests in the region are many and varied,(…) 
95(72) 2 The European Community's activities in the region should now be brought into line with 
that priority,(…) 




(COMM) Identity – role 
94(427) 6 In einer Zeit der Mundialisierung und des verstärkten Regionalismus in Nordamerika 
und in Asien kann die Gemeinschaft nicht auf die Vorteile verzichten(…) 
94(427) 6 Die Gemeinschaft hat bereits wichtige politische Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung (…) in 
die Wege geleitet. 
94(427) 7 Die Erfahrung hat gezeigt, dass die bisherigen Instrumente und Politiken zu eng konzi-
piert waren(…) 
94(427) 10 Die Verwirklichung der Ziele der Mittelmeerpolitik der Gemeinschaft setzt ein viel 
umfassenderes und aktiveres Engagement der Gemeinschaft für die wirtschaftliche und 
soziale Entwicklung der Partnerländer voraus.  
94(427) 16 Die regionale Zuammenarbeit der Mittelmeerländer wird inhaltende Unterstützung von 
seiten der Union erfordern. 
95(72) 7 The Community is happy to put its experience at the disposal of its Mediterranean part-
ners, while taking care to ensure that the partners' cultural identities are mutually re-
spected.   
95(72) 9 The Commission, convinced that both donors and beneficiaries would greatly benefit 
from improved strategic and operational coordination, will seek energetically to pro-
mote that objective. 
97(68) 6 Care must be taken to ensure that the Partnership develops evenly, which will in par-
ticular involve gauging its economic and social impact on the region.  
2000(497) 2 (…)spiegelt den Wunsch der Eu wider, mit ihren Partnern zusammenzuarbeiten und  
über das Stadium hinauszukommen, in dem die EU Vorschläge unterbreitete, die dann 
von den Mittelmeerpartnern entweder angenommen, oder abgelehnt wurden. 
2000(497) 4 Die Menschenrechtspolitik der EU in der Region war nicht kohärent genug. 
2000(497) 8 Die Länder der Region müssen für sich selbst entscheiden, ob sie ihre Wirtschaft für 
den Handel mit ihren Nachbarn öffnen, doch die Kommission kann diesen Prozess 
erleichtern, indem sie technische Hilfe bei den Maßnahmen leistet, die für ein Funktio-
nieren des Süd-Süd-Handels erforderlich sind. 
2000(497) 12 Die EU kann zu diesem Prozess jedoch durch ihre eigenen Erfahrungen und durch fi-
nanzielle Unterstützung aus dem Programm MEDA beitragen. In diesem Zusammen-
hang wird im MEDA-Kontext ein regionaler Finanzrahmen entwickelt(…). 
2002(159) 2 In the first half of the 21st Century it must be a cardinal European objective that the 
Mediterranean region does not come to represent a new fault-line. 
2002(159) 9 It may be useful to make a link with the EU's own experiences of promoting employ-
ability, particularly in the context of European Employment Strategy and the European 
Social Fund. 
2003(WP) 6 While the major effort to improve the region's attractiveness to investors needs to come 
from the partners themselves, the EU should explore what further initiatives it can take. 
2003(104) 3 The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, 
but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion 
and economic dynamism. 
2003(104) 6 (…) it is clear that a new EU approach cannot be a one-size-fits-all policy. 
2003(104) 6 A new EU approach to its neighbouring countries cannot be confined to the border 
regions alone. 
2003(104) 10 If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without 
being a member. 
2003(104) 12 The EU should take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Pales-
tine, the Western Sahara and Transdniestria. 
2005(139) 2 (…) the EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods 
and services. 
2005(139) 2 Europe is the largest direct foreign investor (…) and the EU is the region's largest pro-
vider of financial assistance and funding.  
2005(139) 2 The EU is also the main source of tourism and the first destination for migrants. 
2005(139) 7 The principle of voluntary participation must be clearly inscribed and fully respected. 
2005(139) 11 The guiding principle of the EU strategy is the ownership of the partner government and 
the need to ensure a balanced approach, which will guarantee the sustainability of the 
reforms in the long term.  
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2005(139) 15 (…) the EU should show its willingness to help resolve other conflicts in the region (…) 
2006(475) 2 As a major regional player the European Union (EU) must play its role in protecting 
this common heritage (…) 
2006(620) 2 The European contribution to the implementation of UNSCR 1701 is significant, as was 
the Em’s rapid reaction to humanitarian and environmental needs during and after the 
conflict.  
2006(620) 2 Events in the Palestinian territories underline the importance of EU assistance in the 
provision of essential services to the Palestinian population, as well as the need to re-
main engaged on issues of movement and access. 
2006(620) 2 The EU remains convinced that there are no military or unilateral solutions to the chal-
lenges in Middle East. Lasting peace and security in the region can only be ensured by a 
comprehensive settlement with a negotiated two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict at its core. 
2008(319) 6 The establishment of a co-presidency from the EU side must be compatible with the 
provisions on the external representation of the European Union in the Treaty of the 




2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL (CC) 
CC – EXPRESSION 
(CC) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
D 1995 2 (…) this EuroMediterranean initiative 
MC 1997 6 The Participants reaffirm the role of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the 
Barcelona Process as a central forum for providing impetus, monitoring and follow-
ing up actions and initiatives within the framework of the Partnership. 
MC 1997 2 Reiterating that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the 
other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interest of peace, stability and de-
velopment in the region, but (…) 
MC 1999 1 The discussions have shown that the Partnership is solid and lasting 
MC 1999 1 All members remain fully committed to all its objectives and principles and have 
reaffirmed their resolve to take forward the Partnership into the new millennium. 
MC 2000 1 (…) the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and devel-
opment in the region. 
IM 2001 1 (…) a vital and preferred framework for dialogue and cooperation between the 
European Union and the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediter-
ranean. 
IM 2001 6 [Social, cultural and human Partnership] The Ministers reiterated the importance 
and uniqueness of this chapter and the need to combat all forms of racism and any 
cultural or religious prejudices or stereotyping which may occur. 
MC 2002 1 (…)Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as an essential framework of dialogue and 
cooperation, a tue meeting point of different cultures and civilisations. 
MC 2002 5 The Barcelona Process is now sufficiently well established and resilient for the 
participants to be able to engage in an open dialogue on all issues of mutual con-
cern. 
MC 2002 5 (…) the Valencia Conference provided the opportunity for a full, frank and con-
structive discussion of what has been achieved since Barcelona, what problems have 
been encountered and what solutions found. 
IM 2003 1 The Ministers also expressed their full solidarity with Morocco 
IM 2003 1 The Ministers discussed the recent developments in the Middle East… 
IM 2003 2 The Ministers warmly welcomed the decision of the Palestinian Authority and 
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas to adopt the Road Map. They were equally con-
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vinced that the Road Map serves the interest of the Israeli people to live in security 
and in this context, they welcomed the acceptance by Prime Minister Sharon and the 
Government of Israel on 25 May 2003. 
IM 2003 4 Differences regarding the definition of terrorism should not prevent partners from 
identifying areas where they can cooperate. 
IM 2003 6 As regard South-South trades and integration the Ministers welcomed the initialling 
of the Agadir Agreement (…) 
IM 2003 7 They welcomed the important initiative of Israel and the Palestinian Authority to 
cooperate in the framework of a Technical Working Group open to other Mediterra-
nean Partners with a view to identifying and promoting inter-connexion projects of 
common interest to be integrated into the framework of the Euro Mediterranean 
partnership. 
IM 2003 8 Besides, the contribution of the Ministerial Conference on the Environment in Hel-
sinki in 1997 on cooperation between the Mediterranean and the Baltic and the 
launching in Athens of the cooperation initiative on sustainable development be-
tween the Mediterranean and the Baltic, enable the two regions to benefit from each 
other's experience. 
IM 2003 8 The Ministers noted with interest the initiatives undertaken by the Greek Presidency 
on the issue of sustainable development such as the convening of the International 
Conference on Sustainable Development and Lasting Peace 
MC 2003 1 (…) the Ministers reaffirmed their shared willingness to strengthening their partner-
ship, (…) 
MC 2003 1 They reaffirmed their joint interest (…) 
MC 2003 1 These challenges call for a reinvigorated and renewed partnership, based on a 
stronger commitment both of the European Union and the Mediterranean countries 
to common values and objectives. 
MC 2003 4 The Association process remains at the core of the Partnership. 
MC 2003 7 The Ministers confirmed that (…) the dialogue could deal inter alia with the follow-
ing issues: monitoring the economic situation in the region; monitoring the struc-
tural reforms in Partner countries and the implementation of Association Agree-
ments and assessing the economic impact of the Association process by using pre-
cise and measurable indicators including poverty issues and policies. 
IM 2004 1 The Union has proposed to include Mediterranean partners in the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy 
IM 2004 1 (…) relations with an area which extends from Mauritania to Iran - the Mediterra-
nean and the Middle East.  
IM 2004 3 The EU presented an overview of its internal discussions on its proposed Strategic 
Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East and encouraged partners to 
make comments and suggestions on the Strategic Partnership and follow up actions 
relating to it. 
IM8,5 2004 10 The main reasons for this success are the deepening of the Partnership, the better 
appropriation of programmes and projects by all Mediterranean partners, and the 
devolution of decisions and implementation to the EU Delegation. 
IM 2004 1 (…) the framework for solidarity and co-operation between the EU and its Mediter-
ranean partners in tackling common security threats. 
IM 2004 1 (…) the Barcelona Process as the main framework for a coherent set of privileged 
relations within the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood. 
IM 2004 3 (…)EU Strategic Partnership with regard to its Mediterranean dimension (…) 
IM 2004 15 (…) the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership makes a distinct contribution to encourag-
ing a process of political and economic progress for the benefit of the peoples of the 
region. 
IM8,5 2004 1 (…) the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood policy, is the 
main initiative for the Mediterranean in which the EU and the Mediterranean part-
ners jointly participate. 
IM8,5 2004 1 The Barcelona Process, enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy, is the 
central instrument for partnership and dialogue for the Mediterranean… 
IM8,5 2004 2 The meeting has sent a strong message of the shared commitment of Europe and the 
Mediterranean partners to the Barcelona Process, enhanced by the European Neigh-
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bourhood policy… 
MC 2005 1 1995 marked a turning-point in relations between the European Union and its 
neighbours on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 
MC 2005 1 A partnership was launched which is unique in its scope.  
MC 2005 1 The Barcelona Declaration is still the cornerstone of the partnership and is actually 
more relevant than ever. 
MC 2005 1 Its vast potential is far from being exhausted and sets the objectives for many years 
to come. 
MC 2005 2 The centrality of the Barcelona Process is an unanimously accepted principle, (…) 
MC 2005 2 The process has also been a catalyst to encourage coordination among the partners 
themselves. 
MC 2005 3 This is a mutually beneficial partnership. 
MC 2005 6 The Barcelona Process provides an important contribution to promoting progress 
and to furthering mutual understanding, even if it is not the forum in which a settle-
ment will be reached. 
MC 2005 1 Arab partners have circulated a paper with their views which has provided a very 
useful contribution to the exercise and reinforced the sense of joint ownership. Other 
partners have also submitted ideas and suggestions. 
MC 2006 1 The importance of co-ownership and co-responsibility of the Process, which re-
mains the cornerstone of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
MC 2006 2 (…) the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important tool which contributes to 
reinforcing and complementing the Barcelona Process through the implementation 
of the Association Agreements and the Action Plans. 
MC 2007 2 Ministers emphasise the important role that the Barcelona Process can play in ad-
dressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as: eco-
nomic and social development, climate change and energy, civil protection, migra-
tion, and countering terrorism and extremism. 
MC 2007 4 The Barcelona Declaration launched a partnership which is unique in its scope. 
MC 2007 4 Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Med partners exchange 
views and engage in a constructive dialogue in spite of the persisting conflict in the 
Middle East and in the other parts of the region. 
D 2008 8 The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona 
Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as 
the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to 
increasing the potential for a regional integration and cohesion. 
D 2008 9 The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro Mediterranean rela-
tions. 
D 2008 9 (…) it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development. 
D 2008 9 The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean part-
ners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue. 
D 2008 9 It represents a strong commitment to peace, democracy, regional stability and secu-
rity through regional cooperation and integration. 
D 2008 9 [A strategic ambition for the Mediterranean] This initiative is also the expression of 
a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security  according to the 
Barcelona Declaration of 1995, (…) 
D 2008 11 The Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues to be an inclusive process driven in 
all its aspects by the principle of consensus, (…) 
D 2008 17 The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is 
an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and 
upgrade it to a new level. 
MC 2008 3 The Paris Summit of the Barcelona Process :(…) injected a renewed political mo-
mentum into Euro-Mediterranean relations. 
MC 2008 3 This first Summit marked an important step forward for the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership while also highlighting the EU and Mediterranean partners' unwavering 
commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declara-
tion -(…)- a reality 
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(CC) Expression – the “other” 
MC 1999 4 Progress achieved by Partners in this respect was welcomed and Partners were strongly 
encouraged to follow this road and reinforce South-South cooperation in general. 
MC 1999 6 Ministers agreed that Libya, which participated as guest of the Presidency, will become a 
full member of the Barcelona Process as soon as the UN Security Council sanctions have 
been lifted and Libya has accepted the whole Barcelona acquis. 
MC 2002 3 They expressed their grave concern at the present situation, which involves serious risks for 
regional security and is leading to a grave humanitarian crisis.  
IM 2003 1 The Ministers expressed their deep sorrow, sincere sympathy and full support to the Alge-
rian government and people alike for the unspeakable human and material losses caused by 
the last earthquake's catastrophe. 
MC 2003 9 Successful economic policies will require bolder reforms in Mediterranean partners. 
MC 2005 2 Compared to 1995 Euro-Mediterranean relations now have a solid framework where only 
an intermittent pattern of contacts existed before. 
MC 2005 6 The Euro med Partners are encouraged to consider how to make progress in these areas, 
including developing policies to promote gender equality, pluralism, institution building 
and how to better associate and engage social partners and civil society as well as encourage 
its development, while adhering and accordance with the rules of international law to the 
principal of non-intervention, directly and indirectly, in the internal affairs of another part-
ner and while recognising the specifity of each society. 
MC 2005 6 Ministers underlined that Libya should be included in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
MC 2008 5 The Ministers welcome the dedication and interest expressed by three new members of the 
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of 
Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to a 
successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and 
projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region. 
 
 
(CC) Expression – associative/dissociative elements 
D 1995 2 The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council 
resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle 
East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this im-
plies; 
D 1995 2 The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the 
Mediterranean region are a common asset (…) 
D 1995 3 respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners; 
D 1995 7 The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout 
the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, 
scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples 
closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of 
each other. 
MC 2000 8 (…) and a Euro-Mediterranean "label" will be established. 
IM 2001 1 The Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks (…). In this 
connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the 
world and their solidarity. 
MC 2002 3 They expressed their condemnation of terrorism and violence (…) 
MC 2002 4 Different views on the possibility of an international conference were expressed. 
IM 2004 5 The Euro Mediterranean partners stated their determination to assist the Iraqi people 
as they enter a new era in the history of their country. 
IM 2004 14 The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of migration and expressed the view that, if 
carefully managed migration, can be a positive factor for the socio-economic growth 
of the whole region. 
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IM8,5 2004 6 Ministers called on all states in the region to exert every effort to promote peace and 
urged all states to act to combat terrorism. 
D 2008 9 Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture. 
D 2008 9 (…) they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, de-
mocracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding. 
 
 
(CC) Expression – European predominance 
MC 2002 4 In conclusion of the debate, the Presidency called on the authorities of Israel to halt its mili-
tary operations, to immediately withdraw its military forces from Palestinian cities, (…) 
MC 2006 2 The EU will establish a substantial financial Facility to support willing Mediterranean Part-
ners in carrying out their reforms taking into account that successful reforms must develop 
from within the societies of the region. 
 
 
CC – PURPOSE 
(CC) Purpose – Purpose 
IM 2003 10 They underlined the need to continue a common reflexion on these issues. 
MC 2003 1 on the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue as the key element for their respective relationship, 
they underlined the need for enhanced efforts at increasing its effectiveness. 
IM 2004 1 The Dublin Mid-Term meeting (…) reaffirmation of the Partner's continuing commit-
ment to the Barcelona Process.  
IM 2004 1 It confirmed the importance of partnership and co-ownership as essential elements of 
the process. 
IM 2004 14 Concerted efforts by all members of the Barcelona Process should lead to a prevention 
of transporting illegal immigrant by sea… 
IM8,5 2004 3 The challenge as far as the Mediterranean is concerned will be to improve the efficiency 
of the Barcelona Process enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy as an in-
strument to this end. Still greater efforts are needed to translate words into actions and to 
demonstrate genuine political will to implement the commitments jointly entered into in 
the Valencia Action Plan. 
IM8,5 2004 12 They stressed the need for to make sure that extremism and radicalization, racism and 
discrimination and xenophobia do not gain the upper hand over the majority of the 
population that wants to live peacefully. 
MC 2006 7 The need to further strengthen the intercultural dialogue… 
D 2008 8 Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterra-
nean on the political agenda of all countries. 
D 2008 8 They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance 
and visibility for the citizens. 
D 2008 9 (…)Heads of State and Government decide to launch a reinforced partnership 
 
D 1995 2 Stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their 
future relations a new dimension, (…) 
MC 1999 3 They recognised the serious threat that terrorism poses to the objectives of the Partnership. 
MC 1999 4 Ministers stressed that free trade agreements among Mediterranean Partners are essential 
for the creation of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. 
MC 2000 3 The Ministers reaffirmed the need, without waiting for the Charter to be adopted, to en-
hance the political dialogue, at their level too, in order to contribute to clearing up misun-
derstandings, foster the approximation of analyses and perceptions and make it possible 
subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency. 
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IM 2001 1 (…) the Barcelona Process as a relevant and recognised instrument for promoting a dia-
logue of equals between cultures and civilisations was emphasised by all. 
IM 2001 1 They reaffirmed their determination to play their full part in a coordinated manner in the 
coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations. 
IM 2001 2 Pointing out that the integration of all countries into a fair global system of prosperity and 
development should help to strengthen the stability of the international community; the 
Euro-Mediterranean partners reiterated their attachment to the objectives spelt out in the 
three chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and to a balanced treatment of those three 
chapters. 
MC 2002 1 (…) the need for an increased dialogue and the relevance of the principles and objectives 
agreed in the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 to make the Mediterranean a region of peace 
and stability, development and common prosperity, cooperation and understanding be-
tween cultures and civilisations. 
IM 2003 6 They underlined the importance they attach to the development of sub-regional integra-
tion. 
IM 2003 9 (…) the dialogue of cultures and civilisations instituted by the Barcelona Process is one of 
the major contributions to bring peoples closer and promote understanding and improve 
mutual perceptions. 
IM 2004 1 These events reinforced the relevance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (…) 
IM 2004 14 It remains of key importance to tackle illegal migration via the Mediterranean Sea as well 
as associated criminal offences, including cross-boarder human trafficking. 
 
 
(CC) Purpose – aim 
D 1995 2 to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the Euro Mediterra-
nean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, (…) 
MC 1997 5 The Participants recall that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the 
Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scien-
tific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, 
promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other. 
MC 1999 2 By enhancing comprehensive stability the Barcelona Process will furthermore contrib-
ute to the solution of tensions and crises in the area. 
MC 1999 3 Ministers expressed their determination to counter this threat by strengthening coop-
eration. 
MC 2000 1 The fourth Conference (…), held in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona 
meeting, bore witness to the desire of all partners to reinvigorate the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. 
MC 2000 3 They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mu-
tual interest were concerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other 
topics (…) 
MC 2000 5 (…) make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible pref-
erential instrument for upgrading economies (…) 
IM 2001 4 They called for an examination of any new initiatives which could be taken to improve 
the attractiveness of the region for foreign direct investment (…) 
IM 2003 2 Peace in the Middle East should be restored on the basis of UNSCR 242, 338 and 
1397. The Peace Process should lead to the creation of a democratic, viable and inde-
pendent State of Palestine, (…) 
IM 2003 2 The Road Map adopted by the Quartet is a great opportunity to bring back substantial 
peace negotiations, which should not be missed. 
IM 2003 2 (…) the Middle East Peace Process and the Barcelona Process are complementary, and 
expressed their readiness to use fully the potential of the Barcelona Process to make a 
positive contribution to the stabilisation of the Mediterranean region. 
IM 2003 6 The issue should be studied jointly 
MC 2003 1 (…) that furthering the process of dialogue and co-operation in order to improve mu-
tual understanding is essential to the vision of the Barcelona Process, (…) 
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MC 2003 2 (…) reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in all its chapters (…) 
MC 2003 7 (…) should aim at supporting and accompanying an acceleration of reforms necessary 
to overcome those challenges. 
IM 2004 1 (…) to reinvigorate the Barcelona Process while seeking ways of improving the sense 
of co-ownership of the process. 
IM 2004 10 The need to establish closer cross-boarder relations and to create closer sub-regional 
links, institutional and in infrastructure both in the Maghreb and the Mashraq, should 
become an increasingly high priority in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. 
IM 2004 14 (…) it is an area which needs to be pursued urgently. 
IM 2004 14 The dialogue should cover possibilities for intensified cooperation regarding the root 
causes of migration and the fight against illegal migration. 
IM 2004 15 (…) to speed up the process of implementation of the commitments (…) 
IM8,5 2004 7 Cooperation should be developed using a comprehensive approach based on interna-
tional commitments leading to concrete activities in the fight against terrorism, notably 
by preventing the financing of terrorism, as well as a dialogue on the underlying fac-
tors relating to the recruitment for terrorism. 
IM8,5 2004 12 They underlined that the Barcelona Process, and in particular the Dialogue between 
Cultures, should be used to the fullest to promote understanding between and among 
the people living in EU and around the Mediterranean and to create conditions in 
which freedom and initiative can flourish. 
MC 2005 5 (...) the need to upgrade the activities of the Partnership… 
MC 2005 6 (…) provide continued support for cooperation among the parties… 
MC 2005 9 Ministers recognised that the expansion of South-South trade links in the region is of 
vital economic interest for the Mediterranean countries. 
MC 2007 1 (…) to establish a common area of peace and stability, to create an area of shared 
prosperity and to develop a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. 
D 2008 8 (…) this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing 
the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food 
security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and deserti-
fication, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; 
terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures. 
D 2008 9 (…) to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation, political and socio-economic 
reform and modernisation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other's 
sovereignty. 
D 2008 10 They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of 
democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in inter-
national human rights law, such as the promotion of economic, social, cultural, civil 
and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society, the respect of minori-
ties, the fight against racism and xenophobia and the advancement of cultural dialogue 
and mutual understanding. 
D 2008 11 (…) challenge of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is to enhance 
multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process, set governance on the 
basis of equal footing and translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens. 
D 2008 11 Now is the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the Barcelona Process. 
D 2008 12 (…) to achieve a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire region by imple-
menting projects that will enhance the flow of exchanges among the people of the 
whole region. 
MC 2008 5 Ministers reaffirm their common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional secu-
rity according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia, promotes re-
gional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-
proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international 
and regional non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements 
such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT, and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free 
zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their 
commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions. 
MC 2008 5 The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery 
systems. 
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(CC) Purpose – Mission statement 
D 1995 2 aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides (…) constitute com-
mon challenges calling for a coordinated overall response; 
IM 2004 2 Such close and co-operative relations will depend on a better mutual understanding of secu-
rity concerns and the strengthening of commitments to common values and common princi-
ples, such as promoting human rights, combating terrorism, and non-proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction.  
 
 
CC – IDENTITY 
(CC) Identity – EU 
MC 2000 2 The Ministers of the European Union reiterated their common position based on the Dec-
laration adopted in Berlin on 25 March 1999 
MC 2005 9 Provided adequate management structures are put in place, the Commission should exam-
ine weather the methodology of EU regional policy instruments could be applied in pilot-
regions in the South of the Mediterranean from 2007, also taking into account the aim of 
the South-South and cross-boarder cooperation, as well as cooperation between regions. 
IM 2003 3 The EU Presidency welcomed the Libyan delegation (…) 
IM 2003 3 the EU Presidency believes that Libya could positively contribute to the strengthening of 
the Euro Mediterranean cooperation. 
IM 2004 7 The EU in the European Security Strategy adopted at the European Council in December 
2003 identified terrorism as one of the key threats to EU interests. 
IM 2004 14 Migration can have an impact on the recipient society and on migrants themselves. 
MC 2006 1 Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East.. 
 
 
(CC) Identity – role 
D 1995 9 (…), the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant 
provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to 
readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of 
the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for 
Community purposes; 
MC 1997 6 They also agree that the role of the Committee would be enhanced by the presence of the 
representatives of all Member States of the European Union. 
MC 1997 6 They welcome the fact that the European Parliament has taken the initiative with other 
Parliaments to begin the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary dialogue. 
MC 1999 3 The European Union confirmed that its assistance for the period 2000-2006 will again 
reflect the high priority that it attaches to relations with its Mediterranean Partners in the 
context of its overall external commitments. 
MC 2000 2 The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties 
in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them. 
MC 2002 2 The EU renewed its offer to provide technical assistance to these initiatives. 
MC 2002 5 (…) the EU Presidency hopes Libya will fully contribute to the relaunching of the Euro-
Mediterranean cooperation. It also welcomed the presence of other Special guests of the 
Presidency: Arab League, UMA and Mauritania. 
IM 2003 6 (…) the Commission will provide technical support. 
IM 2003 9 The EU recalled that the necessary steps had been taken in order to facilitate the issuing of 
visas to Mediterranean representatives attending bilateral and multilateral meetings as part 
of the Barcelona Process. Some Mediterranean Partners complained about their inclusion 
in the list of countries for which a consultation (up to 14 days) is required for the issuance 
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of Schengen visas. 
IM 2004 1 Within a differentiated approach, the EU can offer a more intensive political dialogue and 
greater access to EU programs and policies, including their gradual participation in the 
four freedoms particularly the Single Market, as well as reinforced co-operation on justice 
and home affairs. 
IM 2004 2 The ratification processes of the agreements with Lebanon and Algeria are also well un-
derway. All partners were again encouraged to expedite the ratification process of those 
Association Agreements not yet in force. The EU is also encouraged by the progress made 
towards concluding an Association Agreement with Syria, and is hopeful that the few 
outstanding points will be resolved soon, allowing Syria to join the group of Euro-
Mediterranean countries which have signed Association or Interim Agreements with the 
Union, thus completing the network of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements.  
IM 2004 3 The EU stressed that the most recent European Council underlined the importance of 
intensive consultation with the countries involved. 
IM 2004 3 The EU also stated its readiness to cooperate with other actors, (…) notably with the 
US(…) the G8 and NATO 
IM8,5 2004 2 It reiterated that within this partnership the EU will give further focussed support to re-
form undertaken by partners according to agreed priorities and based on shared values as 
endorsed by the Barcelona Declaration. 
MC 2005 1 Indeed, while the world has undergone major changes, while the European Union's institu-
tions have continued to evolve, (…) 
MC 2005 2 This structure also provides a solid basis for the implementation of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy, which enhances the Barcelona Process. Mutually, Ministers, Senior 
officials and experts meet regularly... 
MC 2005 3 The EU remains the main partner of Mediterranean countries both in trade of goods and 
services. 
MC 2005 9 Ministers agreed that EU regional policy could serve, among other policies, as a source of 
inspiration for regional development in Mediterranean countries, in collaboration with the 
relevant regional structures. 
MC 2008 4 Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, 
notably in the framework of the Quartet. They reaffirm their commitment to support the 
ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations (…) 
 
 
(CC) Identity - mandate 
D 1995 2 convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of 
dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity re-
quires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and bal-
anced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of 
greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership 
MC 1999 2 Ministers encouraged the European Union to continue increasing its role in support of 
the Middle East Peace Process. 
MC 2000 2 The Ministers called for greater involvement of the European-Union vis-à-vis all parties 
to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence. 
MC 2002 1 (…) the tragic situation in the Middle East demands to be addressed both in an urgent 
manner and with a longer term perspective. 
MC 2002 1 The challenges of the EU enlargement, the events of September 11 and the serious 
developments in the Middle East and other structural changes in the international scene 
make the Barcelona Process more necessary than ever. 
IM 2003 8 The Ministers encouraged the Commission to continue its efforts to strengthen, in coop-
eration with Member States and Partner countries, the coordination of programmes 
financed by MEDA, Member States, EIB and international organisations. 
IM 2003 10 The Ministers invited the Commission to explore how, within the existing MEDA 
framework; a more substantial involvement of the Mediterranean partners in the rele-
vant EU programmes could be achieved. 
MC 2003 1 They also agreed that the process of enlargement of the EU on one side and the current 
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situation in the Middle East on the other, have given rise to a greater demand for Europe 
on the Southern and Eastern rim of the Mediterranean. 
IM 2004 3 The EU indicated that it will continue to pursue its specific EU Strategic Partnership 
with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, based on the existing frameworks and in 
particular the Barcelona Process as far as the Mediterranean is concerned, and aiming 
for the appropriate articulation between the different frameworks.  
IM8,5 2004 2 (…)Ministers welcomed the EU willingness to support indigenous programmes for 
development and reform emanating from within the countries of the Mediterranean. 
IM8,5 2004 11 (…)and that there is a common interest in fighting illegal migration within the context 
of a comprehensive approach, in particular in upholding respect for the rule of law and 





1. EUROPEAN COMMISSION (COMM) 
COMM – EXPRESSION 










The European Union, and the governments of the Mediterra-
nean countries, has established a variety of shared actions in 
order to guarantee a common area of peace and stability, to 
consolidate an area of share prosperity and to promote part-










Oslo (…) created an unprecedented framework for close political, 





Oslo (…) this joint Declaration establishes the common principles 
of democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, plural-
ism and tolerance, as the core of Euro-Mediterranean co-





Oslo Of course, in these matters it would be naïve to expect that 
long-standing conflicts and problems in the region can be 










Oslo (…) the Barcelona process has been the only forum where all 










Oslo (…) we have a consolidated and stable process: we proved 






Oslo (…) a network of exchanges of views and initiatives has been 








DG 1B A.4 







DG 1B A.4 
(…) la coopération décentralisée, comme toute politique 
nouvelle, ne dispose pas d'une définition juridique satisfai-





Brussels The Partnership established at Barcelona in November 1995 





Brussels One of the achievements of Marseille was precisely to dem-
onstrate the resilience of the Barcelona process: even against 
the background of difficulties in the region we were able to 
pursue a frank political dialogue and to make substantial 





Brussels (…) the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. 
Activities in these sectors are the ones most likely to have a 




18 june 2001 Rabat Ours is a long term and agenda. 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
18 Juni 2001 Rabat Actions speak louder than words. It is no longer enough that 









26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
[Prodi] (…) relations between Europe and the Mediterranean 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
The Barcelona process, which got going in 1995, remains the 
instrument on which we can base our actions. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
the Barcelona process is still fully valid because it is the only 
attempt ever made to address instability and diversity in the 







Strasbourg This is why we have launched the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The Neighbourhood Policy does not replace the Bar-
celona Process; it reinforces it. It builds on the Process' ob-
jectives and instruments, in particular developing the EU's 












Cairo [ENP] (…)the European Neighbourhood Policy(…) to en-
hance relations with the neighbouring countries on the basis 






Cairo (…) the Barcelona Process remains key to relations between 





Cairo The European Neighbourhood Policy does not make Barce-














Madrid La respuesta reside en el redescubimiento de un antiguo 
concepto de la región euromediterránea, cuya raíz sería el 







Madrid El Proceso de Barcelona, que es la denominación con la que 
se dió a conocer el Partenariado Euromediterráneo, ha consti-
tuido una magnífica base para ello durante sus primeros diez 







Madrid (…) el único foro capaz de reunir en un marco común a las 







Madrid El Proceso de Barcelona, reforzado por la política Europea 
de Vecindad, tiene que servir de puente para el intercambio, 




25. Nov 05 Barcelona It is important to understand that the Mediterranean repre-





25. Nov 05 Barcelona Make no mistake ladies and gentlemen, Barcelona is here to 
stay, and now coupled and mutually reinforced by the 
Neighbourhood policy there is a fresh air of optimism and 
determination as we move into the next phase of relations 









2 June 2006 Hamburg The Barcelona Process is a unique regional forum. 







6 June 2006 Brussels Barcelona is an important multilateral forum for the Euro-
mediterranean area, and will continue to be so. ENP com-
plements this by strengthening our bilateral relations. It of-
fers individual countries the opportunity to build a qualita-






Lisbon But let us be frank, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has 









03. Sep 07 Brussels The Euro-Mediterranean partnership is as important as ever - 
the cornerstone of our regional dialogue between the EU and 




07. Apr 08 Bruges ENP continues to prove its worth - showing that our policy 
of encouraging and rewarding reform does have an impact on 





Oslo (…) we also adapted: the sovereign equality of States; non 
interference in internal affairs; respect for territorial integrity; 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the rejection of the 





Oslo Furthermore, common commitments were decided (…) 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
18 Juni 2001 Rabat The agriculture negotiations between the EU and Morocco, 
due to start later this month, will provide the forum for frank 
and honest discussion on this sensitive sector. 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
24. Apr 02 Brussels Some may find it unrealistic to speak about the Barcelona 
Process when the Middle East is in flames and that view is 
not entirely unfounded. Yet it confirms at once the need for 






Lisbon These are not achievements to be taken lightly. They have 
made our partnership solid and durable. And set a high 
standart for the future. 
 
 





Rabat Our partners of the southern flank of the Mediterranean have a privi-





Rabat The countries of the region are increasingly calling on the EU to play its 
role as a political partner and to move beyond its traditional function as a 







Apart from the current candidate countries, the Mediterranean countries 













Cairo On the geo-political level, despite the differences that exist within the 
area, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership encompasses countries which 
geographically the Mediterranean draws closer together more then it 
divides them. Historically these countries have seen their destinies inter-





(COMM) Expression – European predominance 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
The incentives are needed to provide greater encouragement for the in-
ternal reforms that are vital if the Mediterranean countries are to benefit 
fully from bilateral relations with the Union and from the opening-up of 







Madrid Aquellos que adopten decisiones valientes y dificiles y expresan clara-
mente su voluntad de llevar a cabo la reforma resibirán una respuesta 





03. Sep 07 Brussels The closer you want to be in the EU, and the greater your commitment to 
reform, the more we will offer you in terms of both assistance to reach 
those goals, and opportunities to expand and deepen our relations. 
 
 





Oslo In a nutshell, we ask the Mediterranean partners to run the risk of abol-
ishing their tariff barriers to exports from the Union, while benefiting 





Oslo We ask the Member States of the Union not only to improve trade con-
cessions, but to make a major effort or help Mediterranean countries 





Oslo (…) both North and South of the Mediterranean: we must look to the 






Brussels The EU and its Mediterranean partners share many common interests: 
from trade and investment, through safeguarding the environment and 












Brussels (…) the main input for the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meet-





18 Juni 2001 Rabat Of course arguments will always arise between close trading partners 
with a mature relationship. They arise in our relationship with the US 




18 Juni 2001 Rabat But there are some further obstacles which prevent us from harvesting 
the full benefits of the Barcelona process. Let me mention the most 




18 Juni 2001 Rabat [Morocco] Thanks to history, politics and geography, the EU has al-
ways enjoyed an extremely close relationship with Morocco. We are 
now acting as partners, with both of us spearheading efforts at regional 
integration among our neighbours as a precursor to the ultimate goal of 




18 Juni 2001 Rabat [Morocco] And if this close partnership enables us to do even more 
together, within the context of the Barcelona process, then why not try? 
We are studying with great interest the ideas of the Moroccan govern-
ment for a deeper association among us. They are full of good ideas and 
contain a lot of common sense. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Let us not forget that certain European capitals such as Paris and Lon-




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
It is now within our societies, in our countries, that the communities 
that came from the south long ago or more recently are developing new 
ways of living together. These dynamics have nothing to do with secu-
rity or the prosecution of illegality. Rather they hold out the promise of 















Madrid Necesitamos redescubrir la época  de los intercambios que dieron lugar 









07. Apr 06 Wien (…)weil der Begriff "Clash and civilisations" eine Fehlbezeichnung ist. 
Wir sind nicht mit einem Aufeinanderprallen der Zivilisationen kon-




6 June 2006 Brussels Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest part-
ners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals and aspirations, 
and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs 
and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that. 
 
 






Brussels The Mediterranean is our "near abroad" on our Southern flank. Thus it 




24. Apr 02 Brussels The prosperity gap between the North and South of the Mediterranean 
is not diminishing. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
To build the new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, Europe's cra-
dle, would clearly be a grave mistake. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
But the region's diversity makes the task particularly difficult. We 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
There is a human, social and historical reality called the Mediterranean 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
(…) the Mediterranean in all its diversity is seen as a girdle of peace 
and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region 
stretching from Spain to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Between 1994 and 2000, for example, Euro-Mediterranean trade dou-
bled. And yet the Mediterranean region is still unable to develop its 
own personality on the world stage. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
One of the causes of the region's backwardness and the slowness of the 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Today, the frontier world between the southern and northern shores of 
the Mediterranean no longer lies on the other side of the sea. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
The Mediterranean, wrote Mercator, was given different names de-
pending upon the shores it washed up against. The Bible also gives the 
Mediterranean various names. And diversity was also great when we 
called it mare nostrum.  
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 







Strasbourg (…) it is also our neighbourhood. 





















Madrid Esta idea contempla el Mediterráneo no como una barrera que separa a 
los pueblos de sus orillas sino como un medio que facilita los inter-







Madrid Es preciso que concibamos el Mare Nostrum precisamente de ese 
modo, como un espacio compartido, tanto física como psicológicamen-




07. Apr 08 Bruges After all, our common objective is to strengthen our relations across 




COMM – PURPOSE 










On the other hand, it has to be kept in minds of the beneficiaries, 
that no public money will ever be enough to palliate their structural 
problems, Public and European funds are scarce and have to be 
used as an "effect de levier" that will help in modernising and 





Oslo The Union's strategy regarding the Middle East and North Africa 
aims at the establishment of a relationship of close association, and 






Oslo Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial co-operation is the 








DG 1B A.4 
C'est là un moyen essentiel de renforcer la démocratie à l'intérieur 
des sociétés méditerranéennes et également un moyen essentiel de 
favoriser une meilleure compréhension mutuelle entre les deux 
rives de la Méditerranée par un contact direct entre personnes 






Brussels But we should continue working towards Barcelona regardless of 

















26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
This is why the time has come to be decisive and implement and 
strengthen our Mediterranean policy. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
Multilateralism rather than unilateralism, and persuasion rather 
then coercion are the watchwords that will guide our actions in the 
world and particularly in the Mediterranean. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed Re-
port 
The objective is not simply to increase the competitiveness of 
these countries and trade with the Union, but also to further re-






Strasbourg The first is to increase the impact of our policies, so contributing to 













Cairo The European Neighbourhood Policy has general objectives which 
are similar to the Mediterranean partnership and based on it, 
namely to work together with our partners to reduce poverty, cre-
ate a space of prosperity and shared values, based on free trade, 
increased economic integration, stronger political and cultural ties, 
greater cross-border cooperation and shared responsibilities in the 







Madrid Su objetivo era crear a través del libre comercio una región de paz 
y prosperidad compartida y una asociación de amplio alcance 
social y cultural que propiciara un mejor conocimiento recíproco 




25. Nov 05 Barcelona There we see all the biggest challenges for peace - security and the 
fight against terrorism above all - for development, for respect of 
human rights, for the safeguarding of the environment, sustainable 
growth, education - particularly for women and for positive gov-




2 June 2006 Hamburg We need to counter the risk of mutual incomprehension through an 




6 June 2006 Brussels The core principle of the European Neighbourhood Policy is very 
simple - we want to extend the prosperity, stability and security 




03. Sep 07 Brussels The ENP has spurred the Member States to think harder about the 
future of the whole of this corner of our planet, and the need to 





Oslo (…) the Partnership is an instrument to help Mediterranean coun-








Madrid Su misión era transformar toda la cuenca del Mediterráneo en una 
zona de intercambio en la que los estereotipos étnicos y culturales 








Madrid La ola de democracia que viene barriendo el globo durante los 
últimos treinta años, y cuyo resultado es que más de la mitad de los 
Estados del mundo son ahora democracias, solamente ha afectado 





Oslo (…)the sooner it is started, the sooner positive economic results 





Oslo A real dialogue between civilizations and religions will be neces-
sary; the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations will depend, to a 
large degree, on the understanding between peoples of the Chris-







Madrid La UE cree que la única vía para enfrenarse con exito a esos desa-
fíos es impulsar la prosperidad, la seguridad y la estabilidad en 







Madrid La cooperación también es necesaria para hacer frente a las condi-













Oslo Although the Peace Process and Euro-Mediterranean partnership are 
two distinct and separate processes, eventually the latter cannot fully 





Oslo (MEPP) The Euro-Mediterranean partnership provides the legal and 





Brussels working together for peace and stability; creating shared prosperity 
through establishing free trade and providing the economic and fi-
nancial assistance to meet the challenges which that implies; and 
helping to improve mutual understanding and tolerance among peo-





Brussels We must speed up the negotiation, signature and ratification of the 










Brussels Developing South-South trade and cooperation including on a sub-
regional basis :(…) 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
18 Juni 2001 Rabat Working together for peace and stability; improving mutual under-
standing and tolerance; and creating shared prosperity. 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
18 Juni 2001 Rabat Nothing would provide a more positive sign of our mutual determi-
nation to make the Barcelona Process work than a concerted effort to 




18 Juni 2001 Rabat And ambitious they are: together we are starting to lay the founda-




18 Juni 2001 Rabat (…) a better use of targeting of MEDA.  
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
24. Apr 02 Brussels Much remains to be done. 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 
24. Apr 02 Brussels (…) we need to deepen the South-South relationship. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Making the Barcelona process more flexible also means encouraging 
cooperation between groups of countries, at least in the beginning. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
In future, we must further strengthen the political and institutional 
dimension of the process. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
 The aim of the European-Mediterranean Foundation for dialogue 
between cultures and civilisations that we proposed in Valencia is to 
improve mutual understanding in the region through intellectual, 






Strasbourg It is high time we ask ourselves what the partnership can do to meet 





Cairo It is not matter of recasting Barcelona but rather rereading it, redis-







Madrid Nuestro objetivo estratégico es proyectar una zona de prosperidad, y 















Madrid tenemos que encontrar caminos para superar el «choque de ignoran-
cias» que, mucho más que el «choque de civilizaciones», es una de 







Madrid (…)que necesitamos un entendimiento común de nuestra región y 
nuestro futuro. 








COMM – IDENTITY 
(COMM) Identity – EU 
Manuel 
Marin 




May 23, 1997 Oslo (…) it defined the concepts of parallelism and equilibrium 
between the Union's Eastern and Southern borders. 
Manuel 
Marin 
May 23, 1997 Oslo A significant achievement in itself (…) 
Manuel 
Marin 
May 23, 1997 Oslo Europe cannot ignore the fact that there is more then ten mil-
lion Muslims resident in the Union. 
Manuel 
Marin 
May 23, 1997 Oslo Many of our initiatives, in the Middle East and elsewhere, are 
undermined because our partners do not see Europe speaking 
with one voice. 
Manuel 
Marin 
May 23, 1997 Oslo With the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship, the European Union has acquired, for the first time, a 






Brussels It recognised that common objectives and common interests 
need to addressed in a spirit of co-responsibility leaving be-
hind the more "patronising" approach which often marked our 





Brussels (…)political situation in the region. Both reports note the 
considerable significance of the Middle East Peace Process 
for EU policy in the Mediterranean. 
Rt Hon 
Chris Patten 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
At a time when we are building a new Europe, a united Euro-
pean continent, when we are seeking to work out new ways 
for people of different cultures to live and work together, 
when we are creating an new unity within diversity, when the 
EU's borders are expanding, we must also develop our strat-
egy towards the regions closest to Europe and, above all, we 
must be decisive in our Mediterranean policy. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
To build te new Europe but neglect the Mediterranean, 
Europe's cradle, would clearly be a grave mistake. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
[EU enlargement] The first involves viewing the Mediterra-
nean primarily as a question of security. In this case, the 
Mediterranean becomes the southern border of the Union, 
where we must take up position to manage the flows of mi-
grants, combat any forms of international terrorism there and 
encourage a development policy heavily geared towards co-
operation in the fight against unlawful activities. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
The second option involves viewing the Mediterranean as a 
new area of cooperation, where a special relationship can be 
established within the context of a broader proximity policy, 
which will need to address the whole band of regions around 
the Union, streching from the Maghreb to Russia. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
It is very difficult to make out the Union's new frontiers. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
for thousends of years it has been hard to decide how far 
Europe streches in these two directions. But this does not 
mean the Union can just keep on enlarging. The cost would 
 304 
be too great, since it would effectively mean abandoning the 
European political project. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
At the same time we cannot draw a neat demarcation line, as 
some Mediterranean countries --Malta and Cyprus-- are pre-
paring to become members of the Union, others --Turkey-- 
are candidates for membership, and all are linked to Europe 
by ties of tradition, special situations and interests. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Europeans are learning the importance of intercultural dia-
logue, and that it is a powerful instrument for integrating and 
including millions of immigrants in Europe, not just another 
aspect of foreign policy. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
(..)Europe needs to make even better use of the external po-
tential of its various common policies, from the single marked 




14 March 2005 Cairo There is no need for me to stress the importance the Commis-








Madrid [E] (…)sino por el importante papel que España ha desempe-














Madrid [E] España tiene una cultura y una Historia extraordinaria-
mente ricas a las que recurrir para impulsar mejores vínculos 
con otras naciones de las orillas del Mediterráneo, y siempre 
ha tenido un papel destacado a la hora de orientar a la Unión 







Madrid Porque solo si impulsamos la prosperidad, la seguridad y la 








Madrid la UE dispone ahora de un nuevo instrumento que le perimte 
contribuir más eficazmente a la reforma, la Política Europea 







Madrid Nuestros intereses están tan inextricablemente ligados entre sí 
que nuestra única oportunidad es una respuesta común y un 




25. Nov 05 Barcelona Europe cannot assure its own stability, security and prosperity 
without helping our neighbours achieve similar and relative 





Warsaw The great difference of course between 'Europe' and the 
'European Union' is that one is defined by culture, history and 





07. Apr 06 Wien (…)dass die Europäische Kommission völlig dem Grundsatz 
der Forderung des Dialogs mit Europas Hauptreligionen und 




07. Apr 06 Wien In einer Zeit in der der sogenannte "Clash of civilisations" 
erneut Aufwind bekommt, ist es von größter Wichtigkeit, dass 










2 June 2006 Hamburg Europe cannot be an "introspective bystander". On the con-
trary, we are and must remain a key actor in the region; a 
political and economic partner who supports and manages 





2 June 2006 Hamburg This is not just a political imperative, but a matter of self-









2 June 2006 Hamburg It is in our European interest that our neighbourhood is well-
governed and prosperous. It is in our interest that conflicts in 
our vicinity are resolved and issues like migration, organised 






Lisbon (Intern) Ideas such as the Euro-Mediterranean Union pro-
posed by Presidenet Sarkozy, could add political monumen-
tum for regional cooperation and are welcome. They should 
build up an experience gathered and structures established by 
the existing regional policies like the Barcelona Process, 
Euromed and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Com-







Lisbon If we are able to muster the sufficient political will to tackle 
these challenges and make more of the Euro-Med Partnership 
I am certain it will stand us in good stead for tackling the 




03. Sep 07 Brussels Five years ago, the European Union had a vision. On the eve 
of the biggest enlargement in its history, it dreamed of a zone 





03. Sep 07 Brussels (Intern) I know that some have questioned the logic behind 
the ENP, questioned whether countries with such different 
societies, histories and traditions should, or even can, be 









07. Apr 08 Bruges Our goal of promoting stability, security and prosperity for 






Brussels [MEDA] We are in the process of implementing two reforms: 
the revised MEDA Regulation will streamline decision-
making procedures in the Union, lead to a more strategic 
approach and improve coordination between the Commission, 
Member States and other donors; and the International Com-
mission reform which I have announced will rationalise and 






Brussels I have noted the calls to increase the numbers of Commission 
staff available to work on this sector. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
Having excluded the posibility of integrating them in the 







Strasbourg The European Parliament has always been a strong supporter 






Strasbourg But the Commission is also aware of the importance of hav-
ing sufficient resources to support EU policies. 
Mr. Manuel 
Marin 
May 23, 1997 Oslo It aims at opening the economic structures of our partners, 
within the framework of modernisation and competition on a 
world-wide scale, to allow the creation of a broad Free Trade 
Area between now and the year 2010. 
Rt Hon 31. January Brussels Our Commuincation is unequivocal on this subject: the Eu 
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26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
And yet we sense the need for a common approach, an ap-
proach that allows us --both Europeans and Mediterraneans-- 
to decide together the future of a region whose destiny has all 
too often depended solely on desicions taken elsewhere. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
But I am convinced that the course I have suggested today is 





23.02.2005 Strasbourg The EU has an impresive record in democracy building, in-
cluding in those countries which are now new member states. 
We should use this experience to help build stable democacies 








24.11.2005 Madrid Deberíamos impulsar la positiva visión universal del Medite-
rráneo «espaciosísimo y largo» que vio Don Quijote y que 





2411.2005 Madrid Hemos de unirnos, tomando como punto de partida la Cumbre 
del lunes, para volver a descubrir aquel antiguo concepto del 
Mediterráneo como una extensión de agua que une a nuestros 
pueblos, como fuente de vigor y enriquecimiento para todas 
nuestras civilizaciones, y como depósito de magníficas tradi-
ciones religiosas y filosóficas que se han ido alimentando 




25.11.2005 Barcelona We believe that democracy and good governance are essential 
for stability and prosperity. 
 
 











(Institut. Comm) The role of the European Commission as regards 
industrial cooperation is to promote the competitiveness of the Euro-
pean industry but, at the same time, also foster the industrial 
development of third countries. Basically the role of the Commis-
sion should be to facilitate and/or support the private initiative, cre-











(Comm) The Commission is responsible for the general manage-






Oslo The European Union has already shown its readiness to encourage 






Oslo (…)I must stress that the Union's aid and technical assistance can act 
only as a catalyst:they will have an effort only if made in conjunc-
tion with the political will and modernisation efforts of Mediterra-






Oslo Our position is simple: the Oslo agreements have to be respected and 







Oslo (…)we believe that the Union can and should play a more important 








Oslo We do not see the Union's role as an alternative to the role of the 






Oslo ("Friedensstifter")The Palestinians share the same economic and 
trade provisions of other Partners, including Israel, and the Union as 







Oslo (…)if the Union wants to fully use its political potential, it must 








DG 1B A.4 
(…)Cour des Comtes sur les programmes Med, c'est la dimension 
politique: faute de pouvoir coopérer de manière efficace et souple 
avec les «nouveaux acteurs» du développement que sont la société 
civile, le secteur privé ou le secteur associatif, l'Union européenne, 
et donc la commission, se priverait d'un instrument clé du change-








DG 1B A.4 
c'est un des messages forts lancés a Barcelone car jusque là, dans la 
région mediterranéenne, la coopération européenne s'etait limitée 
jusqu'en 1991, date de mise en place de la Politique Mediterra-








DG 1B A.4 
Nous avons mis en évidence ce volet important lorsque nous avons 
parlé de la valeur ajoutée de la coopération décentralisée. C'est ce 
rôle clé de la société civile qui a été reconnu par les 27 gouverne-
ments réunis en 1995 à Barcelone et confirmé depuis, jusque'à Stutt-
gart la semaine dernière; la société civile est reconnue pour la pre-







Brussels My overriding approach has been to see how we could focus the 
partnership on a clear set of short and medium term goals -ambitious 
but achievable; and, also, how to increase the sense of "ownership" 






Brussels I note the calls in both reports for the EU to play a more active role 
in the Peace Process. Let us not underestimate our contribution. We 






Brussels We should make sure that we can capitalise on that progress when 
the time is right so that it becomes a genuinely meaningful document 
reflecting the EU's active commitment to maintaining regional peace 






Brussels (…) we should not wait for the Charter to be in force to make more 
efforts to promote respects for human rights and democratic free-






Brussels of course we should not be naïve: we cannot expect wholesale 
changes to cultural traditions overnight. But we should aim for a 
structural approach leading to improvements over time. I welcome 







Brussels We want all countries signing an Association Agreement with us to 
conclude free trade agreements among themselves within five years. 
This is the only manner to prepare our already agreed objective of an 






Brussels I am convinced that the effectiveness of MEDA depends on keeping 
a tight focus on the key priorities of the partnership even if this 
means that other calls on our assistance, -worthy in themselves as 






Rabat And we want to respond positively to this call, to re-affirm the im-
portance of the Mediterranean region for the EU and to find new 






Rabat The important thing is that we do not let these minor spats interfere 
with our overall relationship which is of far greater and longer term 
importance. All that this requires is good will and a joint determina-
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tion to keep occasional trade disputes in perspective. And to try hart 






Rabat We fully support your efforts. And we stand ready to assist you in 







Rabat We are looking for partners who share our goals. Partners who are 
willing to take a lead in integrating with their own neighbours. Who 
can join us in creating a network which reflects the full diversity of 
human cultures, while encouraging prosperity and protecting the 
values we all hold dear. I believe Morocco is such a partner. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
At the same time we cannot draw a neat demarcation line, as some 
Mediterranean countries --Malta and Cyprus-- are preparing to be-
come members of the Union, others --Turkey-- are candidates for 
membership, and all are linked to Europe by ties of tradition, special 
situations and interests. 
Romano 
Prodi 
26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
We must not start, however, from a closed, one-sided Eurocentric 




26. Nov 02 EuroMed 
Report 
After 26 years of close cooperation between the European Union 
and the Maghreb countries, for example, I believe the time has come 
to think about developing new forms of sub-regional integration 






Strasbourg Many of the EU's objectives for the region are shared by the US, and 
we are more likely to achieve them together. Working in parallel, 
reinforcing our common objectives, the EU and US will have a 
greater degree of persuasion and political influence in the region 




















Hamburg We are now further refinig our incentives for this good governance 
project. Our strategy for the Mediterranean and the Middle East in 
particular is not a "one-size-fits-all" policy, but on the contrary a 











03. Sep 07 Brussels No longer is the level of attention paid to one country or region 
dependent on the special interest of whatever EU Member State 





03. Sep 07 Brussels Let me repeat: we stand firm on the principle that this is not about 
forcing any country in a particular direction. It is about responding 
to the decisions you make towards realising our common vision of a 





03. Sep 07 Brussels And we are committed to the idea that each country shapes its rela-










03. Sep 07 Brussels We are not trying to force artificial links between countries with 





07. Apr 08 Bruges The French Presidency has already made clear its desire to reinforce the 
multilateral element of our relations in the South. 
 
 
2. EUROPEAN COUNCIL (CC) 
CC – EXPRESSION 
(CC) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
Robin Cook 3rd- 4th June 
1998 
Palermo [MEPP] The Barcelona Declaration made clear that 




13. Nov 98 Malta The most ambitious and best progressing Mediterra-
nean initiative is the (European Union's) Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership launchend in Barcelona in 




13. Nov 98 Malta The EMP is to be seen as a comprehensive EU for-
eign policy approach towards the Mediterranean. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta The Barcelona Conference represented the pinnacle 
of a year-long effort by the EU to give the partnership 
with Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunesia, Turkey, and the 
Palestinian National Authority a solid foundation. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta To date the Euro-med Partnership remains the only 
multilateral forum to deal with the problems of the 
region in a comprehensive way with the participation 
of Arab countries and Israel. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Although the EMP has its roots in the MEPP and the 
Madrid Conference, this partnership must not be 




13. Nov 98 Malta This means: the Barcelona Process cannot and shall 
not be used as leverage in the MEPP. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta The most remarkable aspect of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership is its long-term and com-
prehensive approach, virtually non-existent in previ-
ous European efforts in that region. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Today, especially since the successful Palermo Con-
ference, The EMP is less fragile, it is a reality which 
nobody wants to miss. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta The Barcelona Process presents a challenge to the 
European Union with its wide scope and ambitious 
objectives.  
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta The start of the Process at the Barcelona Conference 
meant a qualitative and quantitative change in Euro-
Mediterranean relations. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta The Middle East Peace Process, as a parallel track, 




31.05.2005 Luxembourg Launched in 1995 in a context of hope and peace, our 
partnership has seen some very difficult times over 
the past ten years. But our dialogue has never ceased. 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg This was an innovative concept which, in the context 
of the post-Cold War period and successive enlarge-
ments, was to prove central in consolidating our links 
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of solidarity and in supporting the major changes that 
have affected our region. 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg The Barcelona Declaration was born of this common 
vision and this sense of shared responsibility. 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg Today, this fundamental and unique text has not lost 
any of its urgency. 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg More than ever, it constitutes the frame of reference 
for cooperative relations and links of solidarity be-





junio de 2005 revista "af-
kar/ideas" 
El marco creado en Barcelona se ha convertido en 




junio de 2005 revista "af-
kar/ideas" 
Ni un solo Gobierno participante, ni siquiera los que 
vives más de cerca las tensiones de Oriente Medio, ha 





junio de 2005 revista "af-
kar/ideas" 
Está en nuestras manos decidir si queremos para el 





periódico El País La ampliación de la UE, la Nueva Política de Vecini-
dad y el Proceso de Barcelona han construido rela-
ciones políticas y comerciales más fuertes entre las 
dos orillas del Mediterráneo. 






The Barcelona Process provides an important contri-
bution to promoting progress in the Middle East 
Peace Process and to furthering mutual understand-
ing, even if it is not the forum in which settlement 
will be reached. 
Hans Winkler 22.05.2006 Vienna The Barcelona Process provides, indeed, a crucial 
framework for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in 
the field of migration and, most particular, by serving 
as a tool for the promotion of mutual respect and 
understanding, for the interaction of civil societies 
and for the creation of a dialogue between cultures on 
the basis of an equal partnership 
Hans Winkler 22.05.2006 Vienna This partnership between the EU and the countries 
around the Mediterranean - including Israel - is of 
particular relevance not only in general political, 
economic and cultures terms, but in particular in the 
context of the fight against racism and tolerance 
Hans Winkler 22.05.2006 Vienna we are privileged to have a forum like our Euro-
Mediterranean partnership and we should make full 
use of it 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin interaction between civil society and government. 
This interaction is crucial to socicio-political progress 
in all societies and is a key element for element for 
peace, security and prosperity 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin Of course, we can view this coming-closer-together 
as a threat, as an invasive trend - but in it, we can also 
see an opportunity for our common future. "What 
belongs together is now growing together" - this 
applies not only to Berlin, or to Germany. It also 
applies to the Mediterranean region, where we want 
to expand and intensify cooperation and exchange. 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berline In this context, the relevance of the Barcelona Proc-





Malta The "Barcelona Process" offers many chances on a 
broad scale. It is ambitious in ist objectives and 
! 311 
sounded from the very beginning - that is already in 
the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 - quite promising 
José Magal-
hães 
04.10.2007 Portugal é enorme a importância estratégica da região medi-
terrânica para a União Europeia para Portugal 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers I call on all those who can do so to join the Mediter-
ranean Union because it will be the linchpin of 




23.10.2007 Tangiers This is what the Mediterranean Union is: a break with 
the past- A break with attitudes, ways of thinking, 








30.04.2008 Tunis Because in Barcelona, everything came from the 
North. By that I mean north of the Mediterranean. In 
Barcelona, Europe decided first 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis Barcelona was not bad, because it signalled Europe's 
salutary recognition that part of its destiny was in the 
hands of the South.  
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis Barcelona was an error, because it continued along a 
path of North-South dialogue as it arose after decolo-
nisation - that is, dialogue based on an unequal rela-
tionship where one decides and the other receives. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis (...) the Union for the Mediterranean is a political 
project because it is one of that entails political will, 
without which nothing is possible, and it is a project 
that will allow the Mediterranean to shake off all that 
is keeping it from looking to the future 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis Barcelona was the North helping the South, but Bar-




(CC) Expression – associative/dissociative 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg In 1995, through a major political initiative and 
by common agreement, we decided to combine 
our efforts to help the spirit of solidarity and 




16.03.2007 Berlin We all face the same problems: multiple risks 
and the potential for international conflict, such 
as the crisis in the Middle East, the threat of 
terrorism, the challenges of climate change and 
concerns about the security of energy supplies. 
These problems require urgent responses which 










(CC) Expression – the “other” 
Dr. Her-
bert Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Libya for its part has not been forgotten. Lybia is an integral 
part of the Med, it is considered to be a natural partner in the 








Hay un amplio consenso en el mundo árabe sobre la necesidad 
de intensificar el paso a la modernidad y adaptar gradualmente 
los marcos legales y las practicas administrativas a las necesi-




23.10.2007 Tangiers It is Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not the civilisa-
tions and religions will wage the most terrible of wars. Mediter-
raneans who will decide whether or not the North and South are 
going to clash, Mediterraneans who will decide whether or not 
terrorism and fundamentalism will succeed in imposing on the 
world their violence and intolerance 
 
 




junio de 2005 revista "af-
kar/ideas" 
La connexión con el Mediterráneo es evidente porque se 




04.10.2007 Portugal Mil vezes se disse e se dirá que o Mediterrâneo é fronteira 
entre a Europa e o Continente Africano e pode ser uma 
ponte se conseguirmos uma cooperação global e solidária, 
consolidada através de parcerias 
Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers It' there that everything will be won or everything lost 
Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis What is at stake in the Mediterranean is the survival of a 
certain vision of the human person, a vision that remains 
alive in the hearts and souls of all those living on the shores 
of the Mediterranean sea, and who cannot help but share 
the same dream of unity for the past 15 centuries 
Nicolas 
Sarkozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis We know that this Mediterranean unity, this friendship and 
fraternity between the Mediterranean people, will not be 
achieved by conquest, nor by crusade 
 
 








El Proceso de Barcelona puso en marcha el proceso de 
reforma política y económica en la región, pero los dere-
chos humanos deben todavía ser respetados plenamente en 








CC – PURPOSE 
(CC) Purpose - purpose 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta (…)there is a need for rapid progress in the negotia-
tions of the Association Agreements. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta It is important to encourage Med. Partners to reinforce 
their mutual relations. Strengthening intra-regional 
trade and regional cooperation, especially in key areas 
such as industry, transport, energy, environment, tele-
communication etc is important. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta We have to continue our work in a balanced way in all 
three dimensions of the Barcelona Declaration to attain 
the objective of peace, stability and prosperity. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta We should concentrate our efforts to develop new 




2 July 2003 Strasbourg (…)cultivate the European dialogue(…) 
Silvio Berlus-
coni 
2 July 2003 Strasbourg (…)during this Presidency as a mark of a constant 
commitment to dialogue between Europe and the 
countries of the Mediterranean seaboard. 
Jean Assel-
born 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg Our common ambition was to identify together the 
great political, economic and social challenges faced 




junio de 2005 revista "af-
kar/ideas" 
Creo que el Mediterráneo encarna, mejor que ninguna 
otra zona en el mundo, los riesgos inherentes a un 
conflicto de civilizaciones y, al mismo tiempo, las 
enormes potencialidades de una Alianza. 
Zapatero & 
Blair 
28.11.2005 El País [Cumbre 2005] Es vital que tengamos éxito. 
Zapatero & 
Blair 
28.11.2005 El País Afrontamos retos compartidos y nuevas amenazas. 
Zapatero & 
Blair 
28.11.2005 periódico El 
País 
Subrayaremos los progresos realizados en la última 
década, que hacen que Europa ahora mire más hacia 
fuera y reconoceremos que todos ganamos con una 




28.11.2005 periódico El 
País 
[E/GB] Pero debemos hacer más rápidamente. 
Zapatero & 
Blair 
28.11.2005 periódico El 
País 
La brecha la prosperidad entre la UE y sus vecinos del 
sur -de las más intensas del mundo- no ha disminuido 
sino aumentado, lo que alimenta la frustración y emi-
gración del sur. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers To all Mediterranean (...) I want to say that the time 
has come to move from dialogue to politics, that the 




23.10.2007 Tangiers Since it's in the Mediterranean that Europe will secure 
its prosperity, ensure ist security, that it will regain the 
momentum given it by its founding fathers 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis When Europe launched the Euro-Mediterranean dia-
logue in 1995, in Barcelona, it wanted to demonstrate 
its interest in a South that it had neglected for too long 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis And quite frankly, the Mediterranean has never been at 
the centre of Europe's concerns to this extent 
Silvio Berlus-
coni 
2 July 2003 Strasbourg Establishing conditions for international security today 
represents a key task for countries sharing a system of 





23.10.2007 Tangiers It's not only our political, but our moral responsibility 
to take up this challenge which so many people, even a 
short time ago, still deemed impossible, unreasonable, 
and which so many people around the Mediterranean 
are now ready to commit to 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers But with a single goal: to make the Mediterranean the 
world's largest testing ground for co-development 
where development is decided on together and man-
aged together, where freedom of movement of people 
is built together and managed together, and where 
security is organized together and guaranteed together 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis Let us make this great Mediterranean dream our 
dream, one that has waited centuries for a youth wor-




30.04.2008 Tunis And I promise you this: that if this Union for the 
Mediterranean becomes a reality, this union will 
change the world 
 
 
(CC) Purpose – aim 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta (…)to promote long-term stability through economic 
development and liberalisation. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta The economic partnership should be mutual beneficial. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta The Euro-Mediterranean partnership should define its role 
in relation to them for better coordination and for avoid-
ing duplication of activities. 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin We remain committed to expanding and strengthening the 





Malta We have no other option than to do our best - or at least, 
what we consider to be our best - to improve the prevail-
ing situation in the interest of all of us 
José Magal-
hães 
04.10.2007 Portugal Devemos fazar este debate de forma objetiva e sem núme-
ros inventados, jogados na arena pública para excitar 
medos e provocar conflito artificiais 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers We will build the Mediterranean Union, as Europe's un-
ion was build, on the basis of political determination 
stronger than the memory of suffering, on the basis of the 
conviction that the future counts for more than the past. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers It means taking history from the point it's reached and 
continuing it, instead of forever going back over it 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers Let's forge between us ever-closer practical solidarity on 




23.10.2007 Tangiers The Mediterranean Union must be pragmatic: it will be a 
union embracing variable geometry, with members join-
ing together on projects and when they wish 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis [Sarkozy] I expressed my conviction that this union could 
only succeed if it was founded on a true partnership with 






CC – IDENTITY 
(CC) Identity – EU 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta The EMP reflects a desire to redress a marked imbalance 
in the allocation of resources between Eastern European 
and the Southern Mediterranean countries. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Now all EU member states have become fully aware that 
the Mediterranean region as a single geopolitical entity is 
too important to be neglected. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta [A] Austria sees its Southern Mediterranean partners as 




13. Nov 98 Malta To the EU the whole Mediterranean Area matters and 
there is no EU-fragmentation policy. By no means a fault-




13. Nov 98 Malta [A] I think the Austrian Presidency has made it clear that 
Europe as a whole - not just the southern parts of Europe- 
stands firm behind the Euro-med Partnership. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta [A] Austria is the first EU-Presidency of a "Northern" 




13. Nov 98 Malta [Intern] Germany will follow that line by holding the 
Barcelona III Conference during its Presidency in Stutt-
gart in April 1999. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta There also needs to be a greater emphasis on the output of 
initiatives and on how this is measured. The Commission 
should also offer more detailed information on its own 
activities in the framework of the Euro-med process to the 
Euro-med Committee. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta We hope to be able to do our share in consolidating the 
Partnership during our Presidency. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta The high priority of this area is also reflected in the fact 
that the EU is elaborating a common strategy for the 
Mediterranean as it is for some other priority areas. This 
is an internal exercise of the EU which will hopefully 
make the EU's approach to the Euro-Mediterranean coop-
eration in the future more 
Silvio Berlus-
coni 
2 July 2003 Strasbourg [I] Italy will therefore do everything in its power and 
everything it feels is right to provide this Parliament, the 
Commission and the governments in the European Coun-
cil with the environment most conducive to taking in-




2 July 2003 Strasbourg [I] If the world calls for Europe to act authoritatively in 
tackling today's major challenges -the fight against terror-
ism, the reduction of inequalities and imbalances, world 
economic recovery- it is our duty to respond with a Union 
which can act decisively and therefore exert influence, a 
Union whose decisions can betaken loud and clear on the 
basis of a clear grasp of the common interest and com-




2 July 2003 Strasbourg [Intern] In the Commission, and its President Romano 
Prodi, we see the essential link ensuring continuity in the 
administration and day-to-day coordination of our institu-
tional system. And the European Council, whether in 
imparting fresh impetus into the plan for growth based on 
large-scale investment in civil infrastructure, or engaged 
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in the constitutional opportunity of the forthcoming Inter-
governmental Conference, will be the forum in which this 
Union Presidency, which falls to Italy, will seek to define 
a bold but not a reckless agreement on the major issues of 
institutional arrangements, the extension of qualified 
majority voting, the limits of the common foreign and 
security policy, and the European judicial area. 
Silvio Berlus-
coni 
2 July 2003 Strasbourg Our Union has become much stouter, and weighed down 
with responsibilities and duties towards its partners and 





Malta [D]When we first circulated our program, we were con-
fronted with suspicion by some of our Euromed-partners. 
There was doubt whether Germany would attach enough 
importance to the Mediterranean region. rumours had it 
that the German Presidency would turn its back to Eu-





Malta [D] Germany is convinced that the potential of the Barce-
lona Process is high. At the same time - we think - this 
potential has not been exploit accordingly 
José Magal-
hães 
04.10.2007 Portugal [P] Foi nessa sede que soaram as primeiras vozes a favor 
de projectos de gestão commum das migrações no Medi-
terrâneo, assentes na união de edforços tanto para regular 
tanta a imigração legal, como para enfrentar a realidade 
da imigração ilegal 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] For France, the Mediterranean Union is quite different 
from the Euro-Mediterranean process; it will not be built 
to the detriment of either Africa or Europe. It will be built 
with them, with Europe and with Africa 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] For France, the Mediterranean Union's remit is not to 
take the place of all the already existing initiatives and 




23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] In the name of France (...) I invite all the heads of 
States and government of the Mediterranean rim countries 
to meet in France in June 2008 to lay the foundations of a 
political, economic and cultural union founded on the 
principle of strict equality between the nations bordering 
the same sea: the Mediterranean Union.  
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] I invite all States which don't border the Mediterra-
nean but are concerned by what is happening to it, to 
participate, as observers, in this first summit and contrib-
ute to its success. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] This Mediterranean Union won't be France's project. 
It will be everyone's project. Developed by everyone. It 
will succeed only if everyone commits to it and makes 
their own individual contribution 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers [F] Since Europe's future - I have no hesitation in saying - 
is in the South. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis For too long Europe believed that its future lay in the 
North or the East, and this was a mistake. 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis [F] France therefore proposed the idea of a union between 
all nations in the Mediterranean, founded on equal rights 
and equal responsibilities. This is the difference 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis In Rome, this intiative has become a common one for 
Italy, Spain and France. A major debate was launched 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
30.04.2008 Tunis This debate was first needed between France and Ger-
many. We reached out to one another and made an 
agreement. And finally, we arrived at a sharing responsi-
bilities with a Union for the Mediterranean that will be 
headed by a rotating co-presidency exercised simul-
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taneaously by a country from the northern shore and a 
country from the southern shore, who together will incar-
nate the general interest of the Union for the Mediterra-
nean 
Anita Pipan 16.06.2008  The EU is based on values of democracy and human 
rights. It proposes these values also in its foreign policy 
and external action as it believes that the promotion and 
protection of human rights is the cornerstone of peace and 
security and sustainable development 
Anita Pipan 16.06.2008  [SLO]Intercultural dialogue is one of the priorities of the 
Slovenian Presidency. Just a week ago there was solemn 
inauguration of a Euro-Mediterranean university with its 
seat in Slovenia. It was originally Slovenian idea, now 
enthusiastically endorsed by all Euromed partners. 
Robin Cook 3rd- 4th June 
1998 




13. Nov 98 Malta As a reaction to the EU's involvement in Eastern Europe 
the Southern European countries demanded the recogni-
tion of their strategic and economic interests in the south. 
Moreover, poor economic performance of some Med 
countries has gradually raised concern in the EU. 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to 
engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. 
However, we can - and must - support and promote this 
desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assis-





Malta We are obliged to succeed 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would 
cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and 
spiritual sources, but also from its future 
Robin Cook 3rd- 4th June 
1998 




13. Nov 98 Malta As a reaction to the EU's involvement in Eastern Europe 
the Southern European countries demanded the recogni-
tion of their strategic and economic interests in the south. 
Moreover, poor economic performance of some Med 
countries has gradually raised concern in the EU. 
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin We cannot replace the desire of the conflicting parties to 
engage in dialogue, nor can we issue an order for peace. 
However, we can - and must - support and promote this 
desire to engage in dialogue and give the parties assis-





Malta We are obliged to succeed 
Nicolas Sar-
kozy 
23.10.2007 Tangiers By turning its back on the Mediterranean, Europe would 
cut itself off not only from its intellectual, moral and 
spiritual sources, but also from its future 
 
 
(CC) Identity – role 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta [MMPOL] It is clear therefore that although Russia and 
the US wanted to be included they are not. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta The time of a strengthened EMP is the moment to be-
come less paternalistic on the EU-side. We should not 
dominate the EMP, but move to a genuine partnership 





13. Nov 98 Malta We should not be shy to discuss terrorism, agriculture 
problems, migration and excessive population growth, 
even the dept issue. We must further develop a genuine 
spirit of partnership. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Some partnership countries believe that the EU is more 
interested in stemming the influx of economic migrants, 
terrorists as well as the shipping of drugs across the 
Mediterranean to Europe, than in promoting the region's 




13. Nov 98 Malta The EU has to take and takes on responsibility for its 
neighbouring countries, since this is the very essence of 
it's raison d'etre which is first of all a political one, to 
create a zone of peace and stability as big as possible. 
Dr. Herbert 
Kröll 
13. Nov 98 Malta Progress with EU-enlargement towards the East will 
most likely bring more process in the South too. 
Liisa Valjento November 19-
22, 1999 
Malta [Fin] Even if Finland is situated geographically far 
away from the Mediterranean, the border of the Medi-
terranean is our common border and we are convinced 




2 July 2003 Strasbourg [I] Europe can be coured of its Hamlet syndrome and 
wholeheartedly decide to become an active player on 
the world stage.; it can acquire the diplomatic, eco-
nomic and military means to fulfil that role convinc-
ingly, without calling into question its autonomy, its 
roots or the freedom-giving structures defended oder the 
years in the framework of its Western alliances. 
Silvio Berlusco-
ni 
2 July 2003 Strasbourg The European Union is also a factor of international 
stability and its responsibility in this respect starts at its 
immediate borders and depends on its capacity to be-
come involved in increasingly advanced forms of coop-
eration with neighbouring countries.  
Frank- Walter 
Steinmeier 
16.03.2007 Berlin It is essential that we succeed in making people under-
stand that we cannot solve the key issues of the future 
by cutting ourselves off from each other, but only by 
interacting with each other 
Nicolas Sarkozy 23.10.2007 Tangiers Europe set off on the path of peace and fratemity 
Nicolas Sarkozy 30.04.2008 Tunis This union will not come about through domination. It 
will not come about by force, nor by violence. This 
union that we need, we Tunisians and French alike, just 
like all the people of the Mediterranean, this union will 
only come about with comprehension, with respect, 
with solidarity 
Nicolas Sarkozy 30.04.2008 Tunis Instead of imposing, let us propose. Instead of getting 





AUSTRIA - EXPRESSION 
(A) Expression – the other 
Der Standard 27.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Daß sie trotz solcher Bedenken nach Barcelona kamen, 
liegt an der ausgelobten Prämie:(…) 
 
(A) Expression – associative/dissociative 
Der Standard 28.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Wichtige Streitpunkte waren die Forderung nordafrikani-
scher Länder, die Garantie demokratischer Freiheiten von 
deren "legitimen Ausübung" abhängig zu machen (für die 
EU unakzeptabel), sowie der Wunsch des Südens, die 
kommende Freihandelszone solle auch Agrarprodukte bein-
halten. 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Ägypten, das eben so ein Abkommen aushandelt, wehrte 
sich gegen den EU-Vorschlag, Agrarprodukte vom Frei-
handel auszunehmen. 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Hinter den solemnen Erklärungen, in denen die Außenmi-
nister der Europäischen Union ihren armen Mediterranen 
Nachbarn in Barcelona ein Meer des Friedens und der 
Prosperität verhießen,(…) 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Beide Seiten sind am Erfolg interessiert. Der Süden will auf 
die angebotenen Gelder nicht verzichten, der Norden hofft 
auf mehr Stabilität. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Das langfristige Ziel, bis 2010 eine mediterrane Freihan-
delszone zu schaffen, erscheint da noch vergleichsweise 
leicht zu erreichen. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Viel schwieriger dürfte die Einigung auf mehr Kooperation 
bei der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus werden, denn schon 
auf eine gemeinsame Definition des Begriffs kann man sich 
nicht einigen. Auch bei der Regelung der Migrationsströme 
sind die Interessen von Süd und Nord nicht völlig parallel. 
Der Standard 11.03.2008 Michael Mora-
vec 
Neben Österreich und Deutschland haben sich auch arabi-
sche Staaten gegen diese Union ausgesprochen. 
SN 28.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, 
AFP) 
Insbesondere Ägypten und Syrien drängten nach Angaben 
von Diplomaten darauf, daß der Wegfall der Handels-
hemmnisse bei der Einrichtung der geplanten Freihandels-
zone im Jahr 2010 auch für landwirtschaftliche Produkte 
gelten müsse. Arabische Delegationen waren mit dem For-
mulierungsvorschlag über die Terrorismusbekämpfung 
nicht einverstanden, weil er das Recht der Palästinenser auf 
Selbstbestimmung und auf die Fortsetzung des Kampfes für 
einen eigenen Palästinenserstaat nicht garantiere. 
SN 17.04.1997 Roman Arens Der syrische Außenminister al-Shara nehm kein Blatt vor 
den Mund: Ein Zusammenbruch des Friedensprozesses im 
Nahen Osten werde wahrscheinlich den "Barcelona-Prozeß" 
zusammenbrechen lassen. Bei der Partnerschaft rund ums 
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Mittelmeer hielt er sich jedenfalls nicht auf; er forderte statt 
dessen den israelischen Rückzug von den Golan-Höhen, aus 
dem Südlibanon und den besetzten palästinensischen Ge-
bieten, einschließlich Jerusalems. 
SN 17.04.1997 Roman Arens Mit der Begründung, "etwas mit nach Hause bringen zu 
müssen", verlangten arabische Außenminister in der Schlu-
ßerklärung von Malta einen Zusatz, daß einseitige Initiati-
ven zur Verletzung internationaler Abmachungen unterlas-
sen werden sollten. Die Betreiber dieser Ergänzung wun-
derten sich sehr darüber, daß EU-Länder dies zwar auch 
sagten, aber nicht in der Erklärung haben wollten. Es wurde 
dann lange darüber verhandelt, ob es überhaupt ein Schluß-
dokument geben solle. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
28.11.2005 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
Die Terrorsorgen scheinen zehn Jahre nach Beginn der 
ersten Mittelmeer-Konferenz ("Barcelona-Prozess") kei-
neswegs geringer geworden zu sein. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
28.11.2005 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
(…) Streit um eine gemeinsame Definition des Terrors (…). 
Die Europäer wollen diese Unterscheidung zwischen "guten 
und schlechten Terroristen", wie es ein EU-Diplomat nann-
te, nicht hinnehmen. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
29.11.2005 Dieter Eberling 
(SN, dpa) 
Doch dann drohte der Gipfel an altem Streit und neuem 
Zank zu scheitern. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
Dennoch wird der Wohlstandsgraben zwischen Europa und 
Afrika immer größer. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
26.05.2008 Gerald Stoiber 
(SN) 
Eine gemeinsame Linie ist bei 27 EU-Staaten schon oft 
recht schwierig, duch die Hereinnahme der Anrainerstaaten 
des Mittelmeers wird sie wohl nicht einfacher. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
26.05.2008 Gerald Stoiber 
(SN) 
"Konflikte werden durch Projekte nicht behoben. Das war 
ja leider beim Barcelona-Prozess schon so", räumte Ferre-
ro-Waldner bei der Präsentation des Konzepts im EU-
Parlament ein. Sie hofft aber, dass durch die Verwirkli-




14.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Dabei türmen sich zahlreiche neue Hindernisse auf. Einer-
seits ist das Interesse an der Mittelmeerunion im Inneren 
der EU sehr durchwachsen bis gering. (…) Andererseits ist 
unübersehbar, dass es die neue Organisation auf der südli-
chen Mittelmeerseite mit Partnern zu tun hat, von denen 
viele weder demokratisch gewählt noch repräsentativ für 
ihre Länder sind und ihre politischen, gewerkschaftlichen 
und menschenrechtlichen Gegner eher hinter Gitter bringen, 
als mit ihnen Gespräche zu führen. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn 
(SN) 
Fast alle, die Nicolas Sarkozy eingeladen hat, sind gekom-
men und zeigen sich gut gelaunt. (…) Bloß Libyens Gadda-
fi lässt den französischen Präsidenten abblitzen. Für ihn ist 
die Mittelmeerunion ein "schauderliches Vorhaben". Ma-
rokkos Könik Hassan VI., gewöhnlich ein treuer Verbünde-
ter von Paris, hat plötzlich "Terminschwierigkeiten" und 
schickt seinen Bruder nach Paris. 
Die Presse 28.11.1995 Andreas 
Schwarz (as) 
Wie es hieß, gab es bei den Vorbereitungsgesprächen für 
die am Dienstag zu verabschiedende Erklärung am Wo-
chenende weiterhin Differenzen über die Definition von 
Terrorismus. 
! 321 
Die Presse 29.11.1995 Peter Krotky 
(kro) 
Trotz Differenzen (…) ist am Dienstag eine Schlußerklä-
rung unterzeichnet worden, (…) 
Die Presse 29.11.1995 Peter Krotky 
(kro) 
Barak und PLO-Chef Jassir Arafat betonten, sie seien ent-
schlossen, den Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten fortzuset-
zen. Die in Barcelona vereinbarten Schritte sollten "in vol-
lem Umfang umgesetzt" werden. Einen Erfolg gab es auch 
in den Beziehungen zwischen Israel und Mauretanien, die 
einander anerkannten. 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus Denn die wahre Gefahr der Massenimmigration droht der 
Union nicht von ihrem östlichen, sondern von ihrem südli-
chen Rand, wo das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen gerade ein 
Zwölftel des EU-Durchschnitts beträgt - und diese Schere 
geht stetig weiter auf. 
Die Presse 14.07.2008 (…) gerieten einander Israel und die Palästinenser in die Haare. Es spießte 
sich im Text an dem Wort "Nationalstaat" im Zusammenhang mit Israel. Dies 




(A) Expression -MMR 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze (SN) Dort, wo zwei Zivilisationen zusammenstoßen, das 
reiche Europa und das verleichsweise arme Nordafrika, 
Christentum und Islam, müsse gemeinsam für den 
Frieden gearbeitet werden. 
Die Presse! 17.03.2004! Anneliese Rohrer! Die südliche Mittelmeerregion hat sich - seit 1999 auch 
mit starker finanzieller Hilfe Saudiarabiens - trotz (oder 
wegen) aller Repression der Regime dort zum Anzie-
hungspunkt für potentielle Terroristen entwickelt.!
Die Presse! 17.03.2004! Anneliese Rohrer! Mit Blick auf ein Europa.!
Die Presse! 29.11.2005! Ralph Schulze ! Das Mittelmeer wird immer mehr zu einer Grenze 
zwischen der armen und der reichen Welt.!
Die Presse! 29.11.2005! Ralph Schulze ! "Das Mittelmeer ist heute weltweit die größte Grenze 




14.07.2008! Dorothea Hahn! [Ohne Einbeziehen der Demokratie] Andernfalls bleibt 
sie ein Club zum geschäftlichen und polizeilichen Aus-
tausch zwischen Nord und Süd. Mit vielen Diktatoren. 
Und ohne Menschenrechte und Demokratie.!
 
 
(A) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
Der Standard 27.11.1995 Erhard Stackl (…) ein "großer politischer Impuls" vom Kaliber der 
Helsinki-Konferenz 1975,(…) 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Trotzdem bietet der in Barcelona eingeleitete Prozess 
ähnlich große Chancen, wie sie die Helsinki-
Konferenzen für Osteuropa hatten. 
Der Standard 18.10.1999 Samuel Adams [George Joffe] Der 1995 begonnene "Barcelona-Prozess" 
diene lediglich dazu, die nordafrikanischen Länder von 
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der EU abzuschotten. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn [Gunnar Wiegand, der Sprecher von EU-Außenkom-
missar Chris Patten] "Es ist eine der Haupterrungen-
schaften des Barcelona-Prozesses, dass er seit 1995 noch 
jede Nahost-Kriese überstanden hat" 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn (…) Barcelona-Prozess (…) ein vielversprechendes In-
strument: Wer die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, den 
Aufbau einer Zivilgesellschaft und den demokratischen 
Austausch fördert, schützt nicht nur sich selbst vor Strö-
men von Immigranten aus dem südlichen Mittelmeer-
raum. Er bringt vielleicht auch seine Partner untereinan-
der näher - längerfristig sogar mit Israel. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Vieles geht nur zäh voran im Barcelona-Prozess. 
Der Standard 14.03.2008 (as, pra) (…)um einen Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Bar-
celona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen 
Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben, (…) 
Der Standard 14.03.2008 (as, pra) Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angel-
punkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben. 
derStandart.at 11.07.2008 Stefan Brändle (…) diplomatischen "Club Méditerranée" 
derStandart.at 11.07.2008 Stefan Brändle Die mediterranen Völker des Mittelmeeres sollen, wie er 
vollmundig erklärt, einen "Traum von Frieden und Zivi-
lisation" verwirklichen. 
derStandart.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle, 
Michael Mora-
vec 
Die Mittelmeerunion sei eine wichtige Initiative an einer 
"überaus sensible Schnittstelle" der Weltpolitik, (…) 
derStandart.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle, 
Michael Mora-
vec 
(…) Plassnik nannte die Mittelmeerunion einen "Vita-
minstoß" für die Region rund um das Mittelmeer. 
SN 29.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, 
AFP, dpa) 
Dennoch ist die EU zuversichtlich, daß die in Barcelona 
erzielte "Einbindung" den Menschen an der Südflanke 
bessere wirtschaftliche Perspektive bieten kann. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
Ob die "Mittelmeerunion" als eigenständiger Zusammen-
schluss überhaupt notwendig ist, muss sich freilich erst 
noch erweisen. Immerhin sind dank des 1995 begonne-
nen "Barcelona-Prozesses" der EU bereits zahlreiche 
Bande über das Meer geknüpft worden, (…) 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
14.03.2008 (SN-gs) Ursprünglich als exklusiver Club geplant, (…) 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
14.03.2008 (SN-gs) (…) "Barcelona Prozess". Das Programm kam nie richtig 
in Schwung, (…) 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
14.03.2008 (SN-gs) [Plassnik] die Sache gehe nun "in die richtige Richtung", 
weil es "nur eine gemeinsame Mittelmeerpolitik aller 27 
Mitgliedstaaten geben kann". 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
14.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr werden soll, als es der 
"Barcelona-Prozess" war, der 13 Jahre lang ein Schatten-
dasein führte - wenn sie mehr bieten soll als einen ehe-
maligen großen und internationalen Auftrieb, dann be-




18.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn "Frieden" war das meistgenutzte Wort bei der Gründung 
der Mittelmeerunion in Paris. 





13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn 
(SN) 
[Kouchner] "Ein Traum für 800 Millionen Menschen 
wird wahr." 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 Andreas 
Schwarz (as) 
Der Gipfel in Barcelona hingegen wird nichts an den 
"Meinungsunterschieden" einiger Teilnehmer in Sachen 
Menschenrechte ändern; er wird nicht einen Beistrich im 
Bereich Nahost-Sicherheit weiterbringen; er wird nicht 
einen Schritt in Richtung angeblich angestrebter "Frei-
handelszone" setzen; und was den Brückenschlag betrifft 
- etwa zwischen eine säkularisierten Welt hie und einer, 
in der Verschmelzung von Staat und Religion immer 
drängender wird -, da braucht es Aufklärung und Tole-
ranz mehr als Großkonferenzen, deren Ergebnis nie über 
den sogenannten "atmosphärischen Gewinn" und vorher 
festgeschriebene Schlußerklärungen hinausgeht. 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus [BP], dem Mittelmeer-Projekt der EU 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus (…) braucht der Barcelona-Prozeß aber dringendst Er-
folge, um das Etikett "Mißerfolg" loszuwerden. 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus "Die Barceloa-Erklärung wurde zu einem Zeitpunkt 
unterschrieben, als alle voller Hoffnung für den Frie-
densprozeß waren. Heute könnten wir sie nicht mehr 
abschließen. Weder die Araber noch Israel würden sie 
mittragen." 
Die Presse 17.03.2004 Anneliese Roh-
rer 
Kennen sie den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess? 
Die Presse 17.03.2004 Anneliese Roh-
rer 
Fünf Jahre später wurde er von den EU-Außenministern 
für "tot" erklärt, was diese aber nicht daran hinderte, ihn 
2001 nach den Anschlägen in New York hektisch wieder 
beleben zu wollen. 
Die Presse 29.11.2005 Ralph Schulze  Seit Beginn der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft vor zehn Jah-
ren unter dem Namen "Barcelona-Prozess" ist die wirt-
schaftliche Kluft zwischen beiden Seiten des Meeres 
gewachsen. 
Die Presse 29.11.2005 Ralph Schulze  Trotzdem sprechen die Diplomaten nicht von einem 
Scheitern des Barcelona-Prozesses: Ohne die angescho-
bene Partnerschaft zwischen den beiden Regionen, die ja 
nun weiter mit wirtschaftlicher und politischer Hilfe 
ausgebaut werden soll, "wäre die Situation wohl noch 
schlimmer". 
Die Presse 17.02.2006 Thomas Seifert Der "Barcelona-Prozess" - die engere Anbindung Nord-
afrikas an die EU - wurde von Plassnik als ein Ansatz 
genannt, (…) 
Die Presse 04.03.2008 Thomas Viereg-
ge 
[Merkel] "Das Kind soll Mittelmeerunion gennant wer-
den." 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) Doch der Barcelona-Prozess müsse "Dreh- und Angel-
punkt" der Mittelmeer-Politik der 27 bleiben. 
Die Presse 14.03.2008 (APA) "Wir ersetzen keineswegs den Barcelona-Prozess, wir 
erweitern ihn nur", sagte Jansa. 
Die Presse 15.03.2008 Regina Pöll "Es ist ein Upgrade des Barcelona-Prozesses", so beur-
teilte der slowenische EU-Präsident Janez Jansa die neue 
Mittelmeer-Union. 
Die Presse 15.03.2008 Regina Pöll Der Barcelona-Prozess war in den Vorjahren ins Stocken 
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geraten, die geplante Freihandelszone ist nie Wirklichkeit 
geworden. 
Die Presse 15.03.2008 Regina Pöll Ist die Mittelmeer-Union nur eine behübschte Version 
des Barcelona-Prozesses? 
Die Presse 11.07.2008 Rudolf Balmer Als "großen Traum, der in der Lage ist, die Welt zu be-
wegen", hatte der neugewählte Präsident Sarkozy seine 
Idee bezeichnet, (…) 
Die Presse 11.07.2008 Rudolf Balmer (…), dass seine "Mittelmeerunion" zu einer bloßen Neu-




AUSTRIAN – PURPOSE 
(A) Purpose – purpose 
Der Standard 27.11.1995 Erhard Stackl In Barcelona wird es nicht laut gesagt, aber dem reichen 
Norden geht es darum, Barrieren gegen eine Flut von 
Einwanderern zu errichten. 
Der Standard 28.02.2002 Jörg Wojahn [BP] Sein Ziel ist, die wirtschaftliche - und politische - 
Entwicklung in den südlichen Mitelmeeranrainerstaaten 
zu fördern - nicht zuletzt auch aus Angst vor Migrati-
onsströmen aus der Region in Richtung Norden. 
Der Standard 11.03.2008 Michael Moravec (…) Barcelona Prozess (…), zu dessen vorrangigen Zie-
len die Bekämpfung von illegaler Zuwanderung, Terro-
rismus und Kriminalität sowie die Förderung der wirt-
schaftlichen Entwicklung in den Partnerländern zählen. 
SN 28.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, AFP) Der spanische König Juan Carlos sagte zur Eröffnung der 
zweitägigen Beratungen, er sei überzeugt, daß mit dem 
Treffen eine entscheidene Aufgabe im Interesse der künf-
tigen Generationen angepackt werde: die Einheit des 
Mittelmeer-Raumes. 
SN 29.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, AFP, 
dpa) 
Damit könnte die Massenemigration gestoppt und dem 
militanten islamischen Fundamentalismus auf Dauer der 
Nährboden entzogen werden. 
SN 05.04.1997 Barbara Egger In Barcelona wurde eine dreifache Partnerschaft - poli-
tisch, wirtschaftlich und sozial - als Ziel formuliert. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
(…) und es gelte, Kriege zu verhindern. 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 Andreas Schwarz 
(as) 
Jetzt also Barcelona, wo sich die Staaten der Europäi-
schen Union mit (nicht allen) Mitelmeeranrainern treffen, 
um Einigkeit über Sicherheit, Stabilität und Wirtschaft zu 
demonstrieren und nebsther den kulturellen Brücken-
schlag wie einen Klacks aussehen zu lassen. 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 tau Der Norden setzt den Akzent dafür auf die wirtschaftli-
chen Aspekte des Treffens: Bis zum Jahr 2010 soll ein 
Freihandelsabkommen die Grenzen der Mittelmeerstaaten 
für intensiven Austausch öffnen. Daraus soll dann die 
Entwicklung des Südens folgen, die der Flut von Ein-










Die Presse 17.03.2004 Anneliese Rohrer (…) hätte (…) mehr Demokratie, Pluralismus, bessere 




(A) Purpose –aim 
Der Standard 27.11.1995 Erhard Stackl (…), soll ebenfalls einen Prozeß einleiten, der bis zum 
Jahr 2010 eine Euro-Med-Freihandelszone mit 800 Milli-
onen Einwohnern bringen soll. 
Der Standard 28.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Das Treffen begann exakt 900 Jahre nach dem Tag, an 
dem Papst Urban II. zum ersten Kreuzzug aufrief, sagte 
der für den Mittelmeerraum zuständige EU-Kommissar 
Manuel Marini. Damals sei eine lange Geschichte von 
Intoleranz, Unverständnis und Konflikten die Folge ge-
wesen. Die EU-Mittelmeerkonferenz solle dagegen einen 
Friedensprozeß auslösen. 
Der Standard 28.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Hauptziel ist die ökonomische Stabilisierung der armen 
Länder, um einen Massenexodus zu verhindern. 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Bis zum Jahr 2010 ist die Schaffung einer euro-
mediterranen Freihandelszone geplant. Unabhängig da-
von sollen mit den 12 eingeladenen Ländern EU-
Assoziierungsverträge abgeschlossen werden. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Ihr Projekt der Euromed-Kooperation soll wirtschaftlich, 
sozial, kulturell und damit auf lange Sicht auch politisch 
in den Staaten südlich des Mittelmeeres manches zum 
Besseren verändern. 
derStandard.at 21.05.2008 Michael Mora-
vec 
Die (…) Mittelmeer-Union hat ehrgeizige Pläne. Eine 
Autobahn von Marokko bis Ägypten zählt ebenso dazu 
wie die ökologische Sanierung des Mittelmeers, (…) 
SN 28.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, 
AFP) 
(…) u. a. eine europäische Finanzhilfe von mehr als 60 
Mrd. S, die Schaffung einer gemeinsamen Freihandelszo-
ne bis zum Jahr 2010 und ein dauerhafter politischer 
Dialog. 
SN 29.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, 
AFP, dpa) 
(…) Verabschiedung einer Deklaration zur Förderung 
von Frieden und Wohlstand sowie des Planes der Errich-
tung einer Freihandelszone bis zum Jahr 2010 (…)  
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
26.05.2008 Gerald Stoiber 
(SN) 
Die Pläne der "Union für das Mittelmeer", (…), sind 
gewaltig. Nicht weniger als die Sanierung des Mittel-
meers oder eine durchgehende Autobahn quer durch 
Norafrika zählen zur Liste der möglichen Projekte. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn 
(SN) 
Der "Traum" sieht vor, dass die Anrainerstaaten sich 
gemeinsam um die "Entgiftung" des Meeres kümmern 
werden, dass sie ihre unternehmerische Zusammenarbeit 
intensivieren und dass sie gemeinsam gegen die ver-
meintlich größten Gefahren für die Innere Sicherheit 
kämpfen werden: unkontrollierte Migration, Drogenhan-
del und Terrorismus. 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) (…), sein ein Versuch, den ins Stocken geratenen "Barce-
lona-Prozess" zwischen der EU und den südlichen Mit-
telmeer-Anrainerstaaten neu zu beleben. 
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AUSTRIA - IDENTITY 
(A) Identity – Rolle 
derStandart.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle, 
Michael Mora-
vec 
Die Union gäbe nur Leitlinien für die Wirtschaft vor. 
SN 05.04.1997 Barbara Egger Die EU darf nicht länger ignorieren, daß jenseits des 
Mittelmeers eine "Zeitbombe" tickt. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
14.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Doch Fortschritt kann immer nur in Kombination mit 
Demokratie funktionieren. Deswegen muss die Mittel-
meerunion darauf bestehen, die Zivilgesellschaften im 
Süden zu stärken und in den Prozess einzubeziehen. 
 
 
(A) Identity - EU 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Europa setzt dem die Vision eines gemeinsamen Wirt-
schaftsraumes für 800 Millionen Verbraucher entgegen. 
Der Standard 29.11.1995 Erhard Stackl Wenn das Projekt keine Fata Morgana bleiben soll, muß 
die EU aber auch bereit sein, ihre Märkte für den Süden 
zu öffnen. Und sie muss darauf achten, daß es Stabilität 
letztlich nur dort gibt, wo die Rechte und Freiheiten des 
Individuums gewährleistet sind. 
Der Standard 18.10.1999 Samuel Adams Es drohe zwar keine militärische Gefahr, doch die Ver-
hältnisse in den Staaten des Mittelmeerraumes seien von 
großer Bedeutung für die innere Sicherheit Europas. 
Immerhin sei Europa von den Rohstofflieferungen der 
südlichen Nachbarn abhängig. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Dennoch bangen die Spanier, die 1995 in Barcelona das 
Projekt der EU-Mittelmeerkooperation auf den Weg 
gebracht hatten, dieses Mal um den Erfolg ihrer Bemü-
hungen. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Bei der EU-Mittelmeerpartnerschaft versuchen sich die 
Europäer in einem Bereich, von dem sie etwas verstehen. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Wandel durch Annäherung heißt das Motto, mehrfach 
erprobt auf dem Alten Kontinent, manchmal erfolgreich. 
Der Standard 22.04.2002 Jörg Wojahn Die EU kann zwischen Israelis und Arabern nicht den 
schnellen Frieden schaffen. Dazu ist sie außenpolitisch 
viel zu schwach -  
Der Standard 24.10.2007 Reuters, red Frankreich will während seiner EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 
im Juli 2008 in Marseille einen Gründungsgipfel der 
Mittelmeer-Union organisieren und damit wohl den so-
genannten Barcelona-Prozess der EU überholen. 
Der Standard 11.03.2008 Michael Mora-
vec 
Österreich stellt sich in der EU gegen die Pläne des fran-
zösischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy,(…) 
Der Standard 11.03.2008 Michael Mora-
vec 
[Ursula Plassnik] "Eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit den 
Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten außerhalb der EU ist sicher 
wünschenswert. Aber um das zu erreichen, hat die EU 
bereits eine Reihe von Instrumenten wie die Nachbar-
schaftspolitik und den Barcelona-Prozess". 
Der Standard 11.03.2008 Michael Mora- Dieser Barcelona-Prozess soll nun nach dem Willen der 
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vec slowenischen Präsidentschaft und vor allem Frankreichs 
in eine Mittelmeer-Union übergehen, wobei aber ziem-
lich unklar ist, welche Rolle hier die EU-Staaten spielen, 
die nicht an das Mittelmeer grenzen. 
Der Standard 14.03.2008 (as, pra) Ein neues Projekt samt neuer Institution wird in der EU 
aus der Taufe gehoben, ohne dass den meisten Mitglied-
staaten der Sinn der Sache klar wäre. 
Der Standard 14.03.2008 (as, pra) Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven 
Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber 




Ferrero-Waldner: Das Wichtigste ist, dass es uns jetzt 
gelungen ist, eine ganz wichtige regionale Initiative mit 
einem neuen politischen Impuls zu versehen. 
derStandard.at 11.07.2008 Stefan Brändle [F] In Wahrheit hegt der 53-jährige Franzose vor allem 
Großmachtträume. Mit der Mittelmeerunion will er sein 
Land international besser positionieren. 
derStandard.at 11.07.2008 Stefan Brändle Die deutsche Kanzlerin setzte durch, dass alle EU-Länder 
teilnehmen können - also sogar Ostseeanrainer wie 
Schweden oder Polen. Die "Mittelmeerunion" musste 
deshalb in "Union für das Mittelmeer" (MFU) umgetauft 
werden. 
derStandard.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle Eines muss man Nicolas Sarkozy lassen: Es ist ihm ge-
lungen, "seine" Mittelmeerunion gegen den Widerstand 
von allen Seiten durchzudrücken. 
derStandard.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle Es geht um Geostrategie und Wirtschaftsinteressen. 
Frankreich, durch die EU-Erweiterung an den Westrand 
des Kontinents gedrängt, soll wieder zu einer zentralen 
Stellung zwischen Europa und dem nordafrikanischen 
Maghreb finden. 
derStandard.at 14.07.2008 Stefan Brändle, 
Michael Mora-
vec 
Eine pompöse Inszenierung, hinter den Kulissen aber viel 
Improvisation: (…) 
SN 24.06.1995 Linde Hermann Spanien will seine historische, kulturelle und sprachliche 
Brückenposition zwischen Europa und Lateinamerika zur 
Verwirklichung seines eigenen Großraumkonzepts wäh-
rend seines EU-Vorsitzes benutzen. 
SN 29.11.1995 (SN, Reuter, 
AFP, dpa) 
Die EU bezahlt ihr vitales Interesse an Stabilität vor der 
Haustür mit einem Milliardentransfer und einer Öffnung 
seiner Märkte. Andererseits sicherte sich die EU verbes-
serten wirtschaftlichen Zugang und laufende Energiever-
sorgung. 
SN 05.04.1997 Barbara Egger Die südeuropäischen EU-Mitglieder warnen davor, dass 
die Union im Hinblick auf die geplante Ost-Erweiterung 
ihre "Südflanke" aus den Augen verlieren könnte. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
29.11.2005 Dieter Eberling 
(SN, dpa) 
Solana zeigte sich "erleichtert, dass der Barcelona-
Prozess konsolidiert worden ist". 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
Im Mittelmeer-Raum, so wirbt Frankreichs Präsident für 




22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
"Mittelmeerunion" heißt das politische Projekt von Nico-
las Sarkozy, dem sich nun in einem gemeinsamen "Auf-
ruf von Rom", der italienische Ministerpräsident Romano 
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Prodi und Spaniens Regierungschef José Luis Zapatero 
angeschlossen haben. Aber dieses Vorhaben löst bei 




22.12.2007 Ralph Schulze 
(SN) 
Die Initiative, so beruhigt Spaniens Ministerpräsident 




14.03.2008 (SN-gs) (…) musste Sarkozy sein Vorhaben besonders auf Druck 
Berlins gewaltig zusammenstreichen. 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
12.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn 
(SN) 
Es wird ein "historischer Erfolg". 
Salzburger 
Nachrichten 
12.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn 
(SN) 
Dazu reicht seiner Ansicht nach bereits die Tatsache, dass 
einander Abgesandte aus 44 Staaten treffen, darunter der 
Präsident von Syrien und der Regierungschef aus Israel - 




14.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Keine Frage: Nicolas Sarkozy hat am Sonntag in Paris 
einen diplomatischen Erfolg davon getragen. Mit dem 
Gründungsgipfel der Mittelmeerunion ist ihm etwas ge-
lungen, was lange unerreichbar zu sein schien: Nachdem 
er die (hohen) Hindernisse innerhalb der Europäischen 
Union überwunden hatte, hat er fast alle Staats- und Re-




18.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Ob der nie zuvor da gewesenen Zahl hochkarätiger Gäste 
auf seiner Ehrentribüne konnte Nicolas Sarkozy den 
Feiertag als Erfolg verbuchen. 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 Andreas 
Schwarz (as) 
Es hat den Anschein, als fänden internationale Großkon-
ferenzen umso häufiger statt, je eindringlicher ihre man-
gelnden Ergebnisse beklagt werden. 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 Andreas 
Schwarz (as) 
Nun ist fraglos das Bemühen Europas, vor allem in Nah-
ost den Wirtschaftsaufbau zu puschen, ein hehres (wenn-
gleich nicht selbstloses), das in kleineren Konferenzen 
weit effizienter vorangebracht wird. 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 tau Für (…) Pariser Professor Kebabdjian aber beweist das 
Konzept nur Ideenarmut: "Es gibt kein europäisches 
Projekt für die armen Völker, die sich an Europas Türen 
drängen." 
Die Presse 27.11.1995 tau Der Austausch mit dem Südrand des Mittelmeeres macht 
vier Prozent des Welthandels aus. Vor allem aber will 
Brüssel die eigenen Bauern schützen und die Landwirt-
schaft des Südens vorläufig aus dem Freihandel aus-
schließen. 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus Das Schlagwort von der "Festung Europa" wird nirgends 
gerne gehört - weder innerhalb der EU noch außerhalb. 
Dennoch aber ist die Angst vor Migrationswellen aus 
armen Nachbarländern die treibende Kraft hinter vielen 
Initiativen der Gemeinschaft - und dies zeigt sich nir-
gends deutlicher als im "Barcelona-Prozeß", (...) 
Die Presse 24.09.1998 Doris Kraus Trotz dieses Vertrauensvorschusses für den Barcelona-
Prozeß macht sich aber auch in EU-Kreisen niemand 
Illusionen über die Wirksamkeit dieses Instruments für 
den Frieden in Nahost. 
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Die Presse 12.06.2002 smo Ein ganz offensichtliches Interesse verfolgt die Europäi-
sche Union freilich mit dem Vorschlag, zu einer "ge-
meinsamen Verantwortung für die Steuerung der Migra-
tionsströme" zu gelangen. Denn die illegale Einwande-
rung aus Nordafrika hatte bereits die derzeitige spanische 
EU-Präsidentschaft dazu bewegt, diese Frage zu einer der 
Prioritäten ihrer Vorsitzperiode zu erheben.  
Die Presse 17.03.2004 Anneliese Roh-
rer 
Dort hat man vergessen, wie viele Menschen darauf hoff-
ten, dass der Barcelona-Prozess in Gang kommt. Hätte 
sich die EU nicht selbst mit ein paar Millionen Euro 
beruhigt, wäre man gegen das Einsickern der Radikalen 
nach Europa entschlossener vorgegangen. 
Die Presse 04.03.2008 Thomas Vier-
egge 
[Sarkozy] "Europa kann sich keine Kluft zwischen 
Deutschland und Frankreich leisten." 
Die Presse 04.03.2008 Thomas Vier-
egge 
[Merkel] "Europa ist komplizierter geworden, und es 
reicht nicht mehr aus, dass Deutschland und Frankreich 
etwas vereinbaren. Aber wenn beide Länder sich nicht 
einig sind, wird es in Europa schwierig, eine Einigung zu 
bekommen." 
Die Presse 04.03.2008 Thomas Vier-
egge 
Merkel setzte sich in der Sache durch, fügte sich aber bei 
der Namensgebung: (…) 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) EU-Kommissionspräsident Barroso sagte: "Wir unter-
stützen die Mittelmeer-Union voll." 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) Bundeskanzler Gusenbauer warnte, die "Union für das 
Mittelmeer" dürfe keine "Separatveranstaltung" werden. 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) [Jean-Claude Juncker] Man müsse sehen, welchen 
Mehrwert eine "Mittelmeer-Union" im Vergleich zum 
bestehenden Barcelona-Prozess in der Zusammenarbeit 
der Mittelmeer-Anrainerstaaten habe. 
Die Presse 13.03.2008 (APA) Sarkozy verfolgte zunächst die Idee eines exklusiven 
Clubs der Mittelmeer-Staaten, was Deutschland aber 
ablehnte, ehe zwischen beiden Staaten ein Kompromiss 
erzielt wurde. 
Die Presse 14.03.2008 (APA) [Sarkozy] "Europa dreht den Mittelmeerländern nicht 
mehr den Rücken zu" 
Die Presse 15.03.2008 Regina Pöll Die Mittelmeer-Union, die er seit dem Vorjahr propa-
giert, wurde endlich von den EU-Partnern abgesegnet. 
Die Presse 21.05.2008 Regina Pöll Der EU-Kommission schweben Großprojekte mit den 
Partnern vor, mit denen die EU schon bisher eher lose 
über den "Barcelona-Prozess" verbunden war: (…) 
Die Presse 11.07.2008 Rudolf Balmer Dass nach langem Hin und Her, Bitten und Mahnen nun 
doch praktisch alle der Einladung Folge leisten wollen, 
darf der Initiator, der gegenwärtige EU-Ratspräsident 





FRANCE – EXPRESSION 
(F) Expression – the other 
Le Monde 30.11.1995 Michel Bole-
Richard et Mou-
na Naim 
S’il est vrai, comme l’a souligné un diplomate algérien, que 
chaque pays du sud et de la Méditerranée voit midi à sa porte 
et cherche à bénéficier au maximum de cette nouvelle coopé-
ration avec l’UE, les États du pourtour méditerranéens n’en 
sont pas moins conscients que leur proximité les places de-
vant des « défis communs ».  
Le Figaro 06.12.2003 Pierre Rousselin Le colonel Khadafi s’est à nouveau distingué en refusant de 
s’exprimer et en étant le seul à ne pas applaudir le discours du 
président Chirac qui venait d’exprimer le souhait de la 
France «  de pouvoir établir une relation de confiance » avec 
la Libye.  
Le Figaro 17.11.2003 Patrick Bele « Notre principal but, pour ne pas dire unique, c’est 
l’intégration à l’Union européenne", affirme Cavit Dagdas, 
secrétaire d’État au Trésor turc.  
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana Certains de nos actuels partenaires ont vocation à rejoindre 
l’Union dans quelques années; Mais tous les États de la rive 




(F) Expression – associative/dissociative 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Florence Beaugé Les perspectives de paix au Proche-Orient se sont éloignées. 
Les écarts de richesse entre le Nord et le Sud se sont accrus. 
Quant au partenariat culturel et humaine, il a souffert des 
restrictions croissantes à la circulation des personnes.  
Le Monde 21.03.2008 Thomas Ferenczi Du côté européen, l’ouverture vers des pays du Sud ne dit pas 
se réaliser au détriment des pays de l’Est, comme l’a fait 
craindre à plusieurs États membre la première version du 
projet français. De l’autre côté de la Méditerranée, rien ne 
sera possible tant que la question palestinienne n’aura pas 
trouvé un commencement de réponse. Le processus de paix au 
Proche-Orient devrait être la priorité des priorités pour la 
diplomatie européenne. 
Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre Ce qui est encore plus impressionnant dans ce naufrage, c’est 
qu’il se produit dans une indifférence quasi générale. Notre 
avenir vient d’être amputé d’une part significative, une ques-
tion stratégique majeur va rester pour longtemps sans réponse, 
et cela glisse dans le flot des nouvelles comme si de rien 
n’était. 
Le Monde 28.11.2005 ? Ce premier sommet de l’histoire du partenariat euro-
méditerranéen lancé en 1995 à Barcelone a été entaché par le 
faible niveau de représentation arabe et marqué par les fric-
tions entre pays européens. Ces tensions ont été avivées du 
fait de la conduite des travaux par la présidence britannique, 
jugée particulièrement rigide par plusieurs délégations, ont 
! 331 
indiqué plusieurs sources. 
Le Monde 27.11.2005 Thomas Ferenczi Il est vrai que l’initiative a pris naissance au moment où le 
processus de paix semblait bien engagé au Proche-Orient.  
Le Monde 27.11.2005 Thomas Ferenczi « Les partenaires euroméditerranéens doivent moderniser leur 
économie pour tirer parti des possibilités qu’offrent la mon-
dialisation et le libre échange avec l’Europe », souligne la 
Commission, qui note que « la fragmentation persistante des 
marchés du sud de la Méditerranée entrave les investisse-
ments importants tant nationaux qu’étrangers ».  
Le Monde 28.11.1995 Mouna Naim Les Européens, la France en particulier, disent sur tous les 
tons que ce nouveau partenariat ne vise pas à s’ouvrir un 
nouveau forum pour favoriser l’instauration de la paix israélo-
arabe. Ces assurances étaient nécessaires, d’une part pour que 
la Syrie et le Liban dont les négociations de paix avec Israël 
n’avancent pas acceptent de venir, et d’autre part pour rassé-
réner les États-Unis, qui voyaient dans la conférence de Bar-
celone une initiative concurrente de la leur. Cette précaution 
était aussi nécessaire pour garantir un minimum de succès à 
un projet à long terme.  
Le Figaro 13.11.2000 Lamia Oualalou Alors que la Libye a officiellement annoncé hier qu’elle 
boycottait la conférence euro-méditerranéenne (Euromed) et a 
appelé les pays arabes à ne pas y participer, patrons et experts 
craignent que la France ne profite guère de sa présidence de 
l’Union pour donner un nouveau souffle à ce partenariat, pour 
se borner à célébrer « l’esprit de Barcelone ». 
 
 
(F) Expression – Mediterranean region 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouch-
ner 
La Méditerranée est au cœur de toutes les grandes probléma-
tiques de ce début de siècle. Développement, migrations, paix, 
dialogue des civilisations, accès à l’eau et la énergie, environ-
nement, changement climatique : c’est au sud de l’Europe que 
notre avenir se joue.  
Le Monde 21.03.2008 Thomas Ferenczi M. Sarkozy a souligné avec raison, dans son discours de Tan-
ger, en octobre 2007, que le monde méditerranéen n’a pas 
cessé, depuis des siècles, d’être « écartelé » entre « l’esprit 
des croisades » et « l’esprit du dialogue ». Aujourd’hui, les 
divisions, voire les haines, l’emportent sur les solidarités. Le 
« choc des civilisations » menace le rapprochement entre le 
Nord et le Sud. Le Sud lui-même est déchiré. Le conflit israé-
lo-palestinien est l’expression exacerbée de ces discordes, 
dont la persistance a fait échouer les précédents efforts de 
coopération. 
Le Monde 25.10.2007 Florence Beaugé 
et Philippe Ridet 
Et le président français de dramatiser l’enjeu : « Ici [en Médi-
terranée], nous gagnerons tout ou nous perdrons tout. » 
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten Nous le savons : la Méditerranée entretient avec l’Europe des 
relations singulières, souvent passionnées. Elle est mare nos-
trum, mer à l’intérieur des terres, matrice de grandes civilisa-
tions, lieu d’échange et ligne de partage avec le Sud.  
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel La Méditerranée n’est pas beaucoup plus large aujourd’hui 
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que le Rhin. Son bassin occidental constitue de fait un seul et 
même gigantesque bassin d’emploi. L’évolution démographi-
que, économique, sociale et culturelle du Maghreb nous en 
rend de plus en plus dépendants.  
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel Si la Méditerranée est le jardin de l’Europe, il n’y a pas de 
sécurité pour la « maison commune » s’il n’y pas de sécurité 
dans le jardin .  
Le Figaro 23.06.2008 Mezri Haddad La Mare Nostrum a été, en effet, un carrefour de civilisations 
et le berceau des trois grandes religions monothéistes. Cette 
« machine à civilisations », selon Paul Valéry, peut redevenir 
un grand bassin d’échange interculturel et de dialogue interre-
ligieux, la source d’une civilisation résolument humaniste et 
universaliste, radical antidote au choc des civilisations conjec-
turé par Huntington.  
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Pierre Rousselin La Méditerranée fut le berceau de notre civilisation. 
Le Figaro 12.10.2004 Jean-Louis Gui-
gou 
La zone méditerranéenne est source d’inquiétudes et 
d’espérances.  
Le Figaro 23.04.2002 Philippe Gelie « La Méditerranée continue à être une mer de divisions plutôt 
qu’une mer d’intégration » a admis le ministre espagnole des 
Affaires européennes, Miguel Nadal.  
Le Figaro 29.07.1999 Astrid de Larmi-
nat 
La Méditerranée est un lieu paradoxal qui sépare et rassemble 
à la fois un nœud de guerres mais aussi d’échanges.  
Le Figaro 29.07.1999 Astrid de Larmi-
nat 
Elle concentre deux de principales lignes de fracture du 
monde, explique Amin Maalouf : « La ligne qui sépare le 
monde industrialisé des pays du tiers-monde, et la ligne qui 
sépare l’Occident chrétien du monde arabo-musulman. » 
 
 
(F) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
Ce partenariat euroméditerranéen nouvelle version, après le 
processus de Barcelone initié en 1995, (…) 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
…pour la première fois, tous les pays riverains de la Méditer-
ranée sont regroupés dans un sommet. Sur 44 chefs d’État de 
gouvernement conviés, 41 devraient être présents. 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
(Sarkozy) L’Union pour la Méditerranée est « la meilleur 
nouvelle pour la paix du Proche-Orient »  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
(Kouchner) (…) le sommet sera un « succès historique ».  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
 …l’Union sera « un partenariat multilatéral » basé sur « une 
volonté politique partagée de revitaliser les efforts visant à 
transformer la Méditerranée en un espace de paix, démocratie, 
coopération et prospérité.  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Florence Beaugé  …le bilan d’Euromed est plutôt maigre.  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Florence Beaugé Puisque le processus de Barcelone s’enlise, (…) 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouch-
ner 
L’idée est évidente, mais elle fut longue à mettre en place. 
Dès 1995, le processus lancé à Barcelone apportait une pre-
mière réponse. Ses acquis sont loin d’être négligeables, mais 
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il ne répondait plus aux attentes et donnait l’impression 
d’avoir été confisqué par les Européens 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouch-
ner 
Pour la première fois de l’histoire de la Méditerranée, une 
quarantaine de pays de l’Union européenne et de la Méditer-
ranée se rassemblent le 13 juillet à Paris au plus haut niveau, 
représentés par leur chef d’État ou gouvernement. 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouch-
ner 
Mais l’UpM sera déjà lancée autour de trois principes : une 
impulsion au plus haut niveau avec des sommets tous les deux 
ans ; (…) 
Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre Une initiative originale voyait enfin le jour : le partenariat 
euroméditerranéen.  
Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre Dix ans après la première conférence, il était en effet prévu un 
sommet en présence de tous les chefs d’État pour relancer le 
processus de Barcelone.  
Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre (…) qui a osé parler d’un « succès significatif » … Pas de 
déclaration finale, un vague « code de conduit contre le terro-
risme » et un plan d’action à cinq ans sans portée politique 
comme relance, voire comme refondation du partenariat eu-
roméditerranéen, on peut difficilement faire pire !  
Le Monde 28.11.2005 ? « L’Euromed ne ´résoudra pas le processus de pais au Proche-
Orient, pas à cette conférence en tout cas », a ajouté M. Blair.  
Le Monde 27.11.2005 Thomas Ferenc-
zi 
De part et d’autre, on reconnaît aujourd’hui que le bilan est 
pour le moins mitigé. Sur le plan économique, l’aide euro-
péenne n’a pas permis le décollage attendu. Sur le plan politi-
que, la démocratie n’a pas connue les avancées espérées.  
Le Monde 17.06.2003 Laurent Zecchini Le processus de Barcelone est globalement en échec au regard 
de ses ambitions initiales, notamment parce que, comme l’ont 
constatés les ministres des affaires étrangères du partenariat 
euroméditerranéen réunis le 27 mai en Crète, « la violence, les 
destructions, les violations des droits de l’homme et les mas-
sacres se sont poursuivis dans la région ». Les États riverains 
de la Méditerranée échangent et coopèrent peu entre eux, 
préférant un rapport bilatéral avec l’UE, réputé plus avanta-
geux. Le partenariat euroméditerranéen est en principe une 
incitation pour corriger cette habitude, et l’Europe de son 
côté, a besoin d’un forum pour dialoguer et coopérer avec ses 
voisins du Sud. 
Le Monde 24.01.2001 Laurent Zecchini Quel est le bilan des « stratégies communes » de l’Union 
européen, (…) La réponse est claire : accablant, selon Javier 
Solana.  
Le Monde 16.11.2000 Laurent Zecchini (…) d’un « processus de Barcelone » plutôt mal en point, 
mais elle sait déjà que la crise arabo-israélienne constitue une 
hypothèque majeur : parler de transformer la zone méditerra-
née en un espace de « stabilité et de prospérité », voire, ulté-
rieurement, en une vaste zone de libre-échange, ressemble à 
ce stade, à un objectif chimérique, plus encore si l’on se rap-
pelle que le processus de Barcelone a été lancé en novembre 
1995, c’est-à-dire après les accords d’Oslo. 
Le Monde 16.11.2000 Laurent Zecchini (…) l’accusation selon laquelle le processus de Barcelone est 
l’otage du processus de paix au Proche-Orient ne tient pas, 
puisque la réunion de Marseille a lieu. 
Le Monde 16.11.2000 Laurent Zecchini Mais il est d’autres incertitudes. Le bras séculier du processus 
de Barcelone est le programme communautaire MEDA. Son 
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premier exercice couvrait la période 1995-1999, et son appli-
cation a été exécrable : seuls 26% des aides ont été effective-
ment versés aux intéressés.  
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten Nous les encourageons à progresser encore sur la route tracée 
depuis Barcelone, même si certains chemins sont parfois 
difficiles à emprunter.   
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten L’esprit de partenariat, en outre, aurait pu conduire à des 
résultats plus rapides, s’agissant de questions aussi importan-
tes que les droits de l’homme, la prévention du terrorisme, les 
migrations ou l’implication de la société civile dans un pro-
cessus qui doit lui offrir de larges opportunités.  
Le Monde 15.11.1998 Armelle Cres-
sard 
[EU] Elle s’était achevée par l’adoption d’une déclaration 
annonçant l’ambitieux projet d’  « un partenariat global » 
euroméditerranéen pour les dix ans à venir et la création d’une 
zone de libre-échange en 2010.  
Le Monde 28.11.1995 Mouna Naim La difficulté du projet est à la mesure de son ambition.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tu-
quoi 
(…) le document final de Barcelone, est pour le moins préma-
turé.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tu-
quoi 
Le dialogue euro-méditerranéen actuel privilégie la coopéra-
tion entre gouvernants.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tu-
quoi 
En fait, c’est sur le plan économique que le processus se veut 
novateur.  
Le Figaro 14.11.2008 ? (…) Jacques Chirac a suggéré que l’Union pour la Méditerra-
née (UPM) se penche sur la question « névralgique » de la 
gestion des eaux du Jourdain.  
Le Figaro 04.11.2008 Alain Barluet En trois mois, rien, ou presque, n’a avancé.  
Le Figaro 13.07.2008 Thierry Oberlé Les chefs d’État ou de gouvernement de touts les pays 
d’Europe et du pourtour méditerranéen ont accepté 
l’invitation française à l’issue de difficiles tractations. Tous, à 
l’exception du dirigeant libyen Mouammar Kadhafi.  
Le Figaro 21.12.2007 Alain Barluet Barcelone et la politique de voisinage resteront « centraux ».  
Le Figaro 30.11.2005 Alain Barluet Pour ces derniers, le partenariat euro-méditerranéen reste 
essentiellement perçu comme une manne économique.  
Le Figaro 30.11.2005 Alain Barluet Que de désillusions! À se demander si ce qui divise les rive-
rains de la « mare nostrum » n’est pas plus fort que ce qui les 
rapproche.  
Le Figaro 30.11.2005 Alain Barluet Cette illusion-là, pour ceux qui l’auraient encore conservée, 
est morte à Barcelone. 
Le Figaro 30.11.2005 Alain Barluet Il ambitionnait rien moins, avec son « discours magique », 
que de « ré-enchanter les relations euro-méditerranéennes » 
(…)    
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie En 1995, la conférence de Barcelone a ouvert la voie d’un 
long processus de rapprochement entre les peuples des deux 
rives de la Méditerranée.  
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie (…) le bilan peut être jugé comme trop maigre : les dizaines 
de conférences ministérielles, l’installation d’un « Parlement 
de la Méditerranée », la mobilisation de milliard d’Euros 
destinés à financer les programmes de développement Meda, 
ou la mise en place par la Banque européenne 
d’investissement (BEI) d’une « facilité euro-méditerranéenne 
d’investissement » n’auront pas suffi à atteindre, loin s’en 
faut, les objectifs de Barcelone.  
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Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie Pourtant, le processus reste porteur de grands espoirs liés, 
(…) 
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie Barcelone constitue le seul cadre institutionnel permettant aux 
Israéliens et aux Palestiniens de siéger ensemble ?   
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Cha-
rette 
Le Partenariat euroméditerranéen, (…) définit une politique 
ambitieuse mais fondamentalement cohérente, en s’appuyant 
sur l’intensité des liens économiques, politiques, historiques 
et culturels, afin de faire avancer un projet commun de déve-
loppement et de coopération.  
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Cha-
rette 
Le processus de paix au Proche-Orient a fait long feu.  
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Cha-
rette 
Malgré ces difficultés indéniables, le Partenariat euroméditer-
ranéen n’a pas succombé. C’est dire sa valeur et son intérêt. 
Au contraire, des avancées notables ont été faites.  
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Cha-
rette 
(…) et c’est essentiel, le processus de Barcelone s’est élargi à 
la société civile (…)  
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Cha-
rette 
Le partenariat doit servir de catalyser aux réformes. C’est 
pourquoi il mérite que des déclarations de principes suivies 
d’une gestion bureaucratique ! En un mot, il convient de 
consacrer à la réussite de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne 
autant d’énergie que celle déployée lors de l’élargissement de 
l’Union à l’Est.  
Le Figaro 23.04.2002 Philippe Gelie Pendant le conflit, la coopération continue. 
Le Figaro 23.04.2002 Philippe Gelie (…)  « processus de Barcelone » (…) peut se targuer d’un 
résultat positif : avoir survécu. Non seulement ce forum a 
traversé les diverses crises régionales mais la tenue de ce 
cinquième rendez-vous montre qu’il pourrait survivre à la 
mort même du processus d’Oslo.    
Le Figaro 23.04.2002 Philippe Gelie (…) la Conférence euro-méditerranéenne reste le seul espace 
de coopération où l’on puisse à la fois rencontrer Israël et les 
pays arabes.  
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana Cette approche prospective doit prendre en compte toutes les 
évolutions. 
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana « L’esprit de Barcelone prend aussi en compte le fait que 
l’Europe est le partenaire économique naturel des pays de la 
rive sud de la Méditerranée (…) 
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana Enfin, c’est un processus qui veut intégrer la dimension hu-
maine.  
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana Au moment où nous l’avons lancé, en 1995, il n’était pas 
évident de réussir ce partenariat avec nos amis et voisins mé-
diterranéens.  
Le Figaro 13.11.2000 Lamia Oualalou « Cette démarche, originale et généreuse, s’inscrivait dans le 
contexte favorable des accords d’Oslo », rappelle Jean Claude 
Pasty (…)  
Le Figaro 13.11.2000 Lamia Oualalou L’explication de cet enlisement est en partie politique : gel du 
processus de paix au Moyen-Orient, conflit gréco-turc sur 
Chypre, climat de violence continu en Algérie… Par ailleurs, 
ces derniers temps, les préoccupations de l’UE se sont plutôt 
focalisées sur son élargissement à l’est et sur les crises qui ont 
ensanglanté les Balkans. Aucune institution n’est venue scel-
ler le partenariat euro-méditerranéen (…)  
Le Figaro 29.07.1999 Astrid de Larmi-
nat 
Le processus de Barcelone (…) outre des programmes éco-
nomiques et politiques (…)  
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FRANCE – PURPOSE 
(F) Purpose – purpose 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouch-
ner 
Le projet pour la Méditerranée (…) L’idée est évidente : ré-
concilier enfin les deux rives de cette mer, unies et déchirées 
par mille soubresauts de l’histoire, aujourd’hui confrontées 
aux mêmes espérances et aux mêmes dangers. L’idée est 
évidente et c’est là sa grandeur.   
Le Monde 27.02.2004 P/ Ce partenariat a pour objectif général la paix et la prospérité 
de la région, par le dialogue politique, le développement éco-
nomique et la réforme des sociétés civiles.  
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten Car l’objectif de Barcelone est à la fois simple et ambitieux : 
une région de paix, bénéficiant d’une prospérité partagée, 
favorisant la vitalité de la société civile dans le respect des 
droits de l’homme et la compréhension mutuelle des civilisa-
tions.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tu-
quoi 
Son ambition est immense : rééquilibrer les relations de 
l’Union européenne vers le Sud ; amorcer un partenariat entre 
les Quinze et les pays de la Méditerranée, sur le modèle de 
celui en cours avec les anciens pays de l’Est tout en sachant 
qu’une intégration est exclue.  
Le Figaro 17.11.2003 Patrick Bele Reste l’ambition finale fixée à l’époque : la création d’une 
zone de libre échange entre l’Union et les pays méditerranées 
en 2010. 
Le Figaro 13.11.2000 Lamia Oualalou L’objectif : réduire le fossé entre les deux rives de la Méditer-
ranée avec pour horizon, en 2010-2012, l’instauration d’une 
vaste zone de libre-échange. 
Le Figaro 29.07.1999 Astrid de Larmi-
nat 
(…), il développe un ambitieux projet culturel qui finance des 
opérations de réhabilitation du patrimoine et des initiatives 
comme celle de la Maison méditerranéenne d’Aix-Provence. 
 
 
(F) Purpose -aim 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
(…) à « jouer un rôle important pour faire face aux défis de la 
région » : « La crise de la sécurité alimentaire mondiale », « la 
désertification », les questions de migration, d’énergie, de 
« terrorisme et [d’] extrémisme ».  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nou-
gayrède et Phi-
lippe Ricard 
Six projets régionaux sont envisagés : la dépollution de la 
Méditerranée, les « autoroutes » maritimes et terrestres, la 
protection civile, l’énergie solaire, une universitaire méditer-
ranéenne et un soutien aux PME.  
Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre (…) l’idée était enfin apparue qu’il fallait donner un cadre 
institutionnel aux relations entre l’Europe et la Méditerranée. 
Les accordes de Barcelone étaient signés autour de trois prin-
cipaux volets : politique et de sécurité ; économique, avec en 
perspective la mise en place d’une zone de libre-échange à 
l’horizon 2010 ; social, culturel et humain, avec l’idée de 
rapprocher les cultures et les sociétés.  
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten Relancer le partenariat euro-méditerranéen, en dépassant les 
facteurs de fragmentation et en développant l’intégration : 
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c’est l’ambition de ces pistes de réflexion, qui devront être 
explorées lors de la rencontre de Marseille.    
Le Monde 28.11.1995 Mouna Naim Ambitieux, le projet l’est par sa prétention à englober tous les 
aspects des échanges entre les deux partenaires, puisqu’il 
concerne les questions politiques et de sécurité, l’économie et 
les finances, et les domaines sociale, culturel et humain.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tu-
quoi 
L’Union propose d’instaurer une zone de libre-échange avec 
les pays méditerranéens d’ici à l’an 2010, autrement dit de 
créer « un espace économique euro-méditerranéen ». 
L’ancrage existe déjà. Depuis la fin des années 60, toute une 
panoplie d’accords lie l’Europe aux pays méditerranéens. Ils 
se voulaient ambitieux. Avec le recul, force est de reconnaître 
qu’ils n’ont pas tenu leurs promesses. Depuis une vingtaine 
d’années, la part de la Communauté dans les échanges des 
pays méditerranéens piétine.  
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie (…) il devient urgent de se doter d’une vision stratégique 
commune, qui à ce stade n’existe pas. 
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie (…) le partenariat euro-méditerranéen doit se bâtir sur la base 
de valeurs universelles, susceptibles de garantir un minimum 
de cohérence et de crédibilité à un projet complexe. 
Le Figaro 15.03.2005 Béatrice Patrie En troisième lieu, la création d’une zone de prospérité parta-
gée allant de plaire avec un développement économique et 
social durable est le meilleur gage de stabilité.  
 
 
FRANCE – IDENTITY 
(F) Identity – role 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard 
Kouchner 
La France entend s’y employer activement lors du sommet et 
en faire une des priorités de sa présidence européenne car le 
processus de paix est menacé. L’Union Européenne doit jouer 
sans complexe tout le rôle qui lui revient au Proche-Orient. 




(F) Identity - EU 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nougayrède 
et Philippe Ricard 
Signe de l’exercice d’équilibriste que constitue cet évé-
nement, plusieurs points de la déclaration finale ne seront 
sans doute clarifiés qu’à la dernière minute – raison pour 
laquelle des réunions ultimes sont prévus, samedi, entre 
hautes fonctionnaires, des « quarante-quatre », et entre 
ministres arabes. Le nom même du projet est en discus-
sion ! Les responsables français voudraient éliminer la 
référence au processus de Barcelone. Ils seraient prêts, 
pour cela, à accepter que le secrétariat de l’Union soit 
situé à Barcelone, ce qui réjouirait les Espagnols.  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nougayrède 
et Philippe Ricard 
Même si le sommet du 13 s’appelle « sommet de Paris 
pour la Méditerranée », ce qui met un accent net sur le 
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rôle de la France, le projet de Déclaration, lui, fait la part 
belle au processus européen dit « de Barcelone » (Euro-
med), lancé en 1995 et dont il s’agit de « renforcer les 
accomplissements et les éléments de succès ». 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nougayrède 
et Philippe Ricard 
Dans l’annexe à la Déclaration, il est stipulé que « toute 
contribution » de l’Union européenne aux projets régio-
naux (…) 
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Natalie Nougayrède 
et Philippe Ricard 
Autant de jalons posés pour tenter de répéter, en Médi-
terranée, « ce qui a été fait pour l’Union de l’Europe, il y 
a soixante ans », comme l’a espéré M. Sarkozy, le 6 mai 
2007.  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Florence Beaugé Angela Merkel, la chancelière allemande, s’oppose au 
projet français car il exclut les pays non riverains de la 
Méditerranée. Elle y voit un fermement de division au 
sein de l’UE.  
Le Monde 12.07.2008 Florence Beaugé (…) il accepte d’associer ses partenaires européens non à 
son projet, version améliorée du processus de Barcelone. 
Le nom change. Ce sera désormais l’Union pour la Mé-
diterranée (UPM). S’y joignent l’Albanie, la Croatie, la 
Bosnie-Herzégovine, le Monténégro et Monaco. 
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouchner Il fallut convaincre nos partenaires espagnoles et italiens 
que la France ne faisait pas table rase du Processus de 
Barcelone mais souhaitait au contraire le relancer ; nous 
nous y sommes employés dès les premiers jours, à Rome 
comme à Portoroz lors de la rencontre des dix Européens 
de la Méditerranée. Convaincre l’Allemagne que ce 
projet n’était pas tourné contre l’Europe ; (…)  
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouchner Pour qui connaît les ressentiments de ces peuples enche-
vêtrés, cette rencontre est déjà un succès historique.  
Le Monde 11.07.2008 Bernard Kouchner Nous sommes tous des Méditerranéens de cœur et de 
paix.      
Le Monde 21.03.2008 Thomas Ferenczi La civilisation européenne est née de la Méditerranée.  
Le Monde 21.03.2008 Thomas Ferenczi L’écrivain Paul Valéry définissait les Européens comme 
les héritiers de trois grandes cultures du monde antique – 
grecque, romaine et chrétienne – dont chacune apparte-
nait à l’espace méditerranéen.  
Le Monde 21.03.2008 Thomas Ferenczi L’Europe a refusé l’affrontement en appelant à l’union 
entre les deux rives. Les dirigeants de l’UE ont écarté du 
projet français ce qui paraissait de la nature à diviser les 
Européens en donnant à Paris un rôle prééminent. Ils en 
ont retenue l’essentiel, c’est-à-dire la volonté de recréer 
sur le pourtour de la Méditerranée un espace politique 
commun. 
Le Monde 25.10.2007 Florence Beaugé et 
Philippe Ridet 
Le chef de l’État n’a cependant pas caché la difficulté de 
la tache. il a évoqué, à des nombreuses reprises, « un 
rêve de paix et de justice et non pas de conquête », « un 
grand rêve de civilisation », « un grand rêve capable de 
soulever le monde », comme s’il doutait lui-même de 
pouvoir l’attendre.  
Le Monde 25.10.2007 ? [Sarkozy] (…) il a invité tous les dirigeants méditerra-
néens à participer, « sur un pied d’égalité », à une confé-
rence à Paris en juin 2008.  
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Le Monde 03.12.2005 Thierry Fabre Le vide annonciateur d’une grand violence, la citadelle 
Europe serait à peu près aussi efficace que la ligne Ma-
ginot hier. Reste donc à imaginer et à bâtir une véritable 
Communauté euroméditerranéenne.   
Le Monde 28.11.2005 ? [Solana] « l’important ce n’est pas le porte parole, c’est 
ce qu’il a à dire ».  
Le Monde 27.11.2005 Thomas Ferenczi L’UE entend les aider à assurer le contrôle des frontières, 
la protection des réfugiés, la gestion de l’immigration 
clandestine, notamment pour « éviter les tragédies hu-
maines » qui surviennent régulièrement en Méditerranée.  
Le Monde 02.12.2003 Serge Marti L’élargissement de l’Union européenne (…). Il est aussi 
vécu comme une menace potentielle pour les pays en 
développement du pourtour méditerranéen.  
Le Monde 17.06.2003 Laurent Zecchini Il ne s’agit pas de comptes d’apothicaires : outre que le 
scandale des « projets dormants » européens (de l’aide 
promise mais jamais déboursée) se dissipe, les valeurs 
démocratiques de l’UE sont d’autant mieux acceptées sur 
la rive de la Méditerranée qu’elles ont une traduction 
financière. Car les difficultés de l’UE pour donner vie au 
partenariat euroméditerranéen concourent à renforcer 
l’impression que l’Europe peine à définir le type de rela-
tions qu’elle souhaite avoir ses voisins.  
Le Monde 16.11.2000 Laurent Zecchini La lenteur avec laquelle l’Union européenne achemine 
aux populations et aux pays concernés l’assistance pro-
mise est chronique 
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten Parce que l’Europe ne saurait se placer à l’écart de cette 
stratégique, en se résignant à n’être que le témoin passif 
d’un spectacle tragique. Plus que jamais, les Méditerra-
néens ont besoin de l’Europe, et l’Europe a besoin des 
Méditerranéens. Il en va de notre intérêt commun.  
Le Monde 14.11.2000 Chris Patten L’Union européenne accorde à cette politique un carac-
tère prioritaire. Il faut souligner, à cet égard, que 
l’attention portée à nos voisins d’Europe centrale et 
orientale, dans la perspective de l’élargissement de 
l’Union, ne l’est pas au détriment des relations avec nos 
voisins du Sud.  
Le Monde 02.03.1997 Propos Recueillis 
Par Alain Frachon et 
Daniel Vernet 
[Quai d'Orsay] Il est claire que, dans l’Europe de de-
main, il y aura un rôle particulier pour les pays qui veu-
lent afficher une détermination plus forte que les autres. 
La France est au nombre de ces pays.  
Le Monde 26.11.1995 Jean-Pierre Tuquoi De fait, si les États européens ont intérêt à la création 
d’une zone de paix et de prospérité au sud du continent, 
les entreprises poursuivent des objectifs différents. Pour-
quoi investir dans le Sud quand les pays d’Europe cen-
trale et orientale, demain, seront membres de l’Union 
européenne ? Pourquoi opter pour le pourtour méditerra-
néen quand les salaires asiatiques sont deux à trois fois 
plus bas ? C’est de la réponse à ces questions que dépen-
dra l’avenir des pays du sud de la Méditerranée. Et, pour 
partie, celui de leur voisin du Nord.  
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel L’immigration en provenance de ces pays va sans doute 
accroître et poser à la France des problèmes de politique 
intérieure de plus en plus graves. D’autre part, la menace 
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de l’intégrisme peut créer à nos frontières sud une zone 
d’instabilité et insécurité, sinon d’hostilité.  
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel Il n’y a pas d’avenir pour la „Grande Europe“, qui est 
tout simplement  « l’Europe », si la paix et la sécurité, le 
développement économique et social, le respect des 
droits de l’homme, des idéaux démocratiques et des 
identités culturelles ne sont pas assurés en Méditerranée. 
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel Il faut au-delà des discours, concevoir effectivement 
comme une entité l’espace euro-méditerranéen. Il faut 
fonder peu à peu un ensemble politique, démographique, 
économique, et culturel assez puissant pour former un 
élément essentiel des grands équilibres nécessaires à la 
défense de la paix et de la liberté dans le monde.  
Le Monde 11.05.1990 Vauzelle Michel Au contraire, il s’agit pour l’Europe du Sud d’obtenir de 
l’Europe tout entière qu’elle prenne conscience de ses 
responsabilités vis-à-vis du monde méditerranéen et de 
ce que l’avenir de la Méditerranée est essentiel à son 
propre avenir. Pour la France, l’enjeu est vital. 
Le Figaro 13.07.2008 Thierry Oberlé En contribuant à normaliser les relations entre les nations 
du Proche-Orient, Paris espère redevenir un acteur in-
fluent dans la région où le rôle de l'Europe s'amenuise. 
Le Figaro 11.07.2008 Alexandre Adler Nous vivons un moment très particulier de l’équilibre 
mondial, où pour la première fois depuis bien longtemps, 
l’Europe revient sur le devant de la scène. 
Le Figaro 11.07.2008 Alexandre Adler (…), le processus, dit de Barcelone, de dialogue entre 
l’Europe latine et le Maghreb est arrivé à une situation de 
panne presque totale, à laquelle il faut, à présent, remé-
dier sans délai. 
Le Figaro 23.05.2008 Benita Ferrero-
Waldner 
L’Union européenne a fait le choix de se rapprocher de 
la Méditerranée. 
Le Figaro 14.03.2008 Pierre Avril Au lieu de créer ex nihilo une nouvelle union, le projet se 
contente de prendre appui sur le processus de Barcelone, 
forum de coopération interméditerranéen lancé en 1995, 
aujourd’hui ensablé, et auquel la France souhaite donner 
un « nouvel élan ». 
Le Figaro 12.03.2008 Pierre Avril Le 23 octobre à Tanger, le chef de l’État français avait 
invité les États côtiers de la Mare Nostrum á créer une 
« Union économique, politique et culturelle, dont nos 
enfants seront fiers. » 
Le Figaro 26.02.2008 Pierre Rousselin L’Espagne est très attachée au « processus de Barce-
lone » initié en 1995 en direction des pays du Sud, mais 
sans grand résultat, tandis que la « politique de voisi-
nage » reste l’autre instrument de la coopération euro-
péenne. 
Le Figaro 21.12.2007 Alain Barluet « L’Union pour la Méditerranée aura vocation à être le 
cœur et le moteur de la coopération en Méditerranée et 
pour la Méditerranée », ont souligné les trois dirigeants 
dans leur appel. 
Le Figaro 21.12.2007 Alain Barluet Elle traduit le souci hautement politique de prendre en 
compte les réticences qui s’étaient fait jour à l’égard de 
ce chantier, notamment de la part de l’Allemagne, mais 
aussi, à moindre degré, de l’Espagne et de l’Italie. 
Le Figaro 21.12.2007 Alain Barluet L’ « appel de Rome » souligne que « l’Union n’a pas 
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vocation à se substituer aux procédures de coopération et 
de dialogue qui réunissent déjà les pays de la Méditerra-
née, mais à les compléter ». 
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Alain Barluet Ce projet, ajoute-t-il, vise à créer « un espace de solidari-
té et de coopération » (...) 
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Alain Barluet Nicolas Sarkozy a lancé un vibrant « appel à tous les 
peuples de la Méditerranée ». Le temps est venu de bâtir 
ensemble une Union méditerranéenne qui sera un trait 
d’union entre l’Europe et l’Afrique », (…) 
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Alain Barluet Selon Jean-Louis Guigou, l’occasion est « historique » 
(…) 
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Pierre Rousselin [MU] Face à une entreprise aussi grandiose, le scepti-
cisme est de mise. 
Le Figaro 14.10.2007 Pierre Rousselin La voie de l’Union méditerranéenne sera semée 
d’embûches. Sans se substituer à la recherche de la paix 
au Proche-Orient ou à la résolution des autres conflits, 
elle mérite d’être tentée, dans l’espoir de trouver 
l’harmonie au nord comme au sud de cette Mare Nos-
trum. 
Le Figaro 30.11.2005 Alain Barluet Dans l’euphorie de l’après communisme à l’Est, l’Union 
européenne voulait, en 1995, « sécuriser » son voisinage 
méridional. Une décennie plus tard, cette priorité s’est 
affirmée. En coopérant avec le Sud, les Européens atten-
dent de pouvoir lutter plus efficacement contre le terro-
risme et de mieux réguler l’immigration. Sur ces deux 
volets, les Européens ont obtenu à Barcelone un « code 
de conduite » et un « plan d’action » malgré les réticen-
ces de leurs interlocuteurs du Sud. 
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Charette (…) il est essentiel pour l’Europe de se tourner vers ses 
voisins de la Méditerranée. L’actualité ne cesse de le 
montrer, le destin de l’Europe est désormais inséparable 
de celui de ses voisins du Sud. La coopération euromédi-
terranéenne est pour l’Europe un projet porteur d’une 
vision politique à long terme, faisant primer la solidarité 
sur le repli, la méfiance ou la confrontation. 
Le Figaro 07.12.2004 Hervé de Charette Tout cela est très encourageant et montre combien les 
pays du Sud sont en demande d’Europe. Il est essentiel 
de ne pas les décevoir : il nous faut donc passer la vitesse 
supérieure! 
Le Figaro 12.10.2004 Jean-Louis Guigou Cela étant, la politique européenne en Méditerranée 
souffre de nombreuses limites qui la rendent, actuelle-
ment, peu efficace. L’approche sécuritaire prédomine 
trop souvent ; les instruments financiers (Meda) mis en 
place ne sont pas à la hauteur puisque, en comparaison 
pour la période 2000-2006, l’Union européenne aura 
alloué trente euros par habitant aux Peco contre quatre 
pour les douze pays partenaires de la Méditerranée ; 
l’absence d’organisation politique adéquate et de secréta-
riat permanent rend le processus de coopération tributaire 
de l’administration de la Communauté européenne. En-
fin, la vision eurocentrique prime sur le partenariat, le 
centre domine et les pays voisins restent périphériques.  
Le Figaro 12.10.2004 Jean-Louis Guigou Le projet de voisinage de l’Union européenne nous fait 
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progresser de quelques mètres alors qu’il faudrait avan-
cer de plusieurs kilomètres. Le temps nous est compté. 
Le Figaro 12.10.2004 Jean-Louis Guigou Considérant que l’Europe a, dans les années à venir, 
besoin des pays de la rive sud de la Méditerranée pour se 
développer (…) et que, réciproquement, les pays de la 
rive du Sud ont eux aussi besoin d’une Europe forte, 
dans la mesure où ils vont être confrontés à des chocs 
(…) d’une ampleur telle qu’ils ne peuvent, seuls, y faire 
face. Nous sommes « condamnés » à coopérer dans un 
rapport gagnant-gagnant. 
Le Figaro 06.12.2003 Pierre Rousselin Le président Chirac a souligné que les pays européens 
présents à Tunis partageaient « le même sentiment 
d’urgence, la même volonté de faire de la Méditerranée 
un espace de solidarité et de paix, et la même ambition : 
celle de favoriser l’intégration régionale du Maghreb et 
le développement économique qui l’accompagne ». 
Le Figaro 17.11.2003 Patrick Bele L’Est ne doit pas faire oublier le Sud à l’Europe : (…) 
Le Figaro 17.11.2003 Patrick Bele Pourtant l’Europe a accru ses efforts financiers à l’égard 
de la région. 
Le Figaro 15.11.2000 Javier Solana (…) : l’Union s’est donc engagée à aider à la mise à 
niveau des économies de ses amis du Sud dans l’objectif 
de construire, à l’horizon 2010, une vaste zone de libre-
échange. 
Le Figaro 13.11.2000 Lamia Oualalou On réalise que nos destins sont liés, ne serait-ce que du 
fait de l’équation démographique ». 
Le Figaro 14.03.2008 Pierre Avril Nicolas Sarkozy a répété hier son souhait que les Vingt-
Sept « établissent » l’Union pour la Méditerranée « sur 
un pied d’égalité » 




GERMANY - EXPRESSION 





07.02.1995 wha. Die südlichen Anrainer des Mittelmeers, vor allem die 
Maghreb Staaten, fordern schon seit langem mehr Brüs-
seler Aufmerksamkeit. Es kommt ihren Wünschen zugu-
te, dass in diesem Jahr mit Frankreich und Spanien zwei 
Mittelmeerstaaten die EU-Präsidentschaft innehaben. 
FAZ Nr. 32 07.02.1995 wha. Vergessen, so meinen sie, habe die Europäische Union 
ihre Südgrenze, da sie vornehmlich mit der Entwicklung 
in Mittel- und Osteuropa beschäftigt sei. 
FAZ Nr. 68 21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Europas Nachbarn im Süden beanspruchen immer mehr 
Aufmerksamkeit. 
FAZ Nr. 131 08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Eine Reihe von Staaten der Region suchen engere Anleh-
nung an Europa. 
FAZ Nr. 276 27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Die Staaten Nordafrikas und des Nahen Ostens machen 
sich vor allem große Hoffnungen auf ein Milliarden-
schweres Hilfsprogramm aus Europa. 
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FAZ Nr. 276 27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Kompliziert wird das labile Gefüge in der Region zudem 
durch die schwierigen Beziehungen der arabischen Staa-





29.11.1995 wha. Der israelische Außenminister hatte eine in Inhalt und 
Form konziliante und vorwiegend an seinen syrischen 
Amtskollegen gerichtete Rede vorgetragen; der Syrer 






14.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die mit der EU durch eine Zollunion verbundene Türkei 
sowie nordafrikanische Länder befürchten, daß von der 
Marktöffnung in erster Linie die wettbewerbsfähigeren 
Produkte Europas profitieren könnten. Der Argwohn in 
den südlichen Ländern wird nicht zuletzt durch das klein-
liche Feilschen von EU-Ländern, darunter auch Deutsch-
land, um die Einfuhr einiger hundert Tonnen Kartoffeln, 





17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die Unnachgiebigkeit, mit der die arabischen Delegierten 
in Malta auf einer-wenn auch verklausuliert Formulier-
ten- Verurteilung der israelischen Siedlungspolitik be-






17.04.1997 Michael Staben Die arabischen Teilnehmerländer hätten allerdings zuge-
sichert, so Van Mierlo noch vor Wochenfrist, daß da-
durch die Weiterentwicklung der Ende 1995 in Barcelona 
feierlich besiegelten vertraglichen Partnerschaft mit den 






17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Vorerst gilt, was der ägyptische Außenminister Moussa 
und andere arabische Teilnehmer in Malta klargestellt 
haben: Es sei sinnlos große Projekte für die Stabilität im 
Mittelmeer zu schmieden, solange der Friedensprozess 





19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Selbst Tunesien, das Köhler im Vergleich mit anderen 
südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern als "Musterschüler" bei 
der wirtschaftlichen Öffnung betrachtet, tut sich mit dem 
Zusammenhang zwischen ökonomischer und politischer 





19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Die Konferenz verdeutlichte, dass auch die Maghreb-
Partner ebenfalls legitime Erwartungen an die EU-Länder 
haben. Dies gilt besonders für die zwiespältige EU-
Haltung, ungehindert Zugang für Industrieprodukte und 
Dienstleistungen zu den südlichen Märkten zu verlangen, 






19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Wie solle man es den eigenen Bauern vermitteln, wett-
bewerbsfähig zu werden, wenn es keine neuen Absatz-
märkte gebe, fragt der Adel Tilli, Vorstandmitglied der 
tunesischen Agrar- und Fischervereinigung. Dies sorge 
nicht nur für ein "Gefühl der Zurückweisung", sondern 
erschwere die wirtschaftliche Öffnung. Tillis Warnung an 
die Europäer war knapp, aber eindeutig: "Achtung, Ge-
fahr!" 





gewisses Gegengewicht zu den Vereinigten Staaten bil-
den, die in den Augen vieler arabischer Länder bei ihren 
Vermittlungsbemühungen zu sehr auf der Seite Israels 
stehen. 
FAZ Nr. 268 17.11.2000 Bc. Die Partnerländer hätten zugestimmt, hieß es, daß auch 
sie eine Verantwortung für einen besseren Einsatz der 
Mittel trügen. 
Die Welt Nr. 
54 
04.03.2008 Mariam Lau Obendrein sind viele der Akteure im Süden wegen des 
schwelenden Nahost-Konflikts nicht in der Lage, sich an 
einen Tisch zu setzen. Geld fließt von Nord nach Süd, 




28.11.2005 wtr Die Chance, dieses gegenseitige Misstrauen auf höchster 
Ebene abzubauen, haben die nordafrikanischen Führer 
vertan. Klug war das nicht, denn eine neue Gelegenheit 
wird es so bald nicht wieder geben. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
28.11.2005 wtr Wenn die südlichen Anlieger des Mittelmeeres ihre Part-
nerschaft mit der EU weiterhin so schludrig behandeln, 
sollte die EU ihnen ein böses Erwachen bereiten. Etwa 
durch Drehen am Geldhahn. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
24.10.2007 chi. Für einen Lieblingsplan des Präsidenten, die Mittelmeer-
Union, haben die Marokkaner viel Sympathie. Aber sie 
schätzen deren Aussichten nicht hoch ein. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
07.12.2007 Rudolph Chimelli Vor allem wollen die Algerier wissen, was der neue Pakt 
ihnen brächte. Immerhin gibt es bereits jetzt eine Reihe 
von Bündnissen: die Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft 
(Barcelona-Prozess) zwischen der EU und ihren südli-
chen Nachbarn sowie das Mittelmeer-Forum und den 
Fünf-plus-Fünf-Dialog der Außenminister als informelle 
Konferenzen. Diese Spatzen in der Hand will Algerien 
für keine Taube auf dem noch nicht gebauten Dach über 




11.09.2000 Sven Behrendt 
und Christian-
Peter Hanelt 
Von den acht arabischen Mitgliedsstaaten des Barcelona-
Prozesses haben bislang nur vier - Tunesien, Marokko, 
Jordanien sowie die Palästinensische Autonomiebehörde 
- Assoziierungsabkommen mit der EU abgeschlossen und 
treiben die Transformation ihrer Wirtschaft zumindest 
ansatzweise voran. Andere, wie Ägypten, haben ihr be-
reits verhandeltes Abkommen auf Eis gelegt - sie werden 





17.11.2000 Cornelia Knust Die arabische Welt drängt die Europäische Union (EU), 
sich stärker für den Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten zu 
engagieren und zudem möglichst Partei für die Seite der 
Palästinenser zu ergreifen. 
FTD  05.11.2001 Birgit Jennen Die arabische Welt drängt die EU, sich eindeutig auf die 




25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Sorgenkinder sind die arabischen Partnerländer: Bevölke-
rungswachstum, mangelnde Demokratie, Armut und 
Perspektivlosigkeit sind gerade bei ihnen hoch - ebenso 
hoch ist der Wunsch, in Europa das Glück zu suchen. 
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07.02.1995 wha. In europäischen Ländern hört man häufig die Befürch-
tung, eine enge Zusammenarbeit der islamischen Staaten 
am südlichen Mittelmeer mit Europa könne dort die fun-
damentalistischen Gruppen stärken. Die Teilnehmer aus 
den islamischen Ländern waren in Barcelona anderer 
Ansicht: Der radikale Fundamentalismus nähre sich vor-
wiegend aus Armut und Unterentwicklung. Allerdings 





21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Die leistungsstarke Türkei wird anderer Hilfe bedürfen 





21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Das wirtschaftliche Gefälle zum Süden hin ist viel größer 
als das zu den Reformländern Mittel- und Osteuropas; 
das Durchschnittseinkommen in der EU ist etwa zwan-






22.09.1995 Walter Haubrich Die Schwierigkeit, gerade die in Konferenzen mit viel 
Rhetorik und wenig konkreten Inhalten erfahrenen arabi-
schen Politiker zur Sachlichkeit zu bewegen, wird nicht 
gering sein. König Hassan II. hat das Spiel jetzt schon 
begonnen: Aus Ärger über die deutliche Reaktion der 
Union auf die marokkanische Hinhaltetaktik bei den 
Fischereiverhandlungen überlege er sich, ob er überhaupt 





27.11.1995 now./wha. Als heikel hatten sich zuletzt besonders die politischen 
Passagen zum Friedensprozeß im Nahen Osten und zum 
Vertrag über die Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernich-
tungswaffen erwiesen. Dagegen scheinen die vorbereite-
ten Klauseln zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie so 
allgemein gehalten zu sein, daß sie keinem Teilnehmer 





27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Trotz der Mittelmeer-Euphorie, die sich von Barcelona 
ausgehend nun breitmacht, bleibt der Wirtschaftsraum ein 





29.11.1995 now. Die Teilnehmer verständigten sich schließlich auf Kom-
promißformeln. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.1995 wha. Am schnellsten wurde man sich in Barcelona über die 





17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Statt positiver Bilanzen und ehrgeiziger Pläne zum Aus-
bau der Ende 1995 in Barcelona besiegelten "Euro-
mediterranen Partnerschaft" zwischen den nördlichen und 
südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers beherrschten die 
jüngsten Spannungen im Nahen Osten das Konferenzge-
schehen in einem ehemaligen Hospital des Johanniteror-
dens in der maltesischen Hauptstadt. 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die arabischen Teilnehmer hatten stundenlang damit 




mung zu geben, falls die Europäer nicht zu einer zwar im 
Ton gemäßigten, aber dennoch eindeutigen Kritik an der 





17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die arabische Warnung vor den Folgen einer Politik 
"vollendeter Tatsachen" und vor einseitigen Verstößen 
gegen die seit 1991 zwischen Israel und seinen arabi-
schen Nachbarn getroffenen Vereinbarungen ließ sich 






17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Andererseits konnten und wollten es die Europäer nicht 
riskieren, im Kreis der 27 Staaten Israel politisch zu iso-
lieren und somit die Glaubwürdigkeit der "Euro-





19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Die Verschuldungsprobleme, das Wohlstandsgefälle und 
ein daraus erwachsender Migrationsdruck sind weitere 
Gründe, an Wohlstand und politischer Stabilität rings um 





21.02.1998 Prof. Dr. Helmut 
Hubel 
Aber gerade darin beruht eine charakteristische Differenz 
zwischen Europa und dem Nahen Osten: Anders als in 
Europa wo ein blutiger Erster und ein "totaler", mörderi-
scher Zweiter Weltkrieg tiefe Spuren und einen praktisch 
allseitigen Willen zum Frieden hinterlassen haben, gilt 
den Mächtigen im Nahes Osten vielfach bis heute ein 






15.04.1999 Michael Stabenow Auch die Stuttgarter Konferenz dürfte jedoch zeigen, wie 
schwer sich die Nachbarn beiderseits des Mittelmeers 





17.04.1999 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Schwierig war es in Stuttgart geworden, nachdem Israel 
offenbar den syrischen Außenminister, der zugleich 
Sprecher der arabischen Staaten ist, nicht ohne israelische 
Beteiligung vor den Journalisten auftreten lassen wollte. 
Mit dem Israeli Scharon zusammen wollte wiederum al 





17.04.1999 now. Im Gegensatz zu der Außenministerkonferenz im April 
1997 auf Malta, als der Streit um die israelische Sied-
lungspolitik sogar die Verständigung über eine Abschlu-
ßerklärung vereitelte, wirkte sich der Konflikt im Nahen 





17.04.1999 now. Während der Plenarsitzung am Donnerstag war es zu 
einem kurzen Wortwechsel zwischen Scharon und al 
Scharaa gekommen. Zur Verbesserung der Stimmung des 
Treffens hatte beigetragen, daß auf Einladung Fischers 
erstmal ein Vertreter Libyens, wenn auch ohne Rede-
recht, als Gast an einer Mittelmeerkonferenz teilnehmen 
konnte. 
FAZ Nr. 89 17.04.1999 now. Ungeachtet der zum Ende der Konferenz aufgetretenen 
Misstöne zogen Diplomaten aus der EU, aber auch aus 






Weil dafür kein institutioneller Rahmen gefunden wurde, 




Die Lähmung des Nahost-Friedensprozesses zu Zeiten 
der israelischen Regierung Netanjahu war dafür ein 
Grund, der Bürgerkrieg in Algerien war ein anderer, die 







Auch auf dem Gebiet der kulturellen Zusammenarbeit ist 
wenig geschehen, weil zu wenig Kontakte zwischen 
möglichen Partnern aus der "Zivilgesellschaft", etwa 
zwischen Hochschulen und Bildungseinrichtungen, ent-
standen sind. 
FAZ Nr. 269 18.11.1999 Günther Nonnen-
macher 
Geändert hat sich, wenn man den Politiker-Bekenntnissen 
trauen darf, auch die Einstellung zu den Regeln, nach 







Jedenfalls scheint man auf der anderen Seite des Mittel-
meers inzwischen begriffen zu haben, dass man in der 
globalisierten Wirtschaft in einem Standortwettbewerb 
steht und dass Investoren nicht wegen alter kolonialer 
Verbindungen oder neuer Freundschaften ins Land kom-
men, sondern auch die Aussicht auf Gewinnchancen 







Natürlich kann es kein Treffen im Mittelmeerraum geben, 
ohne dass die Geschichte gegenseitiger kultureller Be-
fruchtungen beschworen und das gemeinsame jüdisch-
christlich-islamische Erbe als Grundlage künftiger Zu-







Zur kulturellen Tradition des Mittelmeerraumes gehört 
es, übrigens am südlichen wie am nördlichen Ufer, über 
unangenehme Dinge wenn möglich nicht zu sprechen, 





17.11.2000 Bc. (Marseille) Außenminister Fischer lobte die "beeindru-
ckende Aussprache" bei der vor allem der israelische 
Außenminister Ben-Ami und der Vertreter der Palästi-
nensischen Autonomiebehörde, Schaath, offen, "aber im 
Geist des Dialogs" die Standpunkte beider Seiten darge-





17.11.2000 Bc. Daß auf diesem Gebiet vorerst kaum Fortschritte zu er-
warten sind, kam auch in der Entscheidung der französi-
schen Präsidentschaft zum Ausdruck, auf eine Beratung 
über den Entwurf einer Euro-mediterranen Charta für 
Frieden und Sicherheit, die in den vergangenen Monaten 
intensiv verhandelt worden war, zu verzichten. Dafür 
sollen günstiger politische Umstände abgewartet werden. 
FAZ Nr. 257 05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 





05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Die Anschläge islamistischer Terroristen haben die 
Nachbarländer der Europäischen Union (EU) am südli-
chen Ufer des Mittelmeeres wieder an Bedeutung gewin-
nen lassen -nachdem bei der letzten Außenministerkonfe-
renz in Marseille im vergangenen November die EU-





05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Die Regierung der Maghreb-Staaten wie die der arabi-
schen Mittelmeeranrainer haben in den vergangenen 
Wochen das getan, was in Europa von ihnen erwartet 
 348 
257 wurde: Sie unterstützten den Kampf gegen den Terror 





05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Doch die erwünschte Stabilität hat einen Preis. Mit ihr 
vertieft sich ein Grundproblem der europäischen Mittel-
meerpolitik, wie bei einer Konferenz der Bertelsmann-
Stiftung zu diesem Thema deutlich wurde: Auf der einen 
Seite will die EU bei den Partnerländern Demokratie und 
Pluralismus fördern. Das haben die Staats- und Regie-
rungschefs auf beiden Seiten des Mittelmeers eindeutig 
als Ziel der Mittelmeerpartnerschaft des sogenannten 
Barcelona-Prozesses, festgeschrieben. Im Zweifelsfall 
verlassen sich die EU und ihre Mitglieder lieber auf die 
meisten autoritär regierenden Regime in der Region. 
Diese Zusammenarbeit hilf ihnen letztlich ihre Macht zu 





05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Seit dem 11. September würden dagegen in den südlichen 
Mittelmeerländern plötzlich Finanzströme auf der Suche 
nach den Attentätern und ihren Auftraggebern überwacht 
und Konten gesperrt. Die Empörung über solche Beispie-
le westlicher Doppelmoral trägt dazu bei, daß Islamisten 






22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Aus Protest gegen die Teilnahme Israels wollen Syrien 
und der Libanon die Konferenz boykottieren. Die Euro-
päische Kommission und die spanische Ratspräsident-
schaft scheint das aber nicht zu schrecken: Mehr als ein 
Dutzend Empfehlungen und mindestens so viele Vor-
schläge hat die Kommission (...) -sie reichen von Frauen-
förderung bis zum Dialog der Zivilisation. 
FAZ Nr. 95 24.04.2002 Walter Haubrich Die militärischen Aktionen Israels in Palästina und die 
Attentate von Palästinensern hatten die EU sogar eine 





24.04.2002 Walter Haubrich Zum ersten erwarteten Eklat kam es schon bei der Eröff-
nungssitzung: Arabische Außenminister verließen für 
einige Minuten den Raum, nachdem der stellvertretende 
Außenminister Melchior (…) das Wort ergriffen hatte. 
Die Organisation hat Araber und Israelis über 40 Kilome-





05.05.2004 Bc. Alle Partnerländer mit Ausnahme Syriens sind der EU 
durch Assoziierungsabkommen verbunden, die nicht nur 
die Handelsbeziehungen regeln, sondern auch die Bedin-






07.05.2004 Bc. Während des zweitägigen Treffens war es zu hetzigen 
Auseinandersetzungen zwischen dem israelischen Au-
ßenminister Silvan Schalom und dem Chefunterhändler 
der Palästinenser im Nahost-Konflikt, Nabil Schaath, 
gekommen. Beide hätten zur allgemeinen Ermüdung die 
"seit langem bekannten Positionen vorgetragen", berich-




07.05.2004 Bc. Außenminister Fischer sagte, obwohl beide Seiten an 
ihren Positionen festgehalten hätten, bleibe es doch "ein 
Wert an sich", wenn sich hohe Vertreter der israelischen 
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106 Regierung, der Palästinenser und der arabischen Staaten 
treffen und miteinander reden könnten. Außerhalb der 
Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der EU gebe es kein anderes 





01.12.2004 Bc. Vor dem gemeinsamen Essen am Montag Abend bei dem 
es traditionsgemäß zu einer offenen und lebhaften Aus-
sprache über die Lage im Nahen Osten kommt, hatten der 
israelische Außenminister Silvan Shalom und der Vertre-
ter der palästinensischen Autonomiebehörde Nabil 
Schaath bei einem bilateralen Treffen für ein wohlwol-
lendes Gesprächsthema gesorgt. 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung Nr. 8 
11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse Der Austausch sei "elitenzentriert" geblieben, und die 
Regierungen seien nun einmal nur an der Stabilität ihrer 
Regime interessiert. Ein Mitarbeiter einer deutschen 
Stiftung formulierte es so: "Der Ansatz vom Trojanischen 
Pferd hat nicht funktioniert. Die Regime haben kein Inte-
resse daran sich selbst abzuschaffen." 





28.11.2005 Horst Bacia Die Euro-Mediterrane Zusammenarbeit -im EU-Jargon 
auch als Barcelona-Prozeß bekannt- wurde 1995 auf einer 
Konferenz der Außenminister ins Leben gerufen. Dies-
mal sollte es ein Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regie-
rungschefs werden, das erste überhaupt. Doch viele der 
Geladenen aus den Partnerländern hatten anscheinend 
Wichtigeres zu tun. Die meisten schickten wieder ihre 
Außenminister. 
FAZ Nr. 277 28.11.2005 Horst Bacia Ein offener, harter Schlagabtausch zwischen den Vertre-
tern Israels und der arabischen Länder gehört indessen 






29.11.2005 Horst Bacia (…) mit mehr als hundert Einzelpunkten akzeptieren die 
Partnerländer der EU gemeinsame Prinzipien wie die 
Achtung der Menschenrechte, die Stärkung der Demokra-
tie, die bessere Beteiligung der Bürger wie der Zivilge-
sellschaft an politischen Entscheidungen, die Gleichbe-
handlung von Männern und Frauen sowie die Meinungs- 
und Informationsfreiheit. Im Gegenzug sagt die EU den 
Staaten, die zu umfassenden Reformen bereit sind, mehr 
praktische Hilfe und finanzielle Unterstützung zu. 
FAZ Nr. 136 13.06.2008 Pariser Zeitung 
"Le Monde" 
Es gibt die Befürchtung, dass die Union für das Mittel-
meer über dieselben Probleme strauchelt wie der 'Barce-
lona Prozess', der nach den israelisch-palästinensischen 
Abkommen von 1993 neuen Schwung bekommen sollte, 
aber im Laufe der Jahre gescheitert ist. Die Demontage 
von Sarkozys ursprünglichem Projekt der Mittelmeeruni-
on, die nur die Anrainerstaaten vereinen sollte, durch 
Deutschland hatte Folgen für die Wahrnehmung des 
Projektes durch die arabischen Führer. Sie sehen ihren 
Rang vermindert. 
Die Welt Nr. 
115 
19.05.2008 Christoph B. 
Schiltz 
Das Interesse der Regierungschefs war gering, die von 
der EU bereitgestellten Milliarden wurden nicht vollstän-
dig abgerufen, und die regionalen Konflikte verhinderten 
eine echte Zusammenarbeit. 
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Die Welt Nr. 
115 
19.05.2008 Christoph B. 
Schiltz 
Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen der EU und den Mit-
telmeerländern ist laut Kommission in den vergangenen 
Jahren noch gewachsen. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
03.11.2005 Rudolph Chimelli Empfindlich reagierten die nordafrikanischen Teilnehmer 
auch auf den Verdacht, schon bei der Gründungskonfe-
renz in Barcelona vor zehn Jahren hätten die Ängste der 
Europäer vor Islamismus und Einwanderung nach Europa 
Paten gestanden. Damals seien auf beiden Seiten alle von 








28.11.2005 wtr Das größte Hindernis für nennenswerte Fortschritte ist 
der Mangel an Vertrauen. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 









13.03.2008 Martin Winter Europäische Diplomaten hoffen, dass die Mittelmeerpoli-
tik nun einen "neuen Schub" bekommt. Allerdings weisen 
sie auch darauf hin, dass deren bisherige Probleme weni-
ger mit den Strukturen des Barcelona-Prozesses zu tun 
hätten als damit, dass die südlichen und östlichen Mittel-
meeranrainer untereinander zerstritten und an einer enge-
ren Bindung an Europa nicht immer interessiert seien. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
29.04.2008 Rudolph Chimelli Die Skepsis, die Union werde nichts weiter als eine Neu-





14.11.2000 Rainer Koch Nicht nur der ungelöste Nahostkonflikt wirft die Annähe-
rungsbemühungen zwischen beiden Seiten immer wieder 
zurück. Die Förderung des Mittelmeerraumes ist Gegens-
tand ständiger Eifersüchteleien zwischen der Nord- und 
Südschiene in der Europäischen Union selbst. 
taz 15.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
Das zeigt, dass der Barcelona-Prozess nicht nur an sei-
nem einstigen Namen krankte, sondern vor allem an den 
unvereinbaren Interessen seiner Mitglieder. Da ihr so 
ungleiche Partner wie die palästinensische Autonomiebe-
hörde, Israel, Algerien und Albanien angehören, kommen 
gemeinsame Projekte nicht in Gang. Die Fördermittel 
wurden bislang nur zu zwei Dritteln abgerufen. 
taz.de 13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Einmal ist das Interesse im Inneren der EU durchwach-
sen. (…) Gleichzeitig ist klar, dass es die neue Organisa-
tion auf der südlichen Mittelmeerseite mit zahlreichen 
Partnern zu tun hat, die weder demokratisch gewählt 







(D) Expression – Mediterranean Region 
FAZ Nr. 276 27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Das Mittelmeer ist und bleibt wohl auf absehbare Zeit 
eine scharfe Wohlstandsgrenze. 
FAZ Nr. 276 27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Die gewaltige wirtschaftliche Kluft wird durch kultu-
relle, religiöse und politische Differenzen verstärkt. 
FAZ Nr. 88 16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt/ 
Christian-Peter Ha-
nelt 
Noch ist das Mittelmeer mehr eine Grenze als eine 
Brücke. 
FAZ Nr. 277 28.11.2005 Javier Solana In vielerlei Hinsicht droht die Mittelmeerregion zu 
einer gefährlichen Schnittstelle der Gefahren der mo-
dernen Welt zu werden: Armut, verbesserungswürdige 
Regierungsführung, Terrorismus, Menschenhandel 
und politischer Extremismus. Gleichzeitig bildet die 
Region unser gemeinsames Erbe und eine einmalige 
Plattform für Kooperation. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.2005 Horst Bacia Die Abschlußerklärung der britischen Präsidentschaft 
bekräftigt das Ziel, die Mittelmeerregion zu einem 
"gemeinsamen Raum des Friedens, der Stabilität und 
des Wohlstands" zu gestalten. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies Nicolas Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union hat gezeigt, wie 
wichtig der Raum ist, der rund um das Mittelmeer 
entsteht. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies (noch Braudel) Die Spannungen zwischen Europa und 
dem Mittelmeer bleiben: "Das Mittelmeer, das den 
Süden Europas schon immer stark beeinflusst hat, hat 
nicht wenig dazu beigetragen, eine europäische Ein-
heit zu verhindern. Es zieht Europa in seinen Bann, 








23.01.2008 Christiane Schlötzer Das "Meer der Nachbarschaft" nennt Predrag Matve-
jevic das Mittelmeer, Atlantik und Pazifik sind für den 
Autor hingegen Meere der Distanz. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
23.01.2008 Christiane Schlötzer "Wenn wir von menschlicher Vervollkommnung 
träumen", schrieb der französische Historiker George 




24.01.2008 Interview: Stefan 
Kornelius 
[Kouchner] Das Mittelmeer ist seit dem 11. Septem-
ber 2001 die wichtigste Bruchlinie zwischen zwei 
Welten. Deshalb brauchen wir Brücken zwischen der 
Europäischen Union und Nordafrika sowie der Afri-
kanischen Union. 
FTD  01.03.2000 Rainer Koch Diesen Raum betrachten nicht nur die USA, sondern 
auch die drei EU-Großmächte, Frankreich, Deutsch-
land und Großbritannien überwiegend durch das 
Brennglas der Sicherheitspolitik. 
FTD  12.05.2003 Edward Alden, Roula 
Khalaf 
Kaum eine Region der Welt ist schlechter auf die 
ehrgeizigen Wirtschaftsreformen vorbereitet, die eine 
Freihandelszone begleiten müsste. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Schaut man auf den Globus, dann ist das Mittelmeer 
nur ein kleines Binnenmeer. Aber seine Ufer sind 
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dicht besiedelt, und ein Wohlstands-, ja Zivilisations-
gefälle schafft mittendurch eine harte Grenze, die man 
gerne unpassierbar machen würde für die verwahrlos-
ten Massen aus Afrika. Doch die Ordnung des Nor-
dens wird zunehmend herausgefordert. Im Süden 
herrscht Chaos - dort organisiert sich bestenfalls eine 
feindliche, kriegslüsterne, gewaltbereite Ordnung im 
Namen des Islam. 
 
 




08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Das Mare nostrum mag für die Wirtschaft Europas 
langfristig zu einem Binnensee werden. Brüsseler 
Milliarden braucht es dafür aber weniger als Brüsse-
ler Freiheiten. 





31.07.1995 wwe. Das Mittelmeer-Forum sieht sich als regionales 
Kooperationsgremium, will aber auch als neue Lob-




31.07.1995 wwe. Das Forum sieht den Mittelmeerraum nach der Ost-
öffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des neu-
en Europas gedrängt. 





24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Auch bei der Konferenz ranghoher Regierungsmit-
glieder der Europäischen Union sowie zwölf südli-
cher und östlicher Mittelmeeranrainer Anfang kom-
mender Woche in Barcelona dürfte viel gesagt und 




24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Die Konferenz in Barcelona wird Zeichen zur Stabi-
lisierung eines Unruheherds vor der Haustür Europas 




27.11.1995 now./wha. Die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union 
(EU) und ihren Nachbarn im südlichen und östlichen 





27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Eine Freihandelszone rund um das Mittelmeer wird 
die zentrale Vision der an diesem Monat in Barcelo-
na beginnenden Gipfelkonferenz. 




27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Kritische Beobachter unken schon im Voraus etwas 
von Fata-Morgana-Gipfel; mit dem großen EU-
Geldtropf am Horizont würden Luftschlösser gebaut, 
eigene Finanzmittel wolle dagegen kaum ein Unter-




27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Konkrete Erfolge jenseits einer unverbindlichen 
Deklaration und bequemer Scheckbuchdiplomatie 
seien wohl kaum zu erreichen. 




Startschuss zu einem Aufbruch in der Region. Erst-
mals kämen alle Staaten an einen Tisch und de-





29.11.1995 "Berliner Zeitung" "Der Konflikt des EU-Nordens mit den besorgten 
Mittelmeer-Staaten der Union hat mittlerweile zur 
Zerreißprobe in der Wohlstandsgemeinschaft ge-
führt. Das Ergebnis ist ein fadenscheiniger Kom-
promiss, wonach Osteuropa rund zwei Drittel der 





29.11.1995 now. (…)daß in Barcelona nur ein erster Schritt auf dem 
Wege zu einer umfassenden Partnerschaft getan 
worden sei, dem weiter folgen müßten. 





29.11.1995 wha. Um die Mittelmeerkonferenz zu würdigen, braucht 
man nicht, wie es der Vizepräsident der Europäi-
schen Union, Marín, in seiner Einführungsrede tat, 
zurückzugreifen auf den 27. November 1095. Da-
mals rief Papst Urban II. zum ersten Kreuzzug auf. 
Zum ersten Mal setzten sich jetzt nach einem von 
Intoleranz geprägten Jahrtausend Europäer, Araber 
und Juden, die Regierungen der Staaten rund um das 
MIttelmeer und aus der nördlichen Europäischen 
Union zu Verhandlungen zusammen. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.1995 wha. Von der Zusammenarbeit, die es im Norden gibt, ist 




14.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Auch die übliche Schönfärberei wird nicht darüber 
hinwegtäuschen können, dass die Euro-Mediterrane 




17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die Verquickung der Nahost-Kriese mit der Konfe-
renz hat schon in Malta dafür gesorgt, dass das ehr-
geizige Projekt einer Stabilitätscharta für den Mit-
telmeerraum bis auf weiteres auf Eis gelegt wurde. 




19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Der frühere Parlamentarische Staatssekretär im Bon-
ner Entwicklungsministerium Köhler (CDU) warnte 
davor, den Prozeß der wirtschaftlichen und politi-
schen Öffnung gewollt oder ungewollt als Bevor-




19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Auch der frühere französische Abgeordnete Di-
meglio, Maghreb-Experte der bürgerlichen Samm-
lungsbewegung UDF meinte, die Erklärung von 
Barcelona sei ein "wertloses Stück Papier", wenn die 
Demokratie-und Menschenrechtsklauseln nicht ernst 
genommen würde. 
FAZ Nr. 87 15.04.1999 Michael Stabenow Stück für Stück nimmt dennoch das Mosaik der 




17.04.1999 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
(…), in Stuttgart sei der "eindeutige Nachweis er-
bracht worden, daß die euro-mediterrane Partner-
schaft "auch unter manchmal heiklen und schwieri-





17.04.1999 now. Die 1995 begründete Partnerschaft zwischen den 15 
Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union (EU) und 
zwölf südlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers soll in 




17.04.1999 now. In der deutschen Delegation hieß es, die Debatte sei 
engagiert und sehr offen geführt worden. Dies zeigt, 
daß der Barcelona-Prozess zu einer "wirklichen 






Der sogenannte Barcelona-Prozess, maßgeblich von 
der damaligen spanischen EU-Präsidentschaft gefor-
dert und gefördert, (…) 
FAZ Nr. 269 18.11.1999 Günther Nonnen-
macher 
Die in Barcelona anvisierte engere politische Zu-




17.11.2000 Bc. Fischer sagte, erst nach einer Lösung des Nahost-
Konflikts werde der Barcelona-Prozess mit all seinen 
an die KSZE in Europa erinnernden Elementen seine 




17.11.2000 Bc. Die größte Schwäche des bisherigen Hilfspro-
gramms (Meda I) ist, daß im Zeitraum 1995 bis 1999 
nur 26 Prozent der von der EU zugesagten Mittel 
abgerufen wurden. 
FAZ Nr. 257 05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Der Barcelona-Prozeß ist das einzige Forum, an dem 




05.11.2001 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Die vor einem guten Jahr auf der Außenministerkon-
ferenz in Marseille schon fast für gescheitert erklärte 
Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft ist nocht nicht am Ende. 
Seit dem 11. September ist ihr Ziel, eien Raum für 
Stabilität und des Friedens auf beiden Seiten des 
Mittelmeers zu schaffen, nicht mehr nur eine Vision 





22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Auch im siebten Jahr seines Bestehens leidet der 
Barcelona-Prozeß an zwei Grundproblemen: Im 
Nahost-Konflikt überfordern sich die Mittelmeer-
partner mit Fragen, die sie nicht lösen können. Geht 
es um die eigentliche Gestaltung der Partnerschaft, 
die die Ost-Erweiterung der EU zumindest ansatz-
weise ergänzen soll, laufen sie Gefahr, sich mit ihren 
zahllosen Vorhaben zu verzetteln, wie auch ein Blick 





22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Überflüssig ist die das Mittelmeer übergreifende 
Zusammenarbeit jedoch nicht geworden -im Gegen-




22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Mittlerweile ist der Barcelona-Prozeß praktisch das 
einzige Forum, wo, wie jetzt wieder in Valencia, 




24.04.2002 Walter Haubrich Der sogenannte "Barcelona-Prozeß" der Annäherung 
zwischen den Ländern auf beiden Seiten des Mittel-
meers hatte auf spanischer Initiative 1995 mit der 
Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona begonnen. 
Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung 
24.04.2002 Walter Haubrich Nachdem die Treffen zwischen Barcelona 1995 und 
Valencia 2002 nicht gerade glanzvolle Ergebnisse 
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Nr. 95 gezeitigt hatten, wird auch diese Konferenz nur 




05.05.2004 Bc. Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft ist das einzige 
Forum, in dem regelmäßig Regierungsvertreter Isra-




05.05.2004 Bc. Der Meinungsaustausch ist jedoch siet Jahre vom 
Nahost-Konflikt überschattet und hat zu seiner Lö-




01.12.2004 Bc. (EMP) Noch in diesem Jahr will die Kommission 
individuelle Aktionspläne für die Nachbarn veröf-





11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse Fast über Nacht wurde deshalb ein bis dahin wenig 
beachtetes Kooperationsprogramm der Europäischen 
Union (EU) die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft zum 




11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse Leider wird immer deutlicher, dass dieser "europäi-
sche Ansatz" keine Früchte trägt. Im zehnten Jahr 
seines Bestehens sagen Diplomaten offen, dass der 





11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse Eine nüchternde Bilanz wird zu dem Schluss gelan-
gen, daß messbare Fortschritte nur auf dem Gebiet 





28.11.2005 Horst Bacia Schon an der immer kürzer werdenden Gästeliste 
[Regierungschefs] ließ sich ablesen, daß die Euro-
med-Partnerschaft noch ein gutes Stück von dem 
erklärten Ziel entfernt ist, rund um das Mittelmeer 
einen gemeinsamen "Raum des Friedens, der Stabili-




28.11.2005 Horst Bacia Die Mittelmeerpolitik wird jetzt durch die neue Eu-
ropäische Nachbarschaftspolitik, der die Euromed-





28.11.2005 Javier Solana Der Barcelona-Prozeß war ein integraler Bestandteil 
unserer Antwort auf das Ende des Kalten Krieges 




28.11.2005 Javier Solana Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft ist nicht der 
einzige Rahmen multilateraler Kooperation in dieser 
Region. Dennoch ist es der am weitesten entwickelte 




28.11.2005 Javier Solana Es ist wahr, daß der Barcelona-Prozeß aus den Hoff-
nungen der Osloer Friedensgespräche geboren wur-
de. In diesem Zusammenhang wirft die Abwesenheit 
von Frieden zwischen Insraelis und Palästinensern 
einen Schatten auf unsere Arbeit. Und dennoch, 
Barcelona verfolgt das Ziel, den Friedensprozeß zu 




28.11.2005 Javier Solana Für mich ist der Barcelona-Prozeß in erster Linie ein 
Projekt der Hoffnung und ein Mittel, die Hoffnungs-
losigkeit endgültig zu verbannen. Es liegt in unserem 
gemeinsamen Interesse und in unserer Verpflich-
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05.12.2006 Bc. Für die weitere Stärkung der Beziehungen soll der 
Grundsatz gelten: "Je mehr Fortschritte ein Partner-
land bei der Verwirklichung von Reformen erreicht, 
desto enger kann die Beziehung werden, und desto 
mehr Unterstützung sollte die EU leisten. 
FAZ.NET 08.02.2007   Das Bündniss solle keine Alternative zur EU wer-





26.10.2007 Die französische 
Tageszeitung "Le 
Monde" 
"Um die möglichen Teilnehmer einer solchen Union 
zu überzeugen, hat Nicolas Sarkozy das übertrieben, 
was auf dem Spiel steht. Ihm zufolge ist die Koope-
ration im Mittelmeer ein Gegengift gegen die Zivili-
sations- und Religionskriege, die entscheidende 





08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel (…)hatte sich die im Februar in Toulon erstmals 
vorgestellte Initiative einer mediterranen Schicksals-




08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel Ein Kooperationsbündniss der europäischen Mittel-
meeranrainer mit den nordafrikanischen Mittelmeer-
anrainern, insgeamt 25 Staaten (…) 
FAZ Nr. 298 22.12.2007 mic. Sarkozy: "dies ist ein großer Traum, und ich bin 
sicher, dass wir ihn verwirklichen können". 
FAZ Nr. 298 22.12.2007 mic. In Paris werden die Ergebnisse des Barcelona-




04.03.2008 Wulf Schmiese Nun geht es darum, wie sehr sich eine Mittelmeer-





13.03.2008 Wulf Schmiese "Der Barcelona-Prozeß erhält die Bezeichnung, 
Union für das Mittelmeer", heißt es in dem Vor-
schlag. Damit hat Frau Merkel erreicht, dass die 
Mittelmeerunion kein Unterverbund von jenen neuen 





13.03.2008 Wulf Schmiese "Die Union für das Mittelmeer soll eine neue Etappe 
der Zusammenarbeit und damit dem 1995 in Barce-





15.03.2008 Nikolas Busse Die Programme, die Handel und kulturellen Aus-
tausch fördern sollen, kamen aber nicht recht voran. 
Finanzmittel wurden nicht abgerufen, seit Jahren 
befasste sich kein Gipfel mehr mit der Sache. 
FAZ Nr. 64 15.03.2008 Nikolas Busse Der deutsch-französische Kompromiss bestand nun 
im Wesentlichen darin, den Barcelona-Prozess in 
Mittelmeerunion umzubenennen, woraus in Brüssel 
"Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer wur-
de". 
FAZ Nr. 64 15.03.2008 Nikolas Busse Auf dem EU-Gipfel in Paris am 13. Juli soll die 
Mittelmeerunion formal beschlossen werden. 
FAZ Nr. 102 02.05.2008 (dpa) Zum Abschluss eines Staatsbesuches in Tunis be-
zeichnete er am Mittwoch die für den 13. Juli ge-
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plante Gründung der Mittelmeerunion als "seltenes 
historisches Ereignis". Die Union werde "die Welt 
verändern" und eine Konfrontation der Kulturen 
verhindern. 
FAZ Nr. 102 02.05.2008 (dpa) Sarkozy sage in Tunis, der 1995 vereinbarte Barce-
lona-Prozess habe nicht funktioniert, weil er "auf der 
Ungleicheit von Nord und Süd" gründete. Deshalb 
habe Frankreich eine Union "auf der Basis gleicher 




20.05.2008 Nm. Die zuvor im Barcelona-Prozess institutionalisierte 





20.05.2008 Nm. Die "Union für das Mittelmeer" wäre ein tot gebore-
nes EU-Kind, Paris würde wieder auf die bilaterale 
Karte setzen. 
Die Welt Nr. 54 04.03.2008 Mariam Lau Migration, Terrorbekämpfung, Energieversorgung, 
Verkehr oder Klimapolitik - das waren einzelne 
mehr oder weniger erfolgreiche Projekte, denen aber 
die große politische Klammer fehlte. 
Die Welt Nr. 54 04.03.2008 Mariam Lau Niemand schläft schlecht wenn er nichts vom Barce-
lona-Prozess weiß. 
Die Welt Nr. 115 19.05.2008 Christoph B. 
Schiltz 
Der "Barcelona-Prozess" wurde 1995 gegründet und 
hatte keinen Erfolg. 
Die Welt Nr. 133 09.06.2008 Jochen Hehn (…)die "Union für das Mittelmeer" -so der neue 
Name- die Aufgabe haben soll, den erschlafften 
Barcelona-Pozess wiederzubeleben. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies [Sarkozy] "Davon haben wir geträumt. Die Union 
für das Mittelmeer ist Wrklichkeit geworden." 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
03.11.2005 Rudolph Chimelli Im November 1995 setzten die Europäer folglich den 
Barcelona-Prozess in Gang,(…) 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 








26.11.2005 Martin Winter Heute ist der "Barcelona-Prozess", wie er in dem 
unausrottbaren Hang der EU zu sperrigen Begriffen 
heißt, durchaus eine Erfolgsgeschichte. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
28.11.2005 wtr Diese Politik der leeren Stühle zeigt, wie es wirklich 
steht um das ehrgeizige Projekt der EU, am Mittel-








07.12.2007 Rudolph Chimelli Eine Zugehörigkeit aller zu einer Union ist ein 






Die bisherige Nachbarschaftspolitik der EU für die 
Südseite des Mittelmeers funktioniert nicht. Eine 
schon 1995 in Barcelona ausgerufene Partnerschaft 
schlitterte rasch gegen nahöstliche Friedensblocka-
den, dann vertiefte der 11. September 2001 die Kluft 
zwischen Nord und Süd. Die bescheidene Barcelona-





24.01.2008 Interview: Stefan 
Kornelius 
[Kouchner] Diese Union ist ja keine neue Idee. Der 
Barcelona-Prozess befasst sich bereits damit. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
01.02.2008 csc. Barcelona-Prozess nannte die EU schon 1995 ein 
Förderprogramm für das südliche Mittelmeer. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
01.02.2008 Javier Caceres [Merkel] Sie gestand allerdings ein, dass der 1995 
angestoßene "Barcelona-Prozess" zu bürokratisch 
sei, der bislang den institutionellen Rahmen für die 
Mittelmeer-Politik der EU absteckt. In Palma erklär-
te sie, "der Barcelona-Prozess könnte etwas lebendi-
ger sein, intensiviert werden". Dies sei von großer 






[Jouyet]: Union für das Mittelmeer ist tatsächlich 
etwas anderes als eine Mittelmeerunion - aber trotz-
dem sehr wichtig. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
04.03.2008 Stefan Braun So könnte Sarkozys Mittelmeerunion neue Impulse 
und eine neue Überschrift liefern, aber als Teil der 








06.03.2008 Stefan Kornelius Das neue Projekt wird also Mittelmeerunion heißen, 
aber dabei handelt es sich um nichts anderes als eine 




06.03.2008 Stefan Kornelius Hinter diesem sperrigen Begriff verbirgt sich ein 
Bündel von Maßnahmen der EU im Umgang mit 
ihren südlichen Nachbarn - über Migrationsfragen 
und Anti-Terror-Politik bis hin zu Strukturhilfen. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
13.03.2008 Martin Winter Er sieht im Kern vor, dass die seit 1996 als "Barce-
lona-Prozess" firmierende und sich dahin schleppen-
de europäische Mittelmeerpolitik unter neuem Na-
men belebt werden soll. 
Süddeutsche Zei-
tung 
21.05.2008 chi. Statt einer neuen Staaten-Gruppierung akzeptierte 
die Gemeinschaft nur ein anderes Etikett für eine alte 
Sache, nunmehr "Barcelona-Prozess: Union für das 
Mittelmeer" genannt. Die bestehenden Kooperati-
ons-Programme zwischen Nord und Süd wurden 
damit aufgewertet, nicht mehr. 
sueddeutsche.de 14.03.2008 dpa?? [BP] Er soll nun zu einer "Union für das Mittelmeer" 
weiterentwickelt werden. 
FTD  01.03.2000 Rainer Koch So begann unter spanischer Ägide 1995 das, was 
heute als "Barcelona-Prozess" durch das an Wort-
Ungetümen ohnehin reiche Vokabular des EU Mi-
nisterrats geistert. 
FTD  01.03.2000 Rainer Koch Wie so häufig folgt den großartigen Absichtserklä-
rungen die Ernüchterung. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Seit der Barcelona-Konferenz im November 1995 
steht sie mit zwölf Ländern (…) im Dialog. 
FTD  14.11.2000 Rainer Koch Die Bilanz des fünjährigen "Barcelona-Prozesses" - 
(…) - fällt ernüchternd aus. 
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FTD  16.11.2000 Roula Khalaf Seit dem Beginn 1995 ist der sogenannte Barcelona-
Prozess ohnehin wenig erfolgreich. 
FTD  05.11.2001 Birgit Jennen Zum Problem wurde hier vor allem die schleppende 
Auszahlung der zugesagten Gelder. Aus Diploma-
tenkreisen heißt es, die EU sei bis zu acht Jahre im 
Verzug. 
FTD  28.02.2002 Rainer Koch (…)diese Kooperationspolitik mit den Anrainerstaa-




12.05.2003 Edward Alden, 
Roula Khalaf 
Der US-Plan ähnelt der euro-mediterranen Partner-
schaft (Euromed) von 1995, die bis 2010 zwischen 
der EU und zwölf Mittelmeer-Anrainern eine Frei-
handelszone schaffen soll. Durch das Scheitern des 
Nahost-Friedensprozesses ist dieser Plan allerdings 
ins Stocken geraten. Zudem hat Euromed sich zu 
sehr auf den Handel mit der EU konzentriert und den 
Austausch zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeer-




25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Seit zehn Jahren arbeiten die 35 Partnerländer daran, 
das Mittelmeer in einen Wirtschafts- und Kulturraum 
zu verwandeln. 
FTD  05.03.2008 Birgit Marschall Es gehe um die Weiterentwicklung des Barcelona-
Prozesses, der 1995 von der EU gestartet worden 
war und in der jüngeren Vergangenheit ins Stocken 
geraten ist, sagt Merkel. 
FTD  12.03.2008 Sarkozy argumentierte dagegen, der Barcelona-Prozess habe seine Dyna-
mik verloren. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Schön die Formulierungen, mäßig jedoch der Erfolg 
bislang. 
taz 05.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
Mit dem Scheitern des Friedensprozesses in Nahost 
geriet der Barcelona-Prozess jedoch in eine Kriese - 
(…) 
taz 15.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
Zumindest der Name ist ein Fortschritt. Eine "Mit-
telmeer-Union" ist anschaulicher als ein "Barcelona-
Prozess" 
taz 20.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
[Barcelona Prozess] Seither dümpelt er vor sich hin.  
taz 20.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
Zum zehnjährigen Geburtstag des Barcelona-
Prozesses blieben die europäischen Gastgeber näm-
lich fast unter sich. 
taz.de 13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Wenn die Mittelmeerunion mehr bieten soll als einen 
ehemaligen großen, internationalen und selbstredend 
medienwirksamen Auftrieb, dann beginnt die eigent-








GERMANY – PURPOSE 
(D) Purpose – purpose 
FAZ Nr. 68 21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Die politische Partnerschaft soll nach Brüsseler Vorstellun-
gen Fragen der "Sicherheit" einschließen. 
FAZ Nr. 68 21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender (…)sollen die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen -dies ist der Kern 
des Vorschlags- ausgebaut werden. 
FAZ Nr. 68 21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Austausch und Dialog könnten die Verständigung mit der 
islamischen Welt erleichtern 
FAZ Nr. 68 21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Eine Kooperation auf Feldern, die alle Mittelmeeranrainer 
interessieren (…), soll die Partnerschaft abstützen. 
FAZ Nr. 
250 
27.10.1995 wwe. Damit könne einer der größten Wirtschaftsräume der Welt 




24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow (Deklaration) Sie soll auch dabei helfen, den Weg zur poli-
tischen und wirtschaftlichen Verständigung der Nachbarn 
von Marokko über Ägypten, Israel und Syrien bis hin zur 
Türkei zu ebnen. 
FAZ Nr. 
274 
24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft soll ein neues Modell 




24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Wer angesichts des erwarteten Medienspektakels nach dem 
Sinn des Treffens fragt, sollte sich eines Satzes des franzö-
sischen Bevölkerungswissenschaftlers Alfred Sauvy entsin-
nen: "Wenn der Reichtum nicht zu den Menschen kommt, 





27.11.1995 now./wha. Ziel der zweitägigen Konferenz ist es, die Herausbildung 
einer Zone politischer und wirtschaftlicher Stabilität rings 





27.11.1995 now./wha. Nicht zuletzt wegen des Wohlstandsgefälles und der rasan-
ten Bevölkerungsentwicklung in enigen Ländern der Regi-






29.11.1995 now. Freihandelszone(…) politischer Dialog und ein intensiverer 
kutureller Austausch. Dies soll zur Überwindung der im 
Lauf der Geschichte entstandenen Gegensätze zwischen 
Europa und vielen seiner Nachbarn, aber nicht zuletzt auch 
zwischen den südlichen Mittelmeeranrainern beitragen. 
FAZ Nr. 
278 
29.11.1995 now. Ziel aller Teilnehmer sei es, "der Sache des Friedens im 
Mittelmeerraum einen großen Impuls zu geben". 
FAZ Nr. 87 15.04.1999 Michael Stabenow Rund um das Mittelmeer soll ein gemeinsamer Raum des 






16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt und 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
[EU] Ihr strategischer Ansatz basiert auf der Errichtung 
stabiler politischer Strukturen, die Frieden und Sicherheit 
garantieren (das ist Korb I der verabredeten Kooperation), 
dem Aufbau einer Freihandelszone und der Finanzierung 
dringend notwendiger wirtschaftlicher Transformationspro-
zesse (Korb II) sowie der Intensivierung des Dialoges über 
Demokratie und Menschenrechte, aber auch über Ausgren-
zung und Rassismus (Korb III). 
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FAZ Nr. 88 16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt und 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
(Freihandelszone) In einem weiteren Schritt wären sogar 
die sechs ölreichen arabischen Golfstaaten in den transme-





16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt und 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Der auf ein Partnerland beschränkte nationale Ansatz ver-
folgt den kontinuierlichen Umbau von Wirtschaft und Ge-
sellschaft; der regional Anatz stärkt die intraregionalen und 






16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt und 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Doch was im November 1995 in Barcelona begonnen wor-
den ist, soll in einem euro.mediterranen Wirtschaftsraum 
Gestalt annehmen, der zu größerer politischer Stabilität und 
zu einem Zugewinn an Wohlstand insbesondere in den 
südlichen Anrainderstaaten führt. 
FAZ Nr. 89 17.04.1999 now. Wer dauerhaft Sicherheit und Wohlstand garantieren wolle, 
benötige eine enge Partnerschaft auch mit den Nachbarn 







(BP) (…),sollte dabei helfen, am südlichen Ufer des Mit-
telmeers ein Krisenpotenzial zu entschärfen, dessen mögli-
che negative Auswirkungen auf dem anderen Ufer des anti-





17.11.2000 Bc. Alle Länder, mit denen eine Assoziierungsvereinbarung 
besteht, sollen nach dem Wunsch der EU innerhalb von 
fünf Jahren untereinander Freihnadelsabkommen abschlie-
ßen, um die Süd- Süd- Beziehungen zu intensivieren. Fern-
ziel der EU ist die Schaffung einer euro-mediterranen Frei-





22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Es klingt wie ein Wunschtraum. Eine Zone des Friedens 
und der Stabilität soll das Mittelmeerprogramm der Europä-





11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse Das Programm, besser bekannt als Barcelona-Prozeß, zielt 
darauf, Nachbarstaaten im Süden der EU durch Handel und 






13.04.2005 Bc. Nach einem Jahrzehnt de Zusammenarbeit mit den südli-
chen und östliche Anrainern des Mittelmeers, bei der sich 
manche Erwartungen nicht erfüllt haben, will die Europäi-






13.04.2005 Bc. (…), bei der Unterstützung politischer Reformen zur Stär-
kung der Demokratie, der Förderung der Bildung, sowie der 
Liberalisierung des Handels und der Dienstleistungen neue 
Schwerpunkte zu setzen. 
FAZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.2005 Javier Solana Bildung ist die Wunderwaffe. 
FAZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.2005 Javier Solana Ob wir gemeinsam den wachsenden Herausforderungen der 
Migration begegnen können, wird ein weiterer Test für 
unsere Partnerschaft werden. Legale Migration ist ein öko-
nomischer und demographischer Imperativ für Europa. 
FAZ.NET 08.02.2007   Der französische Innenminister und Präsidentschaftskandi-
dat Nicolas Sarkozy will eine Mittelmeer-Union nach Vor-
bild der EU gründen. 
Die Welt 12.03.2008 Ansgar Graw Gemeinsam mit Merkel kündigte er anschließend an, man 
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Nr. 61 wolle den Barcelona-Prozess neu organisieren in Form 
eines Projekts aller 27 EU-Staaten. 
Die Welt 
Nr. 115 
19.05.2008 Christoph B. 
Schiltz 
Die Europäische Union (EU) will die lahmenden Beziehun-
gen zu den Mittelmeeranrainern im Nahen Osten und Afri-
ka mit der Gründung einer sogenannten Union für das Mit-
telmeer deutlich verbessern. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
03.11.2005 Rudolph Chimelli Dieser Prozess sollte in Vereinbarung mit den südlichen 
und östlichen Anrainerstaaten des Binnenmeeres eine Part-
nerschaft errichten, um den Zusammenhalt und die Stabili-





Sarkozy hat keineswegs vor, Maghreb-Staaten in die EU zu 
hieven, im Gegenteil. Seine Mittelmeergemeinschaft soll 




05.03.2008 Gerd Kröncke Die Mittelmeer-Union - mit der die nordafrikanischen und 
nahöstlichen Anrainer-Staaten enger an Europa gebunden 




11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Ziel ist es, duch sicherheitspolitische und wirtschaftliche 
Kooperation sowie kulturelle Zusammenarbeit die Stabilität 




26.05.2003 Judy Dempsey (…)"Euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft", das 1995 in Barcelo-
na ins Leben gerufen wurde, um die wirtschaftliche Lage 
rund um das Mittelmeer zu fördern und politische Refor-
men auf den Weg zu bringen. Bis 2010 sollte eine Freihan-





29.11.2005 Karin Finkenzeller Die EU und die südlichen Mittelmeeranrainer hatten 1995 
den sogenannten Barcelona-Prozess initiiert, um die Koope-
ration in der Region zu verbessern. 
taz 05.03.2008 Daniela Weingärt-
ner 
(…) Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft (EMP), die offiziell 
zum Ziel hat, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und wirt-
schaftliche Entwicklung in der Region zu fördern. 
taz.de 14.07.2008 Bernhard Schmid (…) Union für das Mittelmeer (Union pour la Méditerranée, 
UPM) sagen: Sie ist ein Instrument, um Frankreich in der 
Mitte, den Sürdrand des Mittelmeers und Afrika unten 
sowie die unerwünschten Migranten draußen zu halten. 
 
 
(D) Purpose – aim 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung Nr. 131 
08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Die Römer nannten das Mittelmeer Mare nostrum, 
unser Meer. Das soll es für die Südeuropäer wieder 
werden, die ihren mediterranen Raum nach der 
Ostöffnung und Norderweiterung an den Rand des 
neuen Europas gedrängt sehen. 
FAZ Nr. 274 24.11.1995 Michael Stabe-
now 
(Varb |d EU?) Die Partnerschaft soll auf drei Säu-
len beruhen: regelmäßiger politischer Dialog, wirt-
schaftliche Kooperation sowie Erfahrungsaus-
tausch. 
FAZ Nr. 277 28.11.1995 now. Mit der "Erklärung von Barcelona" wollen die 
Teilnehmer der Konferenz sich dazu verpflichten, 
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bis zum Jahr 2010 eine gemeinsame Freihandels-
zone zu errichten und die politischen sowie kultu-
rellen Bande zu stärken. Ehrgeiziges Ziel ist es, den 
Mittelmeerraum in eine Zone politischer und wirt-
schaftlicher Stabilität zu verwandeln. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.1995 wha. Barcelona soll nur der Beginn eines Prozesses der 
engeren Zusammenarbeit zwischen den südlichen 
und nördlichen Anrainern des Mittelmeers sein. 
FAZ Nr. 86 14.04.1997 Michael Stabe-
now 
Dennoch wollen die EU-Partner in Malta der han-




Zeitung Nr. 86 
14.04.1997 Michael Stabe-
now 
Ein das Mittelmeer umspannender Verbund außen-
politischer Fachinstitute befindet sich im Aufbau; 
in Malta soll es sogar erste Gehversuche auf dem 
Weg zu einer "Charta des Friedens und der Stabili-
tät" geben. Auch Terrorismusbekämpfung, 
Rauschgiftproblematik und Wanderungsdruck 
sollen stärker zur Sprache kommen. 
FAZ Nr. 88 16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt 
und Christian-
Peter Hanelt 
Zentrales Element des Prozesses ist die Errichtung 
einer Freihandelszone für Industrieprodukte im 
Mittelmeerraum, von der man sich all die positiven 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Folgen erhofft, (…) 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung Nr. 88 
16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt 
und Christian-
Peter Hanelt 
Das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen Nord und Süd, 
das sich zur Zeit noch in Disparitäten wie ein Ver-
hältnis von zehn zu eins in den Pro-Kopf-
Einkommen niederschlägt, soll dadurch abgebaut 
werden -nicht zuletzt in der Absicht, die Flücht-
lingswelle in die Union über MArokko, Tunesien 
und die Türkei einzudemmen. 
Frankfurter 
Allgemeine 
Zeitung Nr. 268 
17.11.2000 Bc. Anlaß des Treffens war eigentlich die von der EU 
vorgeschlagene Überprüfung und Belebung ihrer 
ehrgeizigen, vor fünf Jahren in Barcelona ins Le-
ben gerufenen Politik für den Mittelmeerraum, die 
im Rahmen einer umfassenden Partnerschaft lang-
fristig die Voraussetzungen für Frieden, Stabilität 
und Wohlstand in der Region schaffen soll. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.2005 Horst Bacia Auf einem zum zehnten Jahrestag der Zusammen-
arbeit einberufenen Gipfeltreffen in Barcelona 
verständigten sich die 35 Euromed-Staaten, ihrer 
bisher auf Handel, wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und 
kulturelle Beziehungen gegründeten Partnerschaft 
eine stärkere politische Ausrichtung zu geben. 
FAZ Nr. 286 08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel (Sarkozy) Die Zeit sei gekommen, gemeinsam eine 
Mittelmeer-Union aufzubauen, die als Bindeglied 
zwischen Europa und Afrika diene. 
FAZ Nr. 286 08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel Die deutsch-französische Vereinbarung ziele dar-
auf ab, die bisherige Mittelmeepolitik der EU im 
Rahmen des Barcelona-Prozesses mit neuem Leben 
zu erfüllen. 
FAZ Nr. 298 22.12.2007 mic. Sarkozy will die Strukturen der Mittelmeer-Union 
nach dem Vorbild der G-8-Treffen aufbauen: es 
soll ein kleines Generalsekretariat mit begrenztem 
Personal geschaffen werden. 
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Die Welt Nr. 
133 
09.06.2008 Jochen Hehn (also keine wichtigen/ kauf… Themen!) Am 13. 
Juli soll das Projekt auf einem Sondergipfel in 
Paris aus der Taufe gehoben werden und sich zu-
nächst auf vier Projekte konzentrieren: die Entgif-
tung des Mittelmeeres, den Schutz der Zivilbevöl-
kerung, auf Energie und Verkehr. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies Die von Sarkozy entworfene Mittelmeerunion 
sollte die euromediterrane Nachbarschaft beleben. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
24.01.2008 Interview: Stefan 
Kornelius 
[Kouchner] Diese Brücken sollen - und das ist der 
Unterschied zum Barcelona-Prozess - in Form von 
Projekten entstehen, zum Beispiel zum Thema 
Energie oder Hochschule. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
01.02.2008 csc. Diese alte Partnerschaft sollte wiederbelebt wer-







[Jouyet] Wir wollen damit das Ungleichgewicht 
zwischen Nord und Süd beseitigen. 
FTD  01.03.2000 Rainer Koch In Barcelona verabredeten 15 EU-Länder und 
zwölf Mittelmeer-Anrainer, ihre wirtschaftlichen, 
politischen und kulturellen Beziehungen zu inten-
sivieren. Erklärtes Ziel ist die Schaffung einer 
gemeinsamen Freihandelszone bis 2010. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrend-
tund Christian-
Peter Hanelt 
Die Liste der europäischen Vorhaben für die Mit-
telmeer-Region ist lang. 
FTD  05.11.2001 Birgit Jennen Die EU will der Spaltung der Kulturen nach dem 
11. September entgegenwirken und ihrerseits ein 
Signal der Solidarität mit der arabischen Welt set-
zen. 
FTD  28.02.2002 Rainer Koch (…)um die Region politisch und wirtschaftlich zu 
stabilisieren. 
FTD  25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Die Liste der Probleme und Projekte ist lang, daher 
sollte der Fokus auf Bildung, Demokratie und 




25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Neben der regionalen Komponente braucht die 
euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft für die kommenden 
Jahre (…)zwei neue Impulse: Erstens müssen die 
arabischen Staaten die Hilfe der EU nutzen, politi-
sche Reformen voranzutreiben. Zweitens sollte die 
EU ihren Agrarmarkt so öffnen, dass die Mittel-
meerpartner mehr landwirtschaftliche Produkte in 
Europa verkaufen können. 
taz.de 13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn (…), dass die Feindseligkeiten in der Mittelmeer-
region gebannt werden. 
taz.de 13.07.2008 Dorothea Hahn Auch die Intensivierung von Wirtschaftszusam-
menarbeit und das gemeinsame Vorgehen gegen 
Klimakatastrophe und Wasserverschmutzung sind 
überzeugende Gründe für eine bessere Zusammen-
arbeit. 
FAZ Nr. 131 08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Eine Art Marshallplan für den Mittelmeerraum ist 
das erklärte Ziel einer Initiative südeuropäischer 
Staaten unter Führung Frankreichs, Spaniens und 
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Italiens. 
FAZ Nr. 131 08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Eine Art Marshallplan für den Mittelmeerraum ist 
das erklärte Ziel einer Initiative südeuropäischer 




Zeitung Nr. 247 
24.10.2005 wie. (BP) Er könne das Nord-Süd-Verhältnis der Nach-
barn um das Mittelmeer durch die Schaffung neuer 
Mechanismen, wie zum Beispiel einer regionalen 
Entwicklungsbank, stimulieren. 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.2005 Horst Bacia Neu ist auch der Schwerpunkt Migration und ille-
gale Einwanderung im Arbeitsprogramm. 
 
 
GERMAN – IDENTITY 




07.02.1995 wha. Nach der Ostgrenze will die Europäische Union 
(EU) in diesem Jahr die Südgrenze zum wichti-




07.02.1995 wha. (Jordi Pujol, Präsident von Katalonien und der-
zeit Schiedsrichter der gesamtspanischen Poli-
tik), stellte in seiner in drei Sprachen vorgetra-
genen Schlußrede das Fehlen einer Mittelmeer-
politik in den meißten europäischen Hauptstäd-
ten fest. Nicht nur im nördlichen Europa. Italien 
existiere außenpolitisch seit Monaten überhaupt 
nicht mehr. Frankreich halte sich in Mittelmeer-





21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Nach dem weltpolitischen Umbruch in den Jah-
ren nach 1989 hatte die Europäische Gemein-
schaft in der Stabilisierung Ost- und Mitteleuro-
pas ihre vordringliche Aufgabe erkannt. Inzwi-
schen zeigt sich, daß sich Europa auch dem 
Süden stärker zuwenden muß, wenn es die von 




21.03.1995 Reinhold Brender Wenn das Wohlstandsgefälle nicht abgebaut 
werde, drohten breite Wanderungsströme, be-




08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Nun ist Lobbyismus eine erlaubte Technik des 
politischen Verteilungs-Wettbewerbs in Europa. 
Nur sollte man ihm nicht blindlings folgen. 
Richtig an der neuen Südinitiative ist, daß Euro-





08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Allerdings - die Gießkanne ist dazu das falsche 
Instrument. Milliardenschwere staatliche Hilfs-
programme sind die schnellen Einfälle von Poli-
tikern und Diplomaten. 
Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung 
22.09.1995 Walter Haubrich Die Mittelmeer-Konferenz Ende November in 
Barcelona kann nach spanischer Auffassung 
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Nr. 221 eine wichtige Probe sein für den Willen aller 
Europäer -ohne Ausnahme-, eine gemeinsame 




24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Fast noch mehr Furcht löst in Europa das 
Schreckgespenst einer durch das rasche Bevöl-
kerungswachstum bedingten Zuwanderung aus. 





24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow Ebensowenig reicht die blose Ankündigung, 
innerhalb von fünfzehn Jahren den Freihandel zu 
verwirklichen. Nutznießer einer Marktöffnung 




24.11.1995 Michael Stabenow In Brüssel gibt es Bestrebungen, dabei mit Zu-
ckerbrot und Peitsche zu verfahren. Wer schnel-
ler Reformen einführe, solle über einen festge-
legten Sockelbetrag hinaus in den Genuß weite-
rer finanzieller Hilfen kommen. Ob sich die 
ehemaligen Kolonialherren aus Europa als 
Zuchtmeister aufführen sollten, läßt sich bezwei-
feln. Erfolgsversprechender erscheint da schon 
die Überlegung, den freien Zugang zum EU-
Markt von der Bereitschaft zur regionalen Ko-




24.11.1995 wha. Barcelona streitet sich noch mit Athen um den 




27.11.1995 Wolfram Weimer Europas Furcht vor einer größeren Wanderungs-
bewegung aus den Armenhäusern am südlichen 




29.11.1995 "Berliner Zeitung" Die EU unterliegt auch hier wieder dem 
Trugschluß, daß mit dem Scheckbuch alles zu 
regeln sei. Sicherheit ist zwar nicht gratis zu 
haben, doch auch nicht mit Geld allein. Die 
Gemeinschaft wird endlich ans Eingemachte 
gehen müssen, um ihren Nachbarn auf die Beine 
zu helfen. Dazu gehört die überfällige Öffnung 





29.11.1995 now. Unter dem Druck der südeuropäischen Länder 
zeigten sich die EU-Partner nur zu einer zaghaf-
ten Öffnung der Märkte durch Präferenzab-
kommen bereit. Staatsminister Hoyer sagte 
dennoch, die EU sei "an die Grenze des für sie 
Möglichen gegangen". 
FAZ Nr. 278 29.11.1995 wha. Daß es überhaupt zu dem Treffen kam, mag man 





29.11.1995 wha. (Stärker Anwesenheit der EU) Davon kann die 




14.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Ohne Marktöffnung und Unterstützung aus dem 
Norden werde das Durchschnittseinkommen in 
Europa im Jahr 2010 nicht -wie 1995- zwölf-, 
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sonder zwanzigmal so hoch wie in den südlichen 





15.04.1999 Michael Stabenow Auch die nördlichen EU-Regierungen wissen, 
daß Wohlstand und Stabilität am Mittelmeer in 
ihrem ureigenen Interesse liegen. Nach wie vor 
erscheint ein Satz hoch aktuell, den der französi-
sche Bevölkerungswissenschaftler Alfred Sauvy 
schon vor Jahrzehnten formuliert hat: "Wenn der 
Reichtum nicht zu den Menschen kommt, wer-






Außerdem forderten die Mittelmeeranrainer 
unter den EU-Staaten, es müsse ein Signal ge-
setzt werden, um zu zeigen, dass Europa sich, 
nach dem historischen Umbruch in seinem Os-






Doch solche Schwierigkeiten ändern nichts 
daran, dass die Europäische Union allen Grund 
hat, den Dialog mit ihren Nachbarn am südli-
chen Mittelmeerufer neu aufzunehmen. Schon 
lange nicht mehr waren die Chancen so gut, dass 
sich die politische Lage dort langfristig und 






Womöglich müssen die südeuropäischen Län-
der, denen dieser Dialog aus naheliegenden 
Gründen besonders am Herzen liegt, auch über 
ihren eigenen Schatten springen, sprich: nicht 
nur Finanzmittel aus dem nördlichen Europa 







Denn wirtschaftlich -man braucht nur an die 
gemeinsame Agrarpolitik der EU zu denken- 
wäre sie von Konkurenz aus dem Maghreb und 
Nordafrika am stärksten betroffen. Alledings 
wären sie auch die ersten, die den Funkenflug zu 
spüren bekämen, wenn am anderen Ufer des 




17.11.2000 Bc. Daß die Konferenz in Marseille unter so schwie-
rigen politischen Umständen überhaupt habe 
stattfinden können, so der deutsche Außenminis-




17.11.2000 Bc. Eu-Kommissar Patten, der wiederholt seine 
Enttäuschung über die bisher erzielten Erfolge 
geäußert und den europäischen Entscheidungs-
instanzen Vorschläge zu einer Stärkung des 
Barcelona-Prozesses unterbreitet hatte, gehörte 





17.11.2000 Bc. Eine unlängst von der EU beschlossene Entbü-
rokratisierung der Genehmigungs- und Prü-
fungsverfahren soll das in Zukunft ändern. 
Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung 
05.11.2001 Hans Christian Rößler Aus der Region wurde auch auf die Folgen einer 
verfehlten europäischen Asylpolitik hingewie-
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Nr. 257 sen. Islamistische Radikale hätten in Europa 
Unterschlupf gefunden. Sie hätten von dort aus 
ihre Aktivitäten fortgesetzt. Nach den offenbar 
auch in Europa vorbereiteten jüngsten Anschlä-
gen bekomme man nun dort selbst due Folgen 





24.04.2002 Walter Haubrich Die Konferenz und die Probleme im Nahen 
Osten sind auch Themen der innenpolitischen 
Auseinandersetzung: So wirft der frühere spani-
sche Ministerpräsident Gonzáles jetzt seinem 
Nachfolger Aznar vor, das Kaptal, das Spanien 
für Gastgeber der großen Nahost-Konferenz 
1991 in Madrid und der ersten Mittelmeerkonfe-
renz 1995 in Barcelona erworben habe, leicht-




07.05.2004 Bc. Zum Abschluss eines zweitägigen Außenminis-
tertreffens im Rahmen der euro-mediterranen 
Partnerschaft (Euromed) sagt der irische Au-
ßenminister und amtierende EU-Ratsvorsitzende 
Brian Cowen, die Union sei bereit, sich an der 
Überwachung eines Waffenstillstands zu beteili-
gen und in jeder anderen denkbaren Weise dazu 
beizutragen, daß die beiden Konfliktparteien 
ihren im Friedensplan beschreibenen Verpflich-
tungen nachkommen. "Es gibt nur die Road Map 





01.12.2004 Bc. Die EU unterstützt in diesen Staaten auch Pro-
jekte zur Demokratisierung, zur Verbesserung 
der rechtsstaatlichen Verhältnisse und zur För-
derung der Zivilgesellschaft. Mit einigen von 
ihnen wird auch über die Bekämpfung des Ter-




13.04.2005 Bc. Da ein Drittel der Menschen in den Mittelmeer-
Partnerländern unter fünfzehn Jahre alt sei, 
komme dem Ausbau des Bildungswesens eine 
"zentrale Bedeutung" bei der Entwicklung zu. 
Die Kommission will daher die Mittel zur För-
derung des allgemeinen und beruflichen Bil-
dungswesens in diesen Ländern "um mindestens 




28.11.2005 Javier Solana Die Förderung von Demokratie, Pluralismus und 
Menschenrechte war schon immer Teil der Bar-
celona-Initiative. Für uns Europäer sind dies 
fundamentale Werte, weshalb wir diese auch im 
Ausland zu fördern suchen. Wir sind froh, daß 
unsere Mittelmeerpartner ihre Wichtigkeit in 
gleichem Maße anerkennen. Wir alle wissen, 
daß erfolgreiche Regierungen den Erwartungen 
ihrer Bürger entsprechen müssen. 






08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel Sarkozy erhob die französisch-algerische Aus-
söhnung zum Grundstein und Motor der Mittel-
meer-Union. Er zog bewusst den Vergleich zu 
den Anfängen Europas und der deutsch-
französischen Versöhnung. 
FAZ Nr. 286 08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel Eine Einbettung der Mittelmeer-Union in die EU 




08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel Erst nach der Kritik von Kanzlerin Merkel, dass 
eine Mittelmeer-Union unter Ausschluss eines 
Teils der EU-Mitgliedstaaten eine schwere Be-
lastungsprobe für die EU darstellen würde, hat 
Sarkozy in Aussicht gestellt, die Mittelmeer-




08.12.2007 Michaela Wiegel [Merkel] (…),dass "eine eigenständige Mittel-
meer-Union unter französischer Führung kein 




22.12.2007 mic. Er versicherte sich der Unterstützung der bislang 
zaudernden Ministerpräidenten Spaniens und 
Italiens, Zapatero und Prodi, für das außerhalb 




22.12.2007 mic. Das politische Gewicht, das Sarkozy der Mit-
telmeer-Union beimisst, lässt sich auch am ver-





22.12.2007 mic. "Wir drei haben entschieden, dass es einen geei-
nigten Mittelmeerraum gegen Krieg und gegen 
Hoffnungslosigkeit geben soll", (…) 
FAZ Nr. 298 22.12.2007 mic. [Zapatero] "Wir wollen, dass die Länder des 
Mittelmeers parallel zur EU entscheidende Pro-
tagonisten werden". 
FAZ Nr. 298 22.12.2007 mic. [Prodi] "Der Krieg der Kulturen kann nur mit 




24.01.2008 Martin Schulz Sarkozy will sichtlich eine eigene Organisation 
mit eigenen Institutionen. Deutschland könne da 
einen Beobachterstatus haben, sagte er. Das 
sprengt den institutionellen Rahmen der EU, und 
da muss man die Franzosen schon fragen, ob sie 
die Union in ihrer Präsidentschaft in ihre Einzel-




04.03.2008 Wulf Schmiese Sarkozy hat offenbar akzeptiert, dass seine Mit-
telmeerunion nur unter dem Dach des Barcelo-




07.03.2008 flf. (Sarkozy) "Angela wollte, dass alle europäi-
schen Länder im Rahmen des Barcelona-
Prozesses mitmachen können. Und ich dachte, 
dass dieser Prozess, 1995 begonnen, stecken 
geblieben sei und dass man eine wirkliche Part-





15.03.2008 Nikolas Busse Nach einigem Hin und Her gelang es der Bun-
desregierung schließlich, dem französischen 
Projekt die Spitze zu nehmen, in dem sie dessen 






15.03.2008 Nikolas Busse Auf die war Europa einmal sehr stolz, weil hier 
nicht nur viel Geld für die Entwicklung einer 
Kriesenanfälligen Nachbarschaft zur Verfügung 
gestellt wurde, sondern vor allem Israel und die 




20.05.2008 Nm. Die vom französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy 
propagierte Mittelmeeunion entwickelt sich zum 
permanenten Zankapfel in der EU. 
Die Welt Nr. 176 31.07.2007 Thomas Schmid Frankreich will größer sein, als es ist. 
Die Welt Nr. 287 08.12.2007 Jochen Hehn Merkel hatte am Vortag vor der Sprengwirkung 
für die Einheit der EU gewarnt, sollte Frankreich 
mit der Mittelmeerunion einen exklusiven Klub 
aufbauen wollen. 
Die Welt Nr. 54 04.03.2008 Mariam Lau durch den 1995 auf Anregung der Deutschen 
von der EU begonnenden Barcelona-
Prozess,(…) 
Die Welt Nr. 64 15.03.2008 Hannelore Crolly und 
Christoph Schiltz 
"Wir haben jetzt alle Chancen, dem Mittelmeer-
prozess wirklich eine neue Dynamik zu geben", 
sagte Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel. Die Be-
geisterung bei den osteuropäischen Staaten ist 
allerdings verhalten. 
Die Welt Nr. 133 09.06.2008 Jochen Hehn ("Le Monde") "Misstrauen und vor allem eine 
stumme Rivalität um die Führung Europas" zu 
entdecken. 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn Bernard Kouchner: Wir haben gezeigt, dass 
Frankreich zu einer Diplomatie des Dialogs 
zurückgefunden hat. 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn (B. Kouchner): Frankreich spielt heute weltweit 
eine aktive Rolle. 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn (B. Kouchner): Es war nicht leicht, Spanien zur 
Teilnahme zu bewegen, das den Gipfel als Kon-
kurrenzveranstaltung zum Barcelona-Prozess 
gesehen hat. 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn Wird Frankreich die Europäer mit Europa ver-
söhnen? Kouchner: Ich würde gern sagen, dass 
eine Versöhnung stattgefunden hat. Aber daran 
muss noch hart gearbeitet werden. Weil es hier 
keine Sehnsucht mehr nach Europa gibt 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn (B. Kouchner): Die Europäer sind sich nicht 
bewusst, dass all die Fortschritte eng mit Europa 
verbunden sind und dass kein Land allein in der 
Lage wäre, die Herausforderungen der Globali-
sierung zu meistern. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies Der Gründung der Union pour la Méditerrannée 
gingen heftige Konflikte innerhalb der Europäi-
schen Union voraus. 
Welt Online 05.08.2008 Wolf Lepenies Und zum Architekten der Mittelmeerunion wur-
de Sarkozys Berater Henri Guaino, ein Euro-
skeptiker, der nicht aufhört, gegen das "bürokra-
tische Monster" zu wettern, das sich in Brüssel 
breit gemacht hat. Guaino ist in Arles aufge-
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wachsen und hat eine spanische Mutter - er ist 
stolz drauf, ein Mann des Midi zu sein. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
03.11.2005 Rudolph Chimelli Lange bevor die Bilder afrikanischer Boat Peo-
ple oder von Migranten im Stacheldraht der 
spanischen Exklaven Ceuta und Melilla die 
Nordeuropäer aufschreckten, hatte die Europäi-
sche Union begriffen, dass das Mittelmeer, das 
einstige Mare Nostrum der Römer, für sie zu 
einer Problem-Region geworden war: 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
26.11.2005 Martin Winter Die europäische Politik für das Mittelmeer trägt 




26.11.2005 Martin Winter Das europäische Kalkül war schlicht: Wer mit-
einander Handel treibt, lässt sich eher zur Beile-
gung von Konflikten bewegen. Daran, mit die-
sen Ländern auch ein Gespräch über Demokra-
tie, Menschenrechte, Flüchtlinge oder den 
Kampf gegen den Terrorismus einzutreten, 
dachte damals noch keiner. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
26.11.2005 Martin Winter (…)zwei Probleme, die die Europäer besonders 
bewegen. Zum einen wollen sie Algerien, Ägyp-
ten, Israel, Jordanien, den Libanon, Marokko, 
die Palästinenser, Syrien, Tunesien und den 
"Beobachter" Libyen zu einem gemeinsamen 
"Verhaltenskodex" im Kampf gegen den Terror 
bewegen. Die EU erhofft sich davon eine besse-
re Kooperation bei Abwehr und Aufklärung von 
Anschlägen. Zum anderen entsteht das Flücht-
lingsproblem aus Schwarzafrika auf der TAges-
ordnung, das die Maghreb-Satten als Durch-
gangsgeländer als Erste zu spüren bekommen. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
07.12.2007 Rudolph Chimelli Die Mittelmeerunion, ein Wunschkind des fran-
zösischen Präsidenten Nicolas Sarkozy, findet 
kaum freundlich gesinnte Paten. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
07.12.2007 Rudolph Chimelli Seine Existenz so fürchtet sie [Merkel], brachte 
die Gefahr einer Spaltung der EU mit sich, denn 




23.01.2008 Christiane Schlötzer Die EU fürchtet Spaltung, aber wie versponnen 
die Vision von der eurabischen Gemeinschaft 
auch sein mag, Sarkozy hat Geister geweckt und 
Erwartungen gezeugt, die nur schwer zu bändi-
gen sind -an den Küsten des Südens. 
sueddeutsche.de 14.03.2008 dpa?? "Wir haben uns heute geeinigt, dass es gut ist, 
wenn der Barcelona-Prozess gestärkt wird" 
sueddeutsche.de 14.03.2008 dpa?? Sarkozy nannte die grundsätzliche Einigung der 
EU auf die Mittelmeerunion einen Erfolg für 
Frankreich und Europa. "Das ist eine sehr wich-
tige Etappe", sagte Sarkozy. "Europa kehrt dem 
Mittelmeer nicht mehr den Rücken zu." 
sueddeutsche.de 08.11.2008 Werner Weidenfeld Europa ist strategisch verwirrt. 
sueddeutsche.de 08.11.2008 Werner Weidenfeld All die Probleme deuten auf eine gemeinsame 
Wurzel: Europa fehlt die Orientierung, es fehlt 
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01.03.2000 Rainer Koch Die wirtschaftlich schwächere Südschiene der 
EU fand bisher wenig Gehör mit der Klage, ihr 





01.03.2000 Rainer Koch Die EU-Nordlichter betrachten das Mittelmeer 




14.11.2000 Rainer Koch Die Europäer sind ihrem Ziel, die Mittelmeer-
staaten politisch und wirtschaftlich näher an sich 




05.11.2001 Birgit Jennen "Es ist bereits ein Erfolg, dass unter diesen 





25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Europa hat das Ziel ihre Entwicklung [arab. 





15.02.2008 Peter Ehrlich Barosso hat viele Arbeitgeber: Das Europäische 
Parlament und 27 Regierungen. "Wenn es ernst 
wird ruft er in Berlin und Paris an", heißt es aber 
in deutschen Regierungskreisen. Viele andere 
können in der EU Prozesse aufhalten oder blo-
ckieren, aber nur mit Zustimmung der deutschen 
und der französischen Regierung können Ende 
des Jahres die Posten des neuen EU-
Außenministers und des neuen Ratspräsidenten 
besetzt werden. Auch Barosso selbst könnte sich 
die angestrebte zweite Amtszeit abschminken, 
wenn die beiden ihn fallen lassen. 
FTD.de 14.07.2008 Lutz Meier, Wolfgang 
Proissl 
Lange war Nicolas Sarkozys Initiative auf viel 
Widerstand gestoßen, nach der die Staaten von 
Nordafrika, des Nahen Ostens und des Balkans 
mit den Ländern der Europäischen Union eine 
neue Kooperation eingehen sollen. Nun hat der 
Gipfel auch nach Aussage von anfänglichen 
Kritikern -wie etwa Bundekanzlerin Angela 
Merkel - (...) 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak In Wirklichkeit verkörpert Sarkozy den Nieder-
gang der Figur des visionären europäischen 
Staatsmanns. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Nein, Sarkozy geht es weder um Europa noch 
um die Türkei. Ihm geht es um scheinbare fran-
zösische Nationalinteressen, die er mit dem 
Etikett der Modernisierung wertvoller zu ma-
chen versucht, als sie es in Wirklichkeit sind. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Europa geht es bislang nicht darum, Demokratie 
zu exportieren, sondern in erster Linie um die 
Sicherung eigener Hoheitsgebiete. Das sind 
Ausbesserungsarbeiten an der Festung Europa. 
taz 05.03.2008 Daniela Weingärtner [Sarkozys MU] Doch nicht einmal in Spanien 
und Italien stieß der Plan auf Begeisterung. 
taz 20.03.2008 Daniela Weingärtner Das Konzept ist immer das gleiche: Finanzielle 
Hilfe, Förderung der staatlichen Strukturen und 
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des regionalen Dialogs im Austausch gegen 
mehr Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Verbrechensbekämp-
fung, Rücknahme von Flüchtlingen und Grenz-
sicherung. 
taz 20.03.2008 Daniela Weingärtner Trotzdem hat Sarkozys diese Woche vorgelegte 
Operetteninszenierung mit dem Titel "Mittel-
meerunion" zumindest ein Gutes: Die Tatsache, 
dass die Europäische Union auch im Süden 
Nachbarn hat, rückt wieder mehr ins Bewusst-
sein. 
taz 20.03.2008 Daniela Weingärtner Für die Mittelmeerregion aber fühlte sich schon 







17.11.2000 Bc. Der ägyptische Außenminister Musa und andere Vertreter der 
arabischen Staaten forderten die Europäische Union abermals 
auf, sich im Friedensprozeß stärker zu engagieren und auch 





28.11.2005 Javier Solana Viele Mittelmeerländer wollen den Pfad der politischen Re-
form weiterverfolgen, möchten diesen Prozeß jedoch selbst 
gestalten und suchen dazu unsere Unterstützung. Wir befür-






31.07.1995 wwe. Frankreich, Spanien und Italien wollen sich für eine stärkere 
Hinwendung der EU nach Süden stark machen. Die neue 
Südtriade signalisiert mit dem Forum, daß sich Europa in den 
Jahren nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges unter der Führung 




28.11.2005 Javier Solana Wir Europäer haben unaufhörlich daran gearbeitet, ein Frie-













08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Eine gönnerhafte Scheckbuch-Diplomatie der 
Europäer mit semikolonialen Attitüden kann dabei 





08.06.1995 Wolfram Weimer Die EU hat auf der anderen Seite nach ihrer Nord-
Erweiterung Konsolidierungsbedarf und kann sich 





07.10.1995 wha. Über die Teilnahme der Vereinigten Staaten und 
Rußlands an der Mittelmeerkonferenz der Europä-
ischen Union und der südlichen Mittelmeeranrai-
ner in Barcelona (27. und 28. November) gibt es 
noch Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen Frank-
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07.10.1995 wha. (Teilnahme USA --> BP) Eine Protagonistenrolle 
wir den Vereinigten Staaten sicher nicht zugestan-
den. Es wird in Barcelona schließlich zum großen 
Teil um die Verwendung von europäischen Gel-




29.11.1995 wha. Die Europäische Union hat ihren Willen demonst-
riert, in Zukunft in der südlichen Nachbarregion 




08.11.1996 Walter Haubrich (Moratinos) "Die europäische Politik ist in Israel 
nicht gut erklärt worden; es sollte im Nahen Osten 
kein falscher Protagonismus gesucht werden, we-
der von den Vereinigten Staaten noch von Europa. 





14.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Da die Konferenz ohne ameikanische Präsenz 
stattfindet, sind die Hoffnungen auf eine von der 
Mittelmeerinsel ausgehende neue Dynamik im 




17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die in vielen europäischen Hauptstädten gehegte 
Hoffnung, die Gemeinschaft könne mit dem Rah-
men der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft die Annäherung 
zwischen Israel und seinen arabischen Nachbarn 
schnell voranbringen, droht sich sogar in das Ge-




17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Die jetzt offensichtlich gewordene Taktik der 
Europäer, das euro-mediterrane Forum für weitere 
Impulse für den Friedensprozeß zu nutzen, erwies 
sich jedoch als riskant. Vielleicht war es kein Zu-
fall, daß die Stühle der Delegierten im großen 





17.04.1997 Michael Stabenow Unbeeidruckt blieben die Europäer durch die 
jüngsten Mahnungen aus Washington, die Nahost-
Problematik nicht mit dem Prozeß der euro-




19.09.1997 Michael Stabenow Am EU-Sitz weiß man jedoch, daß sich Europa 
angesichts der gegenseitigen Abhängigkeit nicht 




15.04.1999 Michael Stabenow So verlockend es auch für die EU-Partner erschei-
nen mag, die Mittelmeerpartnerschaft als politi-
sches Instrument zur Förderung des Friedenspro-
zesses im Nahes Osten zu nutzen, so riskant kann 




16.04.1999 Sven Behrendt und 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Der den Umbau der einzelnen Folgswirtschaften in 
den Partnerstaaten des südlichen Mittelmeerraums 
ergänzende regionale Ansatz des Barcelona-
Prozesses geht von dem Grundgedanken aus, daß 
sich Kapital und Handel im globalen Zeitalter 




17.04.1999 now. Das entscheidende Zeichen der Konferenz sei, daß 
die Europäische Union nicht nur nach Osten, son-








Die EU und ihre Mitgliedländer, Spanien voran, 
das bei diesem Dialog federführend war und ist, 
müssen jetzt ausloten, auf welchen Gebieten die 




17.11.2000 Bc. Fischer stellte klar, dass die EU bereit sei, eine 




22.04.2002 Hans Christian 
Rößler 
Die spanische Ratspräsidentschaft will sich neben-
bei noch als Vermittlerin im Nahost-Konflikt ver-
suchen: Trotz der Kritik an den jüngsten Militärak-
tionen und angesicht europäischer Forderungen 
nach Sanktionen wird der israelische Außenminis-




06.03.2004 Bc. An der von den Vereinigten Staaten vorgeschlage-
nen Initiative zur Demokratisierung und Moderni-
sierung des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens will sich 





06.03.2004 Bc. Fischer hatte damals unter anderem von einem 
"gemeinsamen Mittelmeer-Prozeß der Nato und 




06.03.2004 Bc. Das von den Außenministerien in Berlin und Paris 
ausgearbeitete "non-paper" hebt nun aber deutlich 
hervor, daß "die EU einen ausgeprägten eigenen 
Ansatz" verfolgen solle, der den der Vereinigten 
Staaten zwar ergänze, aber mit den EU eigenen 
Institutionen und Instrumenten arbeite. Besonders 
verwiesen wird auf die politische und wirtschaftli-
che Zusammenarbeit mit den südlichen Anrainern 
des Mittelmeers im sogenannten Barcelona-Prozeß 





07.05.2004 Bc. Ein dritter Themenschwerpunkt des Treffens war 
das Angebot der EU an die Partnerländer im soge-
nannten Barcelona-Prozeß, politische Reformen 
bei der Demokratisierung und der Achtung der 
Menschenrechte zu unterstützen. Dabei erwarte die 
EU von den Ländern der Region vorschläge, sagt 




11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse (…) Seit 1995 insgesamt 6,2 Milliarden Euro an 
die Partnerländer gezahlt. (…) Das macht die EU 
zum größten nicht militärischen Hilfegeber im 




11.01.2005 Nikolas Busse (Manche Diplomaten): Entweder die EU konzent-
riere sich nur noch auf die wirtschaftliche Seite der 
Zusammenarbeit, oder sie konzipiere die politische 




28.11.2005 Horst Bacia Nicht zuletzt dank der Initiativen ihres Chefdiplo-
maten Solana, der beim ersten Barcelona-Treffen 
als spanischer Außenminister den Vorsitz führte, 
ist die EU heute als Mitglied des Nahost-Quartetts 





02.05.2008 (dpa) Die von ihm vorangetriebene Mittelmeerunion 
trägt nach Auffassung des französischen Präsiden-
ten Nicolas Sarkozy entscheidend zur Verbesse-
rung der Beziehungen des Westens zur arabisch-
muslimischen Welt bei. 
Die Welt Nr. 
176 
31.07.2007 Thomas Schmid Für eine EU, die sich mit der Osterweiterung ver-
ausgabt und den Mittelmeerraum sträflich ver-
nachlässigt - einen Raum, der historisch für Euro-
pa konstitutiv war und der heute als Nahstelle zu 
Afrika und zur arabischen Welt von mehr als stra-
tegischer Bedeutung ist. 
Welt Online 20.07.2008 Jochen Hehn (B. Kouchner): Die Anwesenheit von 43 Staats- 
und Regierungschefs ist schon ein Erfolg für sich. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
28.11.2005 wtr Die Geduld der Europäer ist groß, aber sie darf 
nicht unendlich sein. 
Süddeutsche 
Zeitung 
23.01.2008 Christiane Schlötzer Was aber wäre die EU, wenn sie im Süden darauf 
verzichten würde, Hilfen und Kredite mit Ansprü-




01.02.2008 Javier Caceres Zudem habe man durch den Barcelona-Prozess 
bereits ein Instrumentarium, das genutzt werden 
müsse. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Doch das Vorgehen der EU hat nicht nur Stärken. 
Es beruht auf der zu pauschalen Sichtweise, dass 
sich die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Probleme 
des Mittelmeerraums gleichen und dass die Region 
als einheitlicher Sicherheitskomplex zu verstehen 
ist. Nur zögerlich werden unterschiedliche Ge-
schwindigkeiten und Erfolge der Reformen aner-
kannt. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
[Transformationen durch AA] Hier muss die EU 
Überzeugungsarbeit leisten. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Außerdem fällt auf, dass die Mittelmeerstrategie 
Wohlstand und Sicherheit im östlichen Mittel-
meerraum nicht mit den Entwicklungen in der 
Golfregion verknüpft. Es fehlt ein Konzept wie 
Iran und Irak in Zukunft friedlich an die Region 
angeschlossen werden können. 
FTD  11.09.2000 Sven Behrendtund 
Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
Die Europäische Union muss in ihrer Mittelmeer-
strategie Prioritäten setzen und diese konsequent 
verfolgen. 
FTD  23.04.2002 Rainer Koch, Judy 
Dempsey 
Die Europäische Union gibt trotz kaum über-
brückbarer Differenzen mit Tel Aviv ihre Versu-
che nicht auf, als Vermittler im Konflikt mit den 
Palästinensern zu wirken. 
FTD  23.04.2002 Rainer Koch, Judy 
Dempsey 
Für die Europäische Union steht mit der inzwi-
schen fünften Ministerkonferenz des sogenannten 
"Barcelona-Prozesses" die gesamte Strategie auf 
dem Spiel, mit welcher die EU ihre südliche 
Nachbarregion stabilisieren und damit auch eine 
zentrale Rolle im Nahost-Friedensprozess einneh-
men will. 
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FTD  12.05.2003 Edward Alden, 
Roula Khalaf 
Die USA hoffen, dass durch ihr Konzept Proble-
me, mit denen die EU-Initiative zu kämpfen hat, 
vermieden werden. 
FTD  25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Die EU sollte klarer als bisher Reformen in den 
arabischen Partnerländern unterstützen. 
FTD  25.11.2005 Christian Hanelt Die arabischen Partner, die glaubhaft und intensiv an 
Reformen arbeiten, sollte Europa mit seinen Hilfspro-
grammen stärker fördern. 
FTD  05.03.2008 Birgit Marschall Mit den Anrainerstaaten des Mittelmeers will die 
EU intensiver ins Gespräch kommen, die Wirt-
schaft dort ankurbeln und Know-how exportieren. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Europa braucht eine glaubwürdige, gut durchdach-
te Mittelmeerpolitik. 
taz 06.08.2007 Zafer Senocak Es ist also höchste Zeit, endlich über eine echte 
europäische Mittelmeerpolitik nachzudenken, die 
diesen Namen verdient. 
 
 
4. GREAT BRITAIN 
GREAT BRITAIN – EXPRESSION 
(GB) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
Independent.co-
uk 
12.07.2008 ? The existing drive towards closer realtionship 
with North Africa in the Barcelona process of 
1995 has run into the sands. 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.09.2005 from a speech by the 
secretary general of the 
League of Arab States, 
given at the Euro-Med 
Networks conference at 
Chatham House, Lon-
don 
(…) the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to 
haunt the scene because biased policies have 
pushed the conflict into a dead end. (…) we 
have new agenda items like Iraq, whose shad-
ows and repercussions weigh heavily on the 




18.03.2004 Adrian Hamilton What we need is to make the present struc-
tures like Barcelona effective, not distort eve-
rything to the domestic plitical imperatives of 
Bush and Blair. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader (…) launched an ambitious attempt to 
strengthen links with the countries on its 
southern flank, from Morocco in the west to 
Syria and Jordan in the Middle East proper, 
boldly taking in Israel and the Palestinian 
territories. 
Guardian 28.11.2005 Ewen MacAskill European leaders turned out in force, includ-
ing Tony Blair, but at least eight of the non-
EU 10 failed to send their leaders. 
Guardian 13.05.2004 Ian Black [ENP] In the south, the policy will apply to 




(GB) Expressioon – the other 
Independent.co-
uk 
17.11.2000 Robert Fisk And since the Arabs are desperate for a strong European 
role – and maybe a European multilateral force – that left 
the Israelis with their usual veto. 
 
 
(GB) Expression – associative/dissociative 
Independent.co-
uk 
12.07.2008 ? Libya and Algeria expressed fears that the new 
union was just a means of reasserting French 
colonial ambitions in North Africa and of 
keeping the pressures of immigration into 
southern Europe at bay. Other Arabs were 
suspicious that, by inviting Israel, the project 
was a mean to push Mr Sarkozy’s hopes of 
integrating Israel into a wider Europe. Human 
rights remain conspicuous by their absence 
from the agenda. And worries that this was all 
a French plot under European disguise were 
hardly allayed by the choice of initial co-
operation schemes – solar power, nuclear en-
ergy and claening up the sea – in all of which 
French industrial presence is strong. 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.09.2005 from a speech by the 
secretary general of 
the League of Arab 
States, given at the 
Euro-Med Networks 
conference at Chatham 
House, London 
The same could also be said on the issue of the 
Turkish request to join the European Union. 




14.09.2005 from a speech by the 
secretary general of 
the League of Arab 
States, given at the 
Euro-Med Networks 
conference at Chatham 
House, London 
The Barcelona process needs to play a bigger 
role in supporting Turkey joining the EU. 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.09.2005 from a speech by the 
secretary general of 
the League of Arab 
States, given at the 
Euro-Med Networks 
conference at Chatham 
House, London 
I mean, are we of the same opinion about it in 
the Mediterranean community? Yes, we are all 
on the same side when it comes to combating 




14.09.2005 from a speech by the 
secretary general of 
the League of Arab 
States, given at the 
Euro-Med Networks 
conference at Chatham 
House, London 
No, we don’t believe and we refuse to accept 
the superficial and bad faith interpretations of 
the origins of terrorism as a product of Islamic 
thought and education. 
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Guardian 12.06.2008 Ian Black (…) Gadafy dismissed a French proposal for a 
Euro-Mediterranean alliance as an insult to 
Arabs and Africans. “This is taking us for 
fools,” he said. “We do not belong to Brussels. 
Our Arab League is located in Cairo and the 
African Union is located in Addis Ababa. If 
they want cooperation they have to go through 
Cairo an Addis Ababa.” 
 
 
GREAT BRITAIN – PURPOSE 
(GB) purpose – purpose 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.09.2005 speech by 
the secre-
tary gen-




The launching of the Barcelona Process in 1995 was aimed 
at forming a new community of nations with their Mediter-
ranean identity as the common denominator and the dia-
logue between its several civilisations a priority item, along 
with security, culture and social development. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader The initiative was intended to balance the EU’s enlarge-
ment to the former communist east.  
 
(GB) purpose -aim 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.07.2008 John Lichfield The new Union for the Mediterranean will attempt to 
set up common approaches to, among other things, 
global warming, investment, solar energy, water short-
ages, illegal immigration, maritime pollution, road and 
sea transport and university exchange programmes. 
Guardian 06.02.2008 El Hassan bin 
Talal 
(…) seeks to align governments with the concerns of a 
myopic global security agenda. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader Self-interest and altruism coincided in a plan to export 
stability into Europe’s “Club Med” backyard or see 
instability imported into the EU’s own house. Member-
ship, a huge carrot for Turkey, was not on offer, but 
more trade and investment, the theory went, would 
promote economic growth, democracy and human 
rights as well as reduce conflict and terrorism. 
 
 
GREAT BRITAIN – IDENTITY 
(GB) Identity – role 
Independent.co-uk 18.03.2004 Adrian Hamilton In one sense for Europe to go along with the 
Greater Middle East initiative requires no more 
than melding this policy with US might. But in 
another sense, it wraps a policy of patient di-
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plomacy in a new language of demand which 
could bring about the very conditions of conflict 
that it seeks to resolve. 
Guardian 21.10.2007 El Hassan bin Talal Yet Europe’s potential contribution should not 
be underestimated. Europe’s financial contribu-
tion to the Middle East has been consistent and 
impressive. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader Europeans must try harder to overcome the 
obstacles and turn this lopsided partnership into 
a more constructive one. 
 
 
(GB) Identity - EU 
Independent.co-
uk 
12.07.2008 ? Just after he was elected, M. Sarkozy outlined his 
plan for a “great dream of peace and a great dream of 




12.07.2008 ? But his idea of an EU-funded club that did not in-
clude EU states without a Mediterranean coast an-
gered Germany in particular. 
Independent.co-
uk 
14.07.2008 John Lichfield “The European and the Mediterranean dreams are 
inseparable,” he said. “We will build peace in the 
Mediterranean together, like yesterday we built 
peace in Europe …We will succeed together; or we 
will fail together.” 
Independent.co-
uk 
12.07.2008 ? The idea of a new Union for the Mediterranean com-
bining the Europe of the south with the Arabs of 
North Africa and the Turks, Israelis and Levantines 
of the East was Mr Sarkozy’s prime foreign policy 
proposal during the French presidential campaign. 
Now he has made it his first initiative of France’s 
turn as president of Europe. 
Independent.co-
uk 
18.03.2004 Adrian Hamilton The European Union has so far pursued a perfectly 
sensible course of its own through the Barcelona 
process which tries to bring North Africa and the 
Middle East (including Israel) closer to Europe 
through trade and investment agreements tempered 
by human rights requirements. It’s not dramatic and 
its progress has been somewhat stuttering to date. 
But it is working, as recent developments in Iran and 
North Africa have shown, because it offers induce-
ment without imposition. 
Independent.co-
uk 
28.02.2008 John Lichfield, 
Tony Paterson 
Berlin has been especially annoyed by M. Sarkozy’s 
determination to push ahead with a so-called “Club 
Med” or formal union of countries on the shores of 
the Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel believes that 
such an organisation would be either a pointless 
distraction or a thread to the unity of the EU. 
Independent.co-
uk 
28.02.2008 John Lichfield, 
Tony Paterson 
At the heart of the quarrel – not yet an overt crisis – 
is the strained relationship between the two leaders. 
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Guardian 20.08.2008 David Gow It can count on support from its “Club Med” partners 
in Italy and Spain but Germany, determined to main-
tain fiscal discipline and avoid a repeat of the 1970s, 
is resolutely opposed. And so is the European com-
mission. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor President Nocolas Sarkozy yesterday sought to shift 
Europe’s strategic focus towards the Middle East, 
North Africa and the Balkans, hosting 42 heads of 
state and government at a summit in Paris to launch a 
new Mediterranean Union. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor (…) Sarkozy’s grand initiative is acutely political, 
claiming a pole position for France in European 
foreign policy-marking after years of drift and seek-
ing to redirect policy from the east of Europe to the 
south. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor [Sarkozy] He delivered a message of peace to a sus-
picious audience of leaders more noted for their 
backstabbing rivalries and conflicts. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor “The goal of the summit is to learn how to love each 
other in the Mediterranean, instead of continuing to 
hate and wage war,” said Sarkozy. “We will build 
peace in the Mediterranean together.” 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor Sarkozy’s big idea is to use imperial Rome’s centre 
of the world as a unifying factor linking 44 countries 
that are home to 800 million people. But the plan has 
been pilloried by such diverse sources as Chancellor 
Angela Merkel of Germany and Colonel Muammar 
Gadafy of Libya. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor Despite the fanfare in Paris, Sarkozy’s new “Club 
Med” will be a long haul if it is to amount to much 
beyond a talking shop and a channel for transferring 
EU funds to the Maghreb and the Middle East. 
Guardian 14.07.2008 Ian Traynor Germany, the EU paymaster, balked at that and also 
suspected a Sarkozy scheme to devide the EU into 
zones of influence where Berlin would take charge to 
its east and Paris would play the main role in the 
south. 
Guardian 10.07.2008 Simon Tisdall The idea is to create a permanent institutional link 
between Europe and all countries with Mediterra-
nean coastlines, including such odd bedfellows as 
Israel, Palestine, Syria and Libya. The hope is that 
the union will boost economic and security coopera-
tion. 
Guardian 10.07.2008 Simon Tisdall Critics – (…) – say Sarkozy’s grand projet is a vain-
glorious attempt to increase French influence in a 
region it has manipulated and exploited since Napo-
leonic times. They say Sarkozy is merely trying to 
boost his own battered standing and France’s EU 
presidency – (…) 
Guardian 14.03.2008 Ian Traynor Sarkozy has planned to launch the bold new union 
when France took over the presidency of the EU in 
July, but climed down after fierce opposition from 
Angela Merkel, the German chancellor. 
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Guardian 14.03.2008 Ian Traynor Britain also opposed the plan, suspecting it was de-
signed to wreck any chance of Turkey joining the 
EU. Britain is Turkey’s biggest supporter in the EU, 
while Sarkozy is outspokenly opposed to Ankara 
joining. 
Guardian 14.03.2008 Ian Traynor While backtracking, however, Sarkozy has suc-
ceeded in pushing the Mediterranean issue up the EU 
agenda and establishing new structures and positions 
to bolster his ideas, diplomats said. There are to be 
Mediterranean summits every two years, and two co-
president of the new union. 
Guardian 21.10.2007 El Hassan bin 
Talal 
The European Union’s policy in the Middle East is 
the litmus test of its common foreign and security 
policy. 
Guardian 21.10.2007 El Hassan bin 
Talal 
Europe’s contributions to the Middle East have been 
great. Funding from the EU and from member states 
has helped to alleviate suffering, while compassion-
ate community-building efforts by European indi-
viduals and organisations have highlighted the true 
closeness of all who share a common Mediterranean 
history. It is vital that Europe’s experience, commit-
ment and heritage of hope be framed in a vision for 
the Middle East that becomes a model for its future. 
Guardian 15.06.2007 Jean-Pierre 
Tuquoi, Antoine 
Reverchon 
Mr Sarkozy wants to set up a five-plus-five partner-
ship involving southern European countries (…) in 
direct cooperation with their North African neigh-
bours (…). The plan is to develop links, then use the 
EU as a blueprint for setting up an institutional 
framework focusing on economic issues. There is 
nothing new about this idea. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader France, Spain and Italy had long looked across the 
Mediterranean to their old Maghreb colonies; Brit-
ain’s role stretched back decades; all Europeans 
shared interests in the region. 
Guardian 29.11.2005 Leader EU financial aid has not been made conditional on 
reforms, giving little incentive for Arab regimes, 
scaremongering about Islamists, to democratise. 
Still, it would be quite wrong to write off the Euro-
Med dialogue. 
Guardian 28.11.2005 Ewen MacAskill “We will have a good conference nonetheless,” Mr 
Blair said. 
Guardian 13.05.2004 Ian Black The expanded EU is offering its new neighbours 
greater cooperation and assistance – but also keeping 
them at arm’s length. 
Guardian 07.03.2004 Jeremy Landor The European Union has pressurised Maghreb coun-
tries into economic liberalisation to create opportuni-
ties for European business, but these have not im-






ITALY – EXPRESSION 
(I) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
la Repubblica 31 gennaio 
1998 
Franco Cassano Del resto la Cee, con la Conferenza di Barcellona del `95, 
aveva iniziato a muoversi in questa direzione, ma le esi-
tazioni in primis dei tedeschi che antepongono l'est al sud 
hanno rallentato questo cammino. 




Ma finora è rimasta a livello di pura accademia, anche 
perché ai paesi non mediterranei dell'Unione europea 
interessa poco o nulla. Ora è giunto il momento di passa-
re dall'accademia all' operatività; oppure di disdirla e 
organizzarne un’altra, più seria e più serrata. 
la Repubblica 19.10.1999 Salvatore Tro-
pea 
Il progetto del Europa (…) 




In realtà l'impasse irachena, la paralisi del processo di 
pace israelo-palestinense e l'incessante flusso di navi 
cariche di migranti che cercano di raggiungere la sponda 
nord del Mediterraneo attraversando il canale si Sicilia o 
il canale di Otranto, mettono l’Europa a nudo.  




Questa visione sostanzialmente riduttiva del mondo arabo 
ha favorito un approccio regionale (…), ma allo stesso 
tempo ha impedito un approccio globale alle questioni 
relative alle relazioni tra Europa e mondo arabo. 




Il processo di Barcellona non ha quasi inciso su queste 
tendenze: anzi, i problemi sono aumentati, mentre la 
questione della sicurezza è diventata il tema centrale 
nell’approccio alle questioni mediterranee. 
la Repubblica 24 gennaio 
2004 
Gianni Pittella La politica da sviluppare è quella delle reti, ancora troppo 
esili e insufficienti. 
la Repubblica 19 novem-
bre 2004 
Vincenzo Nigro Ci punta perché un’altra formula, "il processo di Barcel-
lona", da tempo è semi-paralizzato. Il "processo di Bar-
cellona" è il foro di dialogo che include anche Israele, ma 
l'Israele è prigioniero di un’atra formula, il "processo di 
pace", ovvero la "road map", ovvero lo scontro con i 
palestinesi. 




Amputato da un’ondata di defezioni, il vertice euro-
mediterraneo di Barcellona parte oggi sotto i peggiori 
auspici e sullo sfondo di un fitto programma di manife-
stazioni dei gruppi no global. 
la Repubblica 28 novem-
bre 2005 
Tony Blaire e 
Jose Zapatero 
Dieci anni fa a Barcellona i rappresentanti dei Paesi 
dell’Unione Europea e del bacino del Mediterraneo si 
diedero appuntamento per dar vita alla nuova Euromed 
Partnership (partenariato euro-mediterraneo, ndt). 
la Repubblica 28 novem-
bre 2005 
Tony Blaire e 
Jose Zapatero 
Il Barcelona Process ha contribuito sì ad innescare il 
processo di riforme politico-economiche, ma i diritti 
umani ancora non sono rispettati appieno ovunque e in 
tutta l'area del Mediterraneo la società civile deve ancora 
evolversi come auspicato. 
la Repubblica 28 novem-
bre 2005 
Tony Blaire e 
Jose Zapatero 
Al pari di ogni autentica forma di partenariato, il Barce-
lona Process impone di essere d’accordo per procedere: 
ed è essenziale andare avanti. 
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Il vertice euro-mediterraneo di Barcellona, (…), si è 
chiuso senza una dichiarazione comune su terrorismo e 
crisi mediorientale. 




Un compromesso di basso profilo, raggiunto in extremis 
dopo ore di snervante trattativa, che ha permesso di scon-
giurare il fallimento della conferenza di Barcellona. 




Di fronte all’impossibilità di arrivare a un accordo sotto-
scritto da tutti i partecipanti, il documento conclusivo è 
una dichiarazione della presidenza, che il premier britan-
nico Tony Blair, scegliendo la definizione di "visione 
comune", ha provato a gestire - con un ampio sorriso a 
denti stretti - come una dimostrazione di pieno successo. 




Il processo euro-mediterraneo lanciato a Barcellona era 
arrivato ad un punto di stallo perché in troppi avevano 
interesse a che l’Europa non prendesse iniziative politi-
che che avrebbero potuto avere ricadute sul Medio Orien-
te e su un’altra regione strategicamente importante come 
il Nord Africa. 
la Repubblica 20 febbraio 
2007 
Romano Prodi 
e Josè Luis 
Zapatero 
A tale scopo possiamo fare affidamento sul processo di 
Barcellona. 
la Repubblica 20 febbraio 
2007 
Romano Prodi 
e Josè Luis 
Zapatero 
Il Processo di Barcellona è altresì un eccellente foro nel 
quale affrontare sfide comuni di grande importanza come 




















Si tratta di un evento di grande valore simbolico che 
dovrebbe produrre effetti concreti. Solo ai tempi 
dell’impero romano il Mediterraneo ha rappresentato 
un’unità geo politica essendo stato attraversato, prima e 
dopo quell’epoca, da profonde divisioni che non sono 
però riuscite a cancellare un continuo fitto dialogo tra 





Botti Ettore E' un appuntamento difficile, ma molto importante. Per la 
prima volta l’Europa e i Paesi al di là del cosiddetto Mare 






Botti Ettore La formula da raggiungere viene burocraticamente defini-
ta "partenariato": in realtà si tratta di qualcosa di meno di 






Vignolo Mino Il documento, nell’intento dei firmatari è la prima pietra 
di una futura associazione politica, economica e culturale 
fra le due sponde del Mediterraneo che contribuirà a 
combattere l’instabilità e la povertà sulla riva Sud bloc-







"Dichiarazione di Barcellona" sono ancora un miraggio: 
sarà molto difficile, in primo luogo, che quella che s' 
affaccia al Mediterraneo diventi un’area di libero scam-






Taino Danilo la Conferenza di Barcellona del 1995 ha indicato nel 
2010 il termine per la creazione di una zona di libero 
scambio euro-mediterranea, altra opportunità di crescita 





Carioti Antonio (…) euro-mediterranea, avviata nel 1995 a Barcellona, e 
propone il suo rilancio come preziosa opportunità di 
crescita per le regioni meridionali del nostro Paese. Il 






Jacchia Antonia "Laboratorio Euro-Mediterraneo", cercando un approccio 
sociale "non solo il punto di vista economico ma cultura-
le, religioso, artistico". 
 
 





Tony Blaire e Jose 
Zapatero 
Nel mondo arabo è unanime il consenso per quanto ri-
guarda la necessità di incrementare la modernizzazione e 
adattare progressivamente la struttura legale e le pratiche 
amministrative alle esigenze dei cittadini, così come degli 
investitori stranieri e locali. 
 
 







Dall’apertura alla Libia ai problemi dell’immigrazione clan-
destina che in Italia e negli altri paesi del Mediterraneo rischia 





Patrizia Capua "Un'occasione importante d’incontro fra Unione europea e i 
partner della sponda sud del Mediterraneo. L’esigenza di 
dialogo fra di loro trova in questo evento espressione concre-
ta". è stato il messaggio del presidente Ciampi, a dare il via ai 







(…), la maggior parte degli obiettivi allora enunciati è rimasta 
lontana dall’essere compiuta. In particolare, il varo di riforme 
liberali e democratiche nei paesi arabi e la creazione di una 
zona di libero commercio nel Mediterraneo. Già allora, nel 
1995, si parlava della necessità di rafforzare la cooperazione 
per ridurre le migrazioni illegali: l'auspicio di allora è diventa-







Dalla prima bozza di documento finale è stato eliminato un 
paragrafo sulla possibile creazione di una zona medio - orien-






Botti Ettore Le Organizzazioni non governative, riunite in un congresso 
parallelo, hanno affidato il loro scetticismo a uno slogan: 
"Mediterraneo: mare o muro?" - In effetti, il lavoro preparato-
rio della Conferenza ha dovuto affrontare un’infinità di osta-
coli. 
Corriere 28 novem- Botti Ettore Nella stesura finale e' scritto: "Coscienti delle loro responsabi-
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della Sera bre 1995 lità, i partner si dichiarano d’accordo nell’adottare misure 
appropriate per la riammissione dei loro connazionali in situa-
zine illegale". (…) sull’importanza "del ruolo delle migrazioni 
nelle reciproche relazioni", sulla necessità di incrementare la 
cooperazione "per ridurre le pressioni migratorie attraverso 
programmi di formazione professionale e di assistenza alla 
creazione di posti di lavoro (...), sul mantenimento "dei diritti 
riconosciuti agli immigrati legalmente residenti". E rimane la 
decisione di stabilire "una cooperazione più stretta" in mate-
ria. Le resistenze dall’altro fronte, sembra specialmente da 





















Il Mediterraneo costituisce - è inutile negarlo - la frontiera 





Romano Prodi e 
Josè Luis Zapa-
tero 
Per Italia e Spagna il primo ambito di proiezione esterna è 
la regione mediterranea. La centralità geostrategica di 
quest’area comporta sfide di una rilevanza tale da rendere 





Pullara Giuseppe Quattrocento milioni di persone concentrate in un centinaio 
di centri urbani più o meno rivieraschi del Mare Nostrum, 





Taino Danilo [Rossi] Il Sud, dice, è "un’area relativamente omogenea al 
centro del Mediterraneo e caratterizzata da problemi mas-





Carioti Antonio La sponda Sud del Mediterraneo vive, infatti, una situazio-
ne preoccupante, in cui ai problemi causati dal sottosvilup-
po economico si aggiunge la minaccia di un fondamentali-





Querze' Rita Il Mediterraneo lambisce il Duomo. 
 
 
ITALY – PURPOSE 
(I) Purpose- purpose 
la Repubblica 10 novem-
bre 1996 
Alessandra Ziniti Un vertice, che fa seguito alla conferenza di Barcello-
na, convocato per discutere della creazione, entro il 
2001, di una zona di libero scambio, ma che ha finito 
con l'aprirsi ai temi più ampi di una politica di collabo-
razione nel Mediterraneo. 
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L'intesa, che prevede di lavorare per la costituzione di 
una grande area di libero scambio entro il 2010 e per la 
creazione di un nuovo "Patto di stabilità", era rimasta 
impigliata su alcuni punti della dichiarazione politica. 
Ombre lunghe del conflitto mediorientale che si sono 
stese fino a Barcellona: la questione della lotta al terro-
rismo, appunto (...); la non proliferazione nucleare (...); 
il concetto di uno scambio dei territori occupati contro 
la pace, ecc. 




Ne è una testimonianza il Processo di Barcellona nel 
quale  - Unione europea si è impegnata con ingenti 
risorse finanziarie (…) per avviare un dialogo fra le 
due sponde di un bacino percorso da forti tensioni 
politiche provocate da problemi di ordine economico e 
sociale, emarginazione culturale, fanatismo religioso, 
terrorismo. 




Ma quale "fortezza Europa" potrebbe resistere a una 
così forte pressione demografica accompagnata dalla 
sfida della globalizzazione dell’economia? (…) la sola 
risposta possibile è invece la cooperazione e la 
partnership tra le due sponde, la ricerca congiunta di 
nuove forme di integrazione socio-economica, di 
scambi di idee e di cultura. Un’integrazione progressi-
va e controllata che presupponga la creazione di poli di 
sviluppo nel Mediterraneo tesi ad arginare e rallentare 
la pressione demografica verso l'Europa, e la creazione 
di una vasta area di libero scambio, dalla quale tutti 
traggano beneficio, aperta ai traffici provenienti 
dall’Africa e dall’Asia. 
la Repubblica 24 gennaio 
2004 
Gianni Pittella Da questo punto di vista vi sono tre appuntamenti da 
non perdere e una politica da sviluppare. Il primo ap-
puntamento si chiama fondazione per il dialogo interre-
ligioso; il secondo, Banca Euromediterranea e il terzo è 
l’istituzione di un parlamento del Mediterraneo. 




"L’Asia, in pieno boom, arriva all’Europa attraverso il 
Canale di Suez. L’importanza economica del Mediter-
raneo sta crescendo rapidamente e dobbiamo costruire 
le condizioni politiche perché quest’area possa conti-
nuare a prosperare. Senza contare che, nello spazio di 
una generazione, la sponda sud del Mediterraneo avrà 
una popolazione superiore a quella della sponda euro-
pea". E' con questa filosofia in testa, spiega adesso, che 
cinque anni fa Romano Prodi, (...) 




Gli obiettivi della cooperazione rafforzata sono solo 
apparentemente modesti: l'istituzione di una Banca del 
Mediterraneo al cui capitale partecipino anche i Paesi 
della riva Sud; la gestione congiunta dei flussi migrato-
ri; la creazione di istituti universitari comuni tra Euro-
pa, Medio Oriente e Nord Africa. In realtà a ben guar-
dare l’iniziativa tocca settori cruciali come l'economia, 
la sicurezza, il dialogo culturale e perfino la difesa su 
uno scacchiere geopolitico essenziale sia per la crisi 













  … dell’Ue: l’educazione e la formazione professionale, 
il recupero della comune eredità culturale mediterrane-
a; la cooperazione industriale; lo sviluppo 
dell’imprenditoria privata e del ruolo delle piccole e 





Pullara Giuseppe Un tale squilibrio nella distribuzione della popolazione 






Botti Ettore Le basi restano economiche: oltre 11 mila miliardi di 
lire che l’Ue promette di distribuire ai Paesi del Sud. 
Ma gli aiuti non vengono legati soltanto a clausole 
tecniche, poiché si cerca un allargamento del dialogo 
















(…) a fare del Mediterraneo "uno spazio comune di 





Salvatore Tropea …) che è pronta a mettere sul tavolo un bel mucchio di 
miliardi per un piano strategico sull’utilizzo dell’acqua 
che potrebbe sembrare ambizioso non tanto per la sua 








La "nuova Nato" di Frattini deve diventare "simbolo e 
sede" di un "dialogo nuovo e più forte con i paesi 
dell’area mediterranea e mediorientale". Occorre "raf-
forzare la dimensione politica dell’Alleanza" per "deli-
neare una strategia di lungo periodo" nei confronti dei 








Nella visione di Frattini, questo dialogo va sviluppato 
nei settori della sicurezza, della politica, dell’economia 





Tony Blair e Jose 
Zapatero 
Ci stiamo adoperando per migliorare le prospettive 
economiche dei palestinesi, per creare le istituzioni 
dello Stato palestinese, ivi inclusi il supporto alle ele-
zioni e le riforme del settore pubblico. Abbiamo da 
poco preso la decisione di mettere a disposizione una 
missione di monitoraggio della frontiera tra Gaza e 





Alessandro Oppes Il vertice euro-mediterraneo ha anche varato un "piano 
di lavoro" quinquennale per estendere i tradizionali 
ambiti di cooperazione economica, politica e culturale 
a temi di fondamentale importanza per i paesi dell’area 






Romano Prodi e Josè 
Luis Zapatero 
Il dialogo interculturale è un canale prioritario per il 
conseguimento dell’obiettivo di fare del Mediterraneo 













(d.ma) Quel Mediterraneo che dovrebbe arrivare a essere nel 
2010 una zona di libero scambio: un mercato di 600 





Panza Pierluigi La seconda conferenza Euro-Mediterraneo dovrebbe 
avviare altri interventi, come la creazione di una più 
diffusa rete di uffici della Camera di commercio di 
Milano nelle capitali del Mediterraneo e offrire alle 





Jacchia Antonia "Non sarà il 2010 come indicato ma dal 2012 si aprirà 
un mercato di 600 milioni di persone. 
 
 
ITALY – IDENTITY 







E' necessario intervenire a tre livelli: aiuti strutturali ai governi, 
investimenti privati, realizzazione dell’area di libero scambio. 
 
 







I ministri degli Esteri italiani, Susanna Agnelli, e spagnolo, 
Xavier Solana Madariaga, hanno lanciato una proposta per il 
rafforzamento del rapporto in tutti i campi fra l’Europa e i 
paesi del Mediterraneo, in particolare quelli della sponda sud. 
Questo in un tempo in cui a fronte di fatti positivi, cioè il 
processo di pace nel Medio Oriente, si manifestano tendenze a 
dir poco inquietanti, come la diffusione di fenomeni di certo 
radicalismo religioso con relativo terrorismo. Anche in questo 







"Una strada lunga che necessita di tolleranza delle diversità e 







Era la prima volta dall’apertura della conferenza di pace di 
Madrid, quattro anni fa. C'era chi sperava in un incontro a 
quattr' occhi. Spagnoli ed egiziani si sono dati molto da fare, 
ma i siriani non hanno voluto saperne. Delusione? "Neanche 
un po' - dice Solana - sono felice: li ho visti che si parlavano e 







Un altro aspetto di quell’attenzione al sud del mondo che 
Paesi come l'Italia chiedevano da tempo ai partner e che oggi 
fa dire a Susanna Agnelli con "grande soddisfazione" che 








l'Italia è una penisola tuffata nel Mediterraneo (come abbiamo 
tutti imparato a scuola) e non esistono al momento tecnologie 
che permettano di spostarla altrove, nel mare del Nord o di 
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Questo scontro di opzioni e di concezioni dell’Europa è una 
cosa seria perché è fuori discussione che se prevalesse la 
vecchia immagine del Mediterraneo come palude e "buco 
nero", a pagarne le spese sarebbe in primo luogo l'Italia. 
LUNGI dall’essere retorica l'insistenza sulla dimensione me-
diterranea dell’Europa (fenomeno che non è solo italiano) è 
importante per almeno due ragioni. In primo luogo perché 
cambierebbe il ruolo del sud e dell’Italia non più appendice 
remota, molle e sperduta del corpo massiccio d'Europa, ma 







Pedrag Matvejevic ama dire che un’Europa senza Mediterra-







La stabilità, la prosperità, la pace di questo "lago interno", per 
ripetere la citazione di Braudel, non è solamente un problema 







Ignorare quindi la necessità - per l'Europa - di "creare ponti" 







In questo contesto il ruolo dell’Italia non è quello di sentinel-







Un’Italia che abdichi al suo ruolo storico e politico nel Medi-
terraneo è destinata a posizioni marginali nel contesto europe-








Una politica italiana senza una visione mediterranea è un non-
senso storico, inevitabilmente destinata a impoverirci politi-
camente e culturalmente e quindi a ridurre il nostro peso spe-








In fondo trattasi di un tipico problema comunitario, che ha 
molteplici aspetti: politici di sicurezza, economici di aiuto allo 
sviluppo, e umanitari. Un paese da solo non può risolverli, 
può al massimo tamponarli, perché alla base c'è l’enorme 
divario socio-economico, ma anche culturale, tra le due spon-







Perché ritraggono un’Europa doppiamente divisa: spaccata 
sulla questione irachena, quasi assente nel processo di pace 








L’Ue sta cercando di fornire un nuovo approccio a tali que-
stioni, attraverso un ruolo più incisivo delle regioni confinan-
ti: si pensa che la prossimità possa aiutare a realizzare nuove 
politiche nelle relazioni mediterranee. Certo, la regione può 
dare un impulso in più, può avviare processi innovativi: ma 
purtroppo non esistono simmetrie fra istanze regionali come 
quelle spagnole o italiane e quelle dei paesi arabi in cui lo 
stato spesso rimane di tipo giacobino, fortemente centralizza-
to: vale a dire che un presidente di regione in Italia o in Spa-








(…) cui all’Europa interessa prevalentemente premunirsi 
dagli ingenti flussi migratori o dalle ricorrenti minacce terro-
ristiche. L’equazione "Mediterraneo uguale frontiera difensi-
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La mossa di Prodi fu accolta, allora, con un misto di sarcasmo 









Un lavoro diplomatico paziente, di cui la Commissione ha 
costantemente ma discretamente tenuto informate le principali 
capitali europee. Ora la visita di Gheddafi a Bruxelles apre la 
strada alla partecipazione della Libia al processo di Barcello-






Tony Blair e 
Jose Zapatero 
L'Europa e il mondo sono sempre più strettamente intercon-
nessi: il flagello del terrorismo ci ha colpiti tutti, (…). 
L’immigrazione è apportatrice di nuove energie quando è 
legale, ma è deleteria allorché è incontrollata o, ancora peg-





Tony Blair e 
Jose Zapatero 
L’Ue, nonostante tutti gli ostacoli frapposti, rimane fortemen-







(…) l’Unione europea prevede la creazione di un "meccani-
smo finanziario sostanziale" per offrire maggiore assistenza ai 







Un fallimento annunciato, se si vuole, ma che spieghi la ra-
gioni dell’assenza dei principali leader arabi. Si tratti del pro-
cesso di pace in Medio Oriente o della lotta al terrorismo, due 
temi di interesse vitale per tutti gli europei, il ruolo 







La mossa di Prodi ha due facce. Da una parte risponde alla 
sua vecchia idea della "politica di vicinato" grazie alla quale 
l’Europa dovrebbe tessere una fitta rete di rapporti politici ed 
economici con i Paesi limitrofi, e rilancia un altro criterio caro 
al Professore: la ritrovata centralità del Mediterraneo come 
snodo commerciale verso le rampanti potenze asiatiche. 
Dall’altra parte, mettendo sul tavolo per la prima volta l’idea 
di una cooperazione rafforzata, cioè di un’iniziativa politica 
ristretta ai soli Paesi che la condividono, Prodi manda un 







L’Europa è da tempo bloccata da due tipi di veti: quelli espli-
citi e quelli impliciti, esercitati attraverso l’inerzia. Se si apre 
una stagione di cooperazioni rafforzate, almeno quest’ultima 







L’Unione europea è un terreno insidioso e nessun uomo poli-
tico può illudersi di rilanciare da solo processi che sono stati 







Ma l’Europa è una macchina complessa, continuamente per-







Prodi e Josè 
Luis Zapatero 
[Frieden im Nahen Osten] E lo faremo con la convinzione che 
l'Italia e la Spagna hanno molto da offrire, sia in seno 
all’Unione Europea che nell’ambito del Processo di Barcello-
na, per essere realmente in grado di passare da una visione 







(…), l’Unione mediterranea è senz’altro il disegno di politica 
estera più ambizioso di Nicolas Sarkozy. Non si tratta di un 
semplice partenariato tra le due sponde (come quello previsto 
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dal cosiddetto "processo di Barcellona" nato dodici anni fa e 
mai seriamente decollato), ma qualcosa di molto più concreto 
ed esteso. Il progetto propone relazioni non identiche ma 






























(…) l’Unione mediterranea (…). Un progetto voluto da Sar-
kozy e osteggiato dai tedeschi, che considerano quell’idea in 
totale contraddizione con l’Unione europea. Secondo Berlino, 
i rapporti con l’altra sponda del Mediterraneo devono avveni-
re all’interno del processo di Barcellona, lanciato nel 1995, e 
coinvolgere tutti i Ventisette. Un’idea condivisa anche dai 








L’Ue presenterà un programma di collaborazione su tre piani: 






  (…) l’importanza della Conferenza Euro mediterranea che si 
svolgerà a Barcellona il 27 e 28 novembre e che servirà pro-
prio a chiarire gli indirizzi politici dell’Ue verso il lato Sud. " 
Nella nostra visione, Barcellona dovrebbe già porre. ha spie-







E Roma non poteva non essere scelta come la sede di una 





Botti Ettore Un fiume di soldi, a patto che ci siano dall’altro lato garanzie 











(d.ma) Una pressione che per un’Europa malata di disoccupazione, 
con i suoi oltre 18 milioni di senza lavoro, potrebbe diventare 





Taino Danilo Ma, alla fine, Prodi ha voluto dichiarare che si e' trattato di 
una discussione utile per "portare avanti insieme la politica 
del Mediterraneo nei confronti degli altri Paesi dell’Unione 
europea". Per ora, non c' è un asse Italia - Spagna e, ufficial-





Taino Danilo "Per ora - ha aggiunto Prodi - e' importante che due Paesi 
come Spagna e Italia si coordinino sui tempi della Conferenza 
intergovernativa europea: nulla di ufficiale, di concreto", ma 










  Malta ha una conoscenza particolare dell’area euro-
mediterranea; la conferenza per la sicurezza e la cooperazione 
in Europa, conosciuta come "teorema codificato a Helsinki", 
stabilisce che non può esserci stabilità in Europa se non c'è 





Querze' Rita (…), "l’Europa guarda troppo a Nord e ad Est, mentre do-






Allam Magdi "Un’Europa che si allarga e che ha scenari di sicurezza che 
ormai riguardano gli svedesi così come i ciprioti non può non 
avere nel Mediterraneo un partenariato forte per la sicurezza e 
per lo sviluppo sostenibile. Quello che abbiamo fatto col pro-
cesso di Barcellona in termini  di partenario economico lo 
vogliamo realizzare in sede Nato con quei Paesi della sponda 








La strategia del progetto è chiara. L'apertura dell’Europa ai 10 
Paesi dell’Est favorisce, dal punto di vista commerciale, la più 
vicina Germania. L’Italia e Milano possono battere la concor-
renza di Francia e Spagna nel Nord Africa. Non a caso, in un 
momento di contrazione economica, i Paesi in cui salgono le 








Il nostro sviluppo economico, lo stesso recupero di competiti-
vità del nostro sistema, passa dal Mediterraneo, dove possia-
mo avere un ruolo da protagonista più di quanto non lo siano 







In Italia, però, dal mondo della politica come della cultura e 
dell’imprenditoria arrivano segni di un’accelerazione del 





Querze' Rita L'arma migliore contro il terrorismo? Non fucili e cannoni, 







Se l’Europa non riuscirà a diffondere benessere e democrazia 
nel Mediterraneo, rischia di ritrovarsi in casa propria le terri-














In un momento drammatico per il Medio Oriente, Milano 
lancia un messaggio di speranza "una maggior pace ai confini 
è una condizione indispensabile per la crescita, ma l'Italia è 
già il primo partner commerciale dei Paesi che si affacciano 














Un ponte naturale tra l’Europa e il Sud del Mediterraneo. E un 
porto sicuro per gli scambi commerciali. L’Italia è leader in 







Persino gli Stati Uniti si stanno ben posizionando in Marocco. 
L’Italia non può perdere questo treno. E i media possono 







E di fronte a questa audience Promos lancerà una proposta per 
affrontare uno dei problemi che più limita lo sviluppo econo-
mico del Mediterraneo, il nodo delle infrastrutture. Due stru-
menti che dovrebbero operare in tandem: un osservatorio che 
identifichi i progetti prioritari (porti, autostrade, ferrovie) e un 
Fondo ad hoc, per la loro realizzazione. Un progetto ambizio-
so, ma come pensate di organizzarlo perché non faccia la fine 
della Banca mediterranea promessa a Barcellona e mai realiz-
zata? (...) Un veicolo per sostenere le imprese italiane even-
tualmente incaricate di realizzare le opere. 
Corriere 17 luglio Querze' Rita Niente nuotate e bagni di sole: sotto la Madonnina le acque 
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della Sera 2007 del mare nostrum portano ricchi affari, Non deve stupire, 
perciò, che Milano punzecchi l'Italia (e l'Europa) perché si 





Querze' Rita L’Unione mediterranea proposta dal presidente francese, 
Nicolas Sarkozy, è un obiettivo conseguente". Milano non si 
accontenta. "L’intento è condivisibile ma è necessario porsi 
obiettivi concreti. Per questo serve una conferenza program-
matica con tutti i Paesi che intendono far parte del progetto - 
propone il presidente di Promos, Bruno Ermolli -. Una confe-
renza da organizzare a Milano: qui abbiamo un’esperienza 







"Se le opportunità economiche ci sono - ha commentato Prodi 







"Un grande sogno", ha detto Sarkozy, che è il promotore 
dell’iniziativa, anche se molto c' è ancora da fare perché quel-
lo di luglio sia un successo. In realtà l’Appello siglato ieri è 
molto più "rassicurante" di quanto Sarkozy non abbia annun-
ciato e destinato a sciogliere ambiguità e dubbi dei Paesi 
















(…) e vero punto di discordia con gli altri Paesi dell’Ue: "Il 
futuro che abbiamo davanti nel Mediterraneo è una scelta tra 





  "l’obbligo storico di aiutare quella parte di Europa esclusa per 
oltre quarant' anni dai benefici della democrazia politica". Ma 
"e' tempo per l’Unione di adempiere ad un obbligo storico 





SPAIN – EXPRESSION 
(E) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
El Mundo 03.04.2000 Marisa Cruz A falta de limar las últimas aristas, de declaración de la pri-
mera Cumbre de El Cairo (…) es una receta elaborada ínte-
gramente por los europeos en la que éstos admiten implícita-
mente su fracaso a la hora de prestar ayuda con eficacia. 
El Mundo 01.06.2002 EFE Bruselas recuerda que, desde la suspensión en 1997 por pro-
blemas de gestión del programa "Med-Campus", no ha habido 
en el Mediterráneo ningún programa comunitario que finan-
ciara proyectos descentralizados de cooperación gestionados 
por redes univeritarias. 
El Mundo 08.09.2004 EFE [BP] Ese proceso es considerado vital por parte de España 
para sus intereses en la zona y pretende que el próximo año 
haya una significativa conmemoración de su décimo aniversa-
rio. 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 Silvia Taules A partir de la cumbre de Barcelona de 1995 se diseñaron una 
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serie de acuerdos bilaterales entre la Unión Europea y cada 
uno de los países mediterráneos. 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 EFE (…) 'Proceso de Barcelona', es un foro que reúne a los países 
de la Ue y a los de las orillas sur y este del Mediterráneo (…) 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 EFE (…) el proceso de Barcelona, (…), "ha propiciado un produc-
tivo debate en los tres ámbitos fundamentales que cubre esta 
iniciativa: el político y de seguridad, el económico y financie-
ro y el social y cultural". 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? (…) la 'Declaración de Barcelona' (…), lejos de convertirse en 
una herramienta efectiva contra la pobreza, (…) 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? (…), el 'Proceso de Barcelona' o Allianza Euromediterránea, 
(…), ha hecho muy poco para mejorar la vida de las personas 
del sur. 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? (…), la pobreza en la región aún es profunda y es de vital 
importancia que se aprueben medidas que tengan un impacto 
real en la vida de las personas con menos recursos. 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? [Ariane Arpa] (…) "el acuerdo se llama a sí mismo una 'alian-
za', lo que significa que los países tienen que tener en cuenta 
las necesidades de los que más lo necesitan. 
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ramírez La cumbre de noviembre de 2005 en Barcelona fue el princi-
pio del fin del proceso que lIeva su nombre para el diálogo de 
la UE con los países árabes. 
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ramírez (...) Ia creación de una nueva organización para firmar acuer-
dos comerciales o migratorios con los países del sur del Medi-
terráneo, en sustitución del moribundo Proceso de Barcelona, 
cuyo golpe de gracia fue la reunión aquel cálido otoño de 
2005 donde fallaron numerosos Iíderes árabes y no se lIegó a 
ningún acuerdo sustancial.  
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ramírez Las tribulaciones del Proceso de Barcelona, que ha gastado en 
la última década cerca de 20.000 miliones de euros en asisten-
cia y cooperación con pocos resultados, le ha dado la ocasión 
perfecta a Sarkozy para apoderarse de la apetitosa relación 
con los países mediterráneos.  
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ramírez (...) esta nueva organización el 'Club Med', el apodo despre-
ciativo que utilizan algunos diplomáticos en referencia a una 
cadena de hoteles francesa- (...)  
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ramírez El Proceso de Barcelona, tras más de 12 años de altibajos, 
cerca de 20.000 millones de euros invertidos, pocos resultados 
y alguna cumbre fallida, se convirtió anoche en la Unión para 
el Mediterráneo, un invento de París con un futuro incierto en 
manos de Nicolas Sarkozy. 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ramírez [Sarkozy] "Barcelona no ha funcionado. Si hubiera funciona-
do se sabría" 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ramírez [Sarkozy] "Barcelona era buena idea, una buena intuición, 
pero no ha producido todos los frutos que esperábamos" 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ramírez (…) la ambiciosa idea del presidente francés (…) 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? "Se ha dado un impulso cualitativo importante, histórico y 
positivo a lo que fue la Conferencia de Barcelona hace trece 
años", resumió (…) Moratinos. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr se trata de un desarollo basado en la complementariedad vo-
luntaria de los intereses a largo plazo de las dos orillas. 
El PAÍS 01.07.1995 Ignacio La Conferencia Euromediterránea es, probablemente, el acon-
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Cembrero tecimiento más llamativo del semestre español al frente de la 
UE, pero no es una idea nueva surgida en los últimos meses. 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr Tiene la Unión Europea una política para el Mediteráneo? 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr Lejos de constituir una verdadera estrategia de cod'esarrollo 
entre las dos riberas, resulta ser sobre todo un hábil disfraz de 
una mera apertura de los mercados del Sur. 
El PAÍS 27.11.1995 Juan Altable Esto es una novedad muy significativa. 
El PAÍS 13.03.2008 Andreu Mis-
sé/R. M. de 
Rituerto 
"Lo primero que se ve es que cambia la etiqueta: de proceso 
de Barelona a Unión para el Mediterráneo. Es el mínimo 
común denominador", apunta Michael Emerson, (…) (CEPS) 
El PAÍS 14.03.2008 R. M. de Ri-
tuerto/A. Missé 
Proceso que todos ven necesitado de una moderización para 
responder a las expectativas creadas en su nacimiento de 1995 
y hoy defraudadas. 
El PAÍS 15.03.2008 ? (…) cambiar la etiqueta de la cooperación con los países de la 
ribera sur mediterránea por el farragoso título de Proceso de 
Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo. Lo importante no 
debería ser el nombre, sino el contenido. 
El PAÍS 15.03.2008 ? La iniciativa, (…), no ha logrado del todo despegar, pese a los 
20.000 millones de euros invertidos por Bruselas a lo largo de 
este tiempo. 
El PAÍS 15.03.2008 ? El diálogo euromediterráneo ha fracasado en uno de sus prin-
cipales objetivos: la integración y la cooperación entre sí de 
los países de la cuenca sur del Mediterráneo. Pero sobre todo 
se ha visto contaminado por la crisis de Oriente Próximo. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr El 13 de julio de 2008, al mismo tiempo que la recesión nor-
teamericana se dejaba sentir sobre el resto del mundo, se 
anunciaba en París, coincidiendo con el inicio de la Presiden-
cia francesa de la UE, el nacimiento oficial del Proceso de 
Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr En primer lugar, implicaba una toma de conciencia de la ra-
lentización y el estancamiento del proyecto estratégico de 
Barcelona. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr En cualquier caso, ya está en la agenda política europea como 
una continuación del Proceso de Barcelona. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Pero una cosa está clara: se seguirá trabajando dentro del 
marco estratégico establecido por el acuerdo de 1995. 
El PAÍS 05.11.2008 Joan Foguet El denominado Proceso de Barcelona era una primera piedra 
para unir alrededor del Mediterráneo una de las partes del 
mundo con mayor confluencia cultural diferente, grandes 
identidades contrastadas y raíces religiosas opuestas. 
El PAÍS 07.11.2008 ? El proceso euromediterráneo, que lleva 13 años de resultados 
muy mejorables, necesitaba una sede permanente y un orga-
nismo impulsor, equitativamente representativo de todas las 
partes, que lo visualizase. 
El PAÍS 13.11.2008 ? [el principe Felipe] esta iniciativa, que data de 1982, de "au-
daz y valiente", y afirmó que supuso una gran visión de futu-
ro, porque después dio paso al denominado Proceso de Barce-





(E) Expression – the other 
El Mundo 03.04.2000 Marisa 
Cruz 
Los países africanos han dado el visto bueno a la casi totalidad del 
documento, asumiendo, al menos sobre el papel, compromisos que 
nunca cumplirán. 
El Mundo 04.11.2008 Europa 
Press 
La propuesta también introduce una "fórmula" para la participación 
de la Liga Árabe en el proyecto, según indicaron fuentes diplomáticas 
que, sin embargo, evitaron aclarar en qué grado asistiría esta organi-
zación. Hasta ahora, la Liga Árabe ha practicado como 'observador' 
en reuniones de Exteriores y países árabes han defendido una presen-
cia mayor de este órgano, especialmente en otras reuniones de minis-
tros sectoriales. 
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-
Folch 
Crecía en la cuenca sur la angustia por la atención de Bruselas hacia 





(E) Expression – associative/dissociative 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE El presidente libio, Muamar Al Gadafi, ha indicado al presidente 
en funciones español, José María Aznar, que la cooperación entre 
Europa y Africa es "necessaria" y que, para ello, debe existir "la 
confianza mutua que no ha existido en el pasado". 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE Todas las esperanzas de normalización de las relaciones entre 
Libia y la Ue se han perdido, (…) 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE (…), el coronel Gadafi ha tomado la palabra en la primera sesión 
de trabajo de la cumbre euro-africana para pronunciar un "discurso 
excéntrico, repleto de todos los tópicos antioccidentales, anticolo-
niales y antiamericanos". Al parecer, el discurso no contenía nin-
guna de las aperturas solicitadas por la Ue, es decir, mención algu-
na a la aceptación por Tripoli de los principios de la Declaración 
de Barcelona, por la que se regula desde 1995 el diálogo euro-
mediterráneo. Todo lo contrario, Gadafi ha mostrado escaso inte-
rés por lo que representa el proceso de Barcelona. 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE "Ustedes no pueden en nombre de Barcelona unir el norte de Afri-
ca con Europa, No vengan a dividirnos con la excusa de Barcelo-
na", ha afirmado Gadafi, según testigos de su intervención, cele-
brada a puerta cerrada. 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE "El deseo que todos tenemos es que Gadafi acepte los resultados 
de la conferencia de Barcelona para que se pueda incorporar al 
diálogo euro-mediterráneo. Hasta ahora no ha sido así", puntualizó 
Solana. 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 (CET) (…) que la cumbre de Barcelona se celebrará en un momento 
esperanzador para Oriente Medio, tras la apertura del paso de 
Rafah entre Gaza y Egipto. 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? Los acuerdos comerciales agrícolas dentro de la cuenca del Medi-
terráneo no pueden ser recíprocos de igual a igual entre países 
desiguales-, tal y como marcan los estándares de la Organización 
Mundial del Comercio. Si las negociaciones impiden a los países 
del sur del Mediterráneo proteger sus sectores más vulnerables, 
especialmente para defenderse de las exportaciones agrícolas sub-
sidiadas de la Ue, la producción agrícola podría caer alrededor de 
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un 2% y, al mismo tiempo, se reducirían los ingresos de la pobla-
ción que depende de la agricultura para su subsistencia. 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? Este acuerdo, alcanzado después de largas y arduas negociaciones 
en Barcelona, suponen la primera declaración de condena al terro-
rismo que suscriben árabes e israelíes. "Se trata de una demostra-
ción de lucidez y hasta de valentía, una apuesta mayoritaria por el 
diálogo y la cooperación", afirmó Zapatero. 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? En la declaración final no figura, sin embargo, la referencia que 
había en el borrador a una "visión de los Estados, un Israel seguro 
y un Estado palestino viable, soberano y democrático conviviendo 
en paz y seguridad". 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr Someten a las naciones a la arbitrariedad de las relaciones de fuer-
za en el mercado internacionalizado. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr Económicamente, la diferencia entre el Norte y el Sur es enorme: 
más del 87% del producto interior bruto total de la cuenca medite-
rránea está concentrado en la orilla norte. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr Para Europa se trata de saber si va a construirse contra el Sur o con 
él. Para el Sur se trata de saber si va a sumirse en el subdesarrolllo 
y las nuevas formas de colonialismo o si va a recuperarse y con-
vertirse en un elemento constitutivo del conjunto euromediterrá-
neo. 
El PAÍS 01.07.1995 Ignacio 
Cembrero 
Éste es el apartado que más reticencias ha suscitado en las capita-
les árabes, que consideran desmesurada la preocupación europea 
por la seguridad. Cada una, sin embargo, alberga temores específi-
cos. El Cairo, por ejemplo, no desea adquirir grandes compromi-
sos en materia de derechos humanos cuando está enfrascado en 
una lucha sin cuartel contra los islamistas, y Damasco y Beirut 
recelan de un foro del que sospechan que pueda ser utilizado por 
Israel para discutir de cooperación regional. Argelia, el país árabe 
en el que el Estado tiene más peso en la economía, está inquieta 
por verse obligada a avanzar a un ritmo demasiado rápido hacia el 
libre comercio. Marruecos, por fin, teme que la relación específica 
que busca con la UE quede diluida en el revoltijo de Barcelona. 
El PAÍS 23.11.1995 Sami Naïr Ve los movimientos migratorios como una coacción negantiva 
para las relaciones entre las dos riberas, mientras que las migra-
ciones del Sur al Norte han contribuido en gran medida al desarro-
llo de las sociedades del Norte. Pretende imponer a los países del 
Sur la obligación de readmitir a sus súbditos sin pronunciarse 
claramente acerca de los derechos imprescriptibles de aquellos que 
están instalados legalmente en Europa. 
El PAÍS 28.11.1995 X. V. -F./ 
I. C. 
Egipto levantó su reserva sobre la zona de libre comercio -la clave 
del proyecto-, al obtener garantías de que no prejuzga su acuerdo 
de asociación. Turquía logró eliminar la referencia a la ampliación 
de la UE hacia el sur (Chipre y Malta). Y se halló una fórmula de 
compromiso sobre la no proliferación nuclear, pero Israel se negó 
a que se hiciera pública hasta que se cerrase todo el paquete. Que-
daba el último escollo que enfrenta a árabes e israelíes, la frase que 
añade a la condena del terrorismo una defensa de la autodetermi-
nación de los pueblos, en lucha contra los invasores. 
El PAÍS 17.04.1997 S. G. -D. El ministro explicó que no habia sido posible finalizar el texto 
"por problemas políticos sobre la medida en que debía quedar 
reflejado la situación del proceso de paz en Oriente Próximo". 
El PAÍS 16.04.1997 S. G. -D. La II Conferencia Euromediterránea se desarrolla en dos escena-
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rios distintos. En uno, los europeos intentan desempeñar un papel 
mediador en el fuego cruzado árabe-israelí. En otro, más oscuro, 
pero igualmente importante, europeos, isrealíes y árabes intentan 
mantener a flote e, incluso, avanzar en una serie de acuerdos de 
política económica y social, que son los que constituyen el núcleo 
duro del proceso de cooperación entre la UE y la ribera sur del 
Mediterráneo iniciado en Barcelona hace 17 meses. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Todos los países europeos y mediterráneos del sur han afirmado su 
voluntad de reorientar dicho proceso y profundizarlo. 
 
 
(E) Expression – Mediterranean region 
El PAÍS 27.11.1995 Juan Altable [Isaac Siboni] (…) el Mediterráneo es un solo mar con tres 
religiones. Me parece un buen punto de partida. 
 
SPAIN – PURPOSE 
(E) Purpose - purpose 
El Mundo 06.11.2001 EFE Uno es "constituir una zona Euromediterránea de seguridad, de 
esabilidad y de bienestar"; el segundo, "favorecer los contactos 
sociales, culturales y humanos en una amplia gama de ámbitos y 
con el pleno respeto de cultura, religiones, costumbres y tradicio-
nes respectivas" y, por último, "progresar con la perspectiva de 
una visión común por el futuro de la región que, para todos noso-
tros es esencial". 
El Mundo 02.10.2004 Europa 
Press 
(…) al 'Proceso de Barcelona' que nació para reforzar el dialogo 
entre las dos orillas del Mediterráneo y que en noviembre de 2005 
cumpirá diez años. 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 Silvia 
Taules 
La paz y la seguridad son los objetivos fijados en esta propuesta 
que pretenden unir a los países occidentales con los árabes y mu-
sulmanes en un intento de luchar conjuntamente contra el terro-
rismo. 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 EFE "(…) con el objetico de establecer un espacio común de paz, esta-
bilidad, prosperidad y seguridad". 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr En lugar de estabilizar las sociedades, estas relaciones las pertur-
ban al reproducir y ahondar los efectos ya existentes de los des-
equilibrios demográfico, económico, financiero y cultural. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr La conferencia prevista en Barcelona para noviembre de 1995 
podría constituir, en efecto, un giro en el porvenir de las dos ori-
llas. 
El PAÍS 01.07.1995 Ignacio 
Cembrero 
Cooperación a cambio de estabilidad. Esta es, en resumen, la ofer-
ta que la Unión Europea (UE) hará a finales de noviembre en la 
Conferencia Euromediterránea de Barcelona a sus 12 socios ribe-
reños del Mare Nostrum. 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr Su objetivo se define claramente: "La creación de un espacio eu-
romediterráneo en el horizonte del 2010". También sus ejes centra-
les: apoyo a la transición economica para establecer una zona de 
libre comercio de aquí a 10 o 15 años (...) apoyo para un mejor 
equilibrio socio-economico en las sociedades del Sur (...), y, por 
 400 
último, apoyo a la integración regional.  
El PAÍS 23.11.1995 Sami Naïr La creación de una zona de libre comercio de aquí al 2010 no deja 
de plantear serios problemas, pero la Conferencia de Barcelona 
abarca otros dos aspectos importantes: el de la seguridad y el de la 
democratización y desarrollo de la sociedad civil. 
El PAÍS 05.12.1999 ? La declaración expresa el deseo de "aprobar a la mayor brevedad 
posible" la Estrategia Común sobre el Mediterraneo. 




(…) crear una Unión para el Mediterráneo que dé nuevo impulso 
al proceso de cooperación entre ambas orillas lanzado en 1995 en 
Barcelona. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr (…) de inyectar un nuevo y vigoroso impulso al proceso iniciado 
en Barcelona en 1995. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Éste pretendía no solamente crear las condiciones para la puesta en 
marcha de una zona de libre comercio entre las dos riberas del 
Mediterráneo en el 2010, sino también desarrollar una cooperación 
estructural en los campos de la seguridad y de la paz, así como, 
last but not least, favorecer de manera significativa las relaciones 
entre las sociedades civiles de ambas riberas. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Reorientar y profundizar! 
 
 
(E) Purpose - aim 
El Mundo 06.11.2001 EFE (…) hay que actuar en el marco del respeto del derecho internacional 
y en el de "nuestra oposición al uso de la violencia y nuestra aspira-
ción a privilegiar sistemáticamente la resolución pacífica y política de 
las diferencias". 
El Mundo 06.11.2001 EFE El dirigente europeo destacó la importancia de "intensificar nuestra 
colaboración política", lo que significa "hablar de todo" y "por su-
puesto vamos a hablar de la situación internacional pero también de la 
situación regional en Oriente Medio" porque, en su opinión, es nece-
sario que los principios del Proceso de Barcelona sean los medios 
para "encontrar uns perspectiva de paz". 
El Mundo 02.10.2004 Europa 
Press 
(…) decidido poner su empeño para que podamos dar contenido e 
impulso a una nueva relación entre el norte y el sur del Mediterráneo" 
El Mundo 27.11.2005 EFE (…), para que los terrenos político, social y cultural se sumen en 
igualdad de condiciones al ámbito puramente económico, informa 
Marisa Cruz. 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? En el texto final, (…), se comprometen a considerar "pasos prácticos" 
para prevenir la proliferación de armas nucleares, químicas y biológi-
cas, según reza el texto. 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? Los impulsores de la UPM esperan ahora garantizar el éxito de la 
Unión concentrándose en grandes proyectos concretos (no relaciona-
dos con los procesos de paz) como es la limpieza de la contaminación 
del Mediterráneo y la energía solar. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami 
Naïr 
Todos esos programas parecen girar alrededor de una idea básica: la 
de la cooperación descentralizada. 
El PAÍS 21.11.1999 EFE (…) de que el fondo se destinaría adquirir zonas de gran valor ecolo-
gico, cultural y paisajistico con fines de conservación, protección, 
educación y uso social sostenible, y "adoptará formas organizativas 
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adaptadas a la realidad de cada país, pero deberá ser gestionado por la 
sociedad civil y contar con apoyo institucional y privado". Asimismo 
propone que se establezcan normas que "exijan necesariamente" la 
evaluación del impacto de todo desarrollo urbanístico, de las infraes-
tructuras y del turismo sobre los ecosistemas protegidos, que deberán 
incluir "mecanismos de vigilancia".  
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami 
Naïr 
si de lo que se trata es de profundizar en los Acuerdos de 1995 (…), 
es preciso valerse de la experiencia histórica que posee Barcelona 
para liderar tal reorientación. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami 
Naïr 
1) rechazar la marginalización del sur a la hora de ampliar hacia 
el este (…) 2) crear un cuadro de reflexión y de propuestas 
para una gran política de cooperación económica entre las 
dos riberas (...) (…) 3) ayudar a cambiar la mirada europea 
sobre las migraciones destacando el aspecto positivo de las 
mismas. (...) 4) contribuir, finalmente, a acercar a las socie-
dades civiles: (...) 
 
SPAIN – IDENTITY 
(E) Identity – role 
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier Vi-
dal-Folch 
la UE trataría a los pecos (países de Europa Central y Oriental) 
"de región a región, y estimularía sus relaciones mutuas median-
te el establecimiento de una zona de libre cambio. Pero no a 
secas, como ocurrió entre EE UU, Canadá y México, sino con 
medidas políticas –el llamado diálogo estructurado- y financie-
ras -se previeron 7.000 millones de ecus (1,12 billones de pese-
tas) hasta 1999- que suavizaran los costes del proceso. EI es-
quema desembocaria en su integración a la UE para el año 2000.  
El PAÍS 05.11.2008 Joan Foguet El Mediterráneo era una de las grandes asignaturas pendientes 
de la UE y se logró sentar las bases de un espacio de paz y esta-
bilidad, económico, político y humano que comprendía a 800 
millones de personas. 
 
 
(E) Identity - EU 
El Mundo 03.04.2000 Marisa Cruz La Europa de los ricos, la que vive alarmada por el flujo de inmi-
grantes del sur, la que compite deslealmente en los mercados 
internacionales, la que se horroriza frente al televisor contem-
plando lejanas imágenes de muerte y destrucción, reclama de 
Africa programas de ajuste macroeconómico, compromisos con 
el libre mercado y planes de estabilidad política. 
El Mundo 03.04.2000 Marisa Cruz En ninguno de los dos documentos, la Ue se compromete a dar 
más dinero a Africa, aunque el objetivo que se espera conseguir 
es el de reducir a la mitad el nivel de pobreza del continente de 
aquí al 2015. 
El Mundo 04.04.2000 EFE "La Unión Europea va a dedicar un billión de euros para la con-
donación de la deuda del grupo de países más pobre y, al mismo 
tiempo, varios países han hecho anuncios de lo que pretenden 
hacer", como Francia y Alemania, e incluso España, según ha 
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explicado a Radio Nacional el secretario de Estado.  
El Mundo 08.09.2004 EFE Rodríguez Zapatero viajará hoy a Túnez (…) compromiso con el 
Maghreb y pedirá colaboración para reactivar el Proceso de Bar-
celona. 
El Mundo 02.10.2004 Europa 
Press 
Moratinos, (…) ha pedido que "el Mediterráneo no sea un mar 
olvidado".  "Necesita recuperar la atención y el esfuerzo financie-
ro de los 25. En ese sentido haremos todo lo necesario para que, 
dentro de los capítulos que se negocien en las diferentes estructu-
ras de la UE, el Mediterráneo obtenga los recursos suficientes 
para afrontar los retos y desafíos del futuro". 
El Mundo 02.10.2004 Europa 
Press 
(…) el gran reto de Europa es el diálogo con los países del sur 
del Mediterráneo, (…) 
El Mundo 25.11.2005 (CET) [Solana] 'Hoy estamos en una situación de de optimismo" 
El Mundo 29.11.2005 ? De lo contrario nos encontraremos con un nuevo ejemplo en el 
que un país rico, en este caso la UE, se lleva todo lo que quiere 
de sus vecinos más pobres y no les ofrece a cambio nada más que 
palabras y promesas vacías". 
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
El invento español será liquidado, de hecho, esta noche con la 
presentación de la Union Mediterránea de " Nicolas Sarkozy, que 
ha Iogrado embarcar en su Idea a Angela Merkel.  
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
José Manuel Durão Barroso, comentó por la mañana que la 
Unión Mediterránea tiene su "apoyo real", aunque aún falten 
algunos "detaIles".  
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
Para Espana, la alianza galo-germana es un golpe de mano por el 
que Francia toma el control del foro, pero, según fuentes diplo-
máticas españolas, Zapatero está dispuesto a aceptar la ldea 
mientras se incluya en el nombre Proceso de Barcelona -un subtí-
tulo formal, que, de todas formas, se evaporará rápidamente- en 
la nueva Unión Mediterránea.  
El Mundo 13.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
(…) Kouchner, promete un formidable puente entre las dos ori-
llas, el mundo occidental y el mundo árabe", pero los galos se 
encontrarán con los mismos problemas básicos que sufrían los 
españoles, como la participación.  
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
Europa ha tenido hasta ahora "poca visibilidad política" en la 
región. 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
[Solana] "Todo lo que se pueda hacer para que las relaciones 
entre Europa y los países de la cuenca mediterránea sean mejores 
y más profundas, se debe hacer" 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
"España quiere reforzar este Proceso. Fuimos los que lo crea-
mos… Ahora se trata de dar un salto cualitativo", aseguró Alber-
to Navarro, secretario de Estado para la UE (…) 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
Hasta ahora, sólo la Comisión Europea se ocupaba de gestionar 
el dinero y los foros junto con las presidencias de turno de la Ue: 
Sin embargo, con el nuevo sistema, habrá una fuerza permanente 
de personal de Estados miembros y del Consejo que los represen-
ta. 
El Mundo 14.03.2008 María Ra-
mírez 
"Todos los problemas no se van a solucionar esta noche, pero 
esto ya es un paso". 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? [Sarkozy] "Todos lo habíamos soñado, ahora la Unión por el 
Mediterráneo es una realidad" 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? Con todo, el presidente francés celebró la creación de la Unión 
como un éxito, a la vez que rechazó críticas sobre la falta de 
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definición en la cuestión del financiamiento del nuevo bloque, 
uno de los aspectos de la UPM que todavía necesita concreción. 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? En cualquier caso, el gobierno español se ha mostrado hoy "muy 
satisfecho" con el éxito que, a su juicio, ha tenido la reunión de 
Paris para el Mediterráneo, al considerar que da un "impulso 
histórico" al Proceso de Barcelona. 
El Mundo 13.07.2008 ? "Para España se han alcanzado todos los objetivos", insistó Mo-
ratinos quien resaltó que el Gobierno está "muy satisfecho del 
éxito de París porque el éxito de París es el de Barcelona" y del 
proceso que España quiere que se convierta en una auténtica 
'Unión por el Mediterráneo'. 
El Mundo 04.11.2008 Europa 
Press 
El acuerdo incluye a Barcelona como ciudad para albergar la 
sede permanente del proyecto euromediterráneo y deberá ser 
discutido formalmente por los ministros de Exeriores en la ma-
ñana de este martes. 
El Mundo 04.11.2008 Javier Oms Barcelona ha logrado(…): convertirse en abanderado permanente 
de las relaciones euromediterráneas. 
El Mundo 04.11.2008 Javier Oms Ahora Barcelona, pese a todos los golpes recibidos, ha logrado 
redimirse - con el impulso de Francia - al obtener un éxito de 
mayor peso simbólico que efectivo en la realidad. 
El Mundo 04.11.2008 EFE La adjudicación de la sede de la Unión por el Mediterráneo 
(UpM) no irá acompañada de la visita de el presidente del Go-
bierno, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, a Barcelona. 
El PAÍS 08.03.1995 Sami Naïr Esta diferencia, que se acentuará en los próximos años, es espe-
cialmente alarmante porque los países del Norte invierten cada 
vez menos en el Sur. 
El PAÍS 13.06.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-Folch 
España exigía, por boca del ministro Javier Solana, que se ratifi-
case el principio de "equilibrio" entre el Este y el Sur aprobado 
en Essen. 
El PAÍS 01.07.1995 Ignacio 
Cembrero 
Numerosos países terceros han solicitado estar presentes al me-
nos como convidados. En la lista de aspirantes a sentarse en 
segunda fila figuran desde Estados Unidos y Rusia hasta Suráfri-
ca, pasando por Arabia Saudí, Albania y todos los países del Este 
de Europa y los bálticos. 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr De ahí el tercer ajuste, realizado a comienzos de 1995. Ahora se 
habla de un nuevo impulso, esta vez  decisivo, de la Unión Euro-
pea al refuerzo de la política mediterránea. 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr En primer lugar, la idea de espacio euromediterráneo es extrema-
damente borrosa y ambigua: no afirma nada en cuanto al conte-
nido y la naturaleza de ese espacio. Al contrario que la estrategia 
de cooperación desplegada para los paises de Europa central y 
del Este, en este caso no se anuncia ningún objetivo de integra-
ción. Tampoco hay ningún concepto sólido de asociación, ningu-
na pro yección concreta de colaboracion.  
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr En segundo lugar, todo parece indicar que la zona de libre co-
mercio que se desea beneficiará sobre todo a Europa. 
El PAÍS 20.09.1995 Sami Naïr Pero el proyecto europeo, tan elocuente en lo relativo a. la aper-
tura de los mercados y la libre circulación de los capitales, se 
muestra curiosamente silencioso en cuanto a la de las personas. 
Bueno, en realidad, no pide a los países del Sur que reacojan a 
los emigrantes clandestinos expulsados de Europa.  
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-Folch 
Por vez primera se juntarán los ministros de Exteriores de los 
Quince que asoman a la ribera norte y de los Doce -de Marruecos 
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a Turquía- que flanquean la cuenca sur. La convocatoria, lanzada 
por iniciativa de la Union Europea (UE), pretende dar fe de una 
voluntad común, organizar ese espacio y desencadenar una di-
námica de inédita asociación multilateral. 
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-Folch 
Descubre ahora Europa el Mediterráneo? Casi. 
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-Folch 
Hasta hace muy poco la UE mantenía unas relaciones bilaterales 
con casi todos los países ribereños, sin ambicion de estructurar 
una región, pese a que esta política se llamaba global: (...) 
El PAÍS 20.11.1995 Xavier 
Vidal-Folch 
Pero los nuevos conceptos -abandonar la cooperacion clásica 
para pasar a una verdadera asociación, primar lo multilateral 
sobre lo bilateral- no empezaron a tomar cuerpo hasta "que Espa-
ña retoma la idea  y propone una asociación euromagrebí", desta-
ca Bichara Jader, profesor en Lovaina y apóstol del mediterra-
nismo. 
El PAÍS 23.11.1995 Sami Naïr A partir de esta estrategia de estabilización -crucial para Europa-, 
debe plantearse la relación entre ayuda económica y desarrollo de 
Estados de derecho en la orilla sur. 
El PAÍS 27.11.1995 Predrag 
Matvejevic 
[Pedrag Matvejevic] Me ha quejado tantas vezes de que la Unión 
Europea se hiciera sin el Mediterráneo!: Europa sin la cuna de 
Europa. 




España quiere reforzar un eje meridional Madrid-Roma que 
compense el protagonismo que Sarkozy, con el que Zapatero se 
reunirá en París el 10 de enero, tiende a asumir en el Mediterrá-
neo. Además, desea que Italia se comprometa con el Proceso de 
Barcelona, la iniciativa española de diálogo entre las dos orillas 
del Mediterráneo, frente a la Unión Mediterránea que con simila-
res fines promueve Sarkozy. 
El PAÍS 11.01.2008 (…), una alternativa al Proceso de Barcelona "sería negativa para España y para 
la Unión en su conjunto". 
El PAÍS 05.03.2008 J. M. Martí 
Font 
El ambicioso proyecto de la Unión Mediterránea del presidente 
frances Nicolas Sarkozy sigue deshinchándose. 
El PAÍS 05.03.2008 J. M. Martí 
Font 
En cualquier caso, las diferencias entre Sarkozy y Merkel no sólo 
se centran en el proyecto de Unión Mediterránea, aunque éste 
haya sido una piedra de toque muy simbólica. 
El PAÍS 13.03.2008 Andreu 
Missé/R. M. 
de Rituerto 
El gran plan inicial de Sarkozy -que soñaba con crear una "unión 
política, económica y cultural" entre ambas orillas mediterráneas 
cerrada a los demás socios comunitarios- ha quedado reducido a 
la mínima expresión en una tarea de zapa ejecutada por la Ale-
mania de Angela Merkel con el apoyo de todos los demás. 
El PAÍS 14.03.2008 R. M. de 
Rituerto/A. 
Missé 
Los líderes desactivaron los planes del presidente fancés Nicolas 
Sarkozy de la Unión por el Mediterráneo que había despertado 
temores de desestabilización. 
El PAÍS 14.03.2008 R. M. de 
Rituerto/A. 
Missé 
Mientras algunos, como España, confían en "dar un salto cualita-
tivo que refuerce el proceso", otros dudan de la conveniencia de 
crear nuevas estructuras que dupliquen las ya existentes, como es 
el caso de la propia presidencia eslovena, y otros temen que des-
estabilice el marco de relaciones entre los vecinos(...) 
El PAÍS 14.03.2008 R. M. de 
Rituerto/A. 
Missé 
El drástico recorte del ambicioso plan inicial de Nicolas Sarkozy, 
rebautizado ahora como Unión para el Mediterráneo, hizo que la 
canciller germana, Angela Merkel, hablara ayer de que el proceso 
"será elevado de nivel, pero se tratará esencialmente del mismo 
instrumento", (...) 
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El PAÍS 15.03.2008 ? Pero dicho esto, lo que hay que augurar es que se llame como se 
llame la iniciativa funcione mejor, porque va en provecho de 
todos la cooperación en asuntos tan serios como la migración o 
las amenazas del terrorismo islamista. 
El PAÍS 10.05.2008 Jaques 
Barrot 
Con este ánimo, fiel a la visión de Jean Monnet, he presentado un 
proyecto de mandato para una comunidad de los transportes entre 
la Unión Europea y los países de los Balcanes occidentales. Es 
con este ánimo que la Comisión Europea podría estudiar la viabi-
lidad de un proyecto similar ampliado a todo el Mediterráneo. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Dicho proyecto era el resultado de la voluntad, en principio fran-
cesa, pero más tarde asumida de manera conjunta por la UE, (…) 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr La iniciativa francesa respondía también a la preocupación de 
que el Mediterráneo pasara a un segundo plano, en un momento 
en el que la UE se enfrentaba a los desafíos que conlleva su am-
pliación hacia el este. Más aún, Francia -al igual que España e 
Italia- era consciente de que había llegado el momento de pasar a 
una fase superior an las relaciones euromediterráneas, después de 
la creación de un espacio común de intercambios y de la conclu-
sión de acuerdos de asociación con todos los países de la región 
de la ribera sur (salvo Libia y Siria). 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr Infraestructuras ya existentes, disponibilidad del magnífico Pala-
cio de Pedralbes, asunción de los gastos de instalación y mante-
nimiento por las autoridades locales, capacidad comercial y eco-
nómica en el campo de las relaciones entre las dos riberas, expe-
riencia en los contactos euro-árabes, banco de datos para las 
redes de cooperación en el Mediterráneo, etc. Es dificil encontrar, 
en el Mediterráneo, un lugar dotado de tanto atributos a la vez. 
En segundo lugar , por coherencia política de la UE. 
El PAÍS 16.10.2008 Sami Naïr (…) la elección de Barcelona se presenta como un asunto de 
coherencia estratégica, puesto que implica la continuidad del 
proyecto de 1995 y su renovación al mismo tiempo. 
El PAÍS 13.11.2008 ? Recordó que España siempre ha concebido el Mediterráneo como 
"una de las máximas prioridades de su política exterior" y ha 
logrado la "ambiciosa" implicación de la Unión Europea. 
El PAÍS 11.06.1995 Manuel 
Bustos 
[José Borrell] "El mar Mediterráneo está herido, pero todavía 




SWITZERLAND – EXPRESSION 





28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Das Interesse der Arabischen Welt wird, neben der Präsenz 
der jeweiligen Mittelmeeranrainerstaaten, durch die Teil-
nahme von Vertretern der arabischen Liga und der Magh-
reb-Union dokumentiert. Aus dem Mittelmeerraum sind 
lediglich Lybien, Albanien, und die angrenenden Länder 
Ex-Jugoslaviens nicht vertreten. 
"Neue 
Zürcher 
28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Aber der neue israelische Aussenminister Barak nutzte die 










28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. 
(rg) 





28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
Die arabischen Länder sind mit weniger Vorbehalten zur 
Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona aufgebrochen als einen 





28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
Die Araber erhoffen sich von Engagements der Europäer 
ein Gegengewicht zur Dominanz der USA. Lybien wurde 





28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
Damaskus musste sich am Rande der Konferenz von Am-
man vorwerfen lassen, sein Boykott dieser Wirtschaftsver-
anstaltung sein unverständlich, zumal es in Barcelona am 
gleichen Tisch wie die Israeli nicht nur ökonomische, son-





28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
Die etwas papierene syrische Rechtfertigung ist, dass die 
Konferenz in Barcelona im Gegensatz zu derjenigen in 
Amman nicht im Rahmen der multilateralen Friedensver-
handlungen stehe, welche die frühzeitige Normalisierung 





28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
Arabische Diplomaten betonen, dass sie in der Mittelmeer-






28.11.1995 vk Victor Ko-
cher 
[Ausschluß Libyen] Der Revolutionsführer Ghadhafi versi-
cherte einem Radioreporter, er hätte ohnehin nicht teilge-
nommen, weil in Barcelona erneut der dominante Norden 






08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige 
Autoren 
Die arabischen Staaten sind offenbar noch nicht bereit, sich 






14.03.2008 win. Doch es hätte auch Sarkozy auffallen müssen, dass das 
Interesse der Mittelmeeranrainer an den milliardenschweren 
Angeboten der EU über die Jahre erlahmte. 
NZZ onli-
ne 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Nur Libyen war nicht vertreten und hat auf diese Weise 




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Syrien fand sich sogar bereit, die Aufnahme diplomatischer 
Beziehungen mit Libanon ins Auge zu fassen. 
NZZ onli-
ne 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Diese Staaten sind wirtschaftlich schwach und noch dazu 
untereinander nicht nur mit Israel, sondern auch sonst zer-
stritten: Algerien mit Marokko, Syrien mit Libanon und 









28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Während die Leitlinien für die wirtschaftliche Koopera-
tion unbestritten sind, sorgen politische Formulierungen 
zum Terrorismus und zum Nahost-Friedensprozess so-





29.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) [Das Ziel einer Stabilitätszone] Letztere Idee -eine fran-
zösische Anregung, die schon einmal mit Blick auf Ost-
europa lanciert worden war -sorgte indessen für einige 






01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (Agnelli sagte), die geplante Freihandelszone biete gros-
se Möglichkeiten, doch bestünden Risikofaktoren, die 
nicht nur verhindern könnten, dass man an diesem Ziel 
anlange, sondern sogar das bisher Erreichte gefährdeten. 
Er nannte den Nahost-Konflikt und die Spannungen, 




01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (Ein Diskussionsteilnehmer aus Tunesien beklagte), dass 
in Europa die Immigration im selben Licht gesehen 
werde wie der (pseudo)religiös motivierte Terrorismus 
oder der Drogenhandel. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (es)wurde auch gesagt, die Vorstellung sei falsch, jeder 
Nordafrikaner oder jeder Türke wolle nichts anderes als 





01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (Ein französischer Sozialwissenschaftler) Die Integration 
von Ausländern in Europa sei im Grunde nicht wegen 
der Differenzen, sondern wegen der Ähnlichkeiten 
schwierig. Letztere befähigen die Ausländer dazu, zu 
den Einheimischen in Konkurrenz zu treten, etwa am 





01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (Die marokkanische Soziologin Fatima Mernissi) Euro-
pa sei der Harem-Mentalität verfallen, weswegen es sich 
abschotte. Die Araber seien universeller in ihrer Welt-
sicht, da sie in Ländern lebten, wo der Staat schwach sei. 
Deshalb sähen sie den Mittelmeerraum als eine Einheit. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (Agnelli) (…)die Länder am Süd- und am Ostufer des 
Mittelmeeres müssten begreifen, dass Europa eine un-





01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. Dieser Süden hat sich nun -übers Mittelmeer- weiter 
nach Süden verschoben; der Norden allerdings auch, 
wenn auch weniger weit, sind doch Italien und Spanien 





08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige 
Autoren 
Die syrische und die libanesische Delegation erhoben 
bei allen Massnahmen Einspruch, die zu militärischen 
Kontakten oder sicherheitspolitischer Zusammenarbeit 




28.06.2000 iwe (…)von arabischer Enttäuschung und von Asymmetrien 




28.06.2000 iwe Die Ziele seien am Anfang zu hoch gesteckt, die wirt-
schaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Asymmetrien 
unterschätzt worden, konstatierte Roberto Aliboni, der 
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28.06.2000 iwe Das verbreitete Argument, mit der Partnerschaft könne 
es nur vorangehen, wenn der arabisch-israelische Frie-





28.06.2000 iwe Andere Teilnehmer befürchteten, dass Einmischungen 
dieser Art nicht nur bei den Regierungen, sondern auch 
bei der Bevölkerung auf Widerstand stossen würden; 





28.06.2000 iwe (Mustafa Hamarneh) (…)mokierte sich über in der EU 
kursierende Vorstellungen, mittels politischer Einfluss-
nahme könnten die undemokratischen Regime Jorda-
niens und Syriens zu Fall gebracht werden wie einst die 





28.06.2000 iwe Mit einer EU-Mitgliedschaft Bosniens, so der Syrien 
Experte Volker Perthes von der Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, würde ein seit Jahrhunderten in Europa 
beheimateter und tief verwurzelter Islam zur EU gehö-
ren. Dieser könnte dazu beitragen, Brücken zu den Mus-
limen im südlichen Mittelmeerraum zu bauen und die 






17.11.2000 Christian Müller Diesmal stand indes das Treffen nicht wegen europäi-
scher Bedenken, sondern wegen der neuen nahöstlichen 
Gewalteruption und zudem wegen zweifelhafter Koope-






07.11.2001 Raul Lautenschütz Dass der "Barcelona-Prozess" ungeachtet der nach jeder 
Euromed-Konferenz offiziell beschworenen Fortschritte 
in der Praxis so harzig verläuft, liegt sicher an den hüben 
und drüben schwerfälligen bürokratischen Strukturen, 
am gegenseitigen Misstrauen und, wie das gescheiterte 
Fischereiabkommen zwischen der EU und Marokko 






24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia Der spanische Aussenminister Pique erklärte ihm, dass 
legitime Kritik an der Politik der Regierung Sharon nicht 
mit Antisemitismus verwechselt werden dürfe. Peres 
äusserte sich an einer Pressekonferenz anschliessend 
sehr hart über europäische "Stimmen", die Verständnis 
für den palästinensischen Terrorismus äussern, und über 






24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia Der Nahostkonflikt und bürokratische Hindernisse we-
gen zu vieler und unausgereifter Projekte haben greifba-
re Fortschritte verhindert. Der soziale Graben zwischen 





24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia Aznar lobte, dass erstmals die Terrorismusbekämpfung 
in einem solchen Abkommen ausdrücklich erwähnt 
worden sei. Die Verpflichtung auf Einhaltung der Men-
schenrechte war schon immer erwähnt, aber von der EU 
bisher gegenüber ihren Partnern nie mit Nachdruck ein-
gefordert worden. Bouteflika rechtfertigte dagegen die 
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palästinensischen Selbstmordattentate als legitime Wi-
derstandsakte, was im offenen Gegensatz zur Verurtei-






14.03.2008 win. Da wäre man auf heikle Probleme gestossen, etwa dar-
auf, dass einige der Angesprochenen sich untereinander 
im Kriegszustand befinden, während andere zwar vor 
diesem letzten Schritt zurückschreckten, zu ihren Nach-






21.05.2008 win. In erster Linie der Nahost-Konflikt und alte Rivalitäten 
zwischen den Maghreb-Staaten erwiesen sich als un-
überwindbare Hindernisse für das Formulieren einer 
echten, multilateralen Mittelmeerpolitik. 
NZZ onli-
ne 
14. Jul 08 (ap) Zwischenfälle blieben aus. Als der französische Schau-
spieler Kad Merad einen Auszug aus der Erklärung der 
Menschenrechte vorlas, zeigte der autoritäre syrische 




(CH) Expression – Mediterranean region 
NZZ Nr. 
277 




01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. "Das Mittelmeer ist zu klein, um klar zu trennen, aber zu 
gross, um zusammenzuschweissen." Dies sagt der paläs-
tinensische Akademiker Bihara Khader,(..) 
 
 
(CH) Expression – Mediterranean Policy 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Eine gemeinsame Erklärung, die die Basis für eine neue 





28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) [BP] Sie verkörpert im Urteil der Teilnehmerstaaten den 
formellen Beginn einer neuen Kooperation zwischen der 
Europäischen Union und den Mittelmeernrainerstaaten 
sowie den palestinänsischen Autonomiegebieten. 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Die angestrebte Partnerschaft wird (…) als vielverspre-
chende Neuorientierung der EU-Aussenpolitik gewertet. 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. (rg) Zwar drängen die Mittelmeerpartner auf deutlich substa-
niellere Marktöffnungen, sind aber mir solchen Forderun-
gen in Barcelona auf Granit gestossen.  
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. (rg) Vor diesem Hintergrund wird das in der Deklaration von 





29.11.1995 rt Manfred Rist Die Mittelmeerkonferenz, die (ausserhalb der UNO) erst-
mals 27 Partner des euro-arabischen Raums am Verhand-
lungstisch zusammengeführt hat, ist am Dienstag mit etli-
cher Verzögerung aber dennoch viel Applaus für den gast-





01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (…)der euro-mediterranen Konferenz,(…), an der ohne viel 
politischen Druck über die Beziehungen diskutiert wird, 






08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige 
Autoren 
Die beabsichtigte Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit zwi-
schen allen Ländern des Mittelmeerraumes kommt seit der 
weitgehenden Lähmung des israelischen-palästinensischen 
Friedensprozesses nicht mehr voran. 
NZZ Nr. 
155 
08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige 
Autoren 
Die Verschärfung der Nahostkrise führte aber die Konfe-
renz und den gesamten Barcelona-Prozess gefährlich nahe 
an ein apruptes Ende. 
NZZNr. 
155 
08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige 
Autoren 
Die Zukunft der Partnerschaft zwischen der EU und dem 
Mittelmeerraum ist ungewiss. 
NZZ Nr. 
126 
04.06.1998 ap Associated 
Press 
(…)Bestrebungen waren wegen der Probleme bei den Frie-





28.06.2000 iwe (…)euro-mediterranen Partnerschaft ein neues Kapitel in 
der ökonomischen, sicherheitspolitischen und sozialen 




28.06.2000 iwe Das Kernproblem der Partnerschaft ortete George Joffe von 
der London School of Economics bei den unterschiedlichen 
Erwartungen der Partner. 
NZZ Nr. 
269 
17.11.2000 Christian Müller Während Syrien und Libanon das Treffen boykottierten, 
wertete die französische Diplomatie das Erscheinen der 





17.11.2000 Christian Müller Fünf Jahre nach der Konferenz von Barcelona 
(…)ist(…)nur noch wenig von den einstmals grossen Eu-





17.11.2000 Christian Müller Ein neuer Elan welche der Euromed-Idee mit dem Ziel 
einer in einem Jahrzehnt zu schaffenden Freihandelszone 
hätte verliehen werden sollen, war unter diesen Umständen 





17.11.2000 Christian Müller (F) Aussenminister Vidrine mass der europäisch-
mediterranen Zusammenarbeit eine Bedeutung zu, die ihre 
Fortführung unumgänglich mache, unabhängig von den 
neuen Gefahren für den Nahost-Friedensprozess. 
NZZ Nr. 
259 
07.11.2001 Raul Lautenschütz Dieser Dialog warf aber noch keine Dividenden ab. 
NZZ Nr. 
259 
07.11.2001 Raul Lautenschütz Kaum voran kommt hingegen die Integration der Mittel-
meeranrainer unter sich. 
NZZ Nr. 
259 
07.11.2001 Raul Lautenschütz Die EU und Algerien haben am Mittwoch in Brüssel ein 
bilaterales Assoziationsabkommen paraphiert. 
NZZ Nr. 
63 
16.03.2002 Ht. Die EU-Finanzminister haben sich in der Nacht zum Freitag 
in einer Sondersitzung in Barcelona nach stundenlangem 





24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia In Valencia hat am Montag und Dienstag die fünfte Euro-
med-Konferenz zwischen der europäischen Union und 
zwölf Mittelmeerstaaten angesichts arabischer und israeli-
sche Proteste vergeblich versucht, Minimallösungen für den 






24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia Der Spanische Aussenminister Pique hätte gerne bereits in 
Valencia konkrete Lösungen angekündigt, aber die Konfe-






28.11.2005 pgp. Die Bilanz der bisherigen Zusammenarbeit ist bescheiden. 
Erste Integrationsschritte haben die wirtschaftlichen und 





28.11.2005 pgp. Divergierende nationale Interessen, die mangelhafte Infra-
struktur der Region und politische Spannungen standen 





27.02.2008 Ch. M. Wie verhält sich der Vorschlag einer Mittelmeer-Union 





14.03.2008 (ap) Am Freitag werde "förmlich die Entscheidung zur Um-
wandlung des Barcelona Prozesses in der Mittelmeer-Union 






14.03.2008 win. Dieser Plan, den Sarkozy zusammen mit der deutschen 
Bundeskanzlerin Merkel der versammelten Runde vorstell-





14.03.2008 win. Der neueste deutsch-französische Kompromissvorschlag zu 
dieser Union wurde in stark geraffter Form vor einigen 
Tagen den 27 Hauptstädten zugestellt, auf dass sich die 
Staats- und Regierungschefs auf die Debatte während des 





14.03.2008 win. (…)es nur noch darum gehe, eine vor 13 Jahren in Barcelo-
na beschlossene Strategie der EU zum Einbezug der Mit-
telmeeranrainer -im EU-Jargon "Barcelona-





14.03.2008 win. Dazu wird ein Sekretariat mit 20 Mitarbeitern eingerichtet, 
dem eine wohl nicht sehr effiziente, aber "politisch korrek-










20.05.2008 (dpa) Sarkozy hat zu einem Gipfeltreffen am 13. Juli nach Paris 
eingeladen, bei dem die Staats- und Regierungsschefs der 
EU und der Mittelmeerländer gemeinsam dem 1995 ge-










21.05.2008 win. Das ganze Projekt soll laut der Aussenkommissarin Ferre-
ro-Waldner den bereits bestehenden Rahmen für die Zu-
sammenarbeit der EU mit den Mittelmeer-Anrainern neu 
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21.05.2008 win. Ferrero-Waldner gab indirekt zu, dass die bald 13 Jahre 
dauernde Erfahrung mit diesem Barcelona-Prozess die 
Erwartungen nicht erfüllen konnte. 
NZZ 
online 
14. Jul 08 (ap) (Merkel) Die Mittelmeer-Union sei "sehr gut gestartet", 
bescheinigte Kanzlerin Merkel am Sonntag -nachdem sie zu 
Beginn die schärfste Kritikerin des Projektes war. 
NZZ 
online 
14. Jul 08 (ap) (Steinmeier) Ob die Union eine neue Plattform werde, kön-
ne er noch nicht sagen. 
NZZ 
online 
04. Nov (sda/dpa) Die Diplomaten hätten sich ausserdem geeinigt, das Wort 
Barcelona-Prozess aus dem Namen zu streichen und nur 
von der Union für das Mittelmeer zusprechen. 
NZZ 
online 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Der auch sonst gelungene Auftakt zur Errichtung der Mit-
telmeerunion hat die politische Phantasie beflügelt. Ihre 
Struktur beginnt sich aber erst allmählich abzuzeichnen. 
NZZ 
online 




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen In einem Klub sind Stil und Konvention wichtiger als für 




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen In der lockeren Form eines "Club Med" könnte daher sogar 
eine besondere Chance liegen. Wenn man sie ernsthaft 
nutzen will, sollte man sich allerdings auf höchster Ebene 




SWITZERLAND – PURPOSE 
(CH) Purpose - purpose 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) In nahezu allen Grußadressen (…) kam zum Ausdruck, dass 
ohne eine friedliche Partnerschaft rund ums Mittelmeer in 





28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. (rg) [EU] Ziel und Zweck der engeren ökonomischen Bande 
besteht aus EU-Sicht darin, im südlichen und östlichen 
Mittelmeerraum den Wohlstand zu mehren und damit dort 
letztlich eine Zone politischer Stabilität und regionaler 





29.11.1995 rt Manfred Rist Das dritte Element des kooperativen Geistes, der in Barce-
lona geherrscht hat, schlägt sich in einem umfangreichen 
Katalog von Absichtserklärungen nieder, der letztlich das 
Zusammenführen der Völker bezweckt, ausdrücklich aber 
Traditionen und nationale Eigenheiten respektiert. 
NZZ  Nr. 
126 
04.06.1998 ap Associated 
Press 
(Palermo) Das informelle Treffen soll dem sogenannten 
Barcelona-Prozess neuen Auftrieb geben. 
NZZ Nr. 
269 
17.11.2000 Christian Müller [F] Frankreich, das zurzeit den EU-Ratsvorsitz innehat, 
hatte ursprünglich beträchtliche Ambitionen für dieses am 
Donnerstag zu Ende gegangene Treffen entwickelt. 





Sachwalterrolle zugunsten der Mittelmeeranrainer zu profi-
lieren. Deutschland bemüht sich zumindest um in die glei-
che Richtung weisende Lippenbekenntnisse, während 
Grossbritannien und die skandinavischen Mitgliedstaaten 
der EU nach französischer Ansicht es weiterhin in hohem 
Masse an Enthusiasmus für die Kooperation mit den Mit-
telmeerstaaten fehlen lassen. 
NZZ Nr. 
94 
24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia (…)"Bacelona-Prozess" genannte Euromed-Initiative sollte 
den Mittelmeerraum dank europäischer Wirtschaftshilfe 
und einem Dialog der Kulturen zu einer Zone des Friedens 





28.11.2005 pgp. Weitgehend ein Traum blieb die engere wirtschaftliche 
Verbindung der südlichen Mittelmeerländer untereinander 
mit Ausnahme des 2004 in Agadir geschlossenen Freihan-






04.08.2007 eg.  [F] Frankreich möchte die im Jahr 1995 mit der Konferenz 
in Barcelona begonnene EU-Mittelmeerpolitik intensivie-
ren, über die vor kurzem selbst Bundeskanzlerin Merkel 





14.03.2008 win. (…)ruft er zu mehr Anstrengung bei der Früherkennung, 
Verhütung und Schlichtung von Konflikten auf, aber auch 
zur Stärkung der zivilen und militärischen Mittel zur Ab-
wehr unerwünschter Folgen des Klimawandels. Dazu gehö-















28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. 
(rg) 
(…)zwischen der EU und den elf südlichen Mittelmeerlän-
dern, zuzüglich der palestinänsischen Autonomiegebiete, bis 
zum Jahr 2010 eine Freihandelszone zu schaffen, sowie die 
Verpflichtung der EU, den Partnerstaaten milliardenhohe 





29.11.1995 Manfred Rist(rt) Das eigentliche Ziel der Konferenz, die vorbehaltlose Eini-
gung aller Teilnehmerstaaten auf die Barcelona-Deklaration, 
ein Dokument mit weltreichenden Absichtserklärungen für 
eine neue Ära der Zusammenarbeit, ist aber erreicht worden. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. Die Absicht besteht darin, das Geflecht von Kontakten, Struk-
turen und Organisationen zu stärken, welche die Triebkräfte 
gesellschaftlicher Modernisierung sind. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (…)eine engere Nachbarschaft der Länder im Süden unterein-
ander, gleichsam auf horizontaler Ebene, zu fördern. 
NZZ Nr. 
148 




14.03.2008 Win. (…)mit dem Projekt des französischen Präsidenten Sarkozy 
für eine Mittelmeer-Union, die eine stärkere Zuwendung der 
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EU zu ihren südlichen Nachbarn ermöglichte. 
NZZ 
online 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Mees-
sen 
Der von der EU 1995 initiierte Barcelona-Prozess muss über 
ein einseitig verordnetes und bürokratisch gesteuertes Hilfs-




05.11.2008 Karl M. Mees-
sen 
Die Struktur sollte den Aufgaben entsprechen.  
 
 
SWITZERLAND – IDENTITY 





05.07.1995 BA Beat 
Ammann 
Er wolle in den nächsten Monaten dabei mitwirken, dass die EU 
dereinst zu einer "echten politischen Grösse" ausgebaut werden 
könne, die politisch auf der Höhe ihrer wirtschaftlichen Macht 








Die relative Stärke der EU im Mittelmeerraum fusst eindeutig in 





14.03.2008 win. Natürlich stützt sich der Einfluss der EU auf die "sanfte Gewalt" 
des Geldes, im Gegensatz etwa zur militärischen Macht. 
NZZ 
online 




14. Jul 08 (ap) Der französische Staatschef nutzt das Vakuum, das durch die 
amerikanische Präsidentschaftswahl entsteht, geschickt aus, um 




05.11.2008 Karl M. 
Meessen 
Allen Ungeschicklichkeiten, ja groben Missgriffen zum Trotz 




(CH) Identity - EU 
NZZ Nr. 
153 
05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann Ein besonderes Anliegen Spaniens stellt die Außenpolitik 
der EU im Mittelmeerraum dar. 
NZZ Nr. 
153 
05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann Madrid will seinen Partnern zu verstehen geben, dass 
Europa nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch im Süden eine 
heikle Grenze hat. 
NZZ Nr. 
153 
05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann (Solana) (…)es gehe darum, der Union klarzumachen, 
dass sie heikle Grenzen nicht nur im Osten, sondern auch 
im Süden habe. 
NZZ Nr. 
153 
05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann Die im November in Barcelona vorgesehene Konferenz 
(…) stellt einen Kernpunkt der spanischen Politik 
(…)dar. 
NZZ Nr. 05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann Wegen seiner geographischen Lage hat Spanien ein of-
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153 fensichtliches Interesse daran(…) 
NZZ Nr. 
153 
05.07.1995 BA Beat Ammann Der Anspruch Madrids, zu den führenden Ländern der 
EU zu zählen, ist unzweideutig. 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. (rg) Die von der EU angestrebte sogenannte Neue Mittel-
meerpolitik ist zu einem guten Teil die Reaktion der EU 
auf ihre Öffnung gegenüber Ost- und Mitteleuropa. 
NZZ Nr. 
277 
28.11.1995 Gemperle, R. (rg) Es dürfen mit anderen Worten -abgesehen von den wirt-
schaftlichen Interessen- eher sicherheits- als entwick-
lungspolitische Motive für die ambitiöser gewordene EU-
Mittelmeerpolitik maßgebend gewesen sein. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. (…),dass Europa -zumindest demographisch- gleichsam 
auf dem absteigenden Ast sei, weswegen der alte Konti-
nent auf Einwanderer angewiesen sei. 
NZZ Nr. 
280 
01.12.1995 BA Ammann, B. Die Euro-mediterrane Konferenz der Minister war aus 
europäischer Sicht Teil einer Abwehrstrategie. 
NZZ Nr. 
155 
08.07.1997 AA Auswärtige Au-
toren 
Es gibt gegenwärtig noch keine wirkliche gemeinsame 
Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU, und die Union ist 
nach wie vor unfähig, akute Krisen zu meistern. 
NZZ Nr. 
148 
28.06.2000 iwe Von europäischem Desinteresse war die Rede(…) 
NZZ Nr. 
148 
28.06.2000 iwe (…)die EU habe aus sicherheitspolitischen und strategi-
schen Interessen gehandelt. Ihr sei es darum gegangen 
der Migration einen Riegel zu schieben und der amerika-
nischen Dominanz im Nahen Osten etwas entgegenzuset-
zen. Zudem habe man im Auge des nach Osten wandern-
den europäischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Inte-
resses die südlichen Nachbarn besänftigen wollen. 
NZZ Nr. 
94 
24.04.2002 Mr. Valencia [Konferenz] Nach Ansicht der europäischen Union ist es 




04.08.2007 eg.  Was die Politik der EU gegenüber ihren Nachbarn im 
Osten und im Süden angeht, setzen Deutschland und 
Frankreich inzwischen recht unterschiedliche Prioritäten. 
NZZ Nr. 
178 
04.08.2007 eg.  Zugleich verfolgt Berlin aber seine "neue Ostpolitik". 
NZZ Nr. 
48 
27.02.2008 Ch. M. Zwischen Paris und Berlin herrscht ein Malaise(…) 
NZZ Nr. 
48 
27.02.2008 Ch. M. Sichtbarster Stein des Anstosses zwischen Paris und 




27.02.2008 Ch. M. Von dem Projekt, das mittlerweile nun auch Union für 
das Mittelmeer genannt wird, sind die Deutschen alles 
andere als angetan, da sie eine tendenzielle Spaltung der 
EU befürchten und zudem den Verdacht hegen, Sarkozy 
wolle sich vor allem ein Instrument zur Durchsetzung des 
französischen Führungsanspruchs in Europa schaffen. 
NZZ Nr. 
48 
27.02.2008 Ch. M. Ungeachtet dessen hält Frankreich an der Absicht fest, 
unter seiner EU-Präsidentschaft am 13. Juli eine grosse 
Runde mit Mittelmeeranrainern in Paris zu veranstalten 
und am Tage darauf, dem französischen Nationalfeiertag, 
den versammelten Gipfelreigen aller EU-Mitgliedstaaten 







27.02.2008 Ch. M. Eine solche Mittelmeerpolitik dürfe auf keinen Fall zu 
einer zu Recht von Frankreichs Partnern abgelehnten 
Verwässerung der EU in einem schemenhaften neuen 
Gebilde führen, ermahnte Balladur. 
NZZ Nr. 
62 
14.03.2008 win. Im Hintergrund stand sicher auch die Sorge, Paris wolle 
sich in der Mittelmeer-Union mit EU-Geldern eine neue 
Bühne zimmern, auf der es dann die unbestrittene Haupt-
rolle spielen könnte. 
NZZ Nr. 
62 
14.03.2008 win. Doch die Grundfrage, warum denn der "Barcelona-





14.03.2008 win. Statt über Wege nachzudenken, wie neue Milliarden 
südwerts über das Meer geworfen werden könnten, müss-




21.05.2008 win. Das Prestigeprojekt des französischen Präsidenten Sarko-
zy für eine Union der EU und der Mittelmeer-Anrainer ist 






21.05.2008 win. Im Vergleich zu den hochfliegenden Plänen des französi-
schen Präsidenten Sarkozy, der die Idee dazu im letzten 
Dezember während eines Besuchs in Algerien lanciert 
hatte, steht der Kommissionsvorschlag nun fest auf dem 
Boden der Realität, nach einer recht unsanften Landung. 
NZZ 
online 
14. Jul 08 (ap) Frankreichs Präsident Sarkozy hat den Nationalfeiertag in 
einen diplomatischen Coup verwandelt. 
NZZ 
online 
14. Jul 08 (ap) Bei aller zur Schau gestellten Fröhlichkeit ging eine 
wichtige politische Botschaft aus. 
NZZ 
online 
14. Jul 08 (ap) "Ich wünsche das Frankreich die EU-Politik im Nahen 
Osten leitet, weil es die Region geographisch, kuturell 
und politisch gut kennt." 
NZZ 
online 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Europa pflegt bestenfalls kurzatmig zu reagieren, anstatt 
langfristig vorausschauend zu agieren. Dabei ist es höchs-




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Der Rückgriff auf mitgliedstaatliche Aussenpolitik läuft 
jedoch den Bemühungen der europäischen Union, in der 




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Um keine Hindernisse in den Weg zu einer gemeinsamen 
Aussenpolitik zu legen, wurde im Frühjahr vereinbart, die 
geplante "Union des Mittelmeeres" in "Union für das 
Mittelmeer" umzubenennen und an ihr auch die nicht an 
das Mittelmeer angrenzenden Mitgliedstaaten der Euro-
päischen Union zu beteiligen. 
NZZ 
online 
05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen Der ohnehin fernliegenden Vorstellung institutioneller 
Gleichrangigkeit mit der Europäischen Union wurde 
zusätzlich dadurch entgegengewirkt, dass auch noch das -
wenig wirksame- Vorläuferprogramm in die Projektbe-
zeichnung aufgenommen wurde. Die Schlusserklärung 
von Paris verwendete daher das Wortungetüm "Barcelo-
na-Prozess: Union für das Mittelmeer". Dies lässt offen, 
ob es sich um eine internationale Organisation oder wie 




05.11.2008 Karl M. Meessen (Dilemma Sarkozy): Durch Erzwingung der Annahme 
des Lissabonner Vertrags würde er die Mitgliedstaaten 
ihrer massgeblichen Kompetenzen zur Verwirklichung 
seiner Idee einer hauptsächlich von Frankreich und ande-




14. Jul 08 (ap) "Fordern reicht nicht", lautet Sarkozys Motto. "Wer den 
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SOURCES WHICH THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IS BASED ON: 
1. EU Documents  
EUROPEAN COUNCIL  
COM(94)427 endg. Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parla-
ment. Stärkung der Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Union: Ent-
wicklung einer Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer 
19.10.1994 
COM(95)72 final Communication from the Commission, Strenghtening the Mediterra-
nean Policy of the European Union:Proposals for implementing a 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
08.03.1995 
COM(97)68 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Progress report on the Euro-Mediterranean Partner-





Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parla-
ment zur Vorbereitung der vierten Europa-Mittelmeert-Tagung der 
Außenminister: "Intensivierung des Barcelona-Prozesses" 
06.09.2000 
SEC(2002)159 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, to prepare the meeting of Euro-Mediterranean 
Foreign Ministers Valencia, 22-23 April, 2002 
13.02.2002 
 Commission services working document to prepare the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-
Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Crete 26-27 May 2003 
COM(2003)294 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pan Parliament. Reinvogorating EU actions on Human Rights and 
democratisation with Mediterranean Partners. Strategic guideline 
21.05.2003 
COM(2003)104 final Communication from the Commission to the Councila and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Frame-




Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, on the development of a Euro-Mediterranean trans-
port network 
24.06.2003 
COM(2003)610 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliamanet, to prepare the VI Meeting of Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Naples, 2-3 December 2003 (Barcelona 
VI) 
15.10.2003 
COM(2005)139 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Tenth Anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership: A work programme to meet the challenges of the next 
five years 
12.04.2005 
COM(2006)475 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament. Establishing an Environment Strategy for the Me-
diterranean 
05.09.2006 
COM(2006)592 final Communication from the Commission to the Council. Assessment of 
the Facilty for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
(FEMIP) and Future Options 
17.10.2006 
COM(2006)620 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament, on the preparation of the Tampere Euro-
Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference (27-28 No-
vember 2006). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Time to deliver 
25.10.2006 
COM(2007)598 final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Eur-
pean Parliament, on the preparation of the Lisbon Euro-
17.10.2007 
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Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Conference (5-6 November 2007). 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Advancing Regional Coopera-
tion to support peace, progress and inter-cultural dialogue 
COM(2008)319 
(Final) 
Communication from the Commissio to the European Parliament 
and the Council. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean 
20.05.2008 
 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL  
27./28.11.1995 Barcelona Barcelona declaration 
15./16.4.1997 Malta Conclusions of the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Confer-
ence 
3./4.6.1998 Palermo Euromed ad hoc ministerial meeting 
15./16.4.1999 Stuttgard Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
15./16.11.2000 Marseilles Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
5./6.10.2001 Brussels Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
22./23.4.2002 Valencia Fifth Euro-Mediterreanean Conference of Foreign Ministers 
26/27.5.2003 Crete The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers 
2./3.12.2003 Naples Sixth Euro-Med Ministerial Conference: reinforcing and bringing the 
Partnership forward 
5./6.5.2004 Dublin Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs 
29/30.11.2004 The Hague Presidency conclusions for the Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
30/31.5.2005 Luxembourg Conclusions for the VIIth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs 
27/28.11.2006 Tampere 8th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
5./6.11.2007 Lisbon Agreed Conclusion of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Minis-
ters of Foreign Affairs 
13.07.2008 Paris Joint declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean 
3./4.11.2008 Marseille Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial confe-





EUROPEAN COMMISSION   
15.-17.11.1997 Euromed-seminars Pier Paolo 
Merolla 
Status of Euro- Med sectorial policy discussions 
(Industry and Energy) 




The European Union's Mediterranean Policy 
22.-26.04.1999 Euromed-seminars Jacques 
Giraudon 
Coopération décentralisée et société civile en Mé-
diterranée 





Joint debate on common strategy for the Mediter-
ranean and reinvigorating the Barcelona process 
18.06.2001 Rabat Rt Hon 
Chris 















Europe and the Mediterranean: time for action 
23.02.2005 Strasbourg Benita 
Ferreo- 
Waldner 






The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Euro- 
Mediterranean partnership 
07.04.2005 Brussels, Arab Interna-





Ten years after the Barcelona Process: Empower-
ing Women as a Catalyst for Economic Develop-
ment 





El proceso de Barcelona: Un puente sobre el Medi-
terráneo 
25.11.2005 Barcelona, European 





Euromed and the Media 
03.02.2006 Warsaw, The "Club of 
Three" Conference on 
the Frontiers of Europe 
Danuta 
Hübner 
The borders of Europe 






Euro-Mediterranean Policy / Preparation of APEM 
07.04.2006 Wien, Konferenz euro-





Islam in Europa: Vom Dialog zum Handeln 
02.06.2006 Hamburg, The German 
World Bank Forum 
"Middle East & Ger-





The EU, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A 
Partnership for Reform 
06.06.2006 Brussels, 10th Euro-
Mediterranean Eco-
nomic Transition Con-
ference, "Giving the 
Neighbours a stake in 





The European Neighbourhood Policy: bringing our 
neighbours closer 







Shared Challenges, shared futures: Taking the 
neighbourhood policy forward 





Address to Euromed Ministerial Plenary Session 
03.04.2008 Fez (Morocco), Euro-
Med Ministerial Confe-
rence on Tourism 
Joe Borg EU initiatives on tourism in the mediterranean 
region 




the current agenda 
 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL   
3./4.06.1998 Palermo  Robin Cook Concluding statement 
13.11.1998 Malta Herbert Kröll Perspectives of the Euro-med Partnership of the 
Barcelona Process 
19.-22.11.1999 Malta Lisa Valjento Status of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and 
Priorities of the Finnish Presidency 
02.07.2003 Strasbourg Silvio Berlusconi Speech to the European Parliament 
31.05.2005 Luxembourg Jean Asselborn  
June 2005 Spain José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapate-
ro 
Entrevista "Afka/ideas", El Mediterráneo propicia el 
acercamento entre los pueblos 
28.11.2005 Spain José Luis Rodrí-
guez Zapatero, 
Tony Blair 
Articulo de Zapatero y Blair en El Pais, Una cumbre 
para el futuro 
28.11.2005 Spain Tony Blair Chairman's statement 10th anniversary euro-
mediterranean summit 
22.05.2006 Vienna Hans Winkler Racism, Xenophobia and the Media: Towards re-
spect and understanding of all religions 
16.03.2007 Berlin Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier 
 
27-30.2007 Malta Renate Schimko-
reit 
 
04.10.2007 Portugal José Magalhães Migrantes, Expressão do Pilar Humano do Processo 
de Barcelona 
23.10.2007 Tangiers Nicolas Sarkozy State visit to Morocco 
30.04.2008 Tunis Nicolas Sarkozy Speech before the students of the National Institute 
of Applied Sciences and Technology 
16.06.2008 Malta Anita Pipan Opening remarks at the Euro-Mediterranean Seminar 
"Ensuring Respect for Human Rights While Coun-





3. Newspaper Articles 
EL PAIS   
08.03.1995 Por el codesarollo en el Mediterraneo Samí Nair 
11.06.1995 La Cumbre del Mediterraneo llama a detener la degradación de 
este mar 
Manuel Bustos 
13.06.1995 España y Francia logram con reserva las ayudas de la UE al Medi-
terraneo 
Xavier Vidal-Folch 
01.07.1995 La UE ofrece cooperación al Mediterraneo a cambio de reformas 
y estabilidad 
Ignacio Cembrero 
20.09.1995 Europa y el Mediterráneo Samí Nair 
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20.11.1995 Cuando Europa descubrió el Mediterráneo Xavier Vidal-Folch 
23.11.1995 Paisaje Mediterráneo Samí Nair 
23.11.1995 El desafió mediterráneo Manuel Vincent 
27.11.1995 Vientos y espuma Predrag Matvejevic 
27.11.1995 El Mediterráneo es un solo mar y tres religiones Juan Altable 
28.11.1995 Barcelona servirá para denominar el proceso de integración entre 
las orillas del Mediterráneo 
X.V.-F/ I.C. 
07.05.1996 París recibe calurosamente a Hassan II Octavi Martí 
16.04.1997 Acuerdos económicos bajo el fuego cruzado S.G.-D. 
17.04.1997 La II Conferencia Mediterránea termina sin declaración final S.G.-D. 
21.11.1999 La Conferencia Mediterránea pide fondos para proteger el litoral EFE 
05.12.1999 Una mirada para el Mediterráneo no author quoted 
02.05.2003 El Rey apadrina en Lisboa la nueva Cotec Europea Margarida Pinto 
05.12.2007 Zapatero busca con Prodi compensar la influencia de Sarkozy Peru Egurbide 
11.01.2008 Duran advierte de los riesgos de la política mediterránea de Sar-
kozy 
Andreu Missé 
02.03.2008 Crisis de pareja (Editorial) 
05.03.2008 Sarkozy cede a la presión alemana sobre la Unión Mediterránea J.M Martí Font 
13.03.2008 La Unión Mediterránea contará con una copresidencia que durará 
dos años 
A. Missé/ R.M de Ri-
tuerto 
14.03.2008 La UE teme que su política ambiental ahuyente la industria R.M de Rituerto/ A. 
Missé 
15.03.2008 No es cuestión de título (Editorial) 
27.03.2008 Frodo enamorado Lluís Bassets 
10.05.2008 Acciónes para el Mediterráneo Jaques Barrot 
06.07.2008 La UE de Sarkozy Editorial 
16.10.2008 Barcelona, capital euromediterránea Samí Nair 
04.11.2008 Barcelona será sede de la Unión para el Mediteráneo Ricardo M. de Rituerto 
05.11.2008 Europa se abraza al Mediterráneo Joan Foguet 
07.11.2008 Barcelona-Med Editorial 
13.11.2008 El príncipe Felipe asegura que Barcelona "revitalizará" la coope-
ración mediterránea 
Editorial 
EL MUNDO   
03.04.2000 El continente más pobre no logrará en El Cairo que la UE aumen-
te su ayuda 
Marisa Cruz 
03.04.2000 Romano Prodi se entrevista con Gadafi para establecer relaciónes 
con Libia 
EFE 
04.04.2000 Gadafi pide a Aznar la cooperación y confianza que no ha existido 
en el pasado 
EFE 
04.04.2000 Gadafi sorprende a la UE con un discurso contra Occidente EFE 
29.05.2000 Mubarak y Aznar analizarán el proceso de paz en Priente Medio EFE 
06.11.2001 La Conferencia Mediterránea se abre en un ambiente de tensión EFE 
22.04.2002 El Líbano boicotea la Conferencia Euromediterránea en protesta 
por la participación de Israel 
EFE 
01.06.2002 La Unión Europea cooperará con los países del Mediterráneo en 
materia de Educación 
EFE 




02.10.2004 Moratinos pide que la Unión Europea no olvide el área del Medi-
terráneo 
Europa Press 
25.11.2005 Algunas pistas ante la Cumbre Euromediterránea Silvia Taules 
25.11.2005 Los presidentes de Parlamentos Euromediterráneos se reúnen en 
Barcelona en la víspera de la Cumbre 
EFE 
25.11.2005 Barcelona ultima los preparativos para la Cumbre Agencias 
25.11.2005 Merkel acudirá el próximo domingo a la Cumbre de Barcelona, su 
primera reunión mulitlateral 
EFE 
27.11.2005 La Cumbre Euromediterránea arranca hoy en Barcelona con diffi-
cultades para alcanzar acuerdos 
EFE 
29.11.2005 La Alianza Euromediterránea no ha reducido la pobreza en los 
países del sur del Mediterráneo 
Elmundo.es 
29.11.2005 La Cumbre Euromediterránea no logra consenso total pero sí un 
código de conducta antiterrorista 
Agencias 
13.03.2008 Sarkozy y Merkel liquidan el Proceso de Barcelona y venden hoy 
su Unión Mediterránea 
María Ramírez 
14.03.2008 Nicolas Sarkozy consigue sacar adelante 'su Unión Mediterránea' 
con el apoyo de Merkel 
María Ramírez 
13.07.2008 Sarkozy: 'Todos lo habíamos soñado, ahora la Unión por el Medi-
terráneo es una realidad' 
Editorial 
04.11.2008 Barcelona, cerca de convertirse en el puente entre todos los países 
del Mediteráneo 
Editorial 
04.11.2008 La gran victoria simbólica de Barcelona Javier Oms 
LA REPUBLICCA  
23.05.1995 L'Italia si muove Dino Frescobaldi 
10.11.1996 I parlamenti d'Europa aprono alla Libia Alessandra Ziniti 
29.11.1995 Pace, disarmo, commerci intesa sul Mediterraneo Mario Tedeschini Lalli 
31.01.1998 Ma il Mediterraneo non è un 'buco nero' Franco Cassano 
05.02.1998 Italia, un 'ponte' nel Mediterraneo Rocco Antonio Cange-
losi 
29.07.1998 Clandestini caso europeo Paolo Garimberti 
19.10.1999 Emergenza acqua l'incubo del 2000 Salvatore Tropea 
02.09.2003 La Banca Mediterranea diventa società finanziaria Guiseppe Salmè 
05.12.2003 L'Europa, il mondo arabo e il ruolo del Mediterraneo Khaled Fouad Allam 
16.01.2004 Ciampi: I benefici dell' euro sono gli occhi di tutti Patrizia Capua 
24.01.2004 Poniamo il Mare Nostrum al centro dell' Unione europea Gianni Pittella 
03.02.2004 Puglia crocevia di scambi una sfida tutta da vincere Enzo Lavara 
28.04.2004 Da Lockerbie a Bruxelles la lunga marcia del Colonnello Andrea Bonanni 
04.03.2004 Nato e Ue per il Medio Oriente Frattini appoggia il piano Bush Franco Papitto 
19.11.2004 E la prima sfida per il neoministro sará ricucire il rapporto con gli 
arabi 
Vincenzo Nigro 
27.11.2005 Barcellona, il vertice delle diserzioni Alessandro Oppes 
28.11.2005 La Ue avvicini öle sponde del Mediterraneo/ L' europa e i migran-
ti 
Tony Blair e Jose Zapa-
tero 
28.11.2005 Euromed, il vertice si divide sulla definzione di terrorismo Alessandro Oppes 
29.11.2005 Il vuoto europeo Andrea Bonanni 
29.11.2005 Euromed condanna il terrorismo ma tace sul diritto di 'resistenza' Alessandro Oppes 
10.04.2006 Formazione per la logistica sul Mediterraneo red. 
17.06.2006 Mediterraneo, la carta di Prodi per rafforzare la cooperazione dal nostro inviato 
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20.02.2007 L'Europa e il ruolo del Mediterraneo Romano Prodi e Jose 
Zapatero 
10.12.2007 La cordiale discordia tra Merkel e Sarkozy Bernardo Valli 
26.02.2008 Francia-Germania, il grande freddo Giampiero Martinotti 
CORRIERE DELLA SERA  
29.09.1995 "Investite sulla riva Sud" Stefanelli Barbara 
09.11.1995 Roma proponde: allargare l'Europa verso il Mediterraneo Corriere della Sera 
22.11.1995 100 citta'unite per difendere l'equilibrio Mediterraneo Pullara Guiseppe 
27.11.1995 Vertice tra due Mediterranei Botti Ettore 
28.11.1995 Gli immigranti dividono il Mediterraneo Botti Ettore 
29.11.1995 L'Europa si allunga nel Mediterraneo Vignolo Mino 
15.05.1996 Abete: Europa Stai attenta sfide del Mediterraneo Corriere della Sera 
19.01.1997 E il Professore fa pace con Aznar Taino Danilo 
05.06.1998 Al vertice del Mediterraneo una "Carta per la Pace" cerca di rilan-
ciare il dialogo 
Vignolo Mino 
02.03.1999 Impresse, si' a Osservatorio euromediterraneo Corriere della Sera 
10.05.1999 E'l' Africa del Nord il nuovo che emerge Zallio Franco 
19.06.1999 Il prossimo passo e'il patto di stabilita' per il Mediterraneo Jean Carlo 
18.10.1999 Torino, leader mediorientali a convegno su risorse idriche Corriere della Sera 
31.01.2000 Mediterraneo alla riscossa Zallio Franco 
09.01.2002 Aznar e Prodi, fiducia nell'europeismo dell'Italia Caizzi Ivo 
09.05.2003 Per lo sviluppo e la cooperazione Corriere della Sera 
30.05.2003 "Dialoghi tra due sponde del Mediterraneo" Corriere della Sera 
14.06.2003 "Mediterraneo, un patto di sviluppo" Querze' Rita 
08.02.2004 Si studia il clima mediterraneo Foresta Martin Franco 
10.04.2004 "Un patto strategico fra Nato e Sud del Mediterraneo" Allam Magdi 
25.06.2004 Ciampi: "Serve un impegno convinto dell'Onu sul terreno" Breda Marzio 
02.07.2004 Ermolli: il nostro futuro è nel Mediterraneo Panza Pierluigi 
05.07.2005 Ermolli: sul rilancio nel Mediterraneo L'Italia può battere Francia 
e Spagna 
Radice Giancarlo 
12.07.2005 City del Mediterraneo: Milano rilancia la sfide Radice Giancarlo 
12.07.2005 Milano e il Mediterraneo "Contro il terrorismo integrazione e 
sviluppo" 
Querze' Rita 
19.01.2006 E se ci rituffassimo nel Mediterraneo? Taino Danilo 
19.02.2006 Venti da sud nel Mediterraneo Carioti Antonio 
14.07.2006 Convegno sull'economia mediterranea Corriere della Sera 
16.07.2006 "Milano ponte dell'Europa sui Paesi dem Mediterraneo" Jacchia Antonia 
18.07.2006 Scambi, Milano capitale nell' area mediterranea Jacchia Antonia 
19.07.2006 Un premio per chi aiuta il dialogo Corriere della Sera 
30.03.2007 E per i Paesi Mediterraneo l'Italia diventa il primo partner Jacchia Antonia 
07.07.2007 Ermolli: Mediterraneo, l'italia sfidi la Francia Jacchia Antonia 
17.07.2007 "A Milano gli stati generali del Mediterraneo" Querze' Rita 
17.07.2007 E Prodi rilancia la banca del Mediterraneo Stringa Giovanni 
21.12.2007 Unione Mediterranea, atto primo Fregonara Gianni 
09.06.2008 Ha ragione Sarkozy facciamo un "Club Med" Ferrero Waldnder Beni-
ta 
DIE PRESSE   
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27.11.1995 Amtosphäre in Barcelona Andreas Schwarz 
27.11.1995 Ehrgeiziges Programm des Mittelmeer-Anrainer tau 
28.11.1995 Barcelona-Konferenz streitet über Terror Andreas Schwarz 
29.11.1995 Europa und das Mittelmeer: Fortschritte trotz einiger Differenzen Peter Krotky 
24.09.1998 Österreich forciert Mittelmeer-Projekt Doris Kraus 
12.06.2002 EU-Parlament für gemeinsamen Kampf mit Maghreb-Staaten 
gegen illegale Migration 
smo 
15.03.2002 Gipfel Themen diepresse 
17.03.2004 Der vergessene Schlafraum Anneliese Rohrer 
22.07.2004 Das Eurobarometer Dr. Harald Fiegl 
29.11.2005 Gipfel: Kluft zwischen EU & arabischer Welt Ralph Schulze 
17.02.2006 Karikaturen Gipfel: Dialog der Kulturen Thomas Seifert 
01.03.2008 Die bösen Souffleure des Präsidenten Rudolf Balmer 
04.03.2008 Angela und Nicolas versuchen es nocheinmal Thomas Vieregge 
13.03.2008 Barroso unterstützt Sarkozys "Mittelmeer-Union" APA 
14.03.2008 EU: Einigung über Mittelmeerunion und Klimaschutz diepresse 
15.03.2008 Mittelmeer-Union: Die Show des Monsieur Sarkozy Regina Pöll 
21.05.2008 Mittelmeer-Union: EU plant Großprojekte Regina Pöll 
30.06.2008 Am EU-Tisch hartes Brot für Monsieur Sarkozy Paul Schulmeister 
11.07.2008 EU-Vorsitz: Treffen der zerstrittenen Mittelmeer-Familie Rudolf Balmer 
14.07.2008 Internationale Pressestimmen APA 
14.07.2008 Mittelmeer-Union: Turbulenzen im "Club Med" diepresse 
14.07.2008 "Club Med" für ungleiche Partner Rudolf Balmer 
SALZBURGER NACHRICHTEN  
24.06.1995 Europas Süden konkurriert mit dem Osten Linde Hermann 
28.11.1995 Mittelmeer soll Zone des Friedens sein EU stärkt Kooperation mit 
Nordafrika und Nahost 
Redaktion 
29.11.1995 Einer Flüchtlingswelle vorbeugen Redaktion 
05.04.1997 Dicke Luft im Maghreb Nordafrika braucht dringend die Hilfe 
Europas 
Barbara Egger 
17.04.1997 Ein kleiner Prestige-Erfolg für die EU Roman Arens 
05.09.1998 Schüssel: "Partnerschaft für Europa" spu,hkk 
28.11.2005 Brücken übers Mittelmeer Ralph Schulze 
29.11.2005 Am Mittelmeer herrscht Missmut und Misstrauen Dieter Ebeling 
22.12.2007 Südeuropäer werben für eine Mittelmeerunion Ralph Schulze 
14.03.2008 Mittelmeerunion ist noch nicht auf Kurs gs 
26.05.2008 Eine Mittelmeerunion mit Vetorecht Gerald Stoiber 
12.07.2008 Frankreich blickt nach Nordafrika Dorothea Hahn 
14.07.2008 Herausforderungen für die Mittelmeerunion  Dorothea Hahn 
15.07.2008 Erste Worte des Friedens, dann Parade Dorothea Hahn 
13.07.2008 Gipfel mit Nebenwirkungen Dorothea Hahn 
DER STANDARD  
19.06.1995 Gefahrenherd Mittelmeerraum Josef Manola 
27.11.1995 "Ein Helsinki-Prozeß für den Süden" Erhard Stackl 
28.11.1995 Statt Kreuzzügen ein Dialog der Kulturen Erhard Stackl 
29.11.1995 Die Kunst des Kompromisses Erhard Stackl 
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29.11.1995 Der Barcelona-Prozeß Erhard Stackl 
18.10.1999 "EU braucht Zuwanderung" Samuel Adams 
22.04.2002 Nahostkrise beherrscht Euromed- Treffen Jörg Wojahn 
22.04.2002 Ideengeber am Mittelmeer Jörg Wojahn 
28.02.2002 EU-Pläne für eine neue Mittelmeerbank Jörg Wojahn 
29.11.2005 Euromed-Gipfel, und keiner geht hin Reiner Wandler 
24.10.2007 Sarkozy wirbt für Mittelmeer-Union Frankreichs Staatschef lan-
ciert neue Idee 
Redaktion 
11.03.2008 Österreich ist gegen die "Mittelmeer-Union" Sarkozys Plassnik: 
Bestehende EU-Instrumente nutzen 
Michael Moavec 
14.03.2008 Sturm im Meeres-Glas Sarkozys Union mit Anrainerstaaten stößt 
auf Zustimmung und Skepsis 
as, pra 
21.05.2008 Afrika-Autobahn und Mittelmeer-Rettung Michael Moavec 
30.06.2008 Mittelmeer-Union lässt Sarkzy zittern Mimo 
12./13.7.2008 Sarkozy eröffnet seinen "Club Med" Stefan Brändle 
11.07.2008 Ferrero-Waldner: "Neue politische Impulse für die Region" Redaktion 
13.07.2008 Arabaische Liga erhält Beobachterstatur APA 
13.07.2008 Zapatero für Barcelona als Sekretariats-Sitz APA 
14.07.2008 Schöen Worte im "Club Med" Stefan Brändle 
14.07.2008 Pressestimmen Redaktion 
14.07.2008 Mittelmeerunion von 43 Staaten aus der Taufe gehoben Stefan Brändle, Micha-
el Moravec 
NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG  
05.07.1995 Spaniens Präferenzen an der Spitz der EU Beat Ammann 
28.11.1995 Anlauf zu einer neuen Mittelmeerpolitik der EU Manfred Rist 
28.11.1995 Vor engeren euromediterranen Beziehungen? Gemperle, R 
28.11.1995 Arabische Beiträge zur Mittelmeer-Konferenz Victor Kocher 
29.11.1995 Kooperations-Vorsätze für den Mittelmeerraum Manfred Rist 
01.12.1995 Barcelona als "Zentrum" des Mittelmeers Beat Ammann 
08.07.1997 Der Barcelona- Prozess Auswärtige Autoren 
08.07.1997 Die Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft der Europäischen Union in der Kri-
se 
Auswärtige Autoren 
22.04.1998 Mittelmeer-Forum für die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus Ulrich Meister 
04.06.1998 Beratungen über eine Freihandelszone im Mittelmeer Associated Press 
28.06.2000 Gibt es die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft? iwe 
17.11.2000 Unstern über der Euromed-Konferenz Christian Müller 
07.11.2001 "Euromed" im Schatten des Nahostkonflikts... Raul Lautenschütz 
20.12.2001 Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und Algerien Raul Lautenschütz 
28.02.2002 Die Kommission für eine EU-Mittelmeerbank Höltschi, R 
16.03.2002 Kreditfenster statt Mittelmeerbank Höltschi, R 
24.04.2002 Die EU kündigt weitere Nahostmission an Mr 
28.11.2005 Mässige Bilanz der Mittelmeer-Partnerschaft pgp 
04.08.2007 Deutschaland rügt seine Verbündeten eg 
27.02.2008 Schlechte Stimmung zwischen Paris und Berlin Ch.M 
14.03.2008 Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union gestutzt win 
20.05.2008 Sarkozy nur kurz Präsident der Mittelmeerunion dpa 
21.05.2008 Harte Landung für Sarkozys Mittelmeer-Union win 
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14.07.2008 Frankreich gefällt sich in der Vermittlerrolle ap 
04.11.2008 Barcelona soll Sitz der Mittelmeerunion werden sda/apa 
05.11.2008 Die Mittelmeerunion - mehr Klub als Organisation Karl M. Meessen 
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG  
07.02.1995 Die südlichen Nachbarn der Europäischen Unio sollen wieder 
mehr Beachtung finden 
wha 
21.03.1995 Eine neue Strategie für den Süden Reinhold Brender 
08.06.1995 Der Mittelmeerraum braucht Beistand Wolfram Weimer 
31.07.1995 Mittelmeeranrainer fordern stärkere Südausrichtung der EU wwe 
22.09.1995 González' letzte Arbeit für Europa Walter Haubich 
07.10.1995 Dissens zwischen Spanien und Frankreich wha 
24.10.1995 Spanien will Marokko in EU wie Türkei behandeln wie 
27.10.1995 "Wir wollen eine Freihandelszone rund ums Mittelmeer" wwe 
24.11.1995 An Europas Haustür Michael Stabenow 
24.11.1995 Mittelmeerkonferenz in Barcelona wha 
24.11.1995 Barcelona soll zum Symbol werden wha 
27.11.1995 Eine "euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft" now./wha. 
27.11.1995 Die große Vison- eine Freihandelszone rund um das Mittelmeer Wolfram Weimer 
28.11.1995 Aufruf zu einer gemeinsamen Zukunft aller Mittelmeerländer now 
29.11.1995 Nicht mit Geld allein Redaktion 
29.11.1995 Frieden, Wohlstand und Menschenrechte rund ums Mittelmeer now 
29.11.1995 Erste Schritte nach hohen Erwartungen wha 
08.11.1996 Ein Ideengeber Walter Haubich 
14.04.1997 Von Barcelona nach Malta Michael Stabenow 
17.04.1997 Belastungsprobe für die euro-mediterrane Partnerschaft Michael Stabenow 
19.09.1997 Partnerschaft mit Tücken Michael Stabenow 
21.02.1998 Nichts Neues im Nahen Osten? Prof. Dr. Helmut Hubel 
15.04.1999 Schwierige Nachbarschft Michael Stabenow 
16.04.1999 Ein euro-mediterraner Wirtschaftsraum nützt allen Sven Beh-
rendt,Christian-Peter 
Hanelt 
16.04.1999 Die Partner am Mittelmeer trennen noch immer viele Schranken now 
17.04.1999 Schwierige Annäherungsversuche Hans-Christian Rößler 
17.04.1999 Euro-Mediterrane Charta für Frieden und Stabilität now 
18.11.1999 Neue Chancen am Mittelmeer Günther Nonnenmacher 
17.11.2000 Der "Geist des Dialogs" Bc 
05.11.2001 Chance für den Barcelona-Prozess" Hans-Christian Rößler 
22.04.2002 Verzettelung in Valencia Hans-Christian Rößler 
23.04.2002 Eklat am ersten Tag der Mittelmeer-Konferenz Hans-Christian Rößler 
24.04.2002 Spanisches Prestigeobjekt Walter Haubich 
06.03.2004 Eigene EU-Strategie für Nahost Bc 
05.05.2004 Kommission sagt 1,2 Milliarden Euro zu Bc 
07.05.2004 EU zu Überwachunhe von Waffenstillstand bereit Bc 
01.12.2004 "Es gibt ein Fenster der Möglichkeiten" Bc 
11.01.2005 Kein Trojanisches Pferd Nikolas Busse 
13.04.2005 Stärkung der Demokratie Bc 
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28.11.2005 Besseres zu tun Horst Bacia 
28.11.2005 Neue Impulse für eine langfristige Partnerschaft Javier Solana 
29.11.2005 Verhaltenskodex gegen Terrorismus Horst Bacia 
05.12.2006 Mehr Geld für Europas Nachbarn Bc 
08.02.2007 "Die Zukunft Europas liegt im Süden" Redaktion 
26.10.2007 Gegengift gegen Religionskriege Redaktion 
08.12.2007 Mediterrane Interpretation Michaela Wiegel 
22.12.2007 Gipfel zur Mittelmeer-Union im Juli in Paris Mic 
24.01.2008 "Politik ist nicht Privatleben" Martin Schulz 
04.03.2008 "Ein Projekt aller EU-Mitglieder" Wulf Schmiese 
07.03.2008 Details zur Mittelmeer-Union flf 
13.03.2008 Deutsch-französische Einigkeit Wulf Schmiese 
15.03.2008 Die freundschaftliche Zähmung des Nicolas Sarkozy Nikolas Busse 
23.03.2008 Der Nebel ist weg, aber die Sich bleibt schlecht Eckart Lohse 
02.05.2008 "Ausgleich durch Mittelmeerunion" dpa 
20.05.2008 Zankapfel Nm 
20.05.2008 Vorschlag zur Mittelmeer-Union nbu 
13.06.2008 Das Scheitern programmiert? Redaktion 
DIE WELT   
31.07.2007 Vorschnelle Kritik an Frankreichs Präsident. Mehr Srakozy wa-
gen? 
Thomas Schmid 
08.12.2007 Geplante Mittelmeerunion soll un mit allen EU-Staaten kooperie-
ren. Sarkozy und Merkel: keine zweite EU vorgesehen 
Jochen Hehn 
04.03.2008 Beziehungskrise zwischen Merkel und Sarkozy? Kanzlerin und 
Frankreichs Präsident legen Streit über Mittelmeerunion bei- 
andere Differenzen bleiben 
Mariam Lau 
12.03.2008 Streit um Mittelmeer-Union rechtzeitig vor EU-Gipfel beendet. 
Einigung zur Doppelspitze liegt allen Ländern vor 
Ansgar Graw 
15.03.2008 Streit über Mittelmeerunion hat zwei Sieger. Sarkozy und Merkel 
finden in Brüssel Kompromiss 
Hannelore Crolly, 
Christoph Schiltz 
19.05.2008 EU lässt sich die Mittelmeer-Union 16 Milliarden Euro kosten. 
Regionale Projekte sollen politische und wirtschaftliche Entwick-
lung fördern - Strategie-Papier liegt der WELT vor 
Christoph Schiltz 
09.06.2008 "Auf persönlichem Gebiet läuft nichts" Deutsch-französischer 
Gipfel in Straubing- Sarkozy bereitet französische EU-
Präsidentschaft vor - Dissens über Klimaschutzziele 
Jochen Hehn 
20.07.2008 Sarkozys Außenminister verrät die nächsten Pläne Jochen Hehn 
20.07.2008 "Madame Merkel hat uns eine Blamage erspart" Jochen Hehn 
04.08.2008 Sarkozy, ein Jago Frankreichs Dominique Moisi 
05.08.2008 Mare nostrum Wolf Lepenies 
05.08.2008 Fernand Braudel und die Wege ans Mittelmeer Wolf Lepenies 
03.11.2008 Der französische Feuerwehrmann Günther Nonnenmacher 
DIE SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
03.11.2005 Millionen über das Mittelmeer Rudolph Chimelli 
26.11.2005 Die EU und das Meer Martin Winter 
28.11.2005 Misstrauen am Mittelmeer wtr 
28.11.2005 Ärger um Terror-Bekämpfung Martin Winter 
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24.10.2007 Wunschtraum Mittelmeer-Union chi 
07.12.2007 Bündnis ohne Zukunft Rudolph Chimelli 
23.01.2008 Euer Eurabien Christiane Schlötzer 
24.01.2008 "Nehmen Sie usn mit Humor - und mit Ernst" Stefan Kornelius, 
Jeanne Rubner 
01.02.2008 Ein Meer von Fragen csc 
01.02.2008 Merkel will Mittelmeer-Politik der EU stärken Javier Caceres 
02.02.2008 "Wir werden nicht ohne unsere Partner tun" Jeanne Rubner 
23.02.3008 Umstrittene Mittelmeer-Union Nico Fried 
04.03.2008 Treffen in Zeiten der Irritationen Stefan Braun 
05.03.2008 Henri Guaino Pariser Skeptiker und Erfinder der Mittelmeer-
Union 
Gerd Kröncke 
06.03.2008 Neuer Name für eine alter Politik Stafan Kornelius 
13.03.2008 Sarkozy gibt im Streit um Mittelmeer-Union nach Martin Winter 
29.04.2008 Zu Gast beim geschätzen Partner Rudolph Chimelli 
21.05.2008 Allein in Paris chi 
21.05.2008 Brüssel bremst Sarkozy Martin Winter 
14.03.2008 Die Mittelmeerunion kommt Redaktion 
08.11.2008 Die Kraft der großen Ideed Werner Weidenfeld 
DIE TAGESZEITUNG  
23.03.2007 Nachhaltig träumen. Das erfolgreiche Projekt EU feiert 50. Ge-
burtstag. Damit es noch besser wird, muss die Energiepolitik in 
die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicheheitspolitik integriert werden 
Daniel Cohn-Bendit 
06.08.2007 Europas Abgrund. Mit seinen Initiativen wirbelt Frankreichs Prä-
sident Nicolas Sarkozy die Szenerie auf. Es wäre höchste Zeit, 
mal über eine gesamteuropäische Mittelmeer-Politik nachzuden-
ken 
Zafer Senocak 
19.09.2007 Stimmen der Jugend Kerstin Fritzsche 
05.03.2008 Mist. Deutschland liegt nicht am Mittelmeer. Frankreich und 
Deutschaland sagen beide, sie hätten ihre konträren Ideen zu Sar-
kozys "Mittelmeeunion" durchgesetzt 
Daniela Weingärtner 
05.05.2008 die anderen über das Vorbild Merkel und über gordon brown Redaktion 
20.03.2008 Operettenpolitik. Die EU will sich in einen wirtschaftlich und 
sicherheitstechnisch funktionierenden Kokon einhüllen - und 
scheitert systematisch. Auch Nicolas Sarkozys Mittelmeerunion 
ist falsch 
Daniela Weingärtner 
15.03.2008 Springteufelchen wieder in der Kiste - Merkel hat Sarkozys "Mit-
telmeer-Union" erst mal gestutzt 
Daniela Weingärtner 
13.07.2008 Mittelmeerunion, au travail! Dorothea Hahn 
14.07.2008 Unser Gorilla Bernhard Schmid 
FINANCIAL TIMES DEUTSCHLAND  
01.03.2000 Europa spielt nicht mit den Schulkindern Rainer Koch 
11.09.2000 Alles von Casablanca bis Tel Aviv Sven Behrendt, Christi-
an-Peter Hanelt 
14.11.2000 Brüssel beim Mittelmeer-Gipfel ohne Hoffnung Rainer Koch 
16.11.2000 Libanon und Syrien stellen sich quer Roula Khalaf 
17.11.2000 Araber drängen EU zu neuer Rolle in Nahost Cornelia Knust 
05.11.2001 EU sucht Einigkeit mit arabischer Welt Birgit Jennen 
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28.02.2002 Keine eigene Bank der EU für Mittelmeerländer Rainer Koch 
23.04.2002 EU versucht sich als Vermittler in Nahost Rainer Koch, Judy 
Dempsey 
12.05.2003 Bush bietet Nahost-Region Freihandel an Ewars Alden, Roula 
Khalaf 
26.05.2003 Verunsicherte Mittelmeerländer scheuen Reformen Judy Dempsey 
25.11.2005 Ein neuer Ansatz für die südlichen Sorgenkinder Christian Hanelt 
28.11.2005 EU und Mittelmeerstaaten uneins über Terrorbegriff Karin Finkenzeller 
29.11.2005 Mittelmeergipfel endet auf dem kleinsten Nenner Karin Finkenzeller 
30.07.2007 Koalition kritisiert Alleingänge Sarkozys Peter Ehrlich, Max 
Borowski 
15.02.2008 Hin und her ums Mittelmeer Peter Ehrlich 
05.03.2008 Flüchtiges Einvernehmen Birgit Marschall 
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ABSTRACT 
!
The Barcelona Process – A Result of Postcolonial Politics? 
In contrast to former Mediterranean Policy initiatives the Barcelona Process, launched in 1995, consti-
tutes a coherent Policy with a multilateral dimension. Twenty-six countries signed the declaration of 
Barcelona and agreed on the ambitious goal to guarantee: political stability, an economic partnership 
and reciprocal cultural dialogue. Due to the European enlargement policy since 1995 the members of 
the Barcelona Process today mount up to forty-three countries. Recently the Barcelona Process was 
revitalized by the launch of the Mediterranean Union in July 2008 due to the moderate response on its 
success at the tenth anniversary.  
The novelty character of such diplomatic relations, the apparent predominant position of the European 
Union within the Barcelona process and the region- building aspect through the establishment of a 
new paradigm by denominating the Barcelona Process synonymously “Euro-Mediterranean Partner-
ship” constitute three arguments to legitimate a historical analysis.  The analytical common denomina-
tor of these aspects refer to the colonial past as the mayor European powers which remain decisive 
driving motors in the European Foreign Policy in the Mediterranean were interlaced with the histories 
of the Southern Mediterranean countries across sea.   
The sources are settled in the temporal bracket of the initiation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 and 
its revitalisation with the launch of the Mediterranean Union which cumulated in an anew declaration 
in 2008. The discourse analytical method is applied on three types of sources (European documenta-
tion, speeches and press articles) which correspond to three distinctive levels of analysis: the institu-
tional, political and public level. Within this setting the discourse analysis focuses on three dynamic 
stages of the European political discourse: the establishment (European documentation), the imple-
mentation (speeches) and the perception (press articles). It is to expect that considering the action and 
reaction mechanism of the European discourse gives information about the extent of the European 
dominance and their domination claim in the Mediterranean. 
In this context it is the aim of the present doctoral thesis if the Barcelona Process is a result of post-
colonial politics. By questioning the continuity and discontinuity of colonial remains in the European 
discourse it is to expect that significant results can be deduced regarding the self-understanding of the 






Der Barcelona Prozess – ein Ergebnis postkolonialer Politik? 
 
Der Barcelona Prozess, der 1995 initiiert wurde, verkörpert den ersten kohärenten politischen Ansatz 
der Europäischen Union im Mittelmeerraum. Die gemeinsame Deklaration, mitgetragen von anfäng-
lich siebenundzwanzig Ländern, umfasst folgende ambitionierte Zielesetzungen: politische Stabilität, 
Wirtschaftspartnerschaft und die Förderung des gegenseitigen kulturellen Austauschs.  Mit der Grün-
dung der Union für das Mittelmeer im Juli 2008, wurden die Ziele und der politische Rahmen von 
Barcelona bekräftigt. Dreiundvierzig Länder unterschrieben die gemeinsame Deklaration von Paris 
2008. 
 Der Neuwert diese politischen Initiative, die augenscheinliche Europäische Dominanz und der politi-
schen Definition eines gemeinsamen Raums, wie die synonyme Bezeichnung Euro-Mediterrane Part-
nerschaft suggeriert, stellen drei Argumente dar, die eine historische Untersuchung rechtfertigen. Der 
größte gemeinsame Nenner, analytisch betrachtet, stellt die koloniale Vergangenheit der Europäischen 
Staaten dar, die bis heute maßgebliche Antriebskräfte der bestehenden Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäi-
schen Union sind. 
Mit Hilfe eines diskursanalytischen Ansatzes soll in der vorliegenden Arbeit der Diskurs der Europäi-
schen Union im Zusammenhang der Mittelmeerpolitik seit 1995 untersucht werden. 
Die Quellen, die die Grundlage der empirischen Analyse darstellen, sind in der Zeitspanne von dem 
Gründungsmoment im Jahr 1995 und der Revitalisierung 2008 situiert. Die Diskursanalyse basiert auf 
drei unterschiedlichen Dokumentenarten (EU Dokumente, Reden, Zeitungsartikel), die wiederum drei 
unterschiedliche Analyseebenen repräsentieren: die Etablierung (EU Dokument), Implementierung 
(Reden)  und Rezeption (Zeitungsartikel) des Europäischen Diskurses. Die Berücksichtigung der akti-
ven sowie reaktiven Ebene des Diskurses soll das Ausmaß der angestrebten und wahrgenommenen 
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